THE EURO AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT FLOWS

Greater financial integration between core and peripheral European Monetary Union (EMU) members not only had an effect on both sets of countries but also spilled over beyond the euro area. Lower interest rates allowed peripheral countries to run bigger deficits, which inflated their economies by allowing credit booms. Core EMU countries took on extra foreign leverage to expose themselves to the peripherals. We present a stylized model that illustrates possible mechanisms for these developments. We then analyze the geography of international debt flows using multiple data sources and provide evidence that after the euro's introduction, core EMU countries increased their borrowing from outside of the EMU and their lending to the EMU periphery. Moreover, we present evidence that large core EMU banks' lending to periphery borrowers was linked to their borrowing from outside of the euro area.     

RELATIONSHIP LENDING DURING A FINANCIAL CRISIS

This paper studies whether relationship lending mitigates the transmission of the Lehman default shock to the supply of credit in Italy. Exploiting the presence of multiple banking relationships, we control for banks' and firms' unobserved characteristics. Results show that the growth of credit itself is higher and its cost lower the shorter the distance between the bank and the firm, the longer the relationship, and the higher the share of credit held by the bank. Credit growth by relationship lenders is 4.6% higher than that by transactional lenders; the increase in the cost of credit is 50 basis points lower. The positive effect of relationship lending on credit supply increased during the crisis, compared to a pre‐crisis period. The beneficial effect of relationship lending is weaker if the relationship lender is more exposed to the financial crisis, especially when lending to weaker borrowers.     

RELATIVE FACTOR ENDOWMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO CHOICE

We present a model of international portfolio choice based on cross‐country differences in relative factor abundance. Countries have varying degrees of similarity in their factor endowment ratios, and are subject to aggregate productivity shocks. Risk‐averse consumers can insure against these shocks by investing their wealth at home and abroad. In a many‐good setup, the change in factor prices after a positive shock in a particular country provides insurance to countries that have dissimilar factor endowment ratios, but is bad news for countries with similar factor endowment ratios, since their incomes will worsen. Therefore countries with similar relative factor endowments have a stronger incentive to invest in one another for insurance purposes than countries with dissimilar endowments. The importance of this effect depends on the size of countries. Empirical evidence linking bilateral international equity investment positions to a proxy for relative factor endowments supports our theory: the similarity of host and source countries in their relative capital–labor ratios has a positive effect on the source country’s investment position in the host country. The effect of similarity is enhanced by the size of host countries.     

SYSTEMIC AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES

The theoretical literature on sovereign defaults has focused on adverse shocks to debtors' economies, suggesting that defaults are of an idiosyncratic nature. Still, sovereign debt crises are also of a systemic nature, clustered around panics in the financial center, such as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis in 2008. Crises in the financial centers are rare disasters and, thus, their effects on the periphery can only be captured by examining long episodes. In this paper, we examine sovereign defaults from 1820 to the Great Depression, with a focus on Latin America. We find that 63% of the crises are of a systemic nature. These crises are different. Both the international collapse of liquidity and the growth slowdown in the financial centers are at their core. These global shocks trigger longer default spells and larger losses for investors.     

STOCHASTIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND EURO AREA

This paper estimates, using data from the United States and the Euro Area, a two‐country stochastic growth model in which both neutral and investment‐specific technology shocks are nonstationary but cointegrated across economies. The results point to large and persistent swings in productivity, both favorable and adverse, originating in the United States but not transmitted to the Euro Area. More specifically, the results suggest that while the Euro Area missed out on the period of rapid investment‐specific technological change enjoyed in the United States during the 1990s, it also escaped the stagnation in neutral technological progress that plagued the United States in the 1970s.     

Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries

We model a small open economy in which both domestic financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , to study the general equilibrium impact of various types of capital inflows on the efficiency and governance of domestic banks. Banks have an advantage in monitoring firms, but the latter can collude with banks and offer side‐payments to reduce the intensity of monitoring. Opening up to international capital flows makes domestic banks’ capital scarcer relative to uninformed capital, thus increasing the relative cost of monitoring. We show that capital account liberalization has ambiguous effects on the governance of the domestic financial system by sometimes increasing firms’ incentives to collude with banks. We characterize the conditions under which governance is more likely to deteriorate after opening up the capital account, and discuss the effects on investment, productivity and output. We also analyze the effects of foreign direct investment in the corporate and banking sectors. Stylized facts are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS: PREEMPTIVE OR POST‐DEFAULT

Sovereign debt restructurings can be implemented preemptively—prior to a payment default. We code a comprehensive new data set and find that preemptive restructurings (i) are frequent (38% of all deals 1978–2010), (ii) have lower haircuts, (iii) are quicker to negotiate, and (iv) see lower output losses. To rationalize these stylized facts, we build a quantitative sovereign debt model that incorporates preemptive and post‐default renegotiations. The model improves the fit with the data and explains the sovereign's optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex ante, while defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks. Empirical evidence supports these predictions.     

EVALUATING THEORIES OF BANK RUNS WITH HETEROGENEITY RESTRICTIONS

This paper empirically tests theories of bank runs. We use a structural panel VAR to extract runs from deposit market data. Identification exploits cross‐sectional heterogeneity in deposit insurance: we identify bank runs as adverse deposit market supply shocks hitting uninsured banks harder compared to insured. Conditional on a run, we study the behavior of uninsured banks with bad and good fundamentals. We find that both experience runs, but deposit outflows at the former are more severe. Panic effects, which affect all uninsured deposits alike, irrespective of fundamentals, dominate in the aggregate. Insured banks partially absorb the outflow of uninsured deposits.     

A MODEL OF NONBELIEF IN THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS

People believe that, even in very large samples, proportions of binary signals might depart significantly from the population mean. We model this “nonbelief in the Law of Large Numbers” by assuming that a person believes that proportions in any given sample might be determined by a rate different than the true rate. In prediction, a nonbeliever expects the distribution of signals will have fat tails. In inference, a nonbeliever remains uncertain and influenced by priors even after observing an arbitrarily large sample. We explore implications for beliefs and behavior in a variety of economic settings.     

EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL CONTRACTS IN SOVEREIGN BANK LENDING

This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a “punishment” effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities (“loss of reputation”). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present discounted value of the net benefits of future borrowing, which create dynamic incentives. Using data on bank loans to developing countries for 1973–1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel.     

QUALITY LADDERS IN A RICARDIAN MODEL OF TRADE WITH NONHOMOTHETIC PREFERENCES

The North–South trade literature has traditionally explored conditions under which international trade might further magnify income disparities between the advanced North and the backward South. We show that even when no single country is initially more advanced than any other one and productivity changes are uniform and identical in all countries, trade may still be a source of income divergence when nonhomothetic preferences and quality ladders are jointly taken into account. Income divergence will be experienced when comparative advantages induce patterns of specialization that, although initially optimal for all countries, do not offer the same scope for quality upgrading of final products.     

SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE BOARDROOM

This paper provides evidence that social networks strongly affect board composition and are detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a large data set of executives and outside directors of French public firms. This data source is a matched employer–employee data set that provides detailed information on directors/CEOs as well as information about the firm employing them. We find a strong and robust correlation between the CEO's network and that of his directors. Networks of former high‐ranking civil servants are the most active in shaping board composition. Our identification strategy takes into account not only firm and directors’ fixed effects but also the matching of firms and director in terms of one observable and one unobservable characteristic. Turning to the direct effects of such network activity, we find that firms in which these networks are most active pay their CEOs more, are less likely to replace a CEO who underperforms, and engage in less value‐creating acquisitions. These findings suggest that social networks are active in the boardroom and have detrimental effects on firms’ governance.     

THE RISE OF THE EAST AND THE FAR EAST: GERMAN LABOR MARKETS AND TRADE INTEGRATION

We analyze the effects of the unprecedented rise in trade between Germany and “the East” (China and Eastern Europe) in the period 1988–2008 on German local labor markets. Using detailed administrative data, we exploit the cross‐regional variation in initial industry structures and use trade flows of other high‐income countries as instruments for regional import and export exposure. We find that the rise of the East in the world economy caused substantial job losses in German regions specialized in import‐competing industries, both in manufacturing and beyond. Regions specialized in export‐oriented industries, however, experienced even stronger employment gains and lower unemployment. In the aggregate, we estimate that this trade integration has caused some 442,000 additional jobs in the economy and contributed to retaining the manufacturing sector in Germany. This is almost exclusively driven by the rise of Eastern Europe, not by China. We also conduct an analysis at the individual worker level, and find that trade had a stabilizing overall effect on employment relationships.     

