Does a firm’s exposure to ethical failures matter to financial markets? A governance perspective

This paper investigates if a firm’s ethical reputation, in conjunction with its governance, affects its standing within financial markets. A firm`s ethical reputation, as measured by ethical failures, arises from its involvement in ethical violations and incidents while a comprehensive index proxies for governance. We assess a firm’s standing within financial markets through two complementary perspectives, i.e., the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors, as inferred from analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast error, and the relation between a firm’s earnings and its stock market valuation or return (value relevance). Our results suggest that a firm`s ethical reputation affects financial analysts’ forecasts as well as the stock market value assigned to its reported earnings. Moreover, it appears that corporate governance moderates such relations, with strong (weak) governance compensating for a weak (strong) ethical reputation. Overall, our evidence shows that ethical failures do not seem to pay.     

厂商动态竞争性差别定价和竞争优势实现——基于消费者寻求多样化购买行为的分析

随着信息技术的发展,厂商可以根据消费者的历史购买信息实施差别定价.该文主要研究相互竞争的厂商基于消费者的购买历史实行差别定价的本质特征和形成机制,以及实施这种定价策略能否在竞争中获取竞争优势.分析结果显示,在竞争性差别定价均衡中,消费者寻求多样化购买是厂商实施差别定价的内在原因,厂商在第2期通过给予价格优惠吸引消费者重复购买,对忠诚的消费者给予奖励,并在第1期弱化竞争,导致两期竞争存在"默契合谋",消费者寻求多样化购买成为竞争厂商利润的源泉;如果厂商能够比竞争对手率先实施差别定价的营销策略,那么就能在竞争中获取优势.另外,清晰地刻画了竞争性差别定价均衡存在且唯一的充分条件.该文的研究结果可以很好地解释现实经济中许多厂商的定价竞争策略行为,对于厂商的产品营销战略具有重要的指导意义.     

股票分析师的羊群行为对公司股价同步性的影响分析

股价"同涨同跌"是我国股票市场的一种重要现象。多股集体"暴跌"会给公司和投资者造成严重的损失,因而股价同步性的问题受到监管者和学术界的广泛关注。本文以2010-2017年股票分析师对上市公司做出的预测为主要研究对象,验证了股票分析师的羊群行为与公司股价同步性间的关系,讨论了机构投资者和市场情绪的作用机制。实证结果表明我国股票分析师的羊群行为是"非信息驱动"的真羊群行为,这种行为降低了市场上的特质信息含量,从而增加了公司的股价同步性。上述关系在熊市中更为显著,并且分析师与机构投资者之间的利益冲突会加剧其羊群行为对股价同步性的影响。本文的研究对理解如何降低股价崩盘风险、提高我国股票市场的信息传递效率具有十分重要的理论和实践意义。     

Relative Performancebewertung und Produktmarktwettbewerb

Relative Performance Evaluation aims at reducing incentive risk imposed on a manager, and at influencing product market choices. Thereby, firm owners can choose stronger effort incentives, and they may reduce the degree of competition with the firm’s competitors. Within a principal/agent-model, we explore the interrelation between characteristics of product market competition, performance evaluation, and incentives. Our results show that a firm’s optimal performance evaluation significantly depends on the characteristics of product market competition. This implies that a firm’s optimal choice of performance evaluation is firm- and industry-specific. Hence, our results support the industry-selection-approach recently applied in empirical compensation studies.     

Competition network as a source of competitive advantage: The dynamic capability perspective and evidence from China

The search for competitive advantage is the defining inquiry of strategic management research. In this study, we draw on the dynamic capability lens to develop a counterintuitive view that positions competitors of a firm as an important source of competitive advantage. We argue that a firm's competitors form a competition network from which it can collect information about innovative ideas, product market, and related industries. Such information helps it calibrate market opportunities, update the resource base, and, eventually, strengthen its competitive advantage. This positive effect of competition network on competitive advantage will reasonably be contingent upon the proactive information search by the firm. The empirical results based on the survey data of 631 Chinese firms strongly support our theoretical model. This study identifies another distinctive source of competitive advantage than industry context or organizational resources as well as advancing our understanding of competition network.     

Does shareholder protection affect the performance of analysts as a gatekeeper?

This paper investigates the effect of shareholder protection on analysts’ performance. The important corporate governance role analysts can play by monitoring management has largely been ignored in the literature. Using a newly constructed index, we are for the first time able to analyse how changes in shareholder protection over time affect analysts’ performance as a gatekeeper. We find that strengthened shareholder protection improves analysts’ performance as a gatekeeper, i.e. analysts’ ability to reduce information asymmetry improves with strengthened shareholder protection. However, we also find a substitution effect: Strengthened shareholder protection makes analysts’ services less valuable to investors, thereby leading to a reduction in the number of analysts following firms.     

