Dynamic Assignment of Flexible Service Resources

Resource flexibility is an important tool for firms to better match capacity with demand so as to increase revenues and improve service levels. However, in service contexts that require dynamically deciding whether to accept incoming jobs and what resource to assign to each accepted job, harnessing the benefits of flexibility requires using effective methods for making these operational decisions. Motivated by the resource deployment decisions facing a professional service firm in the workplace training industry, we address the dynamic job acceptance and resource assignment problem for systems with general resource flexibility structure, i.e., with multiple resource types that can each perform different overlapping subsets of job types. We first show that, for systems containing specialized resources for individual job types and a versatile resource type that can perform all job types, the exact policy uses a threshold rule. With more general flexibility structures, since the associated stochastic dynamic program is intractable, we develop and test three optimization‐based approximate policies. Our extensive computational tests show that one of the methods, which we call the Bottleneck Capacity Reservation policy, is remarkably effective in generating near‐optimal solutions over a wide range of problem scenarios. We also consider a model variant that requires dynamic job acceptance decisions but permits deferring resource assignment decisions until the end of the horizon. For this model, we discuss an adaptation of our approximate policy, establish the effectiveness of this policy, and assess the value of postponing assignment decisions.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

Quality of Service Based Pricing Schemes for Content Sharing in Peer‐to‐Peer Networks

In this paper, we study quality‐of‐service (QoS) based pricing schemes that serve as incentive mechanisms to induce sharing behaviors in Peer‐to‐Peer (P2P) networks. We incorporate operational QoS metrics into users’ utility functions and demonstrate how they affect individual users’ content sharing decisions. Using a game‐theoretic model, our study reveals how organizations respond to the changes of operational QoS metrics in their design of pricing schemes for various business objectives at different stages of network evolution. Our results show that a higher upload capacity can foster rational sharing to start when the network is small; however, it also discourages sharing behaviors when the network becomes large. In order to induce a socially optimal behavior, a pricing scheme will not charge users for requesting content while compensating them for sharing content. Such compensation is found to increase faster with the network size when the network is large. In order to maximize the profit of a monopolistic provider, however, a pricing scheme will charge content requests with a positive price while providing less compensation to sharing users compared to the socially optimal scheme. When the network size is small, such compensation can be even negative, which implies that a monopolistic provider discourages content sharing when the network is small, but encourages it when the network becomes larger. In addition, we find that more information about peer upload capacity discourages peers to share.     

On service degrade at a discount: Capacity, demand pooling, and optimal discounting

In this paper we study the capacity investment decisions and operational strategies of a firm providing two-class services facing uncertain demands. The capacity decisions of the resources are made before demands are observed. Each service can be implemented by its corresponding resource. Should a mismatch between the capacity and the actual demand for the services arise, the low-class resource can be used as a substitute for the high-class service. We introduce an operational strategy called degrade-at-a-discount, where a price discount is offered to motivate customers to accept a lower class service when their original choice is out of capacity. By formulating the problem as a one-period, two-stage stochastic problem, we analyze how to set up the optimal capacity and the optimal discount. We also conduct a comprehensive numerical study to show the benefits of the degrade-at-a-discount strategy.     

Embeddedness of Organizational Capabilities*

Managers must regularly make decisions on how to access and deploy their limited resources in order to build organizational capabilities for a sustainable competitive advantage. However, failure to recognize that organizational capabilities involve complex and intricately woven underlying processes may lead to an incomplete understanding of how capabilities affect competitive advantage. As a means of understanding this underlying complexity, we discuss how managerial decisions on resource acquisition and deployment influence capability embeddedness and argue that capability embeddedness has an incremental effect on firm performance beyond the effects from organizational resources and capabilities. To investigate these issues, we present a hierarchical composed error structure framework that relies on cross‐sectional data (and allows for generalizations to panel data). We demonstrate the framework in the context of retailing, where we show that the embeddedness of organizational capabilities influences retailer performance above and beyond the tangible and intangible resources and capabilities that a retailer possesses. Our results illustrate that understanding how resources and capabilities influence performance at different hierarchical levels within a firm can aid managers to make better decisions on how they can embed certain capabilities within the structural and social relationships within the firm. Moreover, understanding whether the underlying objectives of the capabilities that are being built and cultivated have convergent or divergent goals is critical, as it can influence the extent to which the embedded capabilities enhance firm performance.     

