Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.     

基于RFID技术的双供应链投资决策研究

本文考虑零售商主导的分别由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两条竞争型供应链中,当两个供应商都未投资RFID技术、只有一个供应商投资RFID技术以及两个供应商同时投资RFID技术时,考虑供应商成本结构的差异,对比分析供应链的投资决策。由于模型解析解过于复杂,本文通过算例分析,着重考虑产品的替代率、RFID标签价格以及库存可获得率三个因素对供应链成员利润的影响。结果表明两条供应链对RFID技术的投资决策会因成本结构和产品替代率的不同而发生变化,其中在两个供应商生产成本差异较大且产品竞争强度较低时,生产成本较高的供应商更愿意投资RFID技术,而生产成本较低的供应商不愿意投资RFID技术,两个零售商则希望使用RFID技术,所以此时仅会有一条供应链上的成员达成一致,决定投资使用RFID技术。     

考虑政府补贴与企业社会责任的两级供应链优化

企业社会责任问题日益受到管理者和研究者关注。研究随机需求下由一个供应商与一个零售商组成的分散式供应链，探讨政府补贴对供应链最优生产与社会责任投入决策的影响，并比较分析了分别由供应商与零售商主导下供应链的运作效率。结果表明，在集中式供应链中价格弹性对采购数量和企业社会责任总投入量的影响更为显著；而在分散式供应链中加入政府补贴因素，会使总收益呈现出倒U形的发展趋势，且零售商主导的分散式供应链会因政府补贴的减少表现出迅速下降的趋势；此外增加政府补贴，会使得供应商主导的分散式供应链中的供应商降低其企业社会责任投入，但对于零售商主导的分散式供应链的影响却不大。     

食品供应链中质量投入的演化博弈分析

针对频频出现的食品安全事件,以及食品供应链质量投入的外部正效应问题,建立了供应商与制造商食品质量投入的演化博弈模型,并进行求解分析。结果表明:食品供应商与制造商的质量投入策略与双方质量投入产出比密切相关,当双方质量投入产出比不断变化时,出现多种演化稳定均衡。如果"搭便车"行为从对方质量投入中获得的收益很大,则供应商或者制造商进行质量投入的积极性会大大降低。政府进行调控,对于"搭便车"行为进行惩罚,迫使供应商或制造商进行质量投入,对于质量投入产出比较小的供应商或制造商给予补贴,激励他们进行质量投入,增大食品的安全性。     

供应链中纵向信息获取和横向信息共享策略研究

研究由一个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商之间的横向信息共享策略和制造商的信息获取以及最优定价问题。在模型中,制造商同时为两家零售商提供等价商品,零售商向消费者销售商品且进行价格竞争。以Bertrand博弈为研究手段,求解了零售商的均衡销售价格、订货量决策和信息共享策略,制造商的最大利润和最优批发价格,以及供应链利润。分析比较了在制造商不同的信息获取策略下,零售商、制造商和供应链的利润。研究表明,零售商之间完全信息共享始终为占优策略。但制造商获取下游信息时会使得自身利润增加,零售商利润减少,因此零售商不会主动把信息共享给制造商。考虑到下游的边界均衡解,供应链的利润变化还与市场的不确定性和产品的替代性有关。当产品替代性较高或产品替代率较低且市场的不确定性处于中间水平时,制造商获取信息后供应链利润增加,此时制造商可以用部分增加的利润成功购买零售商信息。该模型为上游制造商提供了最优定价和信息获取策略,也为下游零售商提供了求解自身最优销售价格、订货量和信息共享决策的方法。     

考虑双重努力因素的制造商和零售商投资机制设计

以往研究主要集中在制造商的质量提高和零售商的销售努力投资。而本文在需求依赖于质量努力和销售努力的前提下,制造商和零售商遵循Stackelberg博弈情形,研究不同供应链成员承担质量努力和销售努力成本对产品定价和利润的影响。商业实践表明,制造商和零售商都有动机对质量努力和销售努力进行投资,由此制定三种投资决策模式：制造商和零售商分别投资、仅制造商投资和仅零售商投资质量努力和销售努力。研究结果表明,零售价格、订购量、质量努力和销售努力水平均随着质量和销售努力成本的增大而递减;制造商更愿意让零售商投资质量努力和销售努力,而零售商可能不愿意让制造商进行投资;在零售商独立投资的情形下,供应链成员的利润以及质量努力和销售努力水平大于其他情形。     

双向部分透明供应链的大数据投资决策与激励

针对供应链中需求大数据的分散投资与决策激励问题,考虑单个供应商和制造商均能通过大数据投资预测需求,且彼此可共享部分大数据。建立基于上下游间双向部分透明的大数据投资决策模型,揭示双向透明对于大数据应用价值与投资激励的影响,并设计契约合作机制解决大数据投资的激励失调问题。研究发现：双向透明总是对供应商有利,当逆向透明度低时,正向部分透明可能对制造商最有利,当正向透明度低时,促进双向透明可能对所有参与者均有利;正向透明而逆向不透明有利于提高大数据投资的可行性;制造商只存在大数据投资激励不足,而供应商在双向透明度低时还存在大数据投资激励过度;投资补偿契约能协调各参与者的大数据投资激励,且可提升系统投资利润5-49%。     

