Economic Development,Human Rights - and the Omelette Thesis

People Matter — Views on International Human Rights Policy. By Theo van Boven, collected and introduced by Hans Thoolen. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1982. 186pp. Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Report of a Conference held in The Hague, 27 April-1 May 1981, convened by the International Commission of Jurists. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982. 237pp.     

Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power

Blair and Pollak (Econometrica (1982) 50: 931–943) prove that, if there are more alternatives than individuals, then, for every arrovian binary decision rule that is acyclic, there is at least one individual who has a veto power over a critical number of pairs of alternatives. If the number of individuals is larger than the number of alternatives, there need not be single vetoers but there could be small coalitions endowed with a similar power. Kelsey (Soc Choice Welfare (1985) 2: 131–137) states precise results in this respect. In this paper, we first give a new and much simpler proof of the main result of Blair and Pollak and complete proofs of the generalization of this result by Kelsey. Then we give a precise answer as to the minimum size of the coalitions that must have a veto power under any acyclic binary decision rule and the minimum number of pairs of alternatives on which these coalitions may exercise their power. We also show that, if the veto power of the coalitions of the minimal size attainable under the last objective is limited to the minimum number of pairs of alternatives, then all larger coalitions have a veto power on all pairs. All the results are obtained by appealing to an acyclicity condition found by Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory (1979) 21: 28–45). In the case of symmetric and monotonic binary decision rules, proofs are even easier and illustrate clearly the reasons for the veto power.     

Power indices and minimal winning coalitions

The Penrose–Banzhaf index and the Shapley–Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of minimal winning coalitions.     

Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games

Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is modeled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted to {0, 1}. The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces a hierarchy in the set of players in terms of the a-priori influence that the players have over the decision making process. In order to determine this hierarchy in a swap robust game, one has to either evaluate a power index (e.g., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Banzhaf–Coleman index) for each player or conduct a pairwise comparison between players, whereby a player i is ranked higher than another player j if there exists a coalition in which i is more desirable as a coalition partner than j. In this paper, we outline an alternative mechanism to determine the ranking of players in terms of their a-priori power. This simple and elegant method uses only minimal winning coalitions, rather than the entire set of winning coalitions.     

Book Reviews

W.A. Czumer, Recollections about the Life of the First Ukrainian Settlers in Canada (1981). Pp. 176.

M. R. Lupul (ed.), Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism and Separatism ‐ An Assessment (1978). Pp. 177.

W. R. Petryshyn (ed.), Changing Realities ‐ Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians (1980). Pp. 249.

F. Swyripa, Ukrainian Canadians — A Survey of Their Portrayal in English Language Works (1978). Pp. 169.

David Eltis and James Walvin (eds.), The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa and the Americas (Madison and London, University of Wisconsin Press, 1981). Pp.xiii + 314. £12.70.

Michael H. Tepper (ed.), Passenger Arrivals at the Port of Baltimore, 1820–1834, From Customs Passenger Lists (Baltimore, Genealogical Publishing Company, 1982). Pp. xxiii + 768. $38.50.

David L. Brye (ed.), European Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States and Canada: A Historical Bibliography (Santa Barbara, California and Oxford, ABC/Clio Press, 1983). Pp. viii + 458. £42.50.

Ruth First, 117 Days (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982). Pp. 144. £1.95.

Hugh Beach and Lars Ragvald, A New Wave on a Northern Shore: The Indochinese Refugees in Sweden (Norrkoping, Statens Invandrarverk, 1982). Pp. v + 163. NP.

Stuart A. Cohen, English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo‐Jewry, 1895–1920 (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1982). Pp. xv + 349. £28.20.

Sandra Wallman and Associates, Living in South London: Perspectives on Battersea 1871–1981 (Aldershot, Gower, 1982). Pp. ix + 229. £13.50.     

Should Dsm Be the Basis for Teaching Social Work Practice in Mental Health? Yes!

Abstract

Point/Counterpoint is a regular feature of the Journal of Social Work Education. Its purpose is to provide a vehicle for the expression of contrasting views on controversial topics in social work education. Our goal is to illuminate important debates and explore the diverse perspectives that are shaping social work education.

