PUBLIC DEBT UNDER LIMITED PRIVATE CREDIT

There is a conventional wisdom in economics that public debt can serve as a substitute for private credit if private borrowing is limited. The purpose of this paper is to show that, while a government could in principle use such a policy to fully relax borrowing limits, this is not generally optimal. In our economy, agents invest in a short‐term asset, a long‐term asset, and government bonds. Agents are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks prior to the maturity of the long‐term asset. We show that a high public debt policy fully relaxes private borrowing limits and is suboptimal. This is because agents expecting such a policy respond by investing less than is socially optimal in the short asset which can protect them in the event of a liquidity shock. The optimal policy is more constrained and it induces a wedge between the technological rate of return on the long asset and the rate of return on bonds. In such a regime, agents subject to liquidity shocks are also borrowing constrained, and this expectation of being borrowing constrained induces them to invest the optimal level in the short asset.     

中国失业问题与财政政策研究

失业是市场经济运行中各国以及我国社会经济发展面临的一大难题。促进就业、控制失业率是各国政府的宏观调控目标之一和不可推卸的责任。本报告从理论与实践的结合上,深入研究失业与宏观调控及财政政策的关系,揭示当前我国政府及财政促进就业政策的成效和问题,并在借鉴国际经验的基础上,进一步提出了近期我国缓解失业压力、建立促进就业长效机制的宏观对策思路和财政政策取向。     

SOVEREIGNS VERSUS BANKS: CREDIT,CRISES, AND CONSEQUENCES

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One interpretation speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policy. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper examines the co‐evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries from 1870 to 2012. We find that in advanced economies financial crises are not preceded by public debt build‐ups nor are they more likely when public debt is high. However, history shows that high levels of public debt tend to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after financial crises. The economic costs of financial crises rise substantially if large private sector credit booms are unwound at times when the public sector has little capacity to pursue macroeconomic and financial stabilization.     

Supply Policies in an Open Economy with Centralized Wage Setting

Abstract. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of a fiscal policy based on government subsidies to firms in an open economy, characterized by the “strategic” interaction of government and unions. Before developing the theoretical model, some evidence about government reaction functions for selected OECD countries is presented. The main theoretical results can be summed up as follows. A fiscal policy based on a tax-financed increase in government transfers to firms makes the country more competitive internationally, but reduces employment. Only when the increase in government transfers to firms is financed by the public debt is the fiscal policy able to achieve its two-fold aim of greater competitiveness and a higher level of employment.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND PENSIONS IN DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY

A dynamic political economy theory of fiscal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies. The driving force of the model is the intergenerational conflict over the allocation of the public budget. Successive generations of voters choose fiscal policies through repeated elections. The political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy. The equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational fiscal policies in modern economies.     

Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.     

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time‐inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks, we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run.     

Unemployment Insurance Policy and Union Wage Formation

Abstract. The paper considers the wage and employment effects of alternative social security policies. Such a policy can take the form of a fixed benefit level or linking the level of unemployment benefits to private sector wages. The latter is an important social security policy instrument to guarantee an equitable distribution of income. A fixed benefit level policy yields lower wages and larger employment than an automatic link between the level of benefits and the wage rate. Further, if the government decides to make the link conditional on the stabilization of the tax rate, wages are lower and employment is higher than in both former alternatives. By endogenizing its social security policy, the government is able to reduce the loss in employment that the link policy brings about.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Public‐Sector Unions

Motivated by the highly unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public‐sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public‐sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970–2007. The union model is an improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing higher welfare losses.     

INSULATION IMPOSSIBLE: MONETARY POLICY AND REGIONAL DEBT SPILLOVERS IN A FEDERATION

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy in the presence of debt spillovers within a monetary union. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of any member country will generally influence equilibrium wages and interest rates across the whole union. We ask whether there exists a monetary policy which can offset these spillovers. Within a general class of monetary policy rules, there does not exist one that completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in the other. These debt spillovers will affect welfare through two channels: intertemporal efficiency and redistribution.     

SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

Saudization (Localization) – A critical review

Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of Saudization and critically reviews its existing and potential impacts and consequences. It identifies that Saudization has positively contributed to reducing the overall percentage of foreign labor. However, there have been some difficulties, such as a decline in competitiveness among regional business companies with respect to a business friendly environment, and reduced direct foreign investment, which influenced the reduction of the tax on foreign investors. Saudization should place importance on skill development among Saudi nationals by strengthening educational and vocational training, and providing time-specific incentives, rather than relying only on a quota system. Saudization should be implemented more through market forces and incentives. Collecting comprehensive information on the nature and magnitude of Saudi unemployment could be a first step in developing appropriate Saudization policies. This paper suggests appropriate coordination and consultation between the government, the private sector and the public at large, so that any policies on Saudization become more easily acceptable and executable in both the public and private sector.     

