America's baby boom generation: the fateful bulge

From 1955-64 nearly 42 million births occurred in the U.S., an unprecedented expansion. The roots of the baby boom lie in the universal rush to early marriage and favorable economic climate for the relatively scarce young men born of the Depression cohort. The impact of the boom interrupted a century-long fertility decline. Pro-marriage, pronatalist norms were revived by the Depression cohort who formed families of at least 2 children or more. During the 1960-70's schools, colleges, and universities were built to accomodate the boom and are now excessive for the baby bust cohort. Unemployment and crime rates rose and fell with the passing of the boom babies through late adolescence and early adulthood. In the 1980's, boom babies will be aged 20-30. Demands for housing will be high. Annual birth numbers will increase even if the rate of childbearing hovers below replacement level at about 1.8 per woman. Per capita earnings and overall labor productivity should improve as the boom baby cohort reaches middle age in the 1990s. However, chances for advancement will be fewer. As the cohort reaches retirement age, the over 65 population will double from 31 million in 2000 to almost 60 million in 2030. Although the burden will be somewhat offset by reduced proportions of under 18-year-olds, the ratio of active workers paying Social Security will fall drastically.     

Immigration to the U.S.: the unfinished story

Annual totals of new immigrants and refugees in the US may now be up to the record highs of over a million immigrants counted in 6 years between 1905 and 1914. Since 1979, legal immigrants have averaged 566,000 a year (570,009 in 1985), newly arrived refugees and asylees approved have averaged 135,000, and the "settled" illegal immigrant population is growing by up to 1/2 million a year, according to some estimates. 1/2 of illegal immigrants are persons who entered the US legally but then overstayed the terms of temporary visas. Immigration and Naturalization Service apprehensions of illegal aliens, projected at a record 1.8 million for fiscal year 1986, indicate a sharp increase in illegal border crossers, driven by Mexico's and Central America's mounting population and economic pressures and lured by the prospect of jobs with employers who through a loophole in US immigration law can hire illegal aliens without penalty. The Census Bureau estimates that net immigration now accounts for 28% of US population growth and will account for all growth by the 2030's if fertility stays at the current low 1.8 births per woman. Public opinion strongly favors crubs on illegal immigration and legalization of illegal aliens long resident in the US, and in 1986 Congress enacted legislation to reduce illegal immigration to the US. Asians and Latin Americans now make up over 80% of legal immigrants and Latin Americans comprised 77% of illegal immigrants counted in the 1980 census. Asians far outstrip Latin American immigrants in education, occupational status, and income and might be expected to assimilate in the same manner as earlier immigrant group did. Hispanic immigrants so far appear to favor cultural pluralism, maintaining their own culture and the Spanish language. Research in California indicates that recent Hispanic immigrants (legal and illegal) have helped preserve low-wage industries and agriculture. Illegal immigrants appear to draw more on public health and education services than they pay back in taxes. With or without immigration reform, population and economic pressures in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin ensure that the numbers of people seeking to enter the US are only likely to increase.     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

Canada's population: growth and dualism

In Canada the current 1.3% population growth rate is causing some concern. Those concerned argue that such a rate of growth in combination with high levels of consumption could jeopardize the country's resource base and its comfortable style of living. Many Canadians are questioning high levels of immigration, for now that the fertility level is below replacement level, net immigration contributes substantially to population growth (over 1/3 in 1976). The growing proportion of non-Europeans among recent immigrants is causing resentment, and, in a tight job market, immigrants are regarded as threats to the World War 2 baby boom cohort who are now at working ages. The baby boom generation also puts stress on housing and health services, and it will increase the need for pension checks as it ages. Although French fertility is no longer high and immigration is no longer dominated by the British, the French group's 200-year struggle to preserve its identity continues on in the current effort of the Quebec government to enforce the use of French language by law within that province. Geography and climate dictate another demographic fact that divides the country and pervades its history. In addition to intense regionalism, uneven population distribution is responsible for 2 other concerns: the rapid growth of several already large cities and depopulation of many small communities. Focus in this discussion is on Canada's population growth in the past and as projected for the future, historical and current fertility, mortality and immigration trends, the search for a new immigration policy, the impact of the baby boom generation on the population's age structure and the problems this creates, and recent shifts in population distribution and in the country's ethnic and linguistic makeup. The population policy proposals evolved thus far involve to a great extent the use of immigration as a lever for achieving given population objectives.     

