DO TAXES ON SODA AND SUGARY DRINKS WORK? SCANNER DATA EVIDENCE FROM BERKELEY AND WASHINGTON STATE

We study two beverage taxes: the SSB tax of 1¢/oz in the city of Berkeley (in effect since 2015) and the temporary 2010 soda tax of 0.166¢/oz in Washington State. Using detailed scanner data, we find that prices in Washington reacted sharply and promptly (often by a larger magnitude than the tax), whereas retail prices in Berkeley reacted marginally (by less than 30% the magnitude of the tax). Further, we find a 5% volume reduction in Washington but fail to detect an effect in Berkeley. We discuss the possible causes for the discrepancy in effectiveness, in particular cross‐border shopping. (JEL H22, L66, I18)     

DO HIGHER TOBACCO TAXES REDUCE ADULT SMOKING? NEW EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF RECENT CIGARETTE TAX INCREASES ON ADULT SMOKING

There is a general consensus among policymakers that raising tobacco taxes reduces cigarette consumption. However, evidence that tobacco taxes reduce adult smoking is relatively sparse. In this paper, we extend the literature in two ways: using data from the Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplements we focus on recent, large tax changes, which provide the best opportunity to empirically observe a response in cigarette consumption, and employ a novel paired difference‐in‐differences technique to estimate the association between tax increases and cigarette consumption. Estimates indicate that, for adults, the association between cigarette taxes and either smoking participation or smoking intensity is negative, small, and not usually statistically significant. Our evidence suggests that increases in cigarette taxes are associated with small decreases in cigarette consumption and that it will take sizable tax increases, on the order of 100%, to decrease smoking by as much as 5%. (JEL I18, I12)     

Taxation,Fiscal Decentralisation and Legitimacy: The Role of Semi‐Autonomous Tax Agencies in Peru

This article analyses the Servicios de Administración Tributaria (SAT), which currently operate in nine Peruvian cities, to show that semi‐autonomous tax agencies can play a significant role in strengthening the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of decentralised tax systems. Its findings indicate that the SAT collect local taxes and non‐tax revenues more effectively than conventional tax administrations, and that, although the SAT model per se does not generate strong incentives for the promotion of efficiency, efficiency may become more important once the SAT are consolidated. Finally, there are hints that the Peruvian SAT contribute to the legitimacy of the tax system thanks to higher levels of transparency and client orientation.     

A note on the existence of progressive tax structures

 This paper studies the possibility of progressive income taxation of heterogeneous populations. While a result due to Moyes and Shorrocks (1994) indicates that there does not exist a universally inequality-reducing tax structure which distinguishes between at least two subpopulations (in the sense of applying a different tax function to each subclass), it is shown here that a minimal refinement of the universality of inequality reduction leads one to a possibility conclusion. Informally stated, we prove the existence of uncountably many differentiated tax structures which are strictly progressive almost everywhere. Received: 14 March 1995/Accepted: 20 April 1996     

Shacking Up or Shelling Out: Income Taxes,Marriage, and Cohabitation

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the income tax penalty associated with marriage contributes to the decision of a couple to live together as a married vs. a cohabiting couple. In this paper, we use household data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to estimate the impact of various factors, including the federal individual income tax, on a couple's decision to marry instead of cohabit. We find that the initial decision to form either a cohabiting or a married union is only marginally affected by the income tax consequences of one form of union vs. another, and other factors play a more important role. However, for those already living together as a cohabiting couple, the decision to make the transition from a cohabiting to a married couple is significantly affected by the tax consequences of such a move. Here, an increase in the income tax at legal marriage, or an increase in the marginal tax rate with marriage, has a statistically significant and negative impact on the probability of transition from cohabitation to legal marriage. However, the magnitude of the tax impact is generally small, and several other variables are more important determinants.     

WHAT MOTIVATES POLITICAL PREFERENCES? SELF‐INTEREST,IDEOLOGY, AND FAIRNESS IN A LABORATORY DEMOCRACY

Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacrifice their own well being to make financial allocations more equal among participants. We test the applicability of this result in an environment that contains some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games, but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general finding is that votes for a redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self‐interest: above‐average earners vote for low tax rates and below‐average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects' preferences for fairness or equality, their self‐reported economic ideology, is not directly related to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because the ideology measure should be correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possess are not strong enough to overcome self‐interest in this context. We do, however, find evidence for a possible indirect effect of ideology on choice behavior in that more conservative subjects tend to be more responsive to their self‐interest than the more liberal subjects. (JEL C90, D63)     