CSR投入对闭环供应链定价与协调决策的影响

研究了供应链成员的社会责任（CSR）投入行为对闭环供应链决策的影响。考虑了闭环供应链中以下四种不同的CSR投入方式：（1）无CSR投入;（2）制造商投入CSR;（3）零售商投入CSR;（4）制造商和零售商同时投入CSR。通过对比不同模型的均衡决策和利润,发现制造商和零售商同时进行CSR投入的方式对闭环供应链决策成员和系统均最有利,而零售商投入CSR的方式优于制造商投入CSR方式。其次,以集中化决策模型的最优结果为基准,探讨了不同CSR投入方式下分散化闭环供应链系统的协调机制设计问题。结果表明：两部定价契约能有效实现CSR约束的闭环供应链的协调;且在制造商与零售商同时投入CSR决策情形,契约中制造商的议价能力最弱,零售商的议价能力最强。最后,通过算例分析了模型中关键参数对闭环供应链均衡决策与利润的影响,并进一步对闭环供应链协调的性能进行了分析。     

不同权力结构下供应链企业社会责任激励

本文以单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链为对象,假设仅考虑供应商对产品安全方面的社会责任,研究了在供应商主导和零售商主导两种权力配置模式下,供应商履行社会责任程度的差异,以及如何在供应商和零售商间建立合理的契约以激励供应商社会责任的履行。研究发现,相对供应商主导,在零售商主导下供应商会更多地履行社会责任。引入收入共享的事后契约和成本共担的事前契约后,在供应商主导下,两种契约在一定条件下均能有效地激励供应商更好地履行社会责任,但在留存比例与分担比例相等的条件下,成本共担契约的激励效应更强。在零售商主导下,收入共享契约虽能激励供应商的社会责任履行,但因导致零售商的利润下降,故无法达成,而成本共担契约只有在分担足够大时才有激励效应。     

供应链中CSR运作:相互激励、CSR配置与合作

基于Baron为代表的战略CSR观点和一条由上游制造商和下游零售商构成的两级供应链,用制造商和零售商是否被要求实施CSR行为来描述供应链中的CSR配置,分别建立求解了三种CSR配置下的三阶段非合作运作模型。相应的均衡社会业绩和经济业绩之间的比较结果表明,在消费者对供应链中的CSR行为具有积极反应的条件下,由于制造商和零售商的CSR行为之间的策略性互补性导致的相互激励机制,使得“制造商和零售商各自为自己的CSR行为负责”这一CSR配置获得的经济业绩和社会业绩均较高。进一步,合作运作下的Nash讨价还价解显示,由于合作的运作方式可以克服非合作运作中存在于产品交易阶段的双重加价的问题和CSR策略性行为互动阶段的CSR行为动机不足问题,从而可以进一步提高社会业绩和经济业绩。这些结果一方面为解决"哪个节点企业应当对供应链整体的社会责任行为负责"这一争议提供了一个理论回应;另一方面,指出供应链中的CSR行为的管理,重点不是CSR在供应链中如何配置,而在于是否采用合作的运作方式。     

企业进入权、组织控制与跨国公司专用性投资激励

论文从国际生产组织控制视角,将Rajan和Zingales^[1]进入权思想融入国际生产与贸易模型中,研究跨国公司专用性投资激励问题。研究发现,在进入权的机会控制和数量调整机制作用下,跨国公司通过限制进入、替代竞争来激发当地供应商做出事前定制投资、分摊投资和事后最优专用性投资,确保获取合意投入品和预期最大化利润。当前,政府要引导外向企业致力于微观企业主体的制度建设和组织能力培养,构建起中国国际生产网络及其组织机制,为推进对外直接投资和企业国际化经营提供微观保障。     

基于讨价还价模型的持股型供应链最优订货与定价策略研究

论文分析了风险规避型供应商和制造商组成的供应链系统，为了降低供应的不确定等因素，通过制造商投资供应商并持股的方式降低供应链的整体风险。构造均值-方差模型刻画制造商和供应商的风险偏好特征，并通过构建纳什讨价还价模型分析供应商和制造商的交易谈判过程。论文证明了纳什讨价还价模型存在唯一的均衡合同，并对均衡合同进行了比较静态分析，提出了可供实践企业参考的管理启示。     

基于激励相容契约的ATO式供应链交叉协调研究

考虑由两个零部件供应商与单个制造商组成的按订单装配式供应链中的信息不对称问题。以完全信息下各成员的利润作为基准,分析了成本类型信息占优的单个供应商"信息伪装"对纵向制造商和横向互补供应商所造成的损失,提出了基于激励相容的供应商-制造商纵向契约和横向互补供应商参与下的交叉协调契约。通过数学建模和仿真数据分析,研究表明：制造商主导的针对单个信息不对称供应商的激励契约,会产生"低端向下扭曲"现象,降低了横向供应商的最优订单量;制造商与横向的信息对称供应商分担信息租金而形成的交叉协调,在显示真实成本信息的同时,还可以提高最优订单量和整个供应链的全局利润。     