U.S. population in the 21st century: Which scenario is reasonable?

A major Census Bureau study released in January 1989 has evoked renewed warnings in the media and among some population analysts that the U.S. faces population decline in the next century if it does not increase fertility and/or raise immigration. The report's middle scenario rests on an assumed future total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8, life expectancy of 81.2 years, and net immigration of 500,000 annually. These mid-range assumptions would yield a United States population of 268 million by 2000, peaking at 302 million in 2040 and falling to 292 million by 2080. Questionable assumptions in the report's most likely scenario are discussed. These are:

1. that immigrants bear children at the same rate as their equivalent age and racial group in the United States population.
2. that the high TFR of Hispanics will not raise the overall 1.8 TFR foreseen for whites as the Hispanic proportion of the white population continues to grow.
3. that net yearly immigration will fall to 575,000 in 1990 and 500,000 by 2000. The Census Bureau's "high" assumption of 800,000 net yearly may be more realistic.

The report's low growth scenario projects future population size that is more reassuring than alarming: 264 million in 2000, rising to 288 million in 2030, and falling to 266 million in 2080. Thus, in ninety years the United States would still have 20 million more people than now. While some fear that such slow growth will lower United States influence and bring labor shortages and an aging population, the nation's quality of life would be less at risk with a population of 266 million than with one approaching the one-half billion projected by the Census report's high estimates.     

Demographics and housing in America

Family-building needs of the "nesting" generation and its offspring, the baby boomers born 1947-1964, dominated post-World War 2 housing demand and production to 1970. Centered on tract-house suburbia, annual housing starts averaged 1.5 million a year in the 1950s and 1960s. With growing real median family incomes, the average size of new dwellings increased and 63% of households owned their homes by 1970, compared to 44% in 1940. The baby boomers' arrival at the ages of household formation sparked the "Golden Housing Age" of the 1970s. Net household increase averaged a record 1.7 million a year and 19 million year-round dwellings were added to the national inventory compared to 11 million in the 1950s and 1960s, despite a plunge in housing starts during the 1974-75 recession. Real median family income declined after 1973 and inflation escalated housing costs but at the same time fueled demand for housing as an investment hedge against inflation. The singles and "mingles" life styles of youthful baby boomers boosted rental housing, condominiums, and compact townhouses. Married-couple households dropped from 74% of the total in 1960 to 58% in 1975. Household formation and housing starts dropped drastically with the 1980-82 recession but bounced back as the economy recovered in 1983-85 and restrained inflation braked housing cost rises. Projections show overall household increases reduced to barely a million a year in 1990-95, with renter household gains at just 175,000, compared to 1/2 a million a year in the 1970s, as the household-formation ages of 18-34 are taken over by the baby bust generation. This will be offset by the baby boomers' maturing into middle age. By 1995 most of the giant generation will be in the peak-earning, high-homeownership ages of 35-54. Married-couple households in this age bracket will account for 56% of the household gain from 1983 to 1995, boosting national affluence and the demand for upscale housing, likely to be located in the suburbs.     

Recent Immigration and Studies of Ethnic Assimilation

Studies of ethnic assimilation are frequently based upon status comparisons between the foreign born and their "children," the second generation. The assumption that recent immigration has been negligible and that the foreign born represent a closed population is implicit in that procedure. However, analysis of official statistics indicates that immigrants who arrived since World War II now comprise a substantial share of the foreign-born population, while the foreign born who arrived before quota restrictions are rapidly being depleted by mortality. Recent immigrants, as intended by quota legislation, are of much higher socioeconomic status than immigrants who arrived before World War 1. Hence, characteristics of both recent immigrants and earlier arrivals are confounded in data for the foreign-born population. Existing data do not permit rigorous assessment of this confusion or adequate control for it. This paper suggests that tabulations of the foreign born by "year of arrival" would improve the sociological utility of data for ethnic groups.     

