Self‐financing Unemployment Insurance and Bargaining Structure

Abstract. This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self‐financing unemployment insurance (UI). For this purpose, we compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the relative size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.     

EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH UNEMPLOYMENT,ENDOGENOUS PARTICIPATION,AND LABOR MARKET FLOWS

The sustainability of welfare states requires high employment and high participation to raise the tax base. To analyze labor supply in a world with market frictions, we propose and solve a macro model of the labor market with unemployment and labor force participation as endogenous and distinct states. In our world, workers' decisions of participating are determined by an entry decision and an exit decision. A calibration of the model improves the usual representations of labor markets, since it quantitatively accounts for the observed flows between employment and nonparticipation. The paper investigates also the effect of payroll taxes and unemployment benefits on participation decisions. Taxes reduce entries and increase exits, whereas unemployment benefits, at a given job‐finding rate, raise entries and have ambiguous effects on exits. (JEL: J2, J6)     

Financing Unemployment Benefits: Dismissal versus Employment Taxes

Abstract. This paper investigates the effects of using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment benefits. We compare dismissal and employment taxes in a model with search frictions. Employment taxes give rise to externalities because firms do not take into account the effects their dismissal decisions have on others. These externalities can be tackled by using dismissal taxes to finance unemployment insurance. Taking into account the budget for unemployment insurance, employment taxes can be reduced by more than is necessary to offset the adverse effect of dismissal taxes on the value of the firm. The introduction of dismissal taxes leads to higher job creation and lower unemployment.     

Labour Market Regulation,Flexibility and Employment

ABSTRACT: Chronic unemployment and slow employment growth in some countries have led to calls for more labor-market “flexibility”. This paper defines the flexibility issue in terms of legally-mandated “severance”, a generalized employment cost linked to seniority. A mandated severance benefit can stand for a variety of programs including employer-provided employment guarantees, payments which must be made to laid-off workers, and compensation for wrongful discharge. Such a mandated cost can be seen as a payroll tax on the employer, raising the issue of tax incidence. Employers often take the view that labor costs are given and that mandated costs are simply add-ons to pre-existing cost levels. However, the literature on tax incidence suggests that a significant portion of “employer-paid” payroll taxes are shifted to labor in the form of lower wages. Such shifting should reduce the dis-employment effects attributed to severance. A model is provided of a firm upon which a severance mandate is imposed. Even at the micro level, the firm can shift some of the cost of severance to employees by lowering wages — although at the expense of higher turnover costs associated with increased quit rates. At the macro level, to the extent that firms reduce employment, there could be still further downward wage adjustments which would shift the severance burden to labor and mitigate the dis-employment effect. Ultimately, if the natural rate of unemployment is raised by severance mandates, the age-old question is raised of why wages do not fall in the face of labor surpluses. The true inflexibility to be explained, therefore, is in wage determination.     

THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

UNINSURED COUNTERCYCLICAL RISK: AN AGGREGATION RESULT AND APPLICATION TO OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We consider an incomplete markets economy with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face countercyclical idiosyncratic labor and asset risk. We derive conditions under which the aggregate allocations and price system can be found by solving a representative agent problem. This result is applied to analyze the properties of an optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with uninsured countercyclical individual risk. The optimal monetary policy that emerges from our incomplete markets economy is the same as the optimal monetary policy in a representative agent model with preference shocks. When price rigidity is the only friction the optimal monetary policy calls for stabilizing the inflation rate at zero.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CULTURAL TRANSMISSION: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper emphasizes the two‐way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural transmission of civicness. The returns to being uncivic are increasing in the generosity of unemployment insurance; but this generosity is decreasing in the number of uncivic individuals. In this context, I determine the evolution of preferences across generations and show that cultural heterogeneity is sustained over the long‐run. The dynamics of cultural transmission can generate a long lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and an increase in people's willingness to live off government‐provided benefits. Hence, it offers an explanation to the ‘European unemployment puzzle’ due to the coexistence of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s.     