Multichannels Strategy Implementation: The Role of Channel Alignment Capabilities*

A firm's distribution channels represent a key portfolio of resources that can be leveraged for competitive advantage. One approach to this portfolio that has become increasingly important in recent years is multichannel distribution (MCD). While this strategy has important benefits in terms of market coverage and firm performance, the use of multiple channels seriously affects downstream channel roles such as service delivery, as the financial rewards to channel members and the services they offer are separated. A channel member who offers poor or no service can free‐ride on the services offered to the same customer from a different channel. We draw on agency theory to explain these negative consequences. Additionally, the resource‐based view of the firm along with capabilities theory provides two key means of alleviating these consequences: channel tracking capabilities and reward alignment capabilities. The study, conducted in an industry facing serious MCD issues (the outdoor sporting goods industry), used key informant data matched to secondary data. Our results show that managers can reap the performance rewards of MCD strategies while minimizing its negative consequences. In particular, monitoring practices such as frequent site visits and phone contact with customers develop the firm's channel tracking capabilities, allowing managers to better monitor downstream activities. This becomes particularly important as the complexity from having multiple channels increases. Likewise, reward alignment capabilities such as retail price maintenance agreements and cooperative advertising enable the manager to minimize conflict among channel participants by ensuring sufficient profitability for all channel members.     

考虑动态损失厌恶的V2G市场交易激励机制设计

为推进V2G服务设想的实现,本文将电动汽车用户的动态损失厌恶特性考虑在内,分析了一般“保底收购,随行就市”市场制度下,电动汽车用户与电网公司间关于V2G服务交易的博弈行为,并提出了相应的激励机制。研究发现:在一般“保底收购,随行就市”市场制度下,电动汽车用户关于V2G服务的行为选择无法满足电网公司关于V2G服务电量的期望;电动汽车用户对V2G服务电量的决策受其对未来交易价格预期的影响,且存在违约风险。鉴于此,文章引入“激励保证金+违约金”的激励机制,并给出了对应的保底价格策略、激励保证金与违约金等策略,以使电动汽车用户的V2G服务选择与电网公司的期望相统一。算例分析结果验证了本文提出的模型与理论分析的可行性。     

The Design of Feature‐Limited Demonstration Software: Choosing the Right Features to Include

Today, software supports many important tasks in a variety of industries. In the specialized nature of these environments, a common problem faced by software vendors is to correctly signal the true value of a software product to the end users. For example, telecommunications equipment manufacturers design complex software for important functions like provisioning new users in the network. These software products automate various functions that would otherwise need to be done manually. In order to enable potential customers—telecommunications providers—to evaluate and recognize the full value of the product, equipment vendors often provide a free, feature‐limited version of the product to the customer. As the specific features included in the feature‐limited version influence whether the full product is purchased or not, it is essential that the features included in the feature‐limited version be selected judiciously. While the importance of identifying the best set of features has been well recognized, there has been little research to date that systematically addresses this fundamental business decision. This study fills this gap in the literature by providing an objective approach to the design of demonstration software. We illustrate the benefits of our approach through a case study involving the design of a feature‐limited demo for a wireless telecommunications equipment manufacturer.     

Updating Inventories of Substitutable Resources in Response to Forecast Updates

We show simple yet optimal results to update the inventory/capacity levels, expected profit, fill rates, and service levels of substitutable resources in response to an updating of the mean demand forecasts for the resources. We find that a change in the mean demand of one resource does not affect the optimal inventory level of any other resource. The results are obtained for demands with location‐scale distribution, and for a revenue structure satisfying a triangle property such that the manager will always use the inventory of a resource to meet her own demand first before using it for substitution. The results for updating the performance measures also extend to managers who maintain non‐optimal inventory/capacity levels. Implications for procurement, sales and operational planning, and multi‐store operations are discussed.     

