Sourcing Decisions with Stochastic Supplier Reliability and Stochastic Demand

Supplier sourcing strategies are a crucial factor driving supply chain success. In this paper, we investigate the implications of uncertain supplier reliability on a firm's sourcing decisions in an environment with stochastic demand. In particular, we characterize specific conditions under which a firm should choose a single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategy. In an environment with both uncertain demand and supply, we characterize the total order quantity, the number of suppliers selected for order placement, and the allocation of the total order quantity among these selected suppliers. For deeper managerial insight, we also examine the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to interactions between uncertainties in product demand and supply reliability. We show that sourcing from a single supplier is an optimal strategy for environments characterized by high levels of demand uncertainty or high salvage values. A numerical analysis based on data obtained from an office products retailer further reinforces our analytical results. In addition, we also find that when minimal order quantities are imposed, there are situations where it is not optimal to place an order with the lowest cost supplier.     

Sourcing from Multiple Suppliers for Price‐Dependent Demands

We analyze a model that integrates demand shaping via dynamic pricing and risk mitigation via supply diversification. The firm under consideration replenishes a certain product from a set of capacitated suppliers for a price‐dependent demand in each period. Under deterministic capacities, we derive a multilevel base stock list price policy and establish the optimality of cost‐based supplier selection, that is, ordering from a cheaper source before more expensive ones. With general random capacities, however, neither result holds. While it is optimal to price low for a high inventory level, the optimal order quantities are not monotone with respect to the inventory level. In general, a near reorder‐point policy should be followed. Specifically, there is a reorder point for each supplier such that no order is issued to him when the inventory level is above this point and a positive order is placed almost everywhere when the inventory level is below this point. Under this policy, it may be profitable to order exclusively from the most expensive source. We characterize conditions under which a strict reorder‐point policy and a cost‐based supplier‐selection criterion become optimal. Moreover, we quantify the benefit from dynamic pricing, as opposed to static pricing, and the benefit from multiple sourcing, as opposed to single sourcing. We show that these two strategies exhibit a substitutable relationship. Dynamic pricing is less effective under multiple sourcing than under single sourcing, and supplier diversification is less valuable with price adjustments than without. Under limited supply, dynamic pricing yields a robust, long‐term profit improvement. The value of supply diversification, in contrast, mainly comes from added capacities and is most significant in the short run.     

时变需求环境下供应链缺货时点与补货次数优化研究

本文基于博弈模型,研究在时变需求和无替代供应源的环境下供需双方缺货时点和补货次数的纳什均衡问题,并通过算例,具体分析了供需之间的关系,主要结论有:配送商的补货次数越大,零售商库存成本越小;补货次数优化后零售商与配送商的库存成本明显下降。     

Supply Diversification with Responsive Pricing

We study sourcing and pricing decisions of a firm with correlated suppliers and a price‐dependent demand. With two suppliers, the insight—cost is the order qualifier while reliability is the order winner—derived in the literature for the case of exogenously determined price and independent suppliers, continues to hold when the suppliers' capacities are correlated. Moreover, a firm orders only from one supplier if the effective purchase cost from him, which includes the imputed cost of his unreliability, is lower than the wholesale price charged by his rival. Otherwise, the firm orders from both. Furthermore, the firm's diversification decision does not depend on the correlation between the two suppliers' random capacities. However, its order quantities do depend on the capacity correlation, and, if the firm's objective function is unimodal, the total order quantity decreases as the capacity correlation increases in the sense of the supermodular order. With more than two suppliers, the insight no longer holds. That is, when ordering from two or more suppliers, one is the lowest‐cost supplier and the others are not selected on the basis of their costs. We conclude the paper by developing a solution algorithm for the firm's optimal diversification problem.     

Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Management with Dual Suppliers of Different Lead Times and Disruption Risks

It is common for a firm to make use of multiple suppliers of different delivery lead times, reliabilities, and costs. In this study, we are concerned with the joint pricing and inventory control problem for such a firm that has a quick‐response supplier and a regular supplier that both suffer random disruptions, and faces price‐sensitive random demands. We aim at characterizing the optimal ordering and pricing policies in each period over a planning horizon, and analyzing the impacts of supply source diversification. We show that, when both suppliers are unreliable, the optimal inventory policy in each period is a reorder point policy and the optimal price is decreasing in the starting inventory level in that period. In addition, we show that having supply source diversification or higher supplier reliability increases the firm's optimal profit and lowers the optimal selling price. We also demonstrate that, with the selling price as a decision, a supplier may receive even more orders from the firm after an additional supplier is introduced. For the special case where the quick‐response supplier is perfectly reliable, we further show that the optimal inventory policy is of a base‐stock type and the optimal pricing policy is a list‐price policy with markdowns.     

