DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk‐averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS: PREEMPTIVE OR POST‐DEFAULT

Sovereign debt restructurings can be implemented preemptively—prior to a payment default. We code a comprehensive new data set and find that preemptive restructurings (i) are frequent (38% of all deals 1978–2010), (ii) have lower haircuts, (iii) are quicker to negotiate, and (iv) see lower output losses. To rationalize these stylized facts, we build a quantitative sovereign debt model that incorporates preemptive and post‐default renegotiations. The model improves the fit with the data and explains the sovereign's optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex ante, while defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks. Empirical evidence supports these predictions.     

Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution

This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy—the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment—can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite general Ramsey policies, including time‐varying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)     

Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT RELIEF AND ITS AFTERMATH

This paper studies sovereign debt relief in a long‐term perspective. We quantify the relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1920–1939, focusing on the defaults on official (government to government) debt in advanced economies after World War I; and 1978–2010, focusing on emerging market debt crises with private external creditors. Debt relief was substantial in both eras, averaging 21% of GDP in the 1930s and 16% of GDP in recent decades. We then analyze the aftermath of debt relief and conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis around the synchronous war debt defaults of 1934 and the Baker and Brady initiatives of the 1980s/1990s. The economic landscape of debtor countries improves significantly after debt relief operations, but only if these involve debt write‐offs. Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit ratings. (JEL: E6, F3, N0, H6)     

SYSTEMIC AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES

The theoretical literature on sovereign defaults has focused on adverse shocks to debtors' economies, suggesting that defaults are of an idiosyncratic nature. Still, sovereign debt crises are also of a systemic nature, clustered around panics in the financial center, such as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis in 2008. Crises in the financial centers are rare disasters and, thus, their effects on the periphery can only be captured by examining long episodes. In this paper, we examine sovereign defaults from 1820 to the Great Depression, with a focus on Latin America. We find that 63% of the crises are of a systemic nature. These crises are different. Both the international collapse of liquidity and the growth slowdown in the financial centers are at their core. These global shocks trigger longer default spells and larger losses for investors.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT SUSTAINABILITY IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES

We develop a measure of maximum sustainable government debt for advanced economies. How much investors are willing to lend to a country's government depends on the country's expected primary surplus, the level and volatility of its rate of growth, and how much debt the government expects to be able to raise in the future for the purpose of servicing the debt it seeks to raise today. We provide a simple formula that computes a country's maximum sustainable debt (MSD) as a function of four easy‐to‐estimate parameters. We further compute a country's theoretical probability of default (PD) as a function of its debt‐to‐GDP ratio. We finally calibrate our measures for 23 OECD countries and test the relation between sovereign yield spreads and our theoretical PD at prevailing debt levels. We find it to be strongly statistically significant.     

违约风险、银行信贷筛选与货币政策非对称效应

本文构建一个包含企业违约风险与银行信贷筛选的动态随机一般均衡模型,研究银行信贷筛选对货币政策宏观经济效应产生的影响。在参数校准的基础上,分析了货币政策冲击的长期效应与短期效应。研究结果显示：(1)无论是基于长期还是短期效应的角度,银行信贷筛选均显著抑制了扩张性货币政策对宏观经济产生的积极影响;(2)基于货币政策冲击的短期效应可以发现,银行信贷筛选降低了扩张性货币政策的实际效应,并且放大了货币政策对通胀的影响;(3)通过比较扩张性与紧缩性货币政策的脉冲响应可以发现,银行信贷筛选导致货币政策的宏观经济效应存在非对称性特征。福利分析的结果表明,相比无银行信贷筛选的情形而言,银行信贷筛选导致了整体社会福利的恶化。     

INSULATION IMPOSSIBLE: MONETARY POLICY AND REGIONAL DEBT SPILLOVERS IN A FEDERATION

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy in the presence of debt spillovers within a monetary union. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of any member country will generally influence equilibrium wages and interest rates across the whole union. We ask whether there exists a monetary policy which can offset these spillovers. Within a general class of monetary policy rules, there does not exist one that completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in the other. These debt spillovers will affect welfare through two channels: intertemporal efficiency and redistribution.     

货币供应机制与财政支出的乘数效应——基于DSGE的分析

本文通过构建包括货币供应机制的DSGE模型,分析了中国政府购买支出和公共投资支出的乘数效应,发现两类财政支出对私人消费和私人投资都产生了挤出效应,公共资本的产出弹性低是产生挤出效应的结构性原因,在中国货币供应机制减小对通货膨胀负向反应和增大对产出正向反应的配合下,政府购买支出和公共投资支出能够对私人消费和私人投资产生正向的挤入效应。     

COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN A MONETARY ECONOMY

This paper reviews the role of collateral constraints in transforming small monetary shocks into large persistent output fluctuations. We do this by introducing money in the heterogeneous‐agent real economy of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Money enters in a cash‐in‐advance constraint and money supply is managed via open‐market operations. We find that a monetary shock generates persistent movements in aggregate output, the amplitude of which depends upon whether or not debt contracts are indexed. If only nominal contracts are traded, money shocks can trigger large output fluctuations. In this case a money expansion triggers a boom, whereas money contractions generate recessions. In contrast, if contracts are indexed then amplification is not only smaller; it can also generate the reverse results. When the possibility of default and renegotiation is considered, the model can generate asymmetric business cycles with recessions milder than booms. Finally, monetary shocks generate a highly persistent dampening cycle rather than a smoothly declining deviation. (JEL: E32, E43, E44, E52)     

SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

货币政策作用的有效性和非对称性研究

货币政策的非对称性主要是指货币政策在经济周期的不同阶段具有不同的作用效果。通过对货币政策状态（扩张性和紧缩性）的度量，我们检验发现在我国经济运行当中，紧缩性货币政策对于经济的减速作用大于扩张性货币政策对于经济的加速作用。因此，在经济收缩阶段应该实行稳健性货币政策来规避金融风险和防范通货膨胀，采用积极财政政策刺激投资需求和消费需求，以保持经济的快速稳定增长。     

央行沟通与实际干预的频域政策效果研究

利用谱分析识别宏观变量的主导频域,进而采用小波方法分离出宏观变量的低频、经济周期频域以及高频三种频域成分,最后构建结构向量自回归模型考察实际干预工具和央行信息沟通在不同频域的政策效果.研究结果显示,中国经济增长的波动由长周期的低频波动所主导,经济周期频域次之,但是所有货币政策工具对低频波动的调控效果都不理想,而只在经济周期频域有较好表现.通货膨胀则是由经济周期频域的波动所主导,价格型货币政策和央行沟通都呈现出对此频域的良好调控效果.预期通胀在各个频域的波动分布较为均衡,央行沟通在低频和经济周期频域均起到了良好的调控效果,体现出其在预期管理中的突出作用.数量型货币政策整体表现均不理想.     

地方政府债券发行额度的优化配置研究

地方政府债券"自发自还"模式虽然可以有效解决以往模式发行主体和偿债主体的不一致性,但高层级地方政府在分配债券资源时仍然面临着较大的信息不对称和道德风险。本文依据结构化模型及契约理论,从高层级地方政府的角度构建了地方政府债券发行额度的分配决策模型。在效益风险合理搭配的框架下,通过使用遗传算法对双重目标进行加权,分析了省级政府与地（市）级政府之间的债券优化配置方案。研究结果表明,基于经济社会效益最大化和政府债券违约概率最小化等多目标优化求解,可以实现政府债券资源分配的帕累托改进。这对于地方政府债务风险显性化和政府债券合理配置研究将大有裨益,从而有利于科学管控我国日益严峻的地方政府债务风险。     

WHAT MEASURE OF INFLATION SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK TARGET?

This paper assumes that a central bank commits itself to maintaining an inflation target and then asks what measure of the inflation rate the central bank should use if it wants to maximize economic stability. The paper first formalizes this problem and examines its microeconomic foundations. It then shows how the weight of a sector in the stability price index depends on the sector's characteristics, including size, cyclical sensitivity, sluggishness of price adjustment, and magnitude of sectoral shocks. When a numerical illustration of the problem is calibrated to U.S. data, one tentative conclusion is that a central bank that wants to achieve maximum stability of economic activity should use a price index that gives substantial weight to the level of nominal wages. (JEL: E42, E52, E58)     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

我国货币政策作用非对称性和波动性的实证检验

货币政策的非对称性主要是指货币政策在经济周期的不同阶段具有不同的作用效果. 文 章利用描述实际GDP 增长率波动成分的各种GARCH 模型检验发现,在我国经济运行当中,紧 缩性货币政策对于经济的减速作用大于扩张性货币政策对于经济的加速作用. 因此,应该在经 济收缩阶段实行稳健性货币政策来规避金融风险和防范通货膨胀,采用积极财政政策刺激投 资需求和消费需求,以保持经济的快速稳定增长.     

粘性信息、通货膨胀惯性与货币政策效应——兼论宏观经济变量的共变性

本文通过构建一个企业获取信息存在粘性的DSGE模型,分析了信息当期宣布和提前宣布或预期到信息两种情况下,发生政府支出和货币供应2种冲击时,宏观经济变量的响应,进而研究主要变量间的共变性与先行滞后关系。结果表明,在基准信息粘性条件下,信息即期宣布,面对政府支出和货币供应冲击,通货膨胀的滞后性存在差异,货币供应冲击发生后的8个季度,通货膨胀达到最大,政府支出6个季度,通货膨胀达到最大,通货膨胀在这2种冲击下均存在惯性。名义利率能够对这2种冲击做出即期反应。信息提前宣布时,通货膨胀和名义利率能够做出即期反应,到信息实现时,在充分吸收信息基础上,反应达到最大,然后呈非连续性快速恢复。从频域和时域角度看,名义利率和通货膨胀2个变量均滞后于实际货币供应,因此,当前可以采用即期增加政府支出的积极财政政策和提前宣布增加货币供应的货币政策相结合的组合政策,达到"稳增长"的目标。