Price and Service Competition in an Outsourced Supply Chain

We consider a buyer who outsources the manufacturing of a product to multiple symmetric make‐to‐stock suppliers who compete on price and service (fill rate). The buyer allocates demand to the suppliers using a score function with an exponential form, which specifies the relative importance of price vs. service, in order to minimize his costs, while the suppliers choose their prices and fill rates to maximize their profits. For the case of dual‐sourcing, we characterize the optimal parameter of the exponential score function, considering the impact of the buyer's decisions on the suppliers, and considering how the suppliers compete against each other to earn a portion of the buyer's demand. We prove the existence of a unique equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium behavior of the system. We then consider a general number of suppliers and show that the equilibrium prices and fill rates, and the buyer's cost, are increasing in the number of suppliers. We compare these results to a model of single‐sourcing, in which the buyer is the Stackelberg leader and extracts all profits from the supplier. We find that the buyer always prefers single‐sourcing to multisourcing. Finally, we study a centralized system and use the results to develop a coordinating contract for the decentralized system.     

Pricing,Allocation, and Overbooking in Dynamic Service Network Competition When Demand Is Uncertain

We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic noncooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze, and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management literature to date. In particular, previous models typically consider only three or four of five key revenue management features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the underpricing of network services, a finding numerically illustrated by an example of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented using well‐known off‐the‐shelf commercial software.     

Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets

This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's “interim preference” over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk‐sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk‐sharing was fully efficient to begin with.     

Benchmark Schedules for Subcontracted Operations: Decentralization Inefficiencies that Arise from Competition and First‐Come‐First‐Served Processing*

Subcontracting has become a prominent business practice across many industries. Subcontracting of industrial production is generally based on short‐term need for additional processing capacity, and is frequently employed by manufacturers to process customer orders more quickly than using only in‐house production. In this article, we study a popular business model where multiple manufacturers, each capable of processing his entire workload in‐house, have the option to subcontract some of their operations to a single third party with a flexible resource. Each manufacturer can deliver customer orders only after his entire batch of jobs, processed in‐house and at the third party, is completed. The third party facility is available to several manufacturers who compete for its use. Current business practice of First‐Come‐First‐Served (FCFS) processing of the subcontracted workloads as well as the competitive Nash equilibrium schedules developed in earlier studies result in two types of inefficiencies; the third party capacity is not maximally utilized, and the manufacturers incur decentralization cost. In this article, we develop models to assess the value created by coordinating the manufacturers' subcontracting decisions by comparing two types of centralized control against FCFS and Nash equilibrium schedules. We present optimal and/or approximate algorithms to quantify the third party underutilization and the manufacturers' decentralization cost. We find that both inefficiencies are more severe with competition than they are when the third party allocates capacity in an FCFS manner. However, in a decentralized setting, a larger percentage of the players prefer Nash equilibrium schedules to FCFS schedules. We extend our analysis to incomplete information scenarios where manufacturers reveal limited demand information, and find that more information dramatically benefits the third party and the manufacturers, however, the marginal benefit of additional information is decreasing. Finally, we discuss an extension wherein each manufacturer's objective takes into account asymmetries in subcontracting, in‐house processing, and delay costs.     

遗传算法在活动网络有限资源分配问题中的应用

有限资源合理分配是网络计划中一个复杂的组合优化问题。应用遗传算法,本文建立了描述有限资源合理分配问题的染色体结构和适应度函数,设计了问题的遗传运算,并举例说明了该遗传算法的有效性。这一工作对于处理工程项目施工安排问题具有重要意义。     