In each issue of the Journal several social work educators are invited to comment on a topic about which they have differing viewpoints. The commentators are given an opportunity to make a brief rebuttal. In this issue, Janet Williams (Professor, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons), Robert Spitzer (Professor, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons), Herb Kutchins (Professor, California State University, Sacramento), and Stuart Kirk (Professor, University of California, Los Angeles) address the question: Should DSM be the basis for teaching social work practice in mental health?     

A value for games with coalition structures

This paper presents an axiomatization of a value for games with coalition structures which is an alternative to the Owen Value. The motor of this new axiomatization is a consistency axiom based on an associated game, which is not a reduced game. The new value of an n-player unanimity game is the compound average of the new values of all the (n-1)-player unanimity games. The new value of a unanimity game allocates to bigger coalitions a larger share of the total wealth. Note that the Owen value allocates to all the coalitions the same share independently of their size.     

Life skills training and the politics of personal effectiveness

In recent years social and life skills curriculum has emerged to occupy an important place in new training initiatives, particularly those associated with YTS and pre-vocational courses such as TVEI, CPVE and City and Guids 365.* one level the attraction of‘life skills’training is that it is relevant and address, in ways that traditional Liberal and General Studies could not, the practical problems likely to affect young people as adults, as parents and as employees. another, ambiguity surrounds the criteria upon which such skills for living are constructed and appraised, not least because of their close behavioural connection with altering young peoples’attitudes toward authority, industry and society. Despite recent concern about the dangers of bias and indoctrination elsewhere in mainstream education, this controversial aspect of government intervention in vocational training (DEP 1981; MSC 1981; DEP 1984) has escaped the critical attention of those who currently express concern about standards in education (Scrution et al 1985). For this reason the paper seeks to examine the kind of‘official’thinking which lies behind life skills training, and the skills which are thought necessary to enhance the‘personal effectiveness’of young people. This would seem all the more important in view of the government's contention that technical and vocational education (14-18) now constitutes a viable alternative for those who fail to succeed in mainstream education. (DEP 1981, 1984; MSC 1981, 1982a).     

Review article: witches,relativism and magic

Enemies of God Christina Larner, Chatto & Windus, London, 1981, £12.95, 244 pp. Rationality and Relativism Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1982, £17.50, paper £6.95, 312 pp. Stolen Lightening: The Social Theory of Magic Daniel O'Keefe, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982, £27.50, paper £9.95, 581 pp.     

A Review of: “Crossing Sexual Boundaries: Transgender Journeys,Uncharted Paths. Edited by J. Ari Kane-DeMaios & Vern L. Bullough.”

THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN. Mary de Young. Jefferson, NC: McFarland &; Company, 1982; 179 pages; $18.95.

“FEMININITY,” “MASCULINITY,” AND “ANDROGYNY” A Modern Philosophical Discussion. Mary Vetterling‐Braggin (Ed.). Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, &; Co., 1982; 326 pages; $8.95.

IMPOTENCE: Physiological, Psychological, Surgical Diagnosis and Treatment. Gorm Wagner and Richard Green. New York: Plenum Press, 1981; 182 pages; $24.50.

Bullough, V. L. Age at Menarche: A Misunderstanding. Science 1981, 213, 365–366.     

Artist-run galleries—A contemporary institutional change in the visual arts

This paper focuses on the contemporary phenomenon of artists who, because of institutional changes in the social organization of the visual arts, become their own gatekeepers by running their own galleries, managing their own exposure and re-establishing direct contact with their audiences and communities. The author contends that the ways in which artists have pursued and organized their own galleries shed light on both the functioning of the established social organization of art and the circumstances that bring about its change. The paper explores the organization, operations and viability of visual artist-managed galleries in the San Francisco and Santa Cruz areas of California as an alternative to the established organization of the art market. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Pacific Sociological Association Meetings in Sacramento, California (April, 1977). This study was made possible by a grant from the Research Committee of the University of California, Santa Cruz. My warmest thanks to Judith Balfe and Gerald Platt for their substantive and editorial assistance and to Jenny Debouzek for her assistance throughout this research.     