Investment in Shared Suppliers: Effect of Learning,Spillover, and Competition

We investigate the optimal strategies for firms to invest in their suppliers when the benefits of such investments can spillover to other firms who also source from the same suppliers. We consider two Bayesian firms that can invest in improving the quality of their shared supplier; the firms do not have complete information on the true quality of the supplier, but they update their beliefs based on the supplier's performance. We formulate the problem as an investment game and obtain Markov perfect equilibria characterized by the investment thresholds of both firms. The equilibrium investment strategies of the two firms are characterized by a region of preemption and a region of war of attrition. We also examine how the interplay between spillover, competition, and returns from the investment at shared suppliers affect the investment threshold and the time to the leader's investment, and identify the conditions under which competition delays or hastens the first investment in a shared supplier.     

基于采购商投资的双源采购与供应商定价决策

随着供应链的全球化发展,供应链成员企业的合作越来越紧密。许多采购商通过直接对供应商投资提高供应的可靠性或降低采购成本。本文研究双供应商-单采购商的两级供应链中采购商投资、供应商定价以及采购商采购决策。在此供应链中,供应商和采购商之间存在先后决策的Stackelberg博弈,供应商之间存在同时决策的贝特兰德博弈。本文考虑异质供应商,即供应成本与稳定性存在差异,接受采购商投资后两者的改进效应也不同,建立了采购商投资、供应商定价、采购商采购三阶段博弈模型,基于凸优化理论和博弈分析方法对问题进行分析,并应用邻域搜索的自适应差分计划算法对问题进行求解。研究了供应链成员企业的最优均衡决策,分析供应成本、供应稳定性以及投资改进效应对最优均衡决策的影响。     

产品组合竞争下远视互补品供应商联盟的稳定结构

考虑由4个远视供应商与1个零售商所组成的两层供应链系统,基于最大一致集的概念,探讨部分供应商可替代时互补品联合销售联盟的远视稳定结构。研究发现:当供应商的成本相差较小时,如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较小,则远视供应商会偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商;如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较大,则远视供应商会偏好形成一个由3个供应商联合销售的大联盟。当供应商的成本相差较大时,远视供应商会偏好形成联合销售的大联盟,或者偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商。但是,两个供应商形成的联合销售联盟不是远视稳定的。     

The Effect of Earnings‐Based Metrics on Vertical Efficiency

The tendency to rely on accounting earnings as the primary metric of corporate performance has been subject to criticism in recent times. A key concern is that earnings misrepresent changes in value in that cash outlays occur upfront but expenses are recognized only over time. While recognized expenses indeed add up to the initial cash outflow, the equality holds only in undiscounted (nominal), not discounted (real), terms. Accordingly, corporate earnings figures suffer from a form of money illusion. In this paper, we demonstrate that such money illusion can have an upside when it is present in vertical relationships subject to self‐interest. In particular, a buyer who focuses on earnings has incentives to increase purchases since it does not immediately encounter the full cost of cash outflows. These added incentives can promote more efficient trade. We also show that the increased incentives to buy can also lead to Pareto improvements by spurring the supplier to invest more in developing technology. Finally, we demonstrate that judiciously chosen inventory valuation rules can lead to efficient supply chain outcomes. Thus, efficiency can be achieved when supply chain parties freely trade and regulators specify only the accounting rules under which they operate.     

The Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue‐sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue‐sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue‐sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue‐sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue‐sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.     

A neuroscience-based model of why and when CEO social values affect investments in corporate social responsibility

Why and when do CEOs invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR)? We theorize how CEOs' intrinsic motivations – their social values – and the incentivizing context interact to determine the utility they attach to generating collectively beneficial outcomes in decision-making, subsequently manifested in organizations' CSR investments. Based on a review of neuroscience evidence, indicating that social values are associated with distinct patterns of neural activation, we propose that these values are the compass by which CEOs navigate in complex decision environments. For CEOs with other-regarding values, generating collectively beneficial outcomes is part and parcel of their utility function. They are intrinsically motivated to invest in CSR, regardless of context. In contrast, CEOs with self-regarding values derive utility from generating collective benefits only when it is monetarily or socially incentivized. They are extrinsically motivated to invest in CSR when they stand to gain from it personally.     

VERTICAL RELATIONS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS

We model the impact that credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. Firms which might face credit constraints in future investments become endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable assets. In the short run, the optimal supply contract involves risk sharing, so inducing double marginalization. Credit constraints thus result in higher retail prices, and this is true whether the firm is debt or equity funded. Further, we offer a new theory of supplier finance arms as we show an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending which reduces financing inefficiencies created by informational asymmetries. The model offers: a theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints; a transmission mechanism linking the cost of borrowing with retail prices; and a motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution) in the face of market risk.