Optimal Control of Selling Channels for an Online Retailer with Cost‐per‐Click Payments and Seasonal Products

The problem studied in this paper is a predigestion of the decision faced by online retailers (etailers) that advertise on publisher or comparison‐shopping websites. An etailer may sell its product not only through its online and bricks‐and‐mortar stores, but also through the websites of one or more third parties (e.g., Yahoo.com). However, the etailer has to pay a certain amount to such third parties in an action‐based payment scheme, such as a cost‐per‐click (CPC) scheme. Under the CPC scheme, payment is based solely on click‐throughs, which means that the etailer pays only when a shopper clicks through to the product page of its website. Only a fraction of such clicks lead to actual sales. The extra cost that is associated with shoppers who first click through to the third‐party websites makes them less attractive as customers than those who directly visit the etailer's online store. Moreover, the CPC rate for a prominent placement is normally set by competitive bidding, and thus varies over time. Therefore, the etailer needs to decide dynamically whether or not to list on a third‐party website. The structural properties of the optimal policy are discussed, and numerical examples are given to show the revenue impact of dynamic listing control.     

我国东中西部地区专利创新效率差异研究

随着科学技术和社会经济的发展,创新成为推动经济迅速发展的重要力量,而专利是创新成果的主要表现形式,在生产实践中成功应用专利是提高生产力的重要动力。由于我国各区域的经济水平和产业结构等方面存在不同,因此,各区域的专利创新效率也存在差异。本文通过设计专利创新效率综合评价指标体系,运用数据包络分析的方法,对我国东中西部区域创新效率进行了综合分析。继而运用多元统计回归的方法探讨了形成各地区专利创新效率差异的影响因素。     

Benefactors and Beneficiaries: The Effects of Giving and Receiving on Cost‐Coalitional Problems

Motivated by supply chain collaborations in practice, we introduce a class of cost‐coalitional problems, which are based on a priori information about the cost faced by each agent in each set that it could belong to. Our focus is on problems with decreasingly monotonic coalitional costs. In this class of problems, we study the effects of giving and receiving when there exist players whose participation in an alliance always contributes to the savings of all alliance members (we refer to these players as benefactors), and there also exist players whose cost decreases in such an alliance (we call them beneficiaries). We use linear and quadratic norm cost games to analyze the role played by benefactors and beneficiaries in achieving stability of different cooperating alliances. We consider different notions of stability (the core and the bargaining set) and provide conditions for stability of an all‐inclusive alliance of agents which leads to minimum value of total cost incurred by all agents.     

技术视角下的商业方法创新过程及其专利保护研究

从技术视角出发,研究了一些具有技术性特征的商业方法创新的理念源泉、产生过程及创新的最终实现,揭示了商业方法创新的关键因素,同时研究了商业方法创新的专利保护及其与其他知识产权保护方式的比较.     

Terrorism Risks and Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Aviation Security

We evaluate, for the U.S. case, the costs and benefits of three security measures designed to reduce the likelihood of a direct replication of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To do so, we assess risk reduction, losses, and security costs in the context of the full set of security layers. The three measures evaluated are installed physical secondary barriers (IPSB) to restrict access to the hardened cockpit door during door transitions, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program. In the process, we examine an alternate policy measure: doubling the budget of the FFDO program to $44 million per year, installing IPSBs in all U.S. aircraft at a cost of $13.5 million per year, and reducing funding for FAMS by 75% to $300 million per year. A break‐even cost‐benefit analysis then finds the minimum probability of an otherwise successful attack required for the benefit of each security measures to equal its cost. We find that the IPSB is costeffective if the annual attack probability of an otherwise successful attack exceeds 0.5% or one attack every 200 years. The FFDO program is costeffective if the annual attack probability exceeds 2%. On the other hand, more than two otherwise successful attacks per year are required for FAMS to be costeffective. A policy that includes IPSBs, an increased budget for FFDOs, and a reduced budget for FAMS may be a viable policy alternative, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year with consequences for security that are, at most, negligible.     

