DISENTANGLING THE MINIMUM WAGE PUZZLE: AN ANALYSIS OF WORKER ACCESSIONS AND SEPARATIONS

Changes in the legislation in the mid‐1980s in Portugal provide remarkably good conditions for analysis of the employment effects of mandatory minimum wages, as the minimum wage increased sharply for a very specific group of workers. Relying on a matched employer‐employee panel data set, we model gross worker flows—accessions and separations—in continuing firms, as well as in new firms and those going out of business, using a count regression model applied to proportions. Employment trends for teenagers, the affected group, are contrasted to those of older workers before and after the raise in the youth minimum wage. The major effect on teenagers of a rising minimum wage has been the reduction of separations from the employer, which, during the period under analysis, has compensated for the reduction of accessions to new and continuing firms. In this sense, our results can reconcile some of the previous evidence in the empirical literature when analyzing the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on youth employment without decomposing it by type of worker flow. (JEL: D21, J23, J38)     

Residential Location,Job Location,and Wages: Theory and Empirics

I develop a stylized partial on‐the‐job equilibrium search model that incorporates a spatial dimension. Workers reside on a circle and can move at a cost. Each point on the circle has a wage distribution. Implications about wages and job mobility are drawn from the model and tested on Danish matched employer–employee data. The model predictions hold true. I find that workers working farther away from their residence earn higher wages. When a worker is making a job‐to‐job transition where he/she changes workplace location he/she experiences a higher wage change than a worker making a job‐to‐job transition without changing workplace location. However, workers making a job‐to‐job transition that makes the workplace location closer to the residence experience a wage drop. Furthermore, low‐wage workers and workers with high transportation costs are more likely to make job‐to‐job transitions, but also residential moves.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

DO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AFFECT FIRMS’ DEMAND FOR DISABLED WORKERS?

A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This “threshold design” provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low‐wage firms than in high‐wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax.     

DOES EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION CREATE ITS OWN POLITICAL SUPPORT?

This paper investigates the ability of employment protection to generate its own political support. A version of the Mortensen–Pissarides model is used for this purpose. If wages are set through Nash bargaining, workers value employment protection because it strengthens their hand in wage negotiations. Workers in high productivity matches benefit most from higher wages as they expect to stay employed for longer. By reducing turnover employment protection shifts the distribution of match‐specific productivity toward lower values. Thus stringent protection in the past actually reduces support for employment protection today. Introducing involuntary separations reverses this conclusion. Now workers value employment protection because it delays involuntary dismissals. Workers in low productivity matches gain most since they face the highest risk of dismissal. The downward shift in the productivity distribution is now a shift towards supporters.     

The Impact on Inequality of Raising the Minimum Wage: Gap‐narrowing and Reranking Effects

Raising the minimum wage may reduce inequality by increasing the wages of low‐skill workers, but it may also increase inequality due to negative impacts on employment that produce wage losses. Using previous estimates of the elasticities of wages and employment to changes in the minimum wage in Colombia and Brazil, we show that the net impact on inequality of increasing the minimum wage may depend on the distributional weights used for inequality measurement. The results are obtained by decomposing the Gini index into reranking and gap‐narrowing effects. Inequality‐increasing reranking effects, which are associated with job losses, may dominate inequality‐decreasing gap‐narrowing effects, which are associated with wage gains, when high weights are placed on workers with low earnings. For standard distributional weights, however, the likely net impact is a reduction in wage inequality.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

Unemployment Duration of Spouses: Evidence From France

This paper analyses the conditional probability of leaving unemployment of French married individuals from 1991 to 2002. We find that the effect of spousal labor income on unemployment duration is asymmetric for men and women. In particular, the probability of men to find a job is increasing in wife's labor income, while it is decreasing in husband's earnings for women. To adjust for endogenous selection into marriage, we use the quarter of birth as an instrumental variable for the spousal wage. Finally, we show that introducing a breadwinner stigma in a joint job search model generates the positive correlation observed for men in the data.     

Worker and Firm Heterogeneity in Wage Growth: An AKM Approach

This paper estimates a wage growth equation containing human capital variables known from the traditional Mincerian wage equation with year, worker and firm fixed effects included as well. The paper thus contributes further to the large empirical literature on unobserved heterogeneity following the work of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis [1999; Econometrica 67(2): 251–333]. Our main contribution is to extend the analysis from wage levels to wage growth. The specification enables us to estimate the individual‐specific and firm‐specific fixed effects and their degree of explanation on wage growth. The analysis is conducted using Danish longitudinal matched employer–employee data from 1980 to 2006. We find that the worker fixed effect dominates both the firm fixed effect and the effect of the observed covariates. Worker effects are estimated to explain 7–12 per cent of the variance in wage growth whereas firm effects are estimated to explain 4–10 per cent. We furthermore find a negative correlation between the worker and firm effects, as do nearly all authors examining wage level equations.     

HOW DESTRUCTIVE IS CREATIVE DESTRUCTION? EFFECTS OF JOB LOSS ON JOB MOBILITY,WITHDRAWAL AND INCOME

We analyze short and long‐term effects of worker displacement. Our sample consists of male workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants. We find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31%. The drop‐out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement. The average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate, a 3% loss relative to non‐displaced workers after seven years. Splitting displaced workers on within‐ and between‐firm movers, we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between‐firm movers who experience a 3.6% loss. Transfers to other plants within multi‐plant firms upon displacement are quite common. Our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific. We find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific.     