Offshore Outsourcing,Yield Uncertainty,and Contingency Responses

In this article, we study an offshore outsourcing arrangement for a buyer of a produced good in the presence of supply yield uncertainty. We analyze the performance of contingency responses to the realized yield information at the end of production and prior to its delivery to the destination market. The contingency responses considered are: (i) Emergency Production via which an emergency order is placed with another fast and perfectly reliable offshore supplier; (ii) Emergency Production and Delivery via which an expedited shipping of (partial or total) good units is used on top of Emergency Production. Within a periodic review inventory system with uncertain demand setting, we theoretically characterize the optimal decisions on the cycle order size, the emergency order size, and the way to split the available good units between the fast and slow shipping modes. We provide comparative statics on how the choices of these quantities are affected by each other and by the demand and yield uncertainties. We use numerical examples to illustrate the values of such contingency responses and the impact of other factors on the cost of meeting demand.     

Flexible Backup Supply and the Management of Lead‐Time Uncertainty

We consider replenishment decisions for a constant rate demand environment from a supplier with uncertain lead times. We study the potential use of a flexible backup supplier as an emergency response to accurate lead‐time information arriving at (or close after) the beginning of the demand interval and well after an original order with the stochastic lead‐time supplier has been placed. The emergency response decisions involve whether to order and how much from the flexible backup supplier, with the objective of minimizing the cost of meeting demand. We derive the optimal emergency‐response policy and clearly outline its implications on the optimized safety lead time of the original order placement and on the cost of meeting demand. We examine the impact on the use of the flexible backup supplier of factors like the arrival time of accurate lead‐time information and the response lead time of the backup supplier. We further study the potential benefits of the use of the flexible backup supplier in a dual role: as one of the two suppliers in a redundant supply system assigned to originally meet the demand and as an emergency response to later‐arriving lead‐time information. Our numerical studies illustrate the benefits from the use of the flexible backup supplier as an emergency response, but for reasonable purchase premiums and short lead times of flexible backup supply options, their use in a dual (regular and emergency response) role often leads to improved performance over safety lead‐time single and uncertain lead‐time supplier‐replenishment strategies. The benefits of the backup supply options are accentuated the higher the lead‐time uncertainty of the stochastic lead‐time supplier is.     

Inventory Rationing for Multiple Class Demand under Continuous Review

We consider how a firm should ration inventory to multiple classes in a stochastic demand environment with partial, class‐dependent backlogging where the firm incurs a fixed setup cost when ordering from its supplier. We present an infinite‐horizon, average cost criterion Markov decision problem formulation for the case with zero lead times. We provide an algorithm that determines the optimal rationing policy, and show how to find the optimal base‐stock reorder policy. Numerical studies indicate that the optimal policy is similar to that given by the equivalent deterministic problem and relies on tracking both the current inventory and the rate that backorder costs are accumulating. Our study of the case of non‐zero lead time shows that a heuristic combining the optimal, zero lead time policy with an allocation policy based on a single‐period profit management problem is effective.     

A mixed inventory model with variable lead time and random supplier capacity

In this paper, we have studied analytically the implication of a controllable lead-time and a random supplier capacity on the continuous review inventory policy, in which the order quantity, reorder point and lead-time are decision variables. Two models are considered: the normal lead-time demand and lead-time demand is distributed free. For both cases, after formulating the general model, some properties of the optimal ordering policy have been developed. Particularly, we have shown that the expected annual total cost is a unimodal function and quasi-convex in the order quantity. When the variable capacity distribution is exponential, we develop effective procedures for finding the optimal solutions. Furthermore, the effects of parameters are also performed.     

Supplier competition and its impact on firm׳s sourcing strategy

Most research on firms׳ sourcing strategies assumes that wholesale prices and reliability of suppliers are exogenous. It is of our interest to study suppliers׳ competition on both wholesale price and reliability and firms׳ corresponding optimal sourcing strategy under complete information. In particular, we study a problem in which a firm procures a single product from two suppliers, taking into account suppliers׳ price and reliability differences. This motivates the suppliers to compete on these two factors. We investigate the equilibria of this supplier game and the firm׳s corresponding sourcing decisions. Our study shows that suppliers׳ reliability often plays a more important role than wholesale price in supplier competition and that maintaining high reliability and a high wholesale price is the ideal strategy for suppliers if multiple options exist. The conventional wisdom implies that low supply reliability and high demand uncertainty motivate dual-sourcing. We notice that when the suppliers׳ shared market/transportation network is often disrupted and demand uncertainty is high, suppliers׳ competition on both price and reliability may render the sole-sourcing strategy to be optimal in some cases that depend on the format of suppliers׳ cost functions. Moreover, numerical study shows that when the cost or vulnerability (to market disruptions) of one supplier increases, its profit and that of the firm may not necessarily decrease under supplier competition.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

需求替代情形下反应能力的价值分析

本文通过对竞争报童模型加以拓展以研究需求替代情形下企业运用反应能力产生的价值。文中考虑了两种不同的需求结构:第一种中企业总需求是竞争双方库存量的分段线性函数,第二种中企业总需求的均值是双方库存水平任意形式的函数。根据需求结构的不同,建立了不同的库存竞争模型并提出了相应的均衡库存策略。基于这些均衡结论,进一步探讨了反应能力的价值。分析表明运用反应能力能在降低企业库存水平的同时提高顾客服务水平。此外,在不同的需求结构下,运用反应能力产生的价值均随可用反应能力以及缺货惩罚成本递增,而随单位反应能力的使用成本递减。     