Cost‐Benefit Analysis of Passive Fire Protections in Road LPG Transportation

The cost‐benefit evaluation of passive fire protection adoption in the road transport of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was investigated. In a previous study, mathematical simulations of real scale fire scenarios proved the effectiveness of passive fire protections in preventing the “fired” boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), thus providing a significant risk reduction. In the present study the economical aspects of the adoption of fire protections are analyzed and an approach to cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) is proposed. The CBA model is based on the comparison of the risk reduction due to fire protections (expressed in monetary terms by the value of a statistical life) and the cost of the application of fire protections to a fleet of tankers. Different types of fire protections were considered, as well as the possibility to apply protections to the entire fleet or only to a part of it. The application of the proposed model to a real‐life case study is presented and discussed. Results demonstrate that the adoption of passive fire protections on road tankers, though not compulsory in Europe, can be economically feasible, thus representing a concrete measure to achieve control of the “major hazard accidents” cited by the European legislation.     

Measuring Market Power in the Ready‐to‐Eat Cereal Industry

The ready‐to‐eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration, high price‐cost margins, large advertising‐to‐sales ratios, and numerous introductions of new products. Previous researchers have concluded that the ready‐to‐eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition. This paper empirically examines this conclusion. In particular, I estimate price‐cost margins, but more importantly I am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources: (i) that which is due to product differentiation; (ii) that which is due to multi‐product firm pricing; and (iii) that due to potential price collusion. The results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal, the first two effects explain most of the observed price‐cost margins. I conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior, despite the high price‐cost margins. Leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality. It is these two factors that lead to high price‐cost margins.     

An Upper‐Bound Assessment of the Benefits of Reducing Perchlorate in Drinking Water

The Environmental Protection Agency plans to issue new federal regulations to limit drinking water concentrations of perchlorate, which occurs naturally and results from the combustion of rocket fuel. This article presents an upper‐bound estimate of the potential benefits of alternative maximum contaminant levels for perchlorate in drinking water. The results suggest that the economic benefits of reducing perchlorate concentrations in drinking water are likely to be low, i.e., under $2.9 million per year nationally, for several reasons. First, the prevalence of detectable perchlorate in public drinking water systems is low. Second, the population especially sensitive to effects of perchlorate, pregnant women who are moderately iodide deficient, represents a minority of all pregnant women. Third, and perhaps most importantly, reducing exposure to perchlorate in drinking water is a relatively ineffective way of increasing iodide uptake, a crucial step linking perchlorate to health effects of concern.     

The Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue‐sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue‐sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue‐sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue‐sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue‐sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.     

The Dark Side of Information and Market Efficiency in E‐Markets*

Price dispersion reflects the differences in prices for identical products. While in physical markets such dispersion is prevalent due to high search costs, many researchers argue that search costs and price dispersion will be much lower in electronic markets (e‐markets). Empirical evidence does not support this contention, and researchers have studied search costs, market factors, and service‐quality factors to explain this dispersion. Previous research has largely assumed that more information is better. By ignoring the dark side of information, we argue that only a partial understanding of price dispersion is possible. In this article, information overload and equivocality are studied as two dark attributes of information that lead sellers to different pricing decisions in e‐markets. Hypotheses relating these attributes to price dispersion are supported through analysis of 161 product markets. This work opens up new avenues in the study of e‐markets and discusses the implications of these findings for research and practice on consumer and seller decisions.     

产业创新升级阶段市场结构演化仿真分析

本文研究产业创新升级阶段产品创新对市场结构的影响.应用Swarm多主体演化博弈的思想,构建一个不完全信息竞争市场下产品创新过程中多主体进行演化博弈的仿真模型.在模型中,常规产品、自主创新产品和模仿创新产品的需求是依据消费者的效用函数、产品质量及价格决定的.模型将相同境况的企业视为一个群体.并将企业的个体决策置身于群体决策中,企业则以一定的概率选择常规经营、自主创新或模仿创新.模型刻画了企业利用在博弈过程中所获取的信息,不断修正行为规则的演化过程.演化博弈仿真结论可以为企业选择创新策略和政策选择恰当的激励手段提供理论支持.     