Multi‐Product Quality Competition: Impact of Resource Constraints

We study a multi‐product firm with limited capacity where the products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the customer base is heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. While the demand structure creates opportunities through proliferation, the firm should avoid cannibalization between its own products. Moreover, the oligopolistic market structure puts competitive pressure and limits the firm's market share. On the other hand, the firm has limited resources that cause a supply‐side fight for adequate and profitable production. We explicitly characterize the conditions where each force dominates. Our focus is on understanding how capacity constraints and competition affect a firm's product‐mix decisions. We find that considering capacity constraints could significantly change traditional insights (that ignore capacity) related to product‐line design and the role of competition therein. In particular, we show that when the resources are limited, the firm should offer only the product that has the highest margin per unit capacity. We find that this product could be the diametrically opposite product suggested by the existing literature. In addition, we show that for intermediate capacity levels, whereas the margin per unit capacity effect dominates in a less competitive market, proliferation and cannibalization effects dominate in a more competitive market.     

需求不确定下制造商服务投入影响销售的供应链信息共享与激励

针对需求不确定环境下制造商既提供产品也提供相关服务时产品服务供应链中的信息共享与激励问题,考虑零售商拥有需求预测信息且可选择共享任意水平的信息量,通过构建不完全信息下的动态博弈模型,分析了零售商信息共享水平、制造商服务效率以及消费者服务敏感性对服务价值和信息共享价值的影响,并提出了基于两部补偿契约的信息共享激励策略。研究表明：需求信息共享能够有效提升整个供应链的服务价值;当制造商服务效率或者消费者服务敏感性较高时,信息共享的服务改善效应将占优于其双边际效应,零售商会自愿共享全部需求信息并达到供应链"双赢";而当制造商服务效率或者消费者服务敏感性较低时,采用两部补偿激励契约可实现产品服务供应链中的完全信息共享,并且契约实施难度会随着零售商需求预测精度、制造商服务效率以及消费者服务敏感性的提高而降低。     

Determinants of Interoutsourcing: An Analytical Approach

Interoutsourcing is a round‐way process in which the vendor is its customer's customer and the customer is its vendor's vendor. While interoutsourcing is emerging as a prominent outsourcing strategy in many industries, there are no rigorous analytical studies focusing on this mechanism. In this article, we analytically demonstrate the efficacy of interoutsourcing by comparing it with normal outsourcing. Our results show that, compared with normal outsourcing, interoutsourcing acts as a self‐enforcer of vendor firms' behaviors toward increasing outsourcing service value. However, in situations where there is a mismatch of outsourcing activities, a high degree of incentive that is based on outsourcing service value, and a high cost of capital, interoutsourcing is not preferred to normal outsourcing. We discuss these results in detail and provide managerial implications for firms involved in interoutsourcing decisions.     

冗余资源配置条件下的企业技术创新激励合约研究

基于多任务委托代理模型的分析框架,建立了企业同时采用新增资源投入和搜寻企业冗余资源进行技术创新的信息不对称条件下的委托代理模型。通过对模型的分析,得出了企业技术创新所需的新增资源和冗余资源投入的优化配置条件,以及2种资源组合配置模式下的企业员工技术创新活动的最优激励合同条件。企业可以根据新增资源的边际收益、边际成本,以及各行动之间成本函数的相互依存性的不同组合,采取适度激励、重度强化激励、轻度强化激励、重度弱化激励和轻度弱化激励等优化激励组合方案来激励员工进行技术创新活动,从而使企业技术创新资源的配置有更多优化方案选择,以降低企业创新的风险和成本,提高资源效率和创新绩效。     

A Risk-sharing Approach to Transfer Pricing and Incentive Compensation Problems under Exchange Rate Uncertainty*

This study examines the transfer pricing and incentive compensation problems in a multinational enterprise facing currency risk. It is shown that, in the presence of diverse risk preferences among managers, the Hirshleifer (1956) transfer pricing rule results in inefficient resource allocation decisions by division managers. Following the approach developed by Kanodia (1979), two transfer pricing and compensation systems are proposed. The proposed systems enable central management to achieve efficient resource allocation and partial or global risk sharing. It is also argued that the proposed plans can be implemented in conjunction with existing transfer pricing systems that primarily serve tax and tariff concerns.     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.