DEA as a tool for predicting corporate failure and success: A case of bankruptcy assessment

Using an additive super-efficiency data envelopment analysis (DEA) model, this paper develops a new assessment index based on two frontiers for predicting corporate failure and success. The proposed approach is applied to a random sample of 1001 firms, which is composed of 50 large US bankrupt firms randomly selected from Altman's bankruptcy database and 901 healthy matching firms. This sample represents the largest firms that went bankrupt over the period 1991–2004 and represents a full spectrum of industries. Our findings demonstrate that the DEA model is relatively weak in predicting corporate failures compared to healthy firm predictions, and the assessment index improves this weakness by giving the decision maker various options to achieve different precision levels of bankrupt, non-bankrupt, and total predictions.     

The Application of Neural Networks and a Qualitative Response Model to the Auditor's Going Concern Uncertainty Decision*

An auditor gives a going concern uncertainty opinion when the client company is at risk of failure or exhibits other signs of distress that threaten its ability to continue as a going concern. The decision to issue a going concern opinion is an unstructured task that requires the use of the auditor's judgment. In cases where judgment is required, the auditor may benefit from the use of statistical analysis or other forms of decision models to support the final decision. This study uses the generalized reduced gradient (GRG2) optimizer for neural network learning, a backpropagation neural network, and a logit model to predict which firms would receive audit reports reflecting a going concern uncertainty modification. The GRG2 optimizer has previously been used as a more efficient optimizer for solving business problems. The neural network model formulated using GRG2 has the highest prediction accuracy of 95 percent. It performs best when tested with a small number of variables on a group of data sets, each containing 70 observations. While the logit procedure fails to converge when using our eight variable model, the GRG2 based neural network analysis provides consistent results using either eight or four variable models. The GRG2 based neural network is proposed as a robust alternative model for auditors to support their assessment of going concern uncertainty affecting the client company.     

When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?

I study repeated competition among oligopolists. The only novelty is that firms may go bankrupt and permanently exit: the probability that a firm survives a price war depends on its financial strength, which varies stochastically over time. Under some conditions including no entry, an anti‐folk theorem holds: when firms are patient, so that strength levels change relatively quickly, every Nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm remains. Surprisingly, the possibility of entry may facilitate collusion, as may impatience. The model can explain some observed patterns of collusion and predation.     

Vertikale Integration und Unternehmenserfolg: eine empirische Untersuchung in der Formel 1

According to the (new) theory of the firm vertically integrated firms might under certain conditions outperform disintegrated firms. In particular, in a situation with high transaction specific investments and measurement problems concerning individual performance an underinvestment problem may arise. In this paper we show for Formula One motor racing that integrated firms solve arising underinvestment problems more efficiently than disintegrated firms and that the decision to integrate positively affect the firm’s performance.     

竞争环境下客户服务投入对企业利润影响的均衡分析

客户服务投入是企业吸引新顾客和维持现有顾客的重要手段之一。然而,服务投入究竟是否能给企业带来价值？对于这一问题,业界和学界都没有明确的答案。本文通过建模的方法研究在竞争的市场环境下,固有的市场因素对客户服务投入价值的影响。研究发现,服务竞争的市场均衡结构是两家厂商都投入客户服务。服务投入给企业带来的价值随着产品差异度的提高而提高,随着厂商自身市场份额的增加而增加。即,在产品差异度高的市场,服务投入更容易给企业带来价值。而在集中度高的市场,服务投入更容易给市场份额大的企业带来价值。     

Squeezing or cuddling? The impact of economic crises on management control and stakeholder management

This paper analyzes the effects of economic crises on firms’ use of management control mechanisms and on their management of stakeholder relations. Moreover, the association between stakeholder management and management control system use is analyzed. In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008/2009, many firms were faced with severe threats that called for immediate short-term action to ensure firm survival. However, short-term action like massive cost-cutting and cash generation often are blamed for going at the expense of long-term health as key stakeholder relations may be irreversibly harmed. Hence, three interrelated questions are addressed theoretically and empirically: First, we analyze the impact of the recent economic crisis on firms’ control strategies. More specifically, we investigate whether a high crisis impact on firms is associated with a shortening of reporting cycles, a more interactive use of control-relevant information, restriction of employee autonomy and a focus on liquidity and cost-cutting. Second, we examine from the viewpoint of stakeholder theory how firms can make use of active stakeholder management for crisis management. Third, we explore whether firms can take short-term measures for ensuring liquidity and cutting costs and at the same time pursue a stakeholder strategy aiming at the long-term survival of the firm. Using survey data from 204 major Austrian corporations, we provide evidence that firms significantly adjusted their control systems as a response to the economic crisis. Our data do not indicate an immanent contradiction between a “short-term finance focus” and the pursuit of a sustainable stakeholder strategy.     

竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

Biotechnology collaborations: does business model matter?

This study investigates how a biotechnology firm??s collaboration incidence is affected by the business model it adopts. Specifically, we compare interfirm collaboration conducted by biopharmaceutical firms adopting the hybrid business model with those using the product-focused business model. The analysis based on 1,820 collaborations conducted by 87 dedicated biopharmaceutical firms suggests that firms adopting the hybrid business model generally engage in more collaboration. They also establish a greater proportion of exploration collaboration. These findings have implications for firm??s positioning using business models.     

Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.     

In Good Times but Not in Bad: The Role of Managerial Discretion in Moderating the Stakeholder Management and Financial Performance Relationship

We examine the role of managers in controlling the positive impact of stakeholder management (SM) on firm financial performance (FP) in the long term. We develop and test competing hypotheses on whether managers act as “good citizens” or engage in “self‐dealing” when allowed greater discretion. We test our assertions using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 806 U.S. public firms operating in 34 industries over 5 years (2005–2009). Our results indicate a nuanced influence of managerial discretion contexts on the SM‐FP relationship. We infer that given more latitude in decision making, as long as the “going is good” managers act as good citizens, but otherwise they revert to managerial self‐dealing. In light of our results, firms designing governance mechanisms to encourage managers to balance the needs of both shareholders and stakeholders must remain cognizant of contextual contingencies.     

Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs

Several firms prohibit their CEOs from trading in the stock of peer firms. This is puzzling since hedging by the CEO through private trading in the capital market can reduce the CEO’s exposure to systematic compensation risk. When the CEO’s incentive contract comprises relative performance evaluation, we find that the firm might want to disallow private hedging even though there are no technological interdependencies or strategic interactions to peer firms. In the analysis, we highlight two frequently observed characteristics of incentive contracts. First, the use of accounting benchmarks is widespread in compensation contracts for CEOs. Second, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful CEOs have influence on the process of designing their own compensation. We find that in the presence of a powerful CEO, the firm can benefit from disallowing private hedging. In particular, the firm’s decision to allow or to disallow private hedging depends on the characteristics of the accounting benchmarks and the characteristics of the peer firms.     

The Effect of Competition on the Efficient–Responsive Choice

In determining their operations strategy, a firm chooses whether to be responsive or efficient. For firms competing in a market with uncertain demand and varying intensity of substitutability for the competitor's product, we characterize the responsive or efficient choice in equilibrium. To focus first on the competitive implications, we study a model where a firm can choose to be responsive at no additional fixed or marginal cost. We find that competing firms will choose the same configuration (responsive or efficient), and responsiveness tends to be favorable when demand uncertainty is high or when product competition is not too strong. Intense competition can drive firms to choose to be efficient rather than responsive even when there is no additional cost of being responsive. In such a case, both firms would be better off by choosing to be responsive but cannot credibly commit. We extend the basic model to study the impact of endogