U.S. population in the 21st century: Which scenario is reasonable?

A major Census Bureau study released in January 1989 has evoked renewed warnings in the media and among some population analysts that the U.S. faces population decline in the next century if it does not increase fertility and/or raise immigration. The report's middle scenario rests on an assumed future total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8, life expectancy of 81.2 years, and net immigration of 500,000 annually. These mid-range assumptions would yield a United States population of 268 million by 2000, peaking at 302 million in 2040 and falling to 292 million by 2080. Questionable assumptions in the report's most likely scenario are discussed. These are:

1. that immigrants bear children at the same rate as their equivalent age and racial group in the United States population.
2. that the high TFR of Hispanics will not raise the overall 1.8 TFR foreseen for whites as the Hispanic proportion of the white population continues to grow.
3. that net yearly immigration will fall to 575,000 in 1990 and 500,000 by 2000. The Census Bureau's "high" assumption of 800,000 net yearly may be more realistic.

The report's low growth scenario projects future population size that is more reassuring than alarming: 264 million in 2000, rising to 288 million in 2030, and falling to 266 million in 2080. Thus, in ninety years the United States would still have 20 million more people than now. While some fear that such slow growth will lower United States influence and bring labor shortages and an aging population, the nation's quality of life would be less at risk with a population of 266 million than with one approaching the one-half billion projected by the Census report's high estimates.     

Zero growth of the population of the United States

It is sometimes said that there is no population problem in the United States because the U.S. fertility rate is approximately at the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. However the population of the United States increased in 1992 by approximately three million people. There are two major causes of continued population growth even when fertility is approximately at the replacement level. One is population momentum; the other is immigration. This paper examines what must be done if we want to achieve zero growth of the population of the United States immediately, without the long delays caused by population momentum.     

How High is Hispanic/Mexican Fertility in the United States? Immigration and Tempo Considerations

In this article, I demonstrate that the apparently much higher fertility of Hispanic/Mexican women in the United States is almost exclusively the product of period estimates obtained for immigrant women and that period measures of immigrant fertility suffer from three serious sources of bias that together significantly overstate fertility levels: difficulties in estimating the size of immigrant groups; the tendency for migration to occur at a particular stage in life; and, most importantly, the tendency for women to have a birth soon after migration. When these sources of bias are taken into consideration, the fertility of native Hispanic/Mexican women is very close to replacement level. In addition, the completed fertility of immigrant women in the United States is dramatically lower than the level obtained from period calculations. Findings are consistent with classical theories of immigrant assimilation but are a striking departure from the patterns found in previous studies and published statistics. The main implication is that without a significant change in immigration levels, current projections based on the premise of high Hispanic fertility are likely to considerably exaggerate Hispanic population growth, its impact on the ethno-racial profile of the country, and its potential to counteract population aging.     

Africa's expanding population: old problems,new policies

Sub-Saharan Africa faces an historic challenge: to achieve economic and social progress while experiencing extraordinary population growth. With an estimated 1989 population of 512 million, the 42 countries of sub-Saharan Africa have the highest birth and death rates of any major world region. While death rates have fallen since the 1960s, persistently high birth rates yield annual growth rates above 3% in many countries. The United Nations projects that the region's population will increase 2.7 times by 2025--to 1.4 billion. Throughout the region, population has outstripped economic growth since the mid-1970s. In addition, many African countries are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). The extent and demographic impact of the epidemic still are unknown, but disturbing social and political effects are already being felt. The region's population growth will slow only when African couples begin to have fewer children. The average number of children per woman ranges from 6 to 8 for most countries. The Africans' preference for large families is deeply rooted in the culture and fed by the perceived economic benefits they receive from their children. Economic stagnation during the 1980s prompted many national governments to recognize that rapid population growth was hindering their socioeconomic development. The political climate has shifted away from pronatalist or laissez-faire attitudes toward official policies to slow population growth. The policy formation process--detailed here for 4 countries (Zambia, Nigeria, Zaire, and Liberia)--is ponderous and beset with political and bureaucratic pitfalls, However, policy shifts in more and more countries combined with evidence of increased contraceptive use and fertility downturns in a few countries give some hope that the region's extraordinary population growth may have peaked and will start a descent. Whatever the case, the decade of the 1990s will be crucial for the future of sub-Saharan Africa.     

Labor Supply Prospects in 16 Developed Countries, 2000–2050

Over the past 20 years, policy attention has been focused upon the implications of below‐replacement fertility for the aging of populations. This article argues that another potential consequence, a decline in the absolute size of the labor force, may prove to be an equally compelling issue because of its impact on rates of economic growth. Because the United States will experience both increasing labor productivity and an increase in its labor supply, the growth orientation of the global economy is likely to persist. In this circumstance, given relatively comparable changes in the productivity of labor across countries, countries that face major declines in their labor supply will fare less well than countries that are able to maintain their labor supply at least constant. The article examines the labor supply prospects of 16 developed countries for the period 2000–2050, drawing attention to the ways in which countries may be able to influence the future levels of their labor supply.     

Bangladesh: programs geared to meet population goals; communication as a major factor in UNFPA funded projects

The population policy of Bangladesh is aiming for a zero population growth rate at a suitable level of equilibrium. It is hoped that a net reproductive rate of 1.0 will be achieved by 1990, and that by 1985 fertility will be reduced to replacement level. Various measures to attain these goals have been suggested and they include such ones as the integration of family planning programs with other development efforts through a multisectoral approach and the introduction of incentives and disincentives for acceptance of the idea of the small family. Communications by radio and television play a critical role in the program to reduce fertility. UNFPA-funded projects emphasize education, motivation, and communication with the hope of creating a favorable attitude towards family planning and the concept of the small family. Numerous projects in progress are mentioned with regard to their current status. These projects include: rural development cooperatives and population education; pilot projects for family planning motivation and services in industry and on plantations; population education in agricultural extension; strengthening (IEM) information, education, and motivation and training; population awareness for out-of-school youth; a population education program for the Ministry of Education; and a national population information service.     

Population growth,economic development and family planning

This report discusses research conducted to determine whether reduction in population growth rates contributed to the rapid economic growth of Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The 5-year research projects, jointly sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities, the Nihon University Population Research Institute, and the East-West Population Institute, concluded that development and family planning programs contributed substantially to fertility decline in these countries. The project examined 3 factors that influence the long-term productive capacity and growth of the 4 Asian economies: savings, the size of the labor force, and the quality of labor (measured by educational attainment). Available evidence indicates a strong positive contribution of population decline toward growth of savings, a growth in labor force concurrent with a decline in fertility rates which enables per capita income to rise, and an increase in 2ndary education enrollment ratios as fertility is lowered. Development factors by themselves explain no more than 1/2 of the decline in fertility observed, suggesting that family planning programs particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia since 1976 have had an important impact on fertility and economic development.     

Reproductive ideals and educational attainment among white Americans, 1943-1960

Abstract Would the persistent inverse relation between educational attainment and family size in the United States be removed if actual fertility were equal to ideal? Data on ideal family size from 10 national surveys among white Americans of both sexes (from 1943 to 1960) show that gradeschool level respondents have higher ideals than the more educated even when age, religious affiliation, and farm residence are used as controls. Comparison of these ideals with the actual family size or ever-fertile women in the United States indicates that, on the average, the actual family size of all major educational groups falls below the ideal, but the college-educated are furthest from their ideal. If this group lessened the gap between actual and ideal family size, the educational differential in fertility would decrease, but at the price of increasing the rate of population growth.     

Communicating future water needs to an at-risk population: lessons learned following defeat of the Applewhite Dam and Reservoir Project in San Antonio,Texas

San Antonio, Texas, the seventh largest city in the United States, has experienced steady population growth, since the “boom” of the 1960s. Projected water shortages due to this growth were realized as early as the 1970s by city leaders and south-central Texas regional development decision makers. To reduce dependence on the already over-taxed, Edwards aquifer, a solution, the Applewhite Dam and Reservoir Project, was developed with wide acceptance by federal, state, and city leaders who regarded the project as a necessary measure for regional growth and development. However, opposition by taxpayer and environmental groups led to referendums of 1991 and 1994 in which voters blocked construction of the dam and reservoir leaving the city with limited options for water provision. This case study investigated the factors which led to a clear mismatch in communication between decision makers—those who were aware of the actual and quantifiable risk to the region in terms of reduced water supplies—and the general public, a population that did not have complete and/or adequate knowledge of their actual risk regarding future water shortages, nor, of solutions being developed, such as the Applewhite project. The findings from this case study indicate that when municipal leadership fails to adequately communicate risk regarding resource shortage to an affected public, as well as, openly planned solutions, that voters are likely to underestimate future impacts of water shortages, heed last-minute opposition, and reject long-standing, publicly proposed projects. The intent of this research is not to support either side in the Applewhite controversy, but to shed perspective on the process of adequately and effectively communicating future water needs to an at-risk population. Decision makers in cities across the United States who are faced with solving problems of limited resources needed by a large populace may be informed by the results of this research.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

Immigration to the UK from High‐Fertility Countries: Intergenerational Adaptation and Fertility Convergence

The fertility of immigrants' children increasingly shapes the ethnic diversity of the population in Western Europe. However, few data are available on the fertility patterns of immigrants and their offspring. This article provides new fertility estimates of immigrants and immigrants' children by ethnic group in the United Kingdom that may provide better‐informed fertility assumptions for future population projection models. The impact of migration‐specific tempo effects on the period TFR of immigrants is analyzed. Among the results, intergenerational fertility transitions strongly contribute both to fertility convergence between ethnic groups and to fertility “assimilation” or “intergenerational adaptation” to the UK mainstream childbearing behavior. Ethnic fertility convergence, particularly marked for populations originating from high‐fertility countries, reflects in part decreasing fertility in sending countries and in part intergenerational adaptation to the UK mainstream. Higher educational enrollment of the daughters of immigrants may partly explain their relatively lower fertility.     

Crossovers that link populations with the same vital rates

"In this paper, we consider crossovers of demographic density distributions from...populations that have the same fertility and mortality rates. We focus on observed populations and their associated stationary and stable models, and on proportional distributions of persons, births, deaths and reproductive values....Three different populations were selected to represent a range of demographic behavior. Those populations are Japan 1963, a low mortality, low fertility population; Togo 1961, a high mortality, high fertility population; and the United States 1919-1921, a population whose fertility and mortality are intermediate."     

Age distribution and the stable equivalent

Some populations, like that of the United States in the 1950's, have a smaller proportion of women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with continuance of their age-specific birth and deaths rates, a continuance which produces the condition known in demography as stability. Others, like that of the United States in the 1930's, have relatively more women of reproductive age than they would ultimately attain with stability. A way of studying ages is to calculate how many women of stable age distribution would be equivalent from the viewpoint of reproduction to the women observed. This stable equivalent was 69,535,000 or 16 percent below the observed United States female population in 1955, and 12 percent above the observed in 1935. The stable equivalent is a measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher's reproductive value. Calculations for four countries illustrate how a fall of the birth rate, for example in demographic transition, occasions an age distribution in which the stable equivalent is greater than the observed number of women. The notion of stable equivalent is useful for comparison because changes in it are nearly invariant with respect to the age-pattern of fertility used. The statement that the United States stable equivalent increased by 11 percent between 1960 and 1965 holds irrespective of whether the 1960 or the 1965 age-specific fertility and mortality rates are used as standard.     

Population activities of the United States government

The editor's comment in this issue of the journal cites 5 overlapping phases in the evolution of population and family planning programs in the United States. The phases are 1) collecting census data and vital statistics, 1790-, 2) family planning assistance to developing nations, 1963, 3) family planning assistance to the U.S. "disadvantaged," 1964-, 4) overpopulation as a national concern, 1969-, and 5) the multiple action phase, 197? (phase including diverse steps to limit population growth and occurring after basic attitudes toward human reproduction have changed). The issue of the journal focuses on total population size and rates of population increase rather than on the distribution of population, and on federal action rather than on the activities of state and local governments. The editor's comment is followed by an extensive discussion of population activities of the United States government, especially since 1963. Topics discussed include demographic data, international programs, research, federally subsidized family planning services, medical care programs, educational and international programs, national growth policy, and the roles of the legislative and executive branches of government. A directory listing federal agencies with substantial and identifiable programs concerned with population and family planning is appended.     

Stable age by region distributions

If the pattern of fertility, mortality and interregional migration exhibited by the United States population during 1950–60 were to continue in the future, the proportions of persons in the various age groups and regions would fluctuate from decade to decade. These fluctuations would become less marked with time, however, and eventually all the proportions would stabilize at certain fixed values. This collection of values may be called astable age by region composition corresponding to the given schedule of fertility, mortality and migration. The same phenomenon may be observed when individuals move between socioeconomic categories as, for example, socioeconomic status or educational attainment levels. The substantial differences between these various situations conceal remarkable similarities. In each case the continued operation of schedules of fertility, mortality and mobility between categories may result in a stable composition. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the nature of these stable compositions, on the interrelation between their various components, and on their relation to the patterns of fertility, mortality and mobility which generate them.     

Understanding the demographic implications of climate change: estimates of localized population predictions under future scenarios of sea-level rise

Significant advances have been made to understand the interrelationship between humans and the environment in recent years, yet research has not produced useful localized estimates that link population forecasts to environmental change. Coarse, static population estimates that have little information on projected growth or spatial variability mask substantial impacts of environmental change on especially vulnerable populations. We estimate that 20 million people in the United States will be affected by sea-level rise by 2030 in selected regions that represent a range of sociodemographic characteristics and corresponding risks of vulnerability. Our results show that the impact of sea-level rise extends beyond the directly impacted counties due to migration networks that link inland and coastal areas and their populations. Substantial rates of population growth and migration are serious considerations for developing mitigation, adaptation, and planning strategies, and for future research on the social, demographic, and political dimensions of climate change.     

A preliminary investigation of the double-track feedback model of fertility control]

The need to consider the impact of nuptiality and fertility changes when developing models of fertility change in China is stressed. The authors conclude that the development of a system that regulates both fertility and marriage patterns is required if population growth is to be efficiently controlled through a population policy.     

Adjusting period tempo changes with an extension of ryder’s basic translation equation

We show that the observed changes in the period tempo of fertility are biased and derive a new formula for adjusting such bias. We present illustrative applications of our proposed method to the cases of the United States and Taiwan. We then describe the relevance of adjustments of observed period fertility tempo for evaluating family planning programs aiming at delaying and reducing births to slow down population growth in developing countries. The work reported in this article also can be regarded as an extension of Ryder's basic translation equation. The extension provides a set of formulas expressing relationships of quantum-tempo between cohorts and periods under specified assumptions.     

Distinctive features of age-specific fertility profiles in the English-speaking world: common patterns in Australia,Canada, New Zealand and the United States, 1970-98

The paper seeks to identify common features in the fertility patterns of the English-speaking world and provide a model basis for comparison of fertility between countries and over time. Attention is focused on the heterogeneity within the fertility patterns of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, similar to that reported earlier for the UK and the Irish Republic. The recent age-specific fertility patterns of these countries display a marked 'bulge' in fertility of women under age 25. A mixture model with two-component Hadwiger functions provides a suitable fit. The heterogeneity thus suggested is related to the proportion of births outside marriage. Additionally, there is some evidence that, in the United States, and lesser extent in New Zealand, this heterogeneity in fertility patterns may be explained by ethnic difference in the timing and number of births.     

Immigration and free trade with Mexico: protecting American workers against double jeopardy

Free trade may well increase immigration from Mexico to the United States before ultimately slowing it down. Rapid population growth, unemployment or underemployment of half the labor force, and vast ethnic and kinship links to the United States have given Mexican migration a stubborn momentum. Increased prosperity from free trade will give many would-be migrants the means to resettle in the U. S. Foreign competition will displace Mexican workers in small farms, state-owned enterprises, and less competitive industries, forcing some to migrate. The noneconomic incentives and expectations driving migration will also remain strong. Mexicans may see free trade as making the border a mere formality or as conferring an entitlement to live in the United States. On the U. S. side, free trade may well deepen the government's traditional complacency about border controls. Over the long-term, however, a successful free trade agreement could reduce immigration by improving Mexico's democracy and the quality of life, diminishing the prospects of mass asylum movements from Mexico, creating a better climate for effective family planning, and luring marginal, immigration-magnet industries from the U. S. to Mexico. In the United States, less- skilled American workers in some industries and regions can expect job displacement and other disruptions from free trade. Particularly vulnerable will be workers in perishable crop agriculture, border retail trade, construction, apparel, and light manufacturing such as furniture, auto parts and glass. Continued heavy immigration of Mexican and other foreign workers into those industries and communities will further impede the adjustment of resident workers by competing for jobs and consuming public resources needed for retraining and job search. To ease the adjustment of displaced workers, the U. S. must make Mexico's cooperation in restraining immigration a condition for free trade. Mexico's cooperation should include enforcement of its own laws against clandestine border crossing; action against alien smugglers, document forgers and transiting illegal aliens from Central America; and curbs on the reentry of aliens deported from the United States. U.S. initiatives that would cushion vulnerable American workers against the added disruption of immigration would be: better identification and screening of applicants for public assistance; tightened enforcement of safety and labor standards in immigrant-impacted firms and provision of legal workers to such firms; protection of public assistance resources through better screening and identification of applicants; and curbs on imports of temporary foreign workers for firms that will now have access to Mexican labor in Mexico. Finally, the United States must consistently press Mexico for higher safety, environmental and labor standards at the workplace to improve the job satisfaction and quality of life of working Mexicans who might otherwise migrate, as well as to narrow Mexico's labor cost advantages over the United States.