Vacancy Referrals,Job Search,and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment

One goal of the Public Employment Service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job‐seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job‐seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to job‐seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one‐third) of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment.     

Matching Inefficiencies,Regional Disparities,and Unemployment

Abstract. In this paper we apply a stochastic frontier approach to examine how matching inefficiencies and regional disparities in structural factors contribute to regional and aggregate unemployment. Our results suggest that there would be a substantial decline in aggregate unemployment if (i) all local labour offices operated with full efficiency or (ii) they shared the same structure of job seekers and vacant jobs as the most favourable office. In the former case an increase in hirings would lower the average unemployment rate by 2.4 percentage points. In the latter case the decrease would be 1.4 percentage points. Further, we find that fixed effects are positively correlated with both a more favourable structure and higher efficiency. This suggests that the fixed effects may capture some part of time‐invariant features in the structure and inefficiency. Thus, the role of structural factors and inefficiency in regional unemployment disparities may be higher than estimated.     

Education,Mobility and Employers’ Monopsony Power: A Search‐theoretic Analysis

Abstract. We analyse the efficiency of schooling choices in a wage‐posting search equilibrium model with on‐the‐job search. The workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education determines the scope — or adaptability— of individual skills. Individuals obtain schooling to leave unemployment more quickly and to climb the wage ladder rapidly through job‐to‐job mobility — that is, to speed up job shopping. Education reduces firms’ monopsony power in the wage determination by improving workers’ mobility. As a result, the wage distribution shifts rightward with aggregate schooling. However, the ratio of vacant jobs to job seekers also falls in each sector. Either one or the other externality may dominate, implying, respectively, under‐ or over‐education. A combination of minimum wage and schooling fee can decentralize the efficient allocation.     

Time Preferences and Job Search: Evidence from France

Abstract. Increasing impatience reduces search efforts of unemployed job seekers and therefore decreases the exit rate from unemployment. Also, impatience reduces reservation wage and increases the exit rate. To determine the overall effect of impatience on the exit rate from unemployment, we distinguish between exponential and hyperbolic time preferences. Search effort dominates the reservation wage and decreases the exit rate from unemployment if individuals have hyperbolic, rather than exponential, preferences. Using the French sample of the European Household Panel Survey, we found that search effort has a strong effect on the duration of unemployment, whereas the reservation wage is not significant. This result shows that the job seekers have hyperbolic preferences. Hyperbolic preferences affect problems associated with job search and policies aimed at reducing unemployment.     

DOES THE ILO DEFINITION CAPTURE ALL UNEMPLOYMENT?

The labour market status of many nonworking persons is at the boundary between unemployment and inactivity. Like the unemployed, they seek and are available for work; unlike them, their last search action was not recent enough to meet the International Labour Office definition of unemployment. In this paper we examine by nonparametric tests how the transition probabilities of these out‐of‐the‐labour‐force job seekers differ from those of the unemployed as well as the other nonparticipants. First, using data from the European Community Household Panel, we show that in most EU countries these job seekers constitute a distinct labour market state. Second, we rely on information available only in the Italian Labour Force Survey to derive a measure of search intensity that we use to break down the out‐of‐the‐labour‐force job seekers. On the basis of their transition probabilities, the most active are indistinguishable from the unemployed. (JEL: J64, J22, R23)     

TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL

According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), high European unemployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence, leading to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills. These workers refuse new jobs due to high unemployment benefits. In this paper we reassess the turbulence‐unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction. In our model, higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave their jobs. If turbulence has only a tiny effect on the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation, then the results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) are reversed, and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, changes in turbulence cannot provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers. (JEL: E24, J64)     

Low‐wage Jobs — Springboard to High‐paid Ones?

We examine whether low‐paid jobs have an effect on the probability that unemployed persons obtain better‐paid jobs in the future (springboard effect). We make use of data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and apply a dynamic random effects bivariate probit model. Our results suggest that low‐wage jobs can act as springboards to better‐paid work. The improvement of the chance to obtain a high‐wage job by accepting low‐paid work is particularly large for less‐skilled persons and for individuals who experienced longer periods of unemployment. Low‐paid work is less beneficial if the job is associated with a low social status.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN WELFARE STATES: THE IMPACTS OF SOFT DURATION CONSTRAINTS

Abstract Based on a major reform of Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI), we examine the behavioral impacts of soft and hard UI duration constraints. A constraint is interpreted as hard if a claimant cannot rely on any form of income support after exhaustion, and as soft if UI is replaced by follow‐on benefits or participation in active labor market programs (ALMP). We find that both hard and soft constraints raise the job hazard significantly, with surprisingly similar spikes at UI exhaustion. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job, but at the cost of lengthening the overall job‐search period.     