Manufacturer–Retailer Negotiations in the Presence of an Oligopolistic Input Market

When a manufacturer relies solely on its own inputs in making products, the focus of negotiations between the manufacturer and retailer is exclusively on profits in the output (retail) market. In such cases, absent retail competition concerns, standard two‐part tariff negotiations set the per‐unit wholesale price equal to marginal cost, and require fixed transfers from the retailer to the manufacturer. In this article, we recognize that manufacturers often rely on imperfectly competitive markets for at least some inputs. Incorporating this seemingly natural feature has profound implications for manufacturer–retailer negotiations since it shifts their focus from being exclusively on output markets to one that balances strategic concerns in both input and output realms. The article's main result is that the added need to discipline input prices can lead the manufacturer and retailer to write contingent contracts that are cost‐plus and prescribe lump‐sum slotting allowances (i.e., fixed transfer from the manufacturer to the retailer).     

Decision Making in Cross‐Functional Teams: The Role of Decision Power*

Through a series of game‐theoretical models, this study systematically examines decision making in cross‐functional teams. It provides a framework for the design of an organization‐specific decision‐making process and for the alignment of a team's microdecision with the “optimal” decision that maximizes the firm's payoff. This study finds that even without changing the team leader, firms could change and even dictate the team's microdecision outcome via adjusting the team member's seniority, empowering team members with veto power or involving a supervisor as a threat to overrule the team decision. This finding implies that to reposition products in the marketplace, structuring cross‐functional teams’ microdecision‐making processes is essential.     

The Role of Project and Organizational Context in Managing High‐tech R&D Projects

High‐tech organizations often struggle to manage different types of R&D projects. Evidence from research and practice suggests that managers frequently categorize and manage projects based on the extent of change triggered in product, process, technology, and market dimensions. However, this can create challenges in high‐tech organizations. This study investigates how high‐tech organizations manage R&D projects based on their learning goals. First, we argue for the benefits of categorizing R&D projects based on the degree of exploration and exploitation learning goals. A qualitative case study from four high‐tech business units involving 10 R&D projects helps understand the different types of projects based on their learning goals. The case study shows that R&D projects in high‐tech organizations typically fall into three categories based on their learning goals: Radical innovation projects, Incremental innovation projects, and Hybrid projects. Second, we iterate between literature and evidence from our qualitative data to theorize how project context and organizational context affect project performance depending on the type of project. The data for the empirical analysis come from a multilevel survey of 110 R&D projects across 34 high‐tech business units. Results show the importance of designing project and organizational context differently for the three types of R&D projects. Collectively, this study offers a new perspective on how to manage high‐tech R&D projects.     

Revenue Management with End‐of‐Period Discounts in the Presence of Customer Learning

Consider a firm that sells identical products over a series of selling periods (e.g., weekly all‐inclusive vacations at the same resort). To stimulate demand and enhance revenue, in some periods, the firm may choose to offer a part of its available inventory at a discount. As customers learn to expect such discounts, a fraction may wait rather than purchase at a regular price. A problem the firm faces is how to incorporate this waiting and learning into its revenue management decisions. To address this problem we summarize two types of learning behaviors and propose a general model that allows for both stochastic consumer demand and stochastic waiting. For the case with two customer classes, we develop a novel solution approach to the resulting dynamic program. We then examine two simplified models, where either the demand or the waiting behavior are deterministic, and present the solution in a closed form. We extend the model to incorporate three customer classes and discuss the effects of overselling the capacity and bumping customers. Through numerical simulations we study the value of offering end‐of‐period deals optimally and analyze how this value changes under different consumer behavior and demand scenarios.     

Managing Slow‐Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

We address the value of information and value of centralized control in the context of a two‐echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provide a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow‐moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as decentralized information sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit‐maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, centralized control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company‐owned stores or vendor‐managed inventory. We measure the value of information and value of centralized control as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the value of information, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto‐improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.     