LACK OF COMMITMENT AND THE LEVEL OF DEBT

The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero, and we analyze numerically more complex models. We also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full‐commitment is enough to obtain these results.     

Understanding Public Sector Debt: Financial Vicious Circle under the Soft Budget Constraint

The article explains why debt of public sector organizations grows beyond the sustainable level by focusing on the principal-agent relationship under the soft budget constraint. Specifically, this article explores the extent to which factors affect the level of public sector debt in the context of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (quangos) in Korea over the past two decades (1993–2012). The findings from the panel data analysis suggest that the level of public sector debt increases as an outcome of the financial vicious circle created by the soft budget constraint: a knock-on effect of the moral hazard of quangos as well as the opportunistic behavior of political principals. Public sector debt is positively associated with agency-specific factors as well as the factors related to the political incentives such as policy preferences and electoral considerations. However, macroeconomic factors made little difference to the general pattern of the evidence.     

财政风险:从经济总量角度的分析

在干预公共风险的过程中,政府会承受各种各样的支出压力,这些支出压力表现为政府的各种形式的负债,即未来一个时期政府资源的流出。作为公共主体,政府面对的债务是不确定的,不能仅仅从会计学角度来认定。公共债务与经济总量是一种历史的循环关系,不同的循环状态决定了政府财政风险是趋向收敛还是发散。不同的债务结构对经济总量及其增长产生不同的影响,因而具有不同的风险。认清不同公共债务类型的来源、不确定性程度及其风险可控性,是把握公共债务与经济总量的关联向哪一种循环转化的重要一环,仅仅关注债务总量是远远不够的,抽象地谈公共债务负担率的高低没有意义。改善公共债务结构,降低整个公共债务的不确定性程度至关重要,这比控制债务规模更迫切。     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)     

How Do Policies Affect the Exit Rate out of Unemployment? Disentangling Job Creation from Labour Market Frictions

This paper assesses the effects of labour market policies on the unemployment outflow rate while disentangling two channels, namely labour market tightness and employer–employee matching efficiency. Using a sample of 11 OECD countries over the period 1985–2007, we treat the endogeneity of market tightness with business cycle shocks and the tax wedge as instruments. We find that the replacement rate of unemployment benefits, Active Labour Market Policies as well as the tax wedge in countries with poorly representative unions, have a significant, robust, and large impact on market tightness. Employment protection has a negative but small impact on matching efficiency. Overall, policy effects appear to be mostly channeled through market tightness and job creation.     

IS THERE A FISCAL FREE LUNCH IN A LIQUIDITY TRAP?

In this paper, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the effects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap. If the liquidity trap is very prolonged, the spending multiplier can be much larger than in normal circumstances, and the budgetary costs minimal. However, given this fiscal free lunch, it is unclear why policymakers would want to limit the size of fiscal expansion. Our paper addresses this question in a model environment in which the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously, and depends on the size of the fiscal stimulus. We show that even if the multiplier is high for small increases in government spending, it may decrease substantially at higher spending levels; thus, it is crucial to distinguish between the marginal and average responses of output and government debt.     

燃油税、融资约束与企业行为——基于DSGE模型的分析

征收燃油税在实现节能减排的同时也会增加企业的财务负担。如何在保护环境的同时减少对经济的冲击,有赖于对燃油税的科学评估。本文构建了一个包含燃油税和融资约束的随机动态一般均衡模型,并基于1995年第1季度至2018年第2季度的数据对相关参数进行了校准和估计,系统考察了融资约束下征收燃油税对环境经济以及企业行为的影响。研究结果发现：征收燃油税对促进节能减排有显著效果;但同时也会抑制消费、投资和产出,增加失业,对经济产生负影响。此外,融资约束会通过金融加速器的作用放大燃油税冲击的影响。而且,当融资约束越强时,降低燃油税对经济的刺激作用也越明显。     

Privatization and National Development: A Case Study of Ghana

Proponents of privatization claim that privatization can enhance efficiency, reduce public sector debt and consequently improve overall economic performance. However, in many developing countries, and Africa in particular, the evidence is mixed. An exploratory study is done from the perspective of citizens’ about the impact of privatization on the Ghanaian national economy. The findings of the study suggest that: 1) the privatization program is pro rich; it benefits the economic and political elites more than it benefits the nation as a whole; 2) there is a high level of corruption associated with the privatization process; and 3) Privatization is not considered as one of the most important tools needed for national development, though the survey finds that many respondents believe that there is the need for some reforms in the public sector to promote national development. The results of the study indicate that administrative and political problems cannot be overcome simply by reducing the size of the state bureaucracy, but rather making government more accountable in meeting the needs of its people.