FIRMS AND FLEXIBILITY

The United States and France have very similar labor productivity levels while there are considerable differences between the firm‐size distributions and firm dynamics in the two countries. To reconcile these observations we introduce a joint model of endogenous entrepreneurship and firm‐size dynamics with firing costs, unemployment benefits, entry costs, and a tax wedge between wages and labor costs. We use our model to analyze the role of these rigitidies in explaining firm dynamics and productivity patterns in the United States and France. We find that our model with all rigidities goes a long way in accounting for firm‐size differentials between the United States and France while generating similar labor productivity outcomes. (JEL C78, D21, E24, J6)     

CORPORATE TAX GAMES WITH CROSS‐BORDER EXTERNALITIES FROM PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructure investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for cross‐border infrastructural externalities. Depending on the externality, governments are shown to strategically over‐ or underinvest in infrastructure. We also examine how tax cooperation influences investment in infrastructure and find that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax competition; this is the case when infrastructure is very effective in raising the tax base and generates a large negative cross‐border externality. (JEL F23, H40)     

PARTIAL TAX HARMONIZATION THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION

In this article, we analyze the role of infrastructure coordination in facilitating partial tax harmonization within a coalition of asymmetric jurisdictions. Two main results are obtained. First, productivity asymmetries represent a serious handicap for partial tax harmonization that can be remedied by coordinating nontax instruments when they allow to reduce these asymmetries. Second, infrastructure coordination through the choice of a common investment level is particularly indicated when asymmetries between potential members of a tax coalition are large. The current usage of European Union (EU) structural funds orientated to reduce regional infrastructure deficits is therefore suitable to facilitate tax harmonization within the EU. (JEL H87, H54, H21)     

Work performance and tax compliance in flat and progressive tax systems

Different tax systems, and their impact on work motivation and tax compliance are significant issues in contemporary political and economic debates. The proportional feature of a flat tax system is assumed to lead to higher performance, while the fairness of the redistributive progressive tax system is assumed to result in higher tax compliance. However, empirical findings on the topic are inconclusive. Both work performance and tax compliance under different tax systems were examined in an experiment, with special attention devoted to the effect of a change in tax systems. A flat tax system was supposed to induce greater work performance, whereas a progressive tax system was expected to increase tax compliance based on fairness perceptions, allowing for the opposite effect due to higher complexity. Furthermore, it was assumed that performance and tax payments would be influenced by motives of self-interest. The design included 20 rounds with a real-effort task in each round, determining participants’ experimental income. Participants (N = 191) made decisions about their tax payments from round-to-round in four different experimental conditions: (1) a flat tax system, (2) a progressive tax system, (3) starting with a flat and changing to a progressive, and (4) starting with a progressive and changing to a flat tax system. Results indicate higher work performance in a progressive system. However, a change from a progressive tax system to a flat system led to increased tax compliance.     

THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION,AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross‐country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare. (JEL H3, O4)     

ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S SERVICE AND ENFORCEMENT

Built on the seminal work of Graetz et al. (1986), this study considers a model of tax compliance in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) services as well as audits taxpayers as in the real world. Taxpayers are uncertain about whether their incomes are eligible for deduction/exemption, and may seek advice from the taxpayer service provided by the IRS to mitigate the uncertainty. We show: (1) while the society's preferred quality of taxpayer service is likely to be sufficiently high, the IRS's preferred quality of taxpayer service is only at an intermediate level; and (2) the conflict between the society and the IRS tends to be intensified as the cost of tax audits becomes lower. Evidence in support of our results is addressed. We also extend our model to addressing the issue of corruption in tax administration and to considering a dynamic model. (JEL D82, H26, K42)     

Welfare rankings of income distributions: A rôle for the variance and some insights for tax reform

When generalized Lorenz curves cross, it is not possible to rank the underlying income distributions by the unanimous preference of all additively separable symmetric inequality-averse social welfare functions. But in many cases, unanimous preference results in terms of inequality-aversion are nevertheless available. When generalized Lorenz curves cross once, variance is decisive in determining a robust welfare ranking, and can provide a rationale for choosing equity over efficiency where these two desiderata conflict. Welfare recommendations for certain types of income tax reform are implied, including cases of yield-increasing redistribution.This paper has benefitted considerably from the perceptive comments of an anonymous referee. Valentino Dardanoni gratefully acknowledges financial assistance from the Banco di Sicilia and the Ente Luigi Einaudi of Rome.     

MILITARY SPENDING AND THE GROWTH‐MAXIMIZING ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC CAPITAL: A CROSS‐COUNTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long‐run equilibrium and we derive the growth‐maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth‐maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). Then we proceed with an empirical investigation of the theoretical implication of the model that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long‐run growth rate are non‐linear, following an inverse U‐shaped pattern. Using data of public investment in infrastructure and military capital formation, we derive empirical estimations that confirm the theoretical implications of the model. (JEL E62, H56, O40).     