Effects of Changes in the Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements on Job Duration — Swedish Evidence

This paper investigates the impact of the unemployment insurance (UI) entrance requirement on employment duration among earlier unemployed in Sweden. I exploit changes in the rules taking place in 1994 and 1997 to study behavioural adjustments in the timing of job separation in 1992, 1996, and 1998, respectively. Performing across‐year analyses with years involving different working requirements, I find some evidence of clustering of job exits at the time of UI qualification. By using predicted hazard rates for each week, I calculate an approximate 2.3‐week extension in average employment duration between 1996 and 1998, due to the 5‐week prolonging of the entrance requirement.     

Job Matching and the Wage Distribution

This paper brings together the microeconomic‐labor and the macroeconomic‐equilibrium views of matching in labor markets. We nest a job matching model à la Jovanovic (1984) into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)‐type equilibrium search environment. The resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics, and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis. We obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality. First, learning about match quality and worker turnover map Gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape: unimodal, skewed, with a Paretian right tail. Second, high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting, and reduces wage inequality. The equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows—quits to unemployment and to other jobs, displacements, hires—provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form.     

Unemployment Insurance and Entrepreneurship

Based on administrative registers from Norway, we examine how unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) affect the transition rates from unemployment to regular employment and entrepreneurship, as well as subsequent earnings levels. We find that both the employment and entrepreneurship hazards rise sharply in response to UI sanctions and UI exhaustion. On average, transitions to entrepreneurship are more profitable than transitions to regular employment. While employment transitions are highly pro‐cyclical, entrepreneurship transitions are weakly counter‐cyclical. ALMPs targeted at entrepreneurship are rare in Norway, but the few start‐up subsidies that are provided are successful in terms of generating paid work.     

Employment Transitions after Motherhood in Spain

Abstract. This paper investigates transitions from employment to non‐employment and downward occupational mobility after motherhood in Spain. Around 40 per cent of Spanish women who were at work 1 year before childbearing leave employment, most permanently, and one‐third of these exits move to unemployment. The probability of staying on at work after birth is reduced with the rise of fixed‐term contracts and increased with experience and level of education. Downward occupational mobility is not common amongst women remaining employed since they do not switch to part‐time jobs.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FLEXICURITY

We document the presence of a trade‐off in the labor market between the protection of jobs and the support offered to unemployed people. Different countries’ locations along this trade‐off represent stable political‐economic equilibria. We develop a model in which individuals determine the mix of job protection and support for the unemployed in a political environment. Agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: employment status (insiders and outsiders) and skills (low and high). Unlike previous work on the political economy of labor market institutions, we emphasize the role of job protection and unemployment benefits in the wage‐setting process. A key implication of the model is that flexicurity configurations with low levels of job protection and high levels of support to the unemployed should emerge in the presence of a highly educated workforce. Panel regressions of countries’ locations along this institutional trade‐off are consistent with the implications of our model.     

Assessing the ‘Choosiness’ of Job‐seekers. An Exploratory Approach and Evidence for Italy

Abstract. We use information about job search and work preferences, typically collected in a labour force survey, in order to construct an indicator of ‘choosiness’ of the labour supply of job‐seekers. The method for obtaining the indicator, first at individual level and then at aggregate levels, is based on results from multiple correspondence analysis. We investigate the informational value of the indicator by examining its stability over time and its predictive power on labour force transitions. Empirical analyses of cross‐section and panel samples of job‐seekers from the Italian quarterly Labour Force Survey clarify the potentials (and limitations) of the approach.     