Cuba: the demography of revolution

Cuba's post-revolution demographic trends, especially in regard to fertility and emigration, and the causes and consequences of these trends, were examined using available statistical data. The authors maintain that both fertility and emigration trends were highly infuenced by economic factors. The trends are described in the context of the social and economic changes instituted by the revolutionary government. Government policies were aimed at 1) eradicating inequalities in housing, income, education, and health; 2) improving the status of women; and 3) upgrading the living standards of the rural population. Government policies did alleviate many social problems and greatly improved the health and educational status of the population; however, these policies had a marked adverse effect on economic performance. The demographic transition began in Cuba earlier than in most other developing countries and it began long before the 1959 revolution. These earlier changes must be taken into account when assessing the impact of post-revolution policies on demographic trends. Cuba's birthrate declined from 26-14.8/1000 population between 1959-1979 and the total fertility rate declined from 3.7-1.9 between 1970-1978; however, during the 1960s there was a baby boom and the birth rate for 1963 exceeded 35/1000 population. The baby boom was largely a response to the temporary improvement in economic conditions which occurred shortly after the revolution. The decline in fertility during the 1970s was due in part to the increased availability of abortion and contraceptive services and to a decline in the marriage rate; however, Cuba's deteriorating economy was also a major contributing factor. The baby boom of the 1960s is negativley affecting the current economy of the country. Individuals born during the baby boom are entering adulthood and are contributing toward Cuba's current unemployment problems. Prior to the revolution, Cuba experienced a high rate of in-migration. Immediately after the revolution this pattern was reversed and between 1959-1980 more than 800,000 Cubans emigrated. Most of these emigrants went to the U.S. A large proportion of the earlier emigrants were members of the upper and middle socioeconomic classes. Recent emigrants were more evenly representative of all segments of Cuba's population. The socioeconomic characteristics of the emigrants are described and their adjustment in the U.S. is discussed. Tables provide statistical data on Cuba's demographic trends.     

Parental characteristics and the schooling progress of the children of immigrant and U.S.-born blacks

In this study, I examine disparities in schooling progress among children born to immigrant and U.S.-born blacks. I find that in one- and two-parent families, children born to black immigrants are less likely to fall behind in school than those born to U.S.-born blacks. In two-parent immigrant families, children born to two immigrant parents have a significant schooling advantage over children born to one immigrant parent. While children born to two immigrant parents in the wealthiest black immigrant families do better in the second generation than in the first, the reverse is observed among children in less wealthy families. These findings contribute in two ways to our understanding of the assimilation processes of children born to black immigrant parents. First, they show that there is a positive association between the number of immigrant parents in a family and children’s schooling performance. Second, they suggest that disparities in the assimilation patterns of the children of black immigrants are a likely product of the interaction between their parental characteristics and the socioeconomic circumstances of their families.     

The population growth in the city of Beijing and our present tasks (author's transl)]

Concern for the rapid population growth since 1949 of China's second largest city, Beijing, is discussed in terms of population control, migration, and rises in the productive development of the city. From 1949 to 1963 the natural rate of population increased from 7.5 to 35.3%; however, after the introduction of a birth control program in 1971, the natural increase of population declined to 4.02% in 1977. From 1949-1978, the average birth rate was 145,000/year while the average death rate was 46,500/year, leaving the annual average increase in population at 98,000. The natural population increased by 2,340,000 from 1949-1978. The massive population growth since 1949 affected the economic development of the city as well as the country. Cultivated land near Beijing increased from 1949-1952, but because of urban development the land for cultivation decreased by 1,527,000 market acres from that available in 1949 (7,965,000 market acres). Population density increased from 430 persons/ square kilometer in 1962 to 506 persons/ square kilometer in 1978. From 1953 to 1978, production and consumption rates fluctuated with a net balance of only 2020 million catties in the 26 years, causing the need for products to be imported from other areas of the country. Unemployment is exacerbated by the lack of jobs and increasing numbers of people. Transportation problems also have developed. New efforts are being made to inform people of population control by the Beijing Population Association begun in 1979, because Beijing's population will continue to increase until 1989 due to the baby boom years during the fifties which created a 2nd boom in the late 1970s as well as the lack of education on population control. Other programs are being developed to, 1) educate people on economical measures of reducing the population, 2) promote governmental departments to improve birth control programs by means of social security services, child health agencies, and nursing schools, 3) propagandize eugenics and genetic education to enhance the population, and 4) reinforce the propaganda on birth control and technical guidance.     

