Between Darwin and kant: Veblen's theory of causality

The aim of this article is to investigate and define the sources of Veblen's theory of causality. In his perspective, evolutionary explanatory patterns of observed phenomena are based on a causal nexus defined as ‘unteleological and opaque’. Because of the denial of any teleological explanation, Veblen's concept of ‘progress’ appears to be Darwinian, rather than Spencerian, even though there is no doubt on the relevance of Spencer's work in Veblen's intellectual biography. But Veblen's theoretical system seems to have a Kantian matrix too, as already suggested by Vianello (1961), Edgell (2001) and Viano (2003). And we shall try to show the interaction between Darwinian evolutionism and Kant's conception of finalism in Veblen's theory of causality.     

Forgetting the founders*

The inability, or unwillingness, of 20^th‐century sociologists to move beyond the agenda bequeathed by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim is remarkable in view not only of the now outdated presuppositions shared by all three but of the increasing likelihood that the more important influence on the human behavioural sciences in the 21^st century will turn out to be Darwin's. Not only has the coming together of evolutionary theory, population genetics, and molecular biology shown that significantly more of human behaviour can be explained by the theory of natural selection than was previously recognized, but non‐reductionist explanations of cultural and social evolution from within a neo‐Darwinian paradigm can be framed in terms no longer vulnerable to the criticisms previously levelled against the application to sociology of Darwin's original insight about ‘descent with modification’.     

Regrounding Youth Cultural Theory (in Post‐Socialist Youth Cultural Practice)

This article considers how the study of youth cultural practice in Eastern Europe informs theoretical and empirical debate about youth culture. It charts the trajectory of academic writing on East European youth cultures and suggests the region’s state socialist past (which made social inequalities relatively insignificant at a time when, elsewhere, youth cultural studies were dominated by class‐based readings) combined with the explosion of inequality in the post‐socialist period (by which time class‐resistant post‐subcultural theories led anglophone academic discussion), makes it an interesting vantage point from which to reconsider academic paradigms. Drawing on empirical examples of youth cultural practice in (post)‐socialist Eastern Europe, it argues for a perspective that integrates structural and cultural factors shaping young people’s lives. It suggests moving forward western theoretical debates – often stymied in arguments over nomenclature (‘subculture’, ‘postsubculture’, ‘neo‐tribe’) – by shifting the focus of study from ‘form’ (‘subculture’ etc.) to ‘substance’ (concrete cultural practices) and attending to everyday communicative, musical, sporting, educational, informal economy, and territorial practices. Since such practices are embedded in the ‘whole’ rather than ‘subcultural’ lives of young people, this renders visible how cultural practices are enabled and constrained by the same social divisions and inequalities that structure society at large.     

Free agent or ‘conscious automaton’? Contrasting interpretations of the individual in Spencer's writing on social and moral life

Herbert Spencer remains an important and intriguing figure in thinking about political, social and moral matters. At present his writings in relation to idealist thought, social policy, sociology and ethics are undergoing reassessment. This article is concerned with some recent interpretations of Spencer on individuals in social life. It looks in some detail at Spencer's work on psychology and sociology as well as on ethics, seeking to establish how Spencer understood people as social individuals. In particular the neglect of Spencer's denial of freedom of the will is identified as a problem in some recent interpretations. One of his contemporary critics, J.E. Cairnes, charged that Spencer's own theory of social evolution left even Spencer himself the status of only a ‘conscious automaton’. This article, drawing on a range of past and present interpretative discussions of Spencer, seeks to show that Spencerian individuals are psychically and socially so constituted as to be only indirectly responsive to moral suasion, even to that of his own Principles of Ethics as he himself acknowledged. Whilst overtly reconstructionist projects to develop a liberal utilitarianism out of Spencer to enliven political and philosophical debate for today are worthwhile—dead theorists have uses—care needs to be taken that the original context and its concerns with the processes associated with innovation (and decay) in social life are not thereby eclipsed, the more so since in some important respects they have recently received little systematic attention even though the issues have contemporary relevance in sociology.     