NONLINEARITIES AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERTEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT

We analyze the sustainability of the government's intertemporal budget constraint and the corresponding fiscal reaction function within a nonlinear error‐correction framework. Our empirical analysis, based on Italy, provides some evidence that the Italian government is meeting its intertemporal budget constraint. Nevertheless, we show that the burden of correcting budgetary disequilibria is entirely carried out by changes in the average tax rate, with a weakly exogenous government spending, possibly determined by the political process. We also document some rigidities of the tax instrument, in terms of downward inflexibility of the average tax rate with respect to its long‐run level. Finally, we provide some evidence in favor of a nonlinear adjustment toward a sustainable long‐run equilibrium, as the average tax rate adjusts faster the further away it gets from the equilibrium. By considering the behavior of taxes across the economic cycle, we also provide some evidence of inflexibility of the tax instrument during bad times. (JEL C32, C51, C52, H20, H50)     

Discrete choice models of labour supply,behavioural microsimulation and the Spanish tax reforms

The aim of the present study is to show the potential of behavioural microsimulation models as powerful tools for the ex ante evaluation of public policies. We analyse the impact of recent Spanish income tax reforms upon efficiency and household and social welfare and study the effects of various (basic-income and vital-minimum) flat tax schemes. The analysis is performed using a microsimulation model in which labour supply is explicitly taken into account. Instead of following the traditional continuous approach (Hausman, Labour supply, Aaron and Pechman (eds.), How Taxes Affect Economic Behaviour, The Brooking Institution, Washington, DC, 1981; Econometrica, 53: 1255–1282, 1985; Taxes and labour supply, Auerbach and Feldstein, (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, vol. 1, 1979), we estimate the direct utility function employing the methodology proposed by Aaberge et al. (Scand. J. Econ., 97: 635–659, 1995) and Van Soest (J. Hum. Resour., 30: 63–88, 1995). We maintain population heterogeneity by applying a social welfare analysis to the complete sample, rather than merely focusing on the active population. The source of our data is a sample of Spanish individuals in the 1995 wave of the EC Household Panel. We find that the redistribution policies considered have only had a minor impact on economic efficiency but, by contrast, have significantly affected social welfare. An erratum to this article can be found at     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS: THE CASE OF THE MELTZER‐RICHARD ECONOMY

In previous studies on the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF), the existing tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal. This note explores another possibility: the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium. Our exploration proceeds in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) political economy of redistributive taxation. An interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the SMCF and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate. (JEL D61, D72, H21)     

Variations on two themes in Durkheim'sDivision du travail: Power,solidarity, and meaning in Division of Labor

This paper explores two themes that had a significant place in Durkheim's Division of Labor:the idea that people's needs and wants vary across epoches and cultures, and the conception of societies as systems. The first leads to a rejection of efficiency as the primary driving force behind advances in the division of labor. Considering power in addition to efficiency, but also the complex conditions of trust and meaning, leads into questions of interdependence and systems analysis.     

THE GREAT OVERESTIMATION: TAX DATA AND INEQUALITY MEASUREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1913–1943

Historical measures of income inequality in the United States must grapple with the challenge of data quality. We examine one such problem affecting the well-known estimates of income inequality produced by Piketty and Saez (2003) using the records of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Prior to 1943, incomes were self-reported. Combined with lax enforcement on the part of the IRS, self-reporting of incomes could provide a misleading portrait of the income distribution. To test the accuracy of IRS records, we compare them to independently tabulated state income tax returns between 1919 and 1945 from states with more comprehensive and rigorously enforced tax collection procedures. State income tax records show lower overall levels of income inequality than IRS records. However, we still find that top income concentrations declined across the period between 1929 and World War II. These findings attest to the sensitivity of distributional estimation to the reporting selectivity and economic quality of underlying tax data, suggesting that the existing IRS-derived series systematically overstates top-income concentration in the interwar period. (JEL H2, N32, D31, E01)     

Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

 A political–economic environment is studied in which two parties, representing different constituencies of citizens, compete over a proportional tax rate to be levied on private endowments, to finance a public good. Although parties know the distribution of citizen traits (preferences and endowments), they are uncertain about the distribution of traits among the citizens who will turn up at the polls. This uncertainty engenders an endogenously derived function π(t ₁, t ₂) giving the probability that any one tax policy t ₁ will defeat another t ₂ in the election. Equilibrium existence theorems are proved, and the nature of equilibrium is compared with the equilibrium that exists when Downsian parties (ones whose objective is to maximize the probability of victory) face uncertainty. Both constituency-representing parties and uncertainty are needed to generate equilibria in which parties propose different policies. Received: 4 April 1995/Accepted: 2 April 1996