Mass Customization and Guardrails: “You Can Not Be All Things to All People”

A mass customization strategy enables a firm to match its product designs to unique consumer tastes. In a classic horizontal product‐differentiation framework, a consumer's utility is a decreasing function of the distance between their ideal taste and the taste defined by the most closely aligned product the firm offers. A consumer thus considers the taste mismatch associated with their purchased product, but otherwise the positioning of the firm's product portfolio (or, “brand image”) is immaterial. In contrast, self‐congruency theory suggests that consumers assess how well both the purchased product and its overall brand image match with their ideal taste. Therefore, we incorporate within the consumer utility function both product‐specific and brand‐level components. Mass customization has the potential to improve taste alignment with regard to a specific purchased product, but at the risk of increasing brand dilution. Absent brand dilution concerns, a firm will optimally serve all consumers’ ideal tastes at a single price. In contrast, by endogenizing dilution costs within the consumer utility model, we prove that a mass‐customizing firm optimally uses differential pricing. Moreover, we show that the firm offers reduced prices to consumers with extreme tastes (to stimulate consumer “travel”), with a higher and fixed price being offered to those consumers having more central (mainstream) tastes. Given that a continuous spectrum of prices will likely not be practical in application, we also consider the more pragmatic approach of augmenting the uniformly priced mass customization range with preset (non‐customized) outlying designs, which serve customers at the taste extremes. We prove this practical approach performs close to optimal.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

Stock Market Reaction to Green Vehicle Innovation

We study the stock market reaction to announcements of global green vehicle innovation over a 14‐year time span (1996–2009) using the event study methodology. We document that the stock market generally reacts positively to automakers' announcements of environmental innovations, consistent with prior research on the wealth effects of innovation announcements. Our results indicate that crucial green product development decisions such as innovation type and market segment choices exert direct influence on a firm's market value. These results hold after controlling for firm size, leverage, profitability, R&D intensity, and oil price changes.     

Multi‐Product Quality Competition: Impact of Resource Constraints

We study a multi‐product firm with limited capacity where the products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the customer base is heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. While the demand structure creates opportunities through proliferation, the firm should avoid cannibalization between its own products. Moreover, the oligopolistic market structure puts competitive pressure and limits the firm's market share. On the other hand, the firm has limited resources that cause a supply‐side fight for adequate and profitable production. We explicitly characterize the conditions where each force dominates. Our focus is on understanding how capacity constraints and competition affect a firm's product‐mix decisions. We find that considering capacity constraints could significantly change traditional insights (that ignore capacity) related to product‐line design and the role of competition therein. In particular, we show that when the resources are limited, the firm should offer only the product that has the highest margin per unit capacity. We find that this product could be the diametrically opposite product suggested by the existing literature. In addition, we show that for intermediate capacity levels, whereas the margin per unit capacity effect dominates in a less competitive market, proliferation and cannibalization effects dominate in a more competitive market.     

Fixed fee licensing for cost-reducing technologies: Should innovators reveal their private information?

In the process of licensing their technology to downstream firms, innovators often get some information on the firms’ cost reductions. Revealing this information to the market influences the market game, and thereby the licensees’ willingness to pay. We analyze the innovator’s optimal information provision with fixed fee licensing. Our main result is that the innovator should reveal the number of licenses, but should keep silent on the cost reductions of licensees. The intuition is that the innovator’s profit depends only on the willingness to pay of the critical firm which only just buys a license, and this firm benefits if the number of firms is revealed, but nothing is learned on the actual cost distribution.     

Investment in Facility Changeover Flexibility for Early Entry into High‐Tech Markets

A model is introduced to analyze the manufacturing‐marketing interface for a firm in a high‐tech industry that produces a series of high‐volume products with short product life cycles on a single facility. The one‐time strategic decision regarding the firm's investment in changeover flexibility establishes the link between market opportunities and manufacturing capabilities. Specifically, the optimal changeover flexibility decision is determined in the context of the firm's market entry strategy for successive product generations, the changeover cost between generations, and the production efficiency of the facility. Moreover, the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation is obtained as a function of the firm's market entry strategy and manufacturing efficiency. Our findings provide insights linking internal manufacturing capabilities with external market forces for the high‐tech and high‐volume manufacturer of products with short life cycles. We show the impact of manufacturing efficiency and a firm's ability to benefit from volume‐based learning on the dynamic pricing policy for each product generation. The results demonstrate the benefits realized by a firm that works with its manufacturing equipment suppliers to develop more efficient and flexible technology. In addition, we explore how opportunities afforded by pioneer advantage enable a firm operating a less efficient facility to realize long term competitive advantage by deploying an earlier market entry strategy.     