Editorial

This paper is primarily concerned with examining how the current re‐emergence of psychosocial theory, mainly emanating from sociology, is useful for informing social work theory. Firstly it considers two extended examples of the limitations and/or contradictions in current theory for social work (that of linguistic determinism and postmodern versions of identity), and suggests how psychosocial theory offers ways forward for understanding and practice. The paper then considers two particular strengths in psychosocial theory: the ability to offer a ‘rich’ conceptualisation of the subject, and the equalising of worker and service user implicit in the theory. A further section looks briefly at the recent application of psychodynamic principles in social work practice, as ‘relationship‐based practice’. It then briefly considers some further implications for research and ‘evidence’ for social work. The paper's final section offers a discussion of two potential limitations in applying psychosocial theory in practice, before concluding that overall psychosocial theory is both productive, useful and appropriate for social work.     

Institutionalizing Scientific Knowledge: The Social and Political Foundation of Empirical Economic Research

Scientific knowledge is an essential component of modern society. Consequently, sociologists are interested in its production process and have conducted a broad variety of studies showing how social patterns influence the definition and the boundaries of scientific knowledge. In this paper, I ask how social factors influence the transformation of a ‘normal’ field of knowledge into a ‘scientific’ one. First, I give a brief overview of the development of the sociology of scientific knowledge exploring different approaches to the social foundations and boundaries of scientific knowledge. Second, I present a case study of the transformation of empirical economic research in the 1920s from a field of knowledge produced by journalists and civil servants into a prestigious scientific domain. I use neo‐institutionalist ideas to show that knowledge needs a socially legitimated organizational frame in order to count as ‘scientific’ and I examine how political needs to ‘manage the economy’ build boundaries around economic knowledge and define it as ‘scientific’ in order to control its production, distribution, and communication.     

Research,policy and funding – academic treadmills and the squeeze on intellectual spaces1

In recent years, there has been a great deal of collective rumination about social scientists' role in society. In the post‐1997 UK context, public policy commitments to ‘evidence‐based policy’ and ‘knowledge transfer’ have further stimulated such reflections. More recently, Michael Burawoy's 2004 address to the American Sociological Association, which called for greater engagement with ‘public sociology’ has reverberated throughout the discipline, motivating a series of debates about the purpose of sociological research. To date, most such contributions have been based on personal experience and anecdotal evidence. In contrast, this paper responds directly to Burawoy's suggestion that we should ‘apply sociology to ourselves,’ in order that we ‘become more conscious of the global forces’ driving our research ( Burawoy 2005 : 285). Drawing on an empirical research project designed to explore of the relationship between health inequalities research and policy in Scotland and England, in the period from 1997 until 2007, this paper discusses data from interviews with academic researchers. The findings suggest that the growing pressure to produce ‘policy relevant’ research is diminishing the capacity of academia to provide a space in which innovative and transformative ideas can be developed, and is instead promoting the construction of institutionalized and vehicular (chameleon‐like) ideas. Such a claim supports Edward Said's (1994 ) insistence that creative, intellectual spaces within the social sciences are increasingly being squeezed. More specifically, the paper argues we ought to pay far greater attention to how the process of seeking research funding shapes academic research and mediates the interplay between research and policy.     

Revisiting 'communities in Britain'

In this article I re‐examine Frankenberg’s Communities in Britain (1966) and his use of a ‘morphological continuum’ within his analysis. This analysis is itself a re‐assessment of some influential community studies conducted within the British Isles. I look at some particular ideas within the more theoretical part of this book, especially the ideas of ‘social redundancy’ and the distinction between ‘complex’ and ‘complicated’. I then consider some themes arising from some more recent studies. These themes include identity, networks and social capital and time and I argue that Frankenberg's analysis can still provide the reader with useful tools to think through the ideas and practices of community.     

Raymond Williams and sociology

The purpose of this article is to recover Williams as a major theoretical inspiration for the social sciences, specifically, as the inaugurator of what might be regarded as a research paradigm, cultural materialism. In the first section, Williams's encounter with the discipline of sociology is traced and distinguished as a critical alternative to the presently ascendant – at least in the USA – neo‐Durkeimian school of ‘cultural sociology’. In the second section, his cultural‐materialist programme is proposed as a powerful analytical framework for the study of culture and society today. In the final section, a key concept of Williams's cultural materialism, mobile privatization, is selected illustratively and proposed as a powerful analytical tool for studying the production and technological mediation of typical modes of communicative sociality in the early twenty‐first century.     