电子商务市场特征对产品创新影响的实证研究

根据电子商务价值理论,电子商务企业进行产品创新能有效提升或创造客户价值,但电子商务市场环境因素可能会影响电子商务企业的产品创新,而已有关于产品创新的研究大多聚焦于传统市场。依据电子商务客户价值、从众行为、多重创新、组织学习和信息过载等理论,以电子商务市场的两个主要特征市场信息和竞争强度为前导变量,构建它们对于电子商务企业产品创新倾向和电子商务企业绩效的影响模型,并提出变量间关系假设。通过收集中国最大B2C平台天猫商城内309家电子商务企业的数据,应用多元回归分析方法实证检验电子商务市场特征对产品创新的影响。研究结果表明,电子商务企业产品创新正向影响企业绩效;市场信息促进电子商务企业产品创新,但其效用受竞争强度的反向调节;竞争强度显著加强电子商务企业的产品创新倾向且不会影响企业创新绩效,因为在当前电子商务发展阶段和电子商务市场特性的作用下,产品创新能获得熊彼得租金,主导产品创新的是竞争脱离效应而非熊彼得效应。本研究结论对电子商务企业实践具有一定的指导意义。     

顶级券商的明星分析师荐股评级更有价值么?——基于券商声誉、分析师声誉的实证研究

利用2003—2009年《新财富》杂志评选作为分析师声誉和券商声誉代理变量,结合超过54000条分析师推荐评级样本,从投资者角度检验了券商声誉、分析师声誉与分析师荐股评级价值之间的短期关系和长期关系,研究结果发现:在评级公告日,"买入/增持","中性","减持/卖出"评级分组的超常收益率与分析师声誉和券商声誉之间存在不同的影响规律。通过长期关系检验还发现牛市阶段,非顶级券商明星分析师"买入/增持"评级的投资价值高于顶级券商明星分析师,但在熊市阶段,非顶级券商非明星分析师"买入/增持"评级投资价值最高,顶级券商明星分析师投资价值最低。顶级券商和非顶级券商的明星分析师"中性"评级投资价值低,投资者容易错失投资机会。顶级券商明星分析师"减持/卖出"评级投资价值最高;非顶级券商明星分析师"减持/卖出"评级投资价值最低。最后提出了维护分析师证券研究报告独立性的四条政策建议。     

公司规模与信息披露的交易量反应

本研究以年报信息披露为事件,考察了交易量反应的公司规模效应。我们的统计分析和统计检验结果表明,与国外发达市场一样,我国股票市场对信息披露不仅在反应大小上与公司规模负相关,而且在持久性上也与公司规模负相关。这意味着市场对不同规模公司的信息披露反应是不相同的,小公司的信息披露含量高于大公司。     

Evidence on the Superiority of Analysts Quarterly Earnings Forecasts for Small Capitalization Firms*

Financial analysts provide information to support investment analysis and decisions for an ever increasing number of firms. As part of their services they also produce earnings forecasts for covered firms. While there has been much research investigating the determinants of financial analyst earnings forecast superiority for large, widely-followed firms, little research has focused on smaller firms. Until recently, these smaller firms have been largely ignored. This study focuses exclusively on small firms and provides evidence of differing behavior for such firms compared to results previously reported for large firms. Errors in quarterly earnings per share forecasts of small firms obtained from a univariate time-series model are also examined. Regression results indicate that time-series model parameters possess information content with respect to forecast accuracy for analyst-covered firms only. These results are obtained after controlling for firm size, model adequacy, and industry, quarter, and year effects. This suggests that analysts are more likely to cover small firms for which they are able to decipher information correlated with that impounded in the “shocks” in the quarterly earnings time series as captured by the time-series model parameters.     

竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

Supplier competition and its impact on firm׳s sourcing strategy

Most research on firms׳ sourcing strategies assumes that wholesale prices and reliability of suppliers are exogenous. It is of our interest to study suppliers׳ competition on both wholesale price and reliability and firms׳ corresponding optimal sourcing strategy under complete information. In particular, we study a problem in which a firm procures a single product from two suppliers, taking into account suppliers׳ price and reliability differences. This motivates the suppliers to compete on these two factors. We investigate the equilibria of this supplier game and the firm׳s corresponding sourcing decisions. Our study shows that suppliers׳ reliability often plays a more important role than wholesale price in supplier competition and that maintaining high reliability and a high wholesale price is the ideal strategy for suppliers if multiple options exist. The conventional wisdom implies that low supply reliability and high demand uncertainty motivate dual-sourcing. We notice that when the suppliers׳ shared market/transportation network is often disrupted and demand uncertainty is high, suppliers׳ competition on both price and reliability may render the sole-sourcing strategy to be optimal in some cases that depend on the format of suppliers׳ cost functions. Moreover, numerical study shows that when the cost or vulnerability (to market disruptions) of one supplier increases, its profit and that of the firm may not necessarily decrease under supplier competition.     