The Future Composition of the Canadian Labor Force: A Microsimulation Projection

This article charts the future transformations of the Canadian labor force population using a microsimulation projection model. The model takes into account differentials in demographic behavior and labor force participation of individuals according to their ethnocultural and educational characteristics. As a result of a rapid fall in fertility, the Canadian population is expected to age rapidly as baby boomers start to retire from the labor market in large numbers. In response to declining fertility, Canada raised its immigration intake at the end of the 1980s, and immigration is now the main driver of Canadian population growth. At the same time, immigrants to Canada are becoming more culturally diversified. Over the last half century, the main source regions have shifted from Europe to Asia. Results of the microsimulation show that Canada's labor force population will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than in the recent past. By 2031, almost one third of the country's total labor force could be foreign‐born, and almost all its future increase is expected to be among university graduates, while the less‐educated labor force is projected to decline.     

Wealth Inequality Among Immigrants: Consistent Racial/Ethnic Inequality in the United States

Wealth is a strong indicator of immigrant integration in U.S. society. Drawing on new assimilation theory, we highlight the importance of racial/ethnic group boundaries and propose different paths of wealth integration among U.S. immigrants. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and quantile regression, we show that race/ethnicity shapes immigrant wealth inequality across the entire distribution of net worth, along with immigrants’ U.S. experience, such as immigrant status, U.S. education, English language proficiency, and time spent in the United States. Our results document consistent racial/ethnic inequality among immigrants, also evidenced among the U.S. born, revealing that even when accounting for key aspects of U.S. experience, wealth inequality with whites for Latino and black immigrants is strong.     

Family sizes of children and family sizes of women

This paper demonstrates the relation that obtains between the average family size of women and the average family size of offspring of those women. It estimates the value of these two measures for cohorts of American women aged 45–49 in various years from 1890 to 1970. It shows that children born during the post-war baby boom actually derived from smaller families than those born during the low-fertility 1930’s; that under current patterns a woman would have to bear an average of almost two children fewer than were borne by her mother merely to keep population fertility rates constant from generation to generation; and that average family size for nonwhite children exceeds that for white by 50 percent, although the racial difference in family sizes of women is only 19 percent.     

An analysis of baby boom characteristics in China

This article analyzed the 3rd Chinese baby boom and its causes by focusing on the fertility intensity of women and the number of births per year. The 3rd baby boom is expected to end in 2002 and to peak in 1995. The baby boom in urban areas will last a much shorter time than in rural areas. Particular differences are manifested between provinces: 1) The baby boom will last 3-4 years in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, and will last 10 years in Liaoning, Jilin, and Jiangsu. In other provinces, the boom will last 15-23 years; 2) The peak years are different between provinces; 3) The base number of births curves are province-specific; 4) The absolute base birth numbers are different between provinces (Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Sichuan 700,000; Beijing, Tianjin, Qinghai, and Ningzia 100,000); and 5) The shapes of progressive increases for base number of births are province specific. The increase in the number of childbearing-age women, the unplanned higher parity births, and early marriage and childbearing have all contributed to the current baby boom. Recommendations to control the problem include controlling higher parity births, observing birth spacing, and controlling the age of marriage and childbearing.     

“Having it all” no longer: Fertility,Female Labor supply,and the new life choices of Generation x

This study uses data from the U.S. Current Population Surveys and Natality Detail Files to examine cohort-level changes infertility and female labor supply. Although only at the start of their careers, college-educated women from more-recent cohorts are having more children and supplying less market labor than their counterparts born toward the end of the baby boom. Pronounced differences across cohorts suggest that recent increases infertility and declines in female labor supply have structural underpinnings and may continue for some time.     