Having the wrong kind of money. A qualitative analysis of new forms of financial, social and moral exclusion in consumerist Scandinavia

Consumerism not only promotes discourses emphasizing individualized consumer choices, but it also introduces new electronic, invisible and symbolic forms of money. The present article analyses social exclusion in contemporary Scandinavian society by focusing on patterns of consumption and the social meaning of money in low‐income households in Denmark and Sweden. Drawing on recent sociological theory on money and budgeting ( Pahl, 1999, 2002 ; Singh, 1997, 1999 ; Zelizer, 1997, 2005 ) and recent critiques of consumption studies ( Edgell, Hetherington and Warde 1996 ; Gronow and Warde, 2001 ; Lodziak, 2002 ), it argues that experiences of social and financial exclusion in consumerist society must be related to the amount of money available within the household, the social position that the household occupies, and the social form that this money takes. Pahl (1999 ) shows that the development of electronic money seems to alter and further constrain access to consumption for the ‘credit poor’ and ‘information poor’. To this ‘technological filter’, a ‘social filter’ may be added, as the results suggest that consumption patterns and the social meaning of money in low‐income families are largely incompatible with prevailing neo‐liberalist ideas of money and consumption in contemporary society.     

Sociological discourse of the relational: the cases of Bourdieu & Latour1

Pierre Bourdieu's approach to sociology has been so widely recognized as being innovative that his innovations can be said to have been academically incorporated to the degree of having‐been‐innovative. On the other hand, the more recent work of Bruno Latour seems to offer a fresh innovative impetus to sociology. Over against Bourdieu's relational sociology, Latour's relationist sociology overcomes the subject‐object dichotomy, and abandons the notions of ‘society’ and ‘the social’. In this contribution, a comparison is made between the ideas of Bourdieu and Latour on the question of what sociology should look like, specifically focusing on their respective ideas on what can be called the relational. A Latourian critique of Bourdieu is provided, as well as a Bourdieusian analysis of Latourian sociology. Rather than ending up with two different ‘paradigms’, an attempt is made on the basis of Foucault's archaeology of discourse to view Bourdieusian and Latourian sociology as distinct positions within a discourse on the relational.     

Back to Hegel? On Gillian Rose's critique of sociological reason

Thirty‐five years ago, Gillian Rose articulated a significant critique of classical sociological reason, emphasizing its relationship to its philosophical forebears. In a series of works, but most significantly in her Hegel contra Sociology, Rose worked to specify the implications of sociology's failure, both in its critical Marxist and its ‘scientific’ forms, to move beyond Kant and to fully come to terms with the thought of Hegel. In this article, I unpack and explain the substance of her criticisms, developing the necessary Hegelian philosophical background on which she founded them. I argue that Rose's attempted recuperation of ‘speculative reason’ for social theory remains little understood, despite its continued relevance to contemporary debates concerning the nature and scope of sociological reason. As an illustration, I employ Rose to critique Chernilo's recent call for a more philosophically sophisticated sociology. From the vantage point of Rose, this particular account of a ‘philosophical sociology’ remains abstract and rooted in the neo‐Kantian contradictions that continue to characterize sociology.     

Natural relations: horses,knowledge, technology1

Maintaining the tensions and divisions between the human and non‐human, nature and culture has been a mainstay of Euro‐American thought. Drawing upon two studies of people's associations with horses, we examine how these divisions are being reworked in the social sciences as well in everyday life. We focus on how different ideas about ‘horses’, ‘horsemanship’ and how knowledge is acquired, accomplishes different social worlds. Specifically, what emerges in these differential discourses is that a paradox is put into play to make a distinction between traditional and contemporary ways of being in relation to nature and the animal; it is the paradox of what we want to refer to as ‘natural technologies’. We suggest that the paradox of ‘natural technologies’ is a proliferating feature of Euro‐American cultural life that troubles old divisions between nature and culture and propose that it indicates less about a politics of nature than a politics of culture. Specifically, we show that the preoccupation with bringing nature, and the non‐human, more into alignment with the human promotes ethics and equality as matters of lifestyle choice to the exclusion of very specific ideas about tradition, hierarchy, evolution and socialization.     

On Learning and Teaching Family Therapy

This paper explores some ideas about the process of learning to be a family therapist. It considers the questions: how does one learn to think like a family therapist? How is family therapy best taught? How is it learned? The author's experiences in learning and teaching are described. It is argued that family therapy differs from other approaches to therapy in some fundamental respects, and that learning to ‘be’ a family therapist is a different kind of task than learning to be a practitioner of other therapeutic approaches. The paper examines some key theoretical constructs, especially the idea of ‘levels’ of thinking, which are seen as central to both the learning and practice of family therapy.     