An Analysis of the Eco‐Efficiency of Remanufactured Personal Computers and Mobile Phones

Remanufacturing, long perceived as an environmentally friendly initiative, is supported by a number of governments. Yet, the assumption that remanufacturing is desirable to society has never been systematically investigated. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness and eco‐efficiency of remanufacturing in the personal computer and mobile phone industries. We investigate whether remanufacturing substantially reduces the environmental impact, as measured by cumulative energy demand (CED), generated over the life cycles (LCs) of these products, and the size of any reduction. We also examine the relative eco‐efficiency of remanufacturing compared with virgin manufacturing for these two products, where eco‐efficiency includes both willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for the products as well as the energy consumed in producing the products. Our main findings are the following. One, remanufacturing is an effective way to reduce the total energy consumed during the LCs of personal computers and mobile phones, with one notable exception, when the life spans of remanufactured products are substantially shorter than the life spans of their new counterparts. Two, a remanufactured personal computer or mobile phone is not always more eco‐efficient than a corresponding new product. Three, the WTP for remanufactured personal computers and mobile phones, and consequently, their eco‐efficiencies, are a function of the prices of the correspondent new products at launch and years elapsed between launch and remanufacturing. Four, remanufactured units are sold at a discount relative to the price of new personal computers and mobile phones. Five, on the whole, the market for remanufactured mobile phones is more eco‐efficient than the market for new mobile phones. Six, the market for remanufactured computers is more eco‐efficient than the market for new computers. Lastly, because the group of remanufactured products is heterogeneous, not all remanufactured units are more eco‐efficient than the average new computer and mobile phone. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of our findings on European WEEE and WEEE‐like legislation.     

Static and Dynamic Pricing of Excess Capacity in a Make‐to‐Order Environment

We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer that serves two customer classes: core customers who pay a fixed negotiated price, and “fill‐in” customers who make submittal decisions based on the current price set by the firm. Using a Markovian queueing model, we determine how much the firm can gain by explicitly accounting for the status of its production facility in making pricing decisions. Specifically, we examine three pricing policies: (1) static, state‐independent pricing, (2) constant pricing up to a cutoff state, and (3) general state‐dependent pricing. We determine properties of each policy, and illustrate numerically the financial gains that the firm can achieve by following each policy as compared with simpler policies. Our main result is that constant pricing up to a cutoff state can dramatically outperform a state‐independent policy, while at the same time achieving most of the increase in revenue achievable from general state‐dependent pricing. Thus, we find that constant pricing up to a cutoff state presents an attractive tradeoff between ease of implementation and revenue gain. When the costs of policy design and implementation are taken into account, this simple heuristic may actually out‐perform general state‐dependent pricing in some settings.     

纺织业中小企业全面创新能力提升的实证研究

在全面创新管理理论基础上,以浙江省纺织业中小企业为研究对象,通过问卷调查,对全面创新能力如何影响企业创新绩效进行了实证研究.统计分析表明,中小企业实施全面创新管理有助于提升企业创新绩效.但不同维度的创新能力对创新绩效的影响具有差异性.对于纺织业中小企业而言,战略能力与技术能力是当前实现全面创新管理的重点.     

Keyword Auctions,Unit‐Price Contracts,and the Role of Commitment

Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper explores the design of performance‐based unit‐price contract auctions, in which bidders bid their unit prices and the winner is chosen based on both their bids and performance levels. The previous literature on unit‐price contract auctions usually considers a static case where bidders' performance levels are fixed. This paper studies a dynamic setting in which bidders with a low performance level can improve their performance at a certain cost. We examine the effect of the performance‐based allocation on overall bidder performance, auction efficiency, and the auctioneer's revenue, and derive the revenue‐maximizing and efficient policies accordingly. Moreover, the possible upgrade in bidders' performance level gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! and Google. We thus compare the auctioneer's revenue‐maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when she is not, and show that the auctioneer should give less preferential treatment to low‐performance bidders when she is fully committed.