When Should a Firm Open its Source Code: A Strategic Analysis

Deciding to open the source code of a software product has advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage is that the firm loses the revenue from the software. The advantage is that the users' network can contribute to the quality of the software code, which increases the demand for the software and for a complementary product. Demand for the complementary product also goes up, because demand for a product increases when the price of its complement decreases, and under open source, the price of the software product drops down to zero. This paper examines the strategic interactions at work here, within a duopoly framework, and tries to determine the circumstances under which it is optimal for a firm to open its code. We find that firms open the source code when there is a competitive software‐product market, a less competitive complementary‐product market, and when the complementary product is of high quality. Furthermore, it is more profitable for the firm to open the source code if its competitor also does so. When this happens the incentive to open the code can even be higher than in a monopoly situation. More intense competition induces symmetric equilibria in which both firms choose the same strategy.     

Competition and Sustainability: The Impact of Consumer Awareness

Sustainability, a broad concept that includes numerous environmental and social dimensions, has emerged as an important product evaluation criterion for consumers. We suggest the impact of sustainability on consumer behavior depends on two factors—each individual consumer's unique level of concern about sustainability, and the general level of awareness regarding the sustainability of competing products—that together determine the level of heterogeneity among consumer attitudes toward sustainability. We incorporate sustainability concern and awareness into a model of horizontal competition in a duopoly, where one firm's product is more sustainable than the other's. Our results suggest that marginal increases in awareness can benefit all firms, including the less sustainable one, when awareness is sufficiently high (the explicit goal of recent sustainability labeling initiatives). In several model extensions, we provide additional insights for the following cases: the sustainable firm controls the extent of its sustainability advantage, the sustainable firm can directly influence the general level of awareness, and the distribution of sustainability concern across consumers is nonuniform. Our results enable us to suggest several new insights for managers, both those whose products enjoy a sustainability advantage and those whose products do not.     

Opt‐Out Options in New Product Co‐development Partnerships

We study three contractual arrangements—co‐development, licensing, and co‐development with opt‐out options—for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two‐stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co‐development and licensing arrangements: in co‐development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co‐development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co‐development and into a pre‐agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co‐development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.     

Divide and Conquer: Competing with Free Technology Under Network Effects

We study how a commercial firm competes with a free open source product. The market consists of two customer segments with different preferences and is characterized by positive network effects. The commercial firm makes product and pricing decisions to maximize its profit. The open source developers make product decisions to maximize the weighted sum of the segments' consumer surplus, in addition to their intrinsic motivation. The more importance open source developers attach to consumer surplus, the more effort they put into developing software features. Even if consumers do not end up adopting the open source product, it can act as a credible threat to the commercial firm, forcing the firm to lower its prices. If the open source developers' intrinsic motivation is high enough, they will develop software regardless of eventual market dynamics. If the open source product is available first, all participants are better off when the commercial and open source products are compatible. However, if the commercial firm can enter the market first, it can increase its profits and gain market share by being incompatible with its open source competitor, even if customers can later switch at zero cost. This first‐mover advantage does not arise because users are “locked in,” but because the commercial firm deploys a “divide and conquer” strategy to attract early adopters and exploit late adopters. To capitalize on its first‐mover advantage, the commercial firm must increase its development investment to improve its product features.     