Are all communities communities in the mind?

Studies of community undertaken over a period of some forty‐five years by the author and his colleagues are re‐considered to show how the significance of ‘communities‐in‐the‐mind’ has been inadequately appreciated. The distinction made by Clifford Geertz between ‘experience‐near’ and ‘experience‐distant’ is used to sharpen up certain assumptions and approaches of community sociologists, including Frankenberg. Some possible explanations for the decline in the perceived importance of comminity studies from the late 1960s are discussed in the context of the growing centrality of social class in sociological analysis in the 1970s and 1980s. Reference is made to recent research on personal communities by Liz Spencer and the author to illustrate how an ellision between ‘experience‐near’ and ‘experience‐distant’ approaches may be achieved. It is concluded that the imputed community‐on‐the‐ground, often based on materialistic assumptions, should not be conceptually privileged over the real community‐in‐the‐mind.     

Beyond normalization and impairment: theorizing subjectivity in learning difficulties – theory and practice

Normalization and social role valorization continue to play a central role in shaping debates and practice relating to learning difficulties. In the context of recent arguments this paper draws on the work of Foucault to deconstruct these theories. Foucault’s work alerts us to a conceptual confusion at their heart which reproduces a common but problematic individual–society dualism. There is an implicit, and problematic, presence in the theories of a pre‐social individual conceived as having essential impairments and who is passive in the face of negative socialization. We propose that Foucault’s ‘ethical’ domain of inquiry, with its concern for how people actively understand themselves and govern their conduct in relation to specific values and a ‘truth’ that they are obliged to recognize in themselves, provides the basis for returning the individual‐as‐subject to theories in an active, critical manner.     

Deconstruction,postmodernism and philosophy of science: Some Epistemo‐critical bearings

Abstract

In the recent critique of ‘Western metaphysics’ by post‐structuralist and postmodern theorists, there has emerged a distinctive line of thought which seeks to apply such critique to the domain of political theory. This paper approaches Hannah Arendt's conceptualisation of the political as a proto‐type of such a theorisation, deploying as it does key elements of the Heideggerian (and more broadly, phenomenological) position so as to rethink the nature of the political. By delineating the specifically ‘post‐metaphysical’ moments of Arendt's theory and its corresponding critique of political modernity, I endeavour to illuminate both the advantages and pitfalls of contemporary efforts at developing a philosophical conception of the political on the basis of a neo‐Heideggerian position.     

Time,Space and Gender: Understanding ‘Problem’ Behaviour in Young Children

The following article reports on a small‐scale, exploratory study of aggressive and ‘problem’ behaviour in pre‐school children. This project was conceived in the wider context of anxieties about childhood and New Labour’s policy focus on ‘anti‐social’ behaviour in children. Based on interviews with nursery staff and parents in addition to participant observation undertaken in nursery playrooms, this article examines the relevance of time, space and gender for understanding problem behaviour in young children. Taking a social constructionist perspective and drawing on Foucault's ideas in particular, it examines the social processes which regulate and normalise behaviour in young children. © 2006 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2006 National Children's Bureau.     

Do ‘his’ education and class matter? The changing effect of the husband on women's labour‐market transitions in Italy and Britain

A new stream of sociological and demographic theory emphasizes individualization as the key process in late modernity. As maintained by Hakim ( 2000 ), women also have increasingly become agents of their own biographies, less influenced by the social class and the family. In this study, I intend to contribute to this debate by analysing how, in Italy and Britain, women's movements between employment and housework are linked to their husband's education and class, and how this link has changed across cohorts. Using discrete‐time event‐history modelling on the BHPS and ILFI, my findings show that in both countries, if the woman's educational and labour‐market profile is controlled for, the husband's occupation and education have lost importance. Yet, although based more on ‘her’ than ‘his’ profile, divisions along ‘classic’ lines are still evident and not context‐free, and they assume different forms in the two countries with distinctive institutional and cultural settings. In ‘liberal’ Britain, women's labour‐market participation responds more to motherhood and class than to education, while in ‘familistic’ Italy education seems more important, which suggests the existence of returns over and above strictly human capital/economic ones.