Shocks,Stocks, and Socks: Smoothing Consumption Over a Temporary Income Loss

We investigate how households in temporarily straitened circumstances due to an unemployment spell cut back on expenditures and how they spend marginal dollars of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit. Our theoretical and empirical analyses emphasize the importance of allowing for the fact that households buy durable as well as non‐durable goods. The theoretical analysis shows that in the short run households can cut back significantly on total expenditures without a significant fall in welfare if they concentrate their budget reductions on durables. We then present an empirical analysis based on a Canadian survey of workers who experienced a job separation. Exploiting changes in the unemployment insurance system over our sample period we show that cuts in UI benefits lead to reductions in total expenditure with a stronger impact on clothing than on food expenditures. Our empirical strategy allows that these expenditures may be non‐separable from employment status. The effects we find are particularly strong for households with no liquid assets before the spell started. These qualitative findings are in precise agreement with the theoretical predictions. (JEL: D11, D12, D91, J65)     

Uncertainty and Unemployment

This paper studies the impact of time‐varying idiosyncratic risk at the establishment level on unemployment fluctuations over 1972–2009. I build a tractable directed search model with firm dynamics and time‐varying idiosyncratic volatility. The model allows for endogenous separations, entry and exit, and job‐to‐job transitions. I show that the model can replicate salient features of the microeconomic behavior of firms and that the introduction of volatility improves the fit of the model for standard business cycle moments. In a series of counterfactual experiments, I show that time‐varying risk is important to account for the magnitude of fluctuations in aggregate unemployment for past U.S. recessions. Though the model can account for about 40% of the total increase in unemployment for the 2007–2009 recession, uncertainty alone is not sufficient to explain the magnitude and persistence of unemployment during that episode.     

Unemployment Exits Before and During the Crisis

Using administrative data from Spain, we compare the pattern and the determinants of individual unemployment durations and the stability of jobs found after unemployment before and during the recent crisis. We find particularly strong effects of the crisis on the hazards in the beginning of the unemployment spell. The groups hit hardest by the crisis are men, immigrants, older workers, and low‐educated individuals. The disadvantage of men is mainly due to the more pro‐cyclical nature of men's jobs. The increase in average unemployment duration and the fall in the duration of new jobs are not explained by composition effects.     

The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Generosity on Unemployment Duration and Labor Market Transitions

This paper examines the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit generosity on labor market transitions in Turkey from 2002 to 2012. Using a unique administrative dataset, I take advantage of a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment at 900‐paid‐premium‐days to identify the impact of generosity on the outcome variables. I find that unemployment benefit duration is increased by approximately 0.07 weeks per additional week of UI. However, more generous benefits lead to lower probabilities of transition to employment and the impact is greater compared to developed countries. In addition, workers who are entitled to longer UI periods have lower probabilities of cheating the system and rejecting the services of the Turkish Employment Agency.     

Descrepancies between Supply and Demand and Adjustment Processes in the Labour Market

Changes in demand and supply in segments of the labour market will affect the labour market position of workers with an educational background in a related field of study. In one economic tradition such discrepancies between supply and demand are thought to lead to unemployment in the case of excess supply and to unfilled vacancies or skill shortages in the case of excess demand. The other neo‐classical oriented tradition expects wage adjustments to take fully account of these labour market imbalances, leading to higher wages for studies with excess demand and lower wages in case of excess supply. In practice the labour market might, on the one hand, be more flexible than suggested by the first approach, but on the other hand adjustment might be incomplete and not only wages but also other aspects of the employment relationship might be affected by a friction between supply and demand. This study examines the relationship between discrepancies between labour demand and supply on the one hand and manifestations of these tensions in the labour market experience of school‐leavers on the other hand. To investigate this relationship, a random coefficient model has been used, which allows for different adjustment processes for the various educational types, but still makes full use of all the information available in the data. The analyses provide insights about the importance of different adjustment processes and their complementarity and substitutability. We show that on average, supply surpluses lead to pressure to accept jobs at a level which is lower than the school‐leavers educational level, jobs with relatively low wages, and jobs with part‐time contracts. A direct link between supply surpluses and unemployment is only found for a few specific fields of study. Unemployment seems to occur mostly when school‐leavers do not take temporary jobs or jobs below their educational level in case of excess supply.     

TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION,TURBULENCE, AND THE DYNAMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Starting in the late 1970s, European unemployment began to increase while US unemployment remained constant. At the same time, capital‐embodied technical change began to accelerate, and the United States adopted the new capital much faster than Europe. I argue that these two facts are related. The main idea is that if there is capital‐embodied technical change, then the unemployment rate depends critically on how obsolete the installed capital stock is compared to the frontier. In particular, European workers initially worked with relatively obsolete capital, and so they lacked the skills required to work with frontier capital. When they lost their jobs they therefore stayed unemployed for longer than their American counterparts. I find that this channel accounts for about 70% of the discrepancy between the behavior of unemployment rates in Europe and the United States.