Flexible Capacity Investments and Product Mix: Optimal Decisions and Value of Postponement Options

In this article, we study a firm's interdependent decisions in investing in flexible capacity, capacity allocation to individual products, and eventual production quantities and pricing in meeting uncertain demand. We propose a three‐stage sequential decision model to analyze the firm's decisions, with the firm being a value maximizer owned by risk‐averse investors. At the beginning of the time horizon, the firm sets the flexible capacity level using an aggregate demand forecast on the envelope of products its flexible resources can accommodate. The aggregate demand forecast evolves as a Geometric Brownian Motion process. The potential market share of each product is determined by the Multinomial Logit model. At a later time and before the end of the time horizon, the firm makes a capacity commitment decision on the allocation of the flexible capacity to each product. Finally, at the end of the time horizon, the firm observes the demand and makes the production quantity and pricing decisions for end products. We obtain the optimal solutions at each decision stage and investigate their optimal properties. Our numerical study investigates the value of the postponed capacity commitment option in supplying uncertain operation environments.     

How Should a Firm Manage Deteriorating Inventory?

Firms selling goods whose quality level deteriorates over time often face difficult decisions when unsold inventory remains. Since the leftover product is often perceived to be of lower quality than the new product, carrying it over offers the firm a second selling opportunity, a product line extension to new and unsold units, and the ability to price discriminate. By doing so, however, the firm subjects sales of its new product to competition from the leftover product. We present a two period model that captures the effect of this competition on the firm's production and pricing decisions. We characterize the firm's optimal strategy and find conditions under which the firm is better off carrying all, some, or none of its leftover inventory. We also show that, compared to a firm that acts myopically in the first period, a firm that takes into account the effect of first period decisions on second period profits will price its new product higher and stock more of it in the first period. Thus, the benefit of having a second selling opportunity dominates the detrimental effect of cannibalizing sales of the second period new product.     

Competing on Time: An Integrated Framework to Optimize Dynamic Time‐to‐Market and Production Decisions

This study develops a comprehensive framework to optimize new product introduction timing and subsequent production decisions faced by a component supplier. Prior to market entry, the supplier performs process design activities, which improve manufacturing yield and the chances of getting qualified for the customer's product. However, a long delay in market entry allows competitors to enter the market and pass the customer's qualification process before the supplier, reducing the supplier's share of the customer's business. After entering the market and if qualified, the supplier also needs to decide how much to produce for a finite planning horizon by considering several factors such as manufacturing yield and stochastic demand, both of which depend on the earlier time‐to‐market decision. To capture this dependency, we develop a sequential, nested, two‐stage decision framework to optimize the time‐to‐market and production decisions in relation to each other. We show that the supplier's optimal market entry and qualification timing decision need to be revised in real time based on the number of qualified competitors at the time of market‐entry decision. We establish the optimality of a threshold policy. Following this policy, at the beginning of each decision epoch, the supplier should optimally stop preparing for qualification and decide whether to enter the market if her order among qualified competitors exceeds a predetermined threshold. We also prove that the supplier's optimal production policy is a state‐dependent, base‐stock policy, which depends on the time‐to‐market and qualification decisions. The proposed framework also enables a firm to quantify how market conditions (such as price and competitor entry behavior) and operating conditions (such as the rate of learning and inventory/production‐related costs) affect time‐to‐market strategy and post‐entry production decisions.     

Product Design Awards and The Market Value of The Firm

Product design has increasingly been recognized as an important source of competitive advantage. This study empirically estimates the impact of effective design on the market value of the firm. We use a firm's receipt of a product design award as a proxy for its design effectiveness. Based on data from 264 announcements of design awards given to commercialized products between 1998 and 2011, we find that award announcements are associated with statistically significant positive stock market reactions. Depending on the benchmark model used to estimate the stock market reaction, the market reaction over a two‐day period (the day of announcement and the preceding day) ranges from 0.95% to 1.02%. The market reaction is more positive for smaller firms and for firms whose award winning products are consumer goods. However, a firm's growth potential, industry competitiveness, and whether a firm is a first time or repeated award winner do not significantly affect the market reaction.     