库存成本变化的VMI供应链协调

提出了库存成本变化的经济订货批量(EOQ)模型，基于该模型研究了库存成本变化时供应商管理库存(VMI)系统的最优协议问题。在该系统中，订货商和供应商达成缺货成本共担协议：当缺货发生时，供应商需要向订货商支付缺货补偿。订货商和供应商分散决策，订货商通过设计协议来减少其成本，而供应商通过制定补货决策来缩小自身成本。通过与传统系统和整合系统的比较，得出了库存成本变化时VMI系统的最优补货决策和缺货成本共担协议。采用数值算例验证了分析结果。结果表明，当且仅当供应商预期成本等于整合系统的最小总成本与固定缺货罚金之和时，VMI系统与整合系统具有相同的补货决策和系统绩效，即能够实现供应链协调。     

Coordinating Supply Chains via Advance‐Order Discounts,Minimum Order Quantities,and Delegations

To avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders from their customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs. We consider a situation where the supplier's production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre‐established price, we examine whether the supplier should offer advance‐order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance‐order discount contract is Pareto‐improving, our analysis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre‐specified minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance‐order discount, then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier to attain the first‐best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract, the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto‐improving. We extend our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders. Our structural results obtained for the one‐supplier‐one‐manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two manufacturers.     

An integrated supplier selection and inventory problem with multi-sourcing and lateral transshipments

In this research, we consider the supplier selection problem of a firm offering a single product via multiple warehouses. The warehouses face stationary, stochastic demand and replenish their inventory via multiple suppliers, to be determined from a set of candidates, with varying price, capacity, quality, and disruption characteristics. Additionally, the warehouses may simultaneously replenish their inventory from other warehouses proactively. With these characteristics, the problem is a multi-sourcing, supplier selection, and inventory problem with lateral transshipments. Even though the benefits of multi-sourcing and lateral transshipments have been presented in the literature individually to mitigate risks associated with uncertain demand and disrupted supply, the intertwined sourcing and inventory decisions under these settings have not been investigated from a quantitative perspective. We develop a decomposition based heuristic algorithm, powered with simulation. While the decomposition based heuristic determines a solution with supplier selection and inventory decisions, the simulation model evaluates the objective function value corresponding to each generated solution. Experimental results show, contrary to the existing literature, inferior decisions may result when considering the selection of suppliers solely on unit and/or contractual costs. We also evaluate the impact of multi-sourcing with rare but long disruptions compared to frequent but short ones.     

面对共同供应商时的市场进入决策

研究了海外零售商在与本土零售商拥有相同供应商的情况下最优的市场进入策略,以及市场进入决策对供应商的定价决策和零售商的采购决策的影响.把进入决策分为3种类型,分别命名为"市场开拓型"、"采购导向型"和"双重收益型".研究发现当企业目标进入的市场规模比原有市场大时,企业的进入决策为"市场开拓型";而当企业的目标进入市场规模比原有市场小时,企业的进入决策为"采购导向型";当两个市场规模接近时,企业的进入决策为"双重收益型".还研究了市场进入成本对企业进入决策的影响.随着进入成本的增加,海外企业选择进入国内市场的可能性越来越小.而且当进入成本足够大的情况下,其进入只能为"市场开拓型"或"采购导向型",即不可能在两个市场同时获益.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

Managing Slow‐Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

We address the value of information and value of centralized control in the context of a two‐echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provide a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow‐moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as decentralized information sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit‐maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, centralized control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company‐owned stores or vendor‐managed inventory. We measure the value of information and value of centralized control as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the value of information, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto‐improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.     

Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

Impacts of buyers' order batching on the supplier's demand correlation and capacity utilization in a branching supply chain

There are several ways for a manufacturer to cope with demand uncertainty, e.g. inventories, capacity and cash. Among these, this study focuses on the second one, the capacity, especially on the problem of investing in flexible facilities and enhancing their utilization via demand management. In a supply chain, demands that an upstream firm (supplier) faces are the purchase orders from the downstream members (buyers). We analyse the impacts of buyers' order batching on the supplier's demand correlation and capacity utilization in a simple branching supply chain, where a supplier does business with two buyers whose market demands are correlated. Our results show that: (i) a supplier whofacesa smaller demand correlation coefficient (i.e. closer to-1) would invest more in flexible facilities; (ii) an increase in order lot size mitigates the correlation of purchase orders; and (iii) a supplier whose facilities are flexible would prefer frequent orders with smaller lots only when market demands are highly negatively correlated. This means that even suppliers whose facilities are flexible would rather prefer infrequent orders with larger lots in the presence of positively correlated demands. Additionally, some managerial implications are discussed.