Agenda control in coalition formation

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. Keywords: Government Formation, Agenda Control, Coalitional Bargaining, Finite Bargaining Rules. Received: 26 January 2001/Accepted: 31 July 2001     

Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

We call a domain of preference orderings “dictatorial” if there exists no Arrovian (Pareto optimal, IIA and non-dictatorial) social welfare function defined over that domain. In a finite world of alternatives where indifferences are ruled out, we identify a condition which implies the dictatoriality of a domain. This condition, to which we refer as “being essentially saturated”, is fairly weak. In fact, independent of the number of alternatives, there exists an essentially saturated (hence dictatorial) domain which consists of precisely six orderings. Moreover, this domain exhibits the superdictatoriality property, i.e., every superdomain of it is also dictatorial. Thus, given m alternatives, the ratio of the size of a superdictatorial domain to the size of the full domain may be as small as 6/m!, converging to zero as m increases.     

Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods

We consider the problem of allocating a finite set of indivisible goods and a single infinitely divisible good among a group of agents, and we study a solution, called the Identical Preferences Lower Bound solution, in the presence of consistency properties. This solution is not consistent. We prove that its maximal consistent subsolution is the No-envy solution. Our main result is that the minimal consistent extension of the intersection of the Identical Preferences Lower Bound solution with the Pareto solution is the Pareto solution. This result remains true in the restricted domain when all the indivisible goods are identical, but not when there is a unique indivisible good.This paper was developed during my stay at Rochester University in the summer of 1992. I would like to express my special thanks to Professor William Thomson for all his help and advice. Iam also grateful to my supervisor Luis Corchón, to Koichi Tadenuma and to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The remaining errors are my exclusive responsibility. Financial support from the DGCYT under project PB 91-0756 and the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas are gratefully acknowledged.     

Intergenerational equity and an explicit construction of welfare criteria

Ranking infinite utility streams includes many impossibility results, most involving certain Pareto, anonymity, or continuity requirements. We introduce the concept of the future agreement extension, a method that explicitly extends orderings on finite time horizons to an infinite time horizon. The future agreement extension of the given orderings is quasi-transitive, complete, and pairwisely continuous. Furthermore, its asymmetric part is larger than that of any other pairwisely continuous extension of the orderings. In case of anonymous and strongly Paretian orderings, their future agreement extension is variable step anonymous and strongly Paretian. Characterizations of the future agreement extensions of the utilitarian and leximin orderings are obtained as applications.     

Partially monotonic bargaining solutions

The purpose of the paper is to study partially monotonic solutions for two-person bargaining problems. Partial monotonicity relates to the uncertainty a player has about the solution before bargaining. If the minimum utility a player can expect is greater in game T than in game S, and if T contains more alternatives than S, this may bring him to expect that his utility at the solution is greater in T than in S. Partially monotonic solutions reflect these expectations.One partially monotonic solution is axiomatized. The axioms of symmetry and independence of linear transformations are not explicitly assumed, although the solution has also these properties. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is shown to be the only continuous partially monotonic solution.This study was financed by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. I like to thank an associate editor and a referee for their valuable suggestions, and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation Study Group on Public Economics for useful discussions     

Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions

Let be a social preference function, and let v() be the Nakamura number of . If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v() then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that (P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v()-1.Presented at the Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., August 17–24, 1985. This material is based on work supported by NSF Grant SES-84-18295 to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. Particular thanks are due to David Grether, Dick McKelvey and Jeff Strnad for helpful discussion and for making available their unpublished work.     

On power distribution in weighted voting

We study here the strategic possibilities in a voting system where, in weight terms, there is a single main agent and the others are equivalent. As an alternative to the coalition formation, we suggest for the minor agents a more discreet, anonymous and solidary behavior based on commitments referred to the size of the coalitions that they would agree to form. In order to analyze, in a coherent way, the effects of such commitments on the a priori power distribution, we use as measures of power the Shapley value and a certain class of semivalues closely related to it.Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003–01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry. The authors wish to thank Professor Maurice Salles and two anonymous referees for their stimulating comments.     

Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives

In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy “tops only.” That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third,…, or the least. The functions are defined on the domain of profiles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. The unrestricted domain of profiles is an example of such a domain. I also prove an extension theorem. Received: 10 August 1998/Accepted: 3 May 1999     

Covering relations,closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments

We show that the Slater's set of a tournament, i.e. the set of the top elements of the closest orderings, is a subset of the top cycle of the uncovered set of the tournament. We also show that the covering relation is related to the hamiltonian bypaths of a strong tournament in that if x covers y, then there exists an hamiltonian bypath from x to y.We thank B. Monjardet and an anonymous editor for helpful suggestions.