竞争环境下客户服务投入对企业利润影响的均衡分析

客户服务投入是企业吸引新顾客和维持现有顾客的重要手段之一。然而,服务投入究竟是否能给企业带来价值？对于这一问题,业界和学界都没有明确的答案。本文通过建模的方法研究在竞争的市场环境下,固有的市场因素对客户服务投入价值的影响。研究发现,服务竞争的市场均衡结构是两家厂商都投入客户服务。服务投入给企业带来的价值随着产品差异度的提高而提高,随着厂商自身市场份额的增加而增加。即,在产品差异度高的市场,服务投入更容易给企业带来价值。而在集中度高的市场,服务投入更容易给市场份额大的企业带来价值。     

Who performs a stronger response to whom? Detecting individual competitive actions and reactions

This study analyzes the degree of competition through individual actions and reactions. Empirical support for this analysis has derived mainly from structural econometric models describing the nature of competition. This analysis extends the existing literature by empirically considering a direct measurement of competition through the analysis of the competitive actions and responses, and describing how firms compete within and between strategic groups. We estimate the firms’ conduct in the Spanish deposits market with 146 firms and 18,888 observations. This is a specially compelling context for the banking industry, in which a deregulation process gives rise to the adoption of aggressive strategies seeking to increase the market shares of deposit accounts; thus, producing a turbulent situation of increasing rivalry. Our results offer a deeper understanding of the firms’ competitive behavior, since we identify different patterns of actions and reactions depending upon the strategic group the firm belongs to.     

CEO Incentives,Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation

This study examines the effects of CEO equity‐based compensation and anti‐takeover provisions on corporate innovation. Using a large sample of US firms over the period 1996–2014, we find that long‐term incentives have a stronger influence on innovation when combined with takeover threats. We also show that equity‐based compensation is more likely to spur innovation for small firms and firms in industries with high product market competition and innovation pressure. However, this effect is somewhat weaker in the presence of anti‐takeover provisions, suggesting that takeover protection encourages managerial shirking even when external competition is high. Finally, in addition to the existing evidence on the valuation effect of CEO equity‐based compensation, we identify innovation as an important channel through which managerial incentives can enhance firm value. Our results have potential implications for shareholders, managers and policymakers.     

Fixed fee licensing for cost-reducing technologies: Should innovators reveal their private information?

In the process of licensing their technology to downstream firms, innovators often get some information on the firms’ cost reductions. Revealing this information to the market influences the market game, and thereby the licensees’ willingness to pay. We analyze the innovator’s optimal information provision with fixed fee licensing. Our main result is that the innovator should reveal the number of licenses, but should keep silent on the cost reductions of licensees. The intuition is that the innovator’s profit depends only on the willingness to pay of the critical firm which only just buys a license, and this firm benefits if the number of firms is revealed, but nothing is learned on the actual cost distribution.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

To Preannounce or Not: New Product Development in a Competitive Duopoly Market

In this study, we consider the issue of preannouncing or not preannouncing the development of a new product. Our research is motivated by contrasting views in the literature and varying actions observed in practice. We develop and analyze a game theoretic model that examines the effect of a firm's preannouncement of its product development. Our model is based on a durable goods duopoly market with profit‐maximizing firms. The first firm is an innovator who initially begins developing the product; the second firm is an imitator that begins developing a competing product as soon as it becomes aware of the innovator's product. We assume that consumers are rationally expectant and purchase at most one unit of the product when they have maximum positive utility surplus that is determined by the characteristics of the product, the consumer's marginal utility, and the consumer's discounted utility for future expected products. The innovator firm can release information about its product when it begins developing the product or can guard information about its product until it introduces the product into the market. Our analysis and numerical tests show that, under some conditions, the innovator firm can benefit by preannouncing its product and giving the imitator firm additional time to differentiate its product. We discuss these conditions and their implications for new product development efforts.     

Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity

This study empirically analyzes whether gender diversity enhances boards of directors’ independence and efficiency. Using data from 3,876 public firms in 47 countries and controlling for a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms, we find that firms with more female directors have higher firm performance by market (Tobin’s Q) and accounting (return on assets) measures. The results also suggest that external independent directors do not contribute to firm performance unless the board is gender diversified. These results hold with respect to different estimation models and robustness tests. Overall, our findings provide evidence that the female directors enhance boards of directors’ effectiveness. Finally, we find that firms that are concerned with board independence, and that firms in more complex environments are more likely to have gender-balanced boards.     

Horizontal capacity sharing between asymmetric competitors

A common practice to address supply-demand mismatch is capacity sharing, whereby a firm possessing excessive capacity collaborates with its rival that is incapable of meeting captured demand. However, previous studies have seldom focused on the role of capacity sharing in shaping market competition. In this paper, we investigate coopetition strategies under two widely used contracting mechanisms of capacity sharing, namely, the linear transfer payment contracting mechanism and the revenue sharing contracting mechanism. In a model of two competitors with asymmetric capacities, we find that the larger firm becomes less aggressive in market competition and benefits more from capacity sharing. Competition between the firms will be softened by capacity sharing. Moreover, competition intensity is more likely to be higher under the linear transfer payment contracting mechanism than under the revenue sharing contracting mechanism, while it may be lower if the total capacities are slightly larger than the aggregate demand.