Discrimination and Resistance to Low‐skilled Immigration

Abstract. This paper shows that the immigration of some low‐skilled workers can be of advantage for low‐skilled natives when the host economy suffers from unemployment due to the presence of trade unions and an unemployment insurance scheme. This benefit arises if trade unions have appropriate bargaining power and preferences for members’ income, labor market discrimination against immigrants is strong enough and the unemployment tax rate is low.     

Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous‐Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?

This paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous‐agent economy. Such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings, but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets. The resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored, both theoretically and quantitatively, in a model that yields complete analytical solutions. Progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers, but at the cost of lower insurance. Overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but, unlike a standard social welfare function, does not reward equality per se. Simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude, resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates. Aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff.     

The Distribution of Wealth and Fiscal Policy in Economies With Finitely Lived Agents

We study the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in an overlapping generation economy with finitely lived agents and intergenerational transmission of wealth. Financial markets are incomplete, exposing agents to both labor and capital income risk. We show that the stationary wealth distribution is a Pareto distribution in the right tail and that it is capital income risk, rather than labor income, that drives the properties of the right tail of the wealth distribution. We also study analytically the dependence of the distribution of wealth—of wealth inequality in particular—on various fiscal policy instruments like capital income taxes and estate taxes, and on different degrees of social mobility. We show that capital income and estate taxes can significantly reduce wealth inequality, as do institutions favoring social mobility. Finally, we calibrate the economy to match the Lorenz curve of the wealth distribution of the U.S. economy.     

社保投入有利于企业提高劳动生产率吗？——基于“中国企业—劳动力匹配调查”数据的实证研究

现有文献认为,社保投入对企业劳动生产率存在成本效应、激励效应两种不同的影响。由于大样本数据的缺乏,现阶段对于社会保险企业投入的讨论大多停留在其对企业生产的抑制效应。然而,本文运用随机分层抽样的"中国企业-劳动力匹配调查"(CEES)数据,就社保投入对于企业劳动生产率的影响效应、影响机制进行了创新性地实证研究。基准回归表明,在充分剔除选择性偏误的前提下,社保投入对于劳动生产率的激励效应更强。随着人均社保投入每增加10%,企业劳动生产率平均提高3.5%。进一步地,实证研究发现:人力资本、创新精神与管理效率是社保投入对于企业劳动生产率产生激励效应的重要渠道;其中,与人力资本、创新精神相比,管理效率更为重要。与大部分基于发达经济体微观数据的实证研究有所不同,本文发现:对于现阶段我国经济而言,社保投入对企业生产要素投入的成本挤出效应并不明显,社会保险通过激励员工从而促进企业生产率的发展。     

COMPETITION AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE

Abstract When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long‐term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.     

Unemployment Insurance and Entrepreneurship

Based on administrative registers from Norway, we examine how unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) affect the transition rates from unemployment to regular employment and entrepreneurship, as well as subsequent earnings levels. We find that both the employment and entrepreneurship hazards rise sharply in response to UI sanctions and UI exhaustion. On average, transitions to entrepreneurship are more profitable than transitions to regular employment. While employment transitions are highly pro‐cyclical, entrepreneurship transitions are weakly counter‐cyclical. ALMPs targeted at entrepreneurship are rare in Norway, but the few start‐up subsidies that are provided are successful in terms of generating paid work.     

An Equilibrium Theory of Learning,Search, and Wages

We examine the labor market effects of incomplete information about the workers' own job‐finding process. Search outcomes convey valuable information, and learning from search generates endogenous heterogeneity in workers' beliefs about their job‐finding probability. We characterize this process and analyze its interactions with job creation and wage determination. Our theory sheds new light on how unemployment can affect workers' labor market outcomes and wage determination, providing a rational explanation for discouragement as the consequence of negative search outcomes. In particular, longer unemployment durations are likely to be followed by lower reemployment wages because a worker's beliefs about his job‐finding process deteriorate with unemployment duration. Moreover, our analysis provides a set of useful results on dynamic programming with optimal learning.     

Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance around the World

Using annual data on 80 countries for 1980–2007 and a new indicator of product market regulation, this paper studies the effects of product market regulation on labor market performance among the total population as well as among two important groups of labor market outsiders: women and youth. It finds that stricter regulation is likely to both increase the unemployment rate and decrease the employment rate. The magnitude of the estimated effects is substantial. There are above‐average effects on both groups of outsiders, with the effects being particularly strong on youth. The results are robust to variations in specification.     

IMMIGRATION,WAGES, AND COMPOSITIONAL AMENITIES

There is strong public opposition to increased immigration throughout Europe. Given the modest economic impacts of immigration estimated in most studies, the depth of anti‐immigrant sentiment is puzzling. Immigration, however, does not just affect wages and taxes. It also changes the composition of the local population, threatening the compositional amenities that natives derive from their neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. In this paper we use a simple latent‐factor model, combined with data for 21 countries from the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS), to measure the relative importance of economic and compositional concerns in driving opinions about immigration policy. The ESS included a unique battery of questions on the labor market and social impacts of immigration, as well as on the desirability of increasing or reducing immigrant inflows. We find that compositional concerns are 2–5 times more important in explaining variation in individual attitudes toward immigration policy than concerns over wages and taxes. Likewise, most of the difference in opinion between more‐ and less‐educated respondents is attributable to heightened compositional concerns among people with lower education.     

The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Generosity on Unemployment Duration and Labor Market Transitions

This paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit generosity on labor market transitions in Turkey from 2002 to 2012. Using a unique administrative dataset, I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at 900‐paid‐premium‐days to identify the impact of generosity on the outcome variables. I find that unemployment benefit duration is increased by approximately 0.07 weeks per additional week of UI. However, more generous benefits lead to lower probabilities of transition to employment and the impact is greater compared to developed countries. In addition, workers who are entitled to longer UI periods have lower probabilities of cheating the system and rejecting the services of the Turkish Employment Agency.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN WELFARE STATES: THE IMPACTS OF SOFT DURATION CONSTRAINTS

Abstract Based on a major reform of Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI), we examine the behavioral impacts of soft and hard UI duration constraints. A constraint is interpreted as hard if a claimant cannot rely on any form of income support after exhaustion, and as soft if UI is replaced by follow‐on benefits or participation in active labor market programs (ALMP). We find that both hard and soft constraints raise the job hazard significantly, with surprisingly similar spikes at UI exhaustion. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job, but at the cost of lengthening the overall job‐search period.     

Shocks,Stocks, and Socks: Smoothing Consumption Over a Temporary Income Loss

We investigate how households in temporarily straitened circumstances due to an unemployment spell cut back on expenditures and how they spend marginal dollars of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit. Our theoretical and empirical analyses emphasize the importance of allowing for the fact that households buy durable as well as non‐durable goods. The theoretical analysis shows that in the short run households can cut back significantly on total expenditures without a significant fall in welfare if they concentrate their budget reductions on durables. We then present an empirical analysis based on a Canadian survey of workers who experienced a job separation. Exploiting changes in the unemployment insurance system over our sample period we show that cuts in UI benefits lead to reductions in total expenditure with a stronger impact on clothing than on food expenditures. Our empirical strategy allows that these expenditures may be non‐separable from employment status. The effects we find are particularly strong for households with no liquid assets before the spell started. These qualitative findings are in precise agreement with the theoretical predictions. (JEL: D11, D12, D91, J65)     

Macroeconomic Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance

This paper proposes a new modeling strategy as regards the definition of an optimal level of unemployment benefits. While the traditional methodology privileges labor market equilibrium to derive optimal employment, wage and unemployment benefit levels, we present a model in which the optimal level of unemployment benefits is a function of the government’s macroeconomic objectives in terms of inflation and output fluctuations. In a second stage, the model allows for the investigation of unemployment insurance effects on labor market equilibrium.