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND DEMAND SHOCKS IN THE US ECONOMY

This paper analyzes the cross‐country effects of productivity and demand disturbances in the United States identified with sign restrictions based on standard theory. Productivity gains in US manufacturing increase US consumption and investment vis‐à‐vis foreign countries, resulting in a trade deficit and higher international prices of US goods, despite the rise in their supply. Financial adjustment works via a higher global value of US equities, real dollar appreciation, and an expansion of US gross foreign liabilities as well as assets. Positive demand shocks to US manufacturing also increase investment and cause a real dollar appreciation, but have limited effects on the trade balance and net foreign assets. Our findings emphasize the importance for macroeconomic interdependence of endogenous fluctuations in aggregate demand across countries in response to business cycle shocks.     

THE WELFARE GAINS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND HETEROGENEITY

Research has shown that, absent individual heterogeneity and under complete markets, the welfare impact of financial openness is quantitatively limited. Not only are inequalities in wealth and labor productivity a feature of most societies, but also financial markets suffer from many well‐known frictions. This paper demonstrates that, when households face borrowing constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to income, the welfare implications of financial liberalization are considerable. For instance, the average increase in welfare of a typical emerging market economy that switches from a closed capital market to perfect capital mobility is equivalent to a permanent increase in average consumption of roughly 5.4%. This is about 3.9 times more than the welfare gains of the same policy under a complete markets environment without any individual heterogeneity. We show that individual heterogeneity accounts for two thirds of this additional increase in the average welfare gain; market incompleteness accounts for the remaining third. In our calibration, the median household in capital‐scarce countries is in favor of international financial integration. However, if the pivotal voter is wealthy enough then such reform might not be implemented, since richer households have a vested interest in capital market closedness.     

LACK OF COMMITMENT AND THE LEVEL OF DEBT

The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero, and we analyze numerically more complex models. We also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full‐commitment is enough to obtain these results.     

WHY DO EMERGING ECONOMIES BORROW SHORT TERM?

We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaper than borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as during these episodes the relative cost of long‐term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereign bond prices, returns, and issuances at different maturities for 11 emerging economies from 1990 to 2009 and present a set of new stylized facts. On average, these countries pay a higher risk premium on long‐term than on short‐term bonds. During crises, the difference between the two risk premia increases and issuance shifts towards shorter maturities. To illustrate our argument, we present a simple model in which the maturity structure is the outcome of a risk‐sharing problem between an emerging economy subject to rollover crises and risk‐averse international investors.     

RELATIVE RISK AVERSION IS CONSTANT: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA

Most classical tests of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) based on individual portfolio composition use cross‐sectional data. Such tests must assume that the distributions of wealth and preferences are independent. We use panel data to analyze how individuals’ portfolio allocation between risky and riskless assets varies in response to changes in total financial wealth. We find the elasticity of the risky asset share to wealth to be small and statistically insignificant, supporting the CRRA assumption; this finding is robust when the sample is restricted to households experiencing large income variations. In addition, we find a small but significant negative correlation between wealth and risk aversion. Various extensions are discussed.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk‐averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.     

CAPITAL INFLOWS,FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND HOUSING BOOMS

We use a panel VAR to study the effect of shocks to capital inflows, which are identified using sign restrictions, on the housing market in OECD countries. To explore how effects of these shocks change with the structure of the mortgage market and the degree of mortgage securitization, we allow the VAR coefficients to vary with mortgage‐market characteristics. Our results indicate that capital‐inflow shocks have a significant and positive effect on real house prices, real credit available to the private sector, and real residential investment. The responses of these variables are stronger in countries with more developed mortgage markets and in countries where securitization is allowed.