Earning While Learning: When and How Student Employment is Beneficial

Although studies of student employment (‘earning while learning’) mostly find positive wage effects, they do not adequately consider the relation of the employment to the field of study. We investigate how different types of student employment during tertiary education affect short‐ and long‐term labour market returns. Beyond examining differences between non‐working and part‐time working students, we distinguish between student employment related and unrelated to the field of study. Our results show significant positive labour market returns of ‘earning while learning’ only for student employment related to the field of study. These returns consist of a lower unemployment risk, shorter job‐search duration, higher wage effects, and greater job responsibility.     

Price Effects of the Minimum Wage: A Survey Data Analysis for the German Construction Sector

Utilizing the link between employment and price changes as a result of minimum wages, we use firm‐level data to evaluate the effect of minimum wage introduction in the German construction sector. In East Germany we find significant positive price effects that exclude the possibility of rising employment. Rather, the results indicate the existence of a competitive sector‐specific labour market, and thus declining employment. In contrast, we cannot find any significant price reaction for West Germany. This suggests that the implemented minimum wage in West Germany is too low in comparison to the predominantly paid wages and is hence not binding.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity

We construct and estimate an equilibrium search model with on–the–job–search. Firms make take–it–or–leave–it wage offers to workers conditional on their characteristics and they can respond to the outside job offers received by their employees. Unobserved worker productive heterogeneity is introduced in the form of cross–worker differences in a “competence” parameter. On the other side of the market, firms also are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal productivity of labor. The model delivers a theory of steady–state wage dispersion driven by heterogenous worker abilities and firm productivities, as well as by matching frictions. The structural model is estimated using matched employer and employee French panel data. The exogenous distributions of worker and firm heterogeneity components are nonparametrically estimated. We use this structural estimation to provide a decomposition of cross–employee wage variance. We find that the share of the cross–sectional wage variance that is explained by person effects varies across skill groups. Specifically, this share lies close to 40% for high–skilled white collars, and quickly decreases to 0% as the observed skill level decreases. The contribution of market imperfections to wage dispersion is typically around 50%.     

Modeling Earnings Dynamics

In this paper, we use indirect inference to estimate a joint model of earnings, employment, job changes, wage rates, and work hours over a career. We use the model to address a number of important questions in labor economics, including the source of the experience profile of wages, the response of job changes to outside wage offers, and the effects of seniority on job changes. We also study the dynamic response of wage rates, hours, and earnings to various shocks, and measure the relative contributions of the shocks to the variance of earnings in a given year and over a lifetime. We find that human capital accounts for most of the growth of earnings over a career, although job seniority and job mobility also play significant roles. Unemployment shocks have a large impact on earnings in the short run, as well as a substantial long‐term effect that operates through the wage rate. Shocks associated with job changes and unemployment make a large contribution to the variance of career earnings and operate mostly through the job‐specific error components of wages and hours.     

Heterogeneous Firm Responses to Rising Teenage Wages

Substantial youth minimum wage changes in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 raised teenage average wages by 5–10 per cent relative to those for adults. We use Statistics New Zealand's Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED) to examine whether firms' teenage labour demand responses to these changes are greater for firms with higher teenage‐employment share. We find evidence that high teen‐employers reduced their teen employment relative to other firms and had lower survival rates over the period. However, firms that entered the main teen‐employment industries had higher teen‐employment shares than continuing firms. The results are consistent with endogenous technology adoption in response to non‐marginal changes in relative wages.     

Do minimum wages increase job satisfaction? Micro‐data evidence from the new German minimum wage

On January 1, 2015, a new statutory minimum wage of € 8.50 per hour of work was introduced in Germany. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we estimate effects on worker‐level outcomes of continuing employees. The results reveal a meaningful absolute increase in the affected workers' pay satisfaction. The increase in job satisfaction is modest and predominantly driven by changes in pay satisfaction implying only a small effect on all other dimensions of job satisfaction. Moreover, effects from the minimum wage on work engagement and turnover intention are virtually zero.     

Firing Costs,Efficiency Wages and Unemployment

This paper uses a Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model to analyse the effects of firing costs on wages, employment, expected utility and profits. It considers that the probability of a non–shirker being fired depends on an exogenous shock which follows a two–state Markov process. It finds that higher severance payments give rise to lower wages, a lower unemployment rate, an increase in firms’ profits and a decrease in the utility of both workers and the unemployed. These conclusions derive from the finding that a greater probability of keeping one’s job, because of higher firing costs, raises the value of the job and reduces the worker’s incentives to behave opportunistically; this enables firms to reduce wages. Hence, if firms pay efficiency wages, a higher degree of labour market flexibility increases unemployment.     

Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts.     

The Impact of Worker and Establishment‐level Characteristics on Male–Female Wage Differentials: Evidence from Danish Matched Employee–Employer Data

Abstract. This paper uses matched employer–employee data from Denmark to examine how gender segregation at the level of occupation, industry, establishment, and job‐cell impacts the gender wage differential of full‐time, private‐sector salaried and manual workers. Wage effects of gender segregation at the above four levels are estimated through fixed effects or through controls for the proportion females within these structures. We find that occupation has a much larger role than industry or establishment in accounting for the gender gap for salaried but not manual workers, and that for both groups there is a significant within‐job‐cell gender wage differential.     

Employment Protection and the Incidence of Unemployment: A Theoretical Framework

Abstract. The present paper aims to analyse the effects of employment protection on a heterogeneous labour force. To this end, a standard matching model with employment protection has been extended to allow for the existence of two types of workers differing from each other only in the probability of becoming less productive while holding a job. In working out the model it turns out that in equilibrium workers with a relatively higher probability of becoming less productive face both a higher turnover and a longer duration of unemployment. Therefore, employment protection here raises the unemployment rate of this worker category, a result which looks consistent with consolidated evidence but contrasts with standard theoretical results.