Production and Sales Planning in Capacitated New Product Introductions

How should a firm with limited capacity introduce a new product? Should it introduce the product as soon as possible or delay introduction to build up inventory? How do the product and market characteristics affect the firm's decisions? To answer such questions, we analyze new product introductions under capacity restrictions using a two‐period model with diffusion‐type demand. Combining marketing and operations management decisions in a stylized model, we optimize the production and sales plans of the firm for a single product. We identify four different introduction policies and show that when the holding cost is low and the capacity is low to moderate, a (partial) build‐up policy is indeed optimal if consumers are sensitive to delay. Under such a policy, the firm (partially) delays the introduction of its product and incurs short‐term backlog costs to manage its future demand and total costs more effectively. However, as either the holding cost or the capacity increases, or consumer sensitivity to delay decreases, the build‐up policy starts to lose its appeal, and instead, the firm prefers an immediate product introduction. We extend our analysis by studying the optimal capacity decision of the firm and show that capacity shortages may be intentional.     

Optimal Per‐Use Rentals and Sales of Durable Products and Their Distinct Roles in Price Discrimination

We consider a setting in which consumers experience distinct instances of need for a durable product at random intervals. Each instance of need is associated with a random utility and the consumers are differentiated according to the frequency with which they experience such instances of need. We use our model of consumer utility to characterize the firm's optimal strategy of whether to sell, rent, or do a combination of both in terms of the transaction costs and consumers' usage characteristics. We find that the two modes of operation serve different roles in allowing the firm to price discriminate. While sales allow the firm to discriminate among consumers of different usage frequencies, rentals allow it to discriminate according to consumers' realized valuations. Consequently, even when transaction costs are negligible, it is often optimal for the firm to simultaneously rent and sell its product. In addition, we find that although sales and rentals are substitutes and that the offering of sales weakly increases rental prices, it is possible that the introduction of rentals to a pure selling operation can either increase or decrease the optimal sales prices.     

The Design and Introduction of Product Lines When Consumer Valuations are Uncertain

This article presents a model of the design and introduction of a product line when the firm is uncertain about consumer valuations for the products. We find that product line introduction strategy depends on this uncertainty. Specifically, under low levels of uncertainty the firm introduces both models during the first period; under higher levels of uncertainty, the firm prefers sequential introduction and delays design of the second product until the second period. Under intermediate levels of uncertainty the firm's first product should be of lower quality than one produced by a myopic firm that does not take product line effects into consideration. We find that when the firm introduces a product sequentially, the strategy might depend on realized demand. For example, if realized demand is high, the firm's second product should be a higher‐end model; if demand turns out to be low, the firm's second product should be a lower‐end model or replace the first product with a lower‐end model.     

When to Offer Lower Quality or Remanufactured Versions of a Product

We investigate the profitability of adding a lower quality or remanufactured product to the product portfolio of a monopoly firm, both in single‐period and steady‐state settings. Consumer behavior is characterized by a deterministic utility function for the original product and a nonlinear relative utility function for the lower quality product. We find a threshold for the cost of the low‐quality product below which it is optimal to add it to the firm's portfolio, and show that while a cost advantage is necessary to make the lower quality offering profitable under linear or convex relative utility functions, market segmentation alone can justify the addition of the lower quality product under concave relative utility functions. In particular, we characterize (i) the new product cost under which it is optimal to offer a lower quality version of the product even if it is as costly to produce as the original product; and (ii) the weighted average of new and remanufactured product costs in the steady state under which it becomes cost effective to offer new products under the remanufactured label. Finally, we also identify the maximum possible profits from customer segmentation and the form of the relative utility function that achieves them. We discuss the implications for the common marketing practices of branding and generics.     

Industry Clockspeed and the Pace of New Product Development

Recent empirical literature describes an industry's clockspeed as a measure of the evolutionary life cycle, which captures the dynamic nature of the industry. Among other factors, the rate of new product development is found to be associated with an industry's clockspeed. Yet the notion of an industry clockspeed and the essential factors driving suitable decision making in this area have remained relatively unexplored. We develop a simple definition and a corresponding analytic model which explains the interdependent relationship between a firm's own new product development activities and an industry clockspeed. Results from the single firm model show the conditions under which particular firms have an incentive to accelerate their new product development activities. Moreover, we link the single firm's NPD clockspeed decisions to the industry level by creating appropriate metrics which characterize different types of industries. Examples from high‐tech industries such as the personal computer and aerospace industries are included to illustrate our findings. Our intention is not only to offer analytical insights into factors driving the clockspeed for these industries, but also to establish a fundamental structured decision making approach, thereby stimulating future research on this important topic.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.