Alternative Projections of the U.S. population

The U.S. Bureau of the Census recently released a set of population projections that include middle and high projections that we argue are too conservative. The projections discount the possibility of future baby booms and assume slow rates of mortality decline and low levels of immigration. In this article we explore the impact on the size and age composition of the U.S. population of alternative scenarios of plausible fertility, mortality, and immigration assumptions. We conclude that (1) the Census Bureau's highest projection might be interpreted as a reasonable middle projection, (2) a reasonable high projection would yield a U.S. population in 2080 some 300 million persons larger than the Bureau's highest projection, with the population 85 and older more than twice the Bureau's greatest estimate, and (3) uncertainty about the pace of population growth is substantially greater than the Bureau's projections suggest.     

Recent Trends in Coverage of the Mexican-Born Population of the United States: Results From Applying Multiple Methods Across Time

The accuracy of counts of U.S. racial/ethnic and immigrant groups depends on the coverage of the foreign-born in official data. Because Mexicans constitute by far the largest single national-origin group among the foreign-born in the United States, we compile new evidence about the coverage of the Mexican-born population in the 2000 census and 2001–2010 American Community Survey (ACS) using three techniques: a death registration, a birth registration, and a net migration method. For the late 1990s and first half of the 2000–2010 decade, results indicate that coverage error was somewhat higher than currently assumed but had substantially declined by the latter half of the 2000–2010 decade. Additionally, we find evidence that U.S. census and ACS data miss substantial numbers of children of Mexican immigrants, as well as people who are most likely to be unauthorized: namely, working-aged Mexican immigrants (ages 15–64), especially males. The findings highlight the heterogeneity of the Mexican foreign-born population and the ways in which migration dynamics may affect population coverage.     

Unintended consequences of US immigration policy: explaining the post-1965 surge from Latin America

Immigration reforms in the United States initiated in the 1960s are widely thought to have opened the door to mass immigration from Asia and Latin America by eliminating past discriminatory policies. While this may be true for Asians, it is not the case for Latin Americans, who faced more restrictions to legal migration after 1965 than before. The boom in Latin American migration occurred in spite of rather than because of changes in US immigration law. In this article we describe how restrictions placed on the legal entry of Latin Americans, and especially Mexicans, set off a chain of events that in the ensuing decades had the paradoxical effect of producing more rather than fewer Latino immigrants. We offer an explanation for how and why Latinos in the United States, in just 40 years, increased from 9.6 million people and 5 percent of the population to 51 million people and 16 percent of the population, and why so many are now present without authorization.     

Anticipation of retirement among baby boomers

A total of 32 interviews were conducted with women in academia who were born between 1946 and 1964. Twenty-one of these interviews were completed with academic women in the United States. and eleven with academic women in New Zealand. The data were analyzed to determine what these "baby boomers" anticipate for their retirement as well as their concerns about facing retirement. Cohort and cross-cultural comparisons were made. The authors identified common themes in the interviews. These included rejection of the traditional definition of retirement, anticipated age at retirement determined by personal needs rather than age-graded societal norms, retirement projected to be an active period involving a mix of work and leisure activities, and major concerns, about health and health care, the availability of entitlements and finances. The findings from this study indicate baby boomers are forging a new path for retirement. Further research investigating the transition for women of the baby boom generation from worker to retiree may open windows into the future of retirement for women.     

Cohort effects in the educational attainment of second generation immigrants in Germany: An analysis of census data

Even though second generation immigrants make up ever increasing population shares in industrialized countries we know little about their social integration and wellbeing. This study focuses on the educational attainment of German born children of immigrants. Their schooling success still lags behind that of natives. This paper investigates school attendance and completed degrees of second generation immigrants and finds that even after controlling for characteristics the educational gap remains large and significant. The available evidence suggests that this group as a whole does not assimilate to native educational standards and instead increasingly falls behind.This research was completed while the author was guest at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany. I am grateful for IZAs hospitality and particularly for the help of Thomas K. Bauer. I thank the anonymous referees and the editors for very helpful comments. Responsible editors: David Card and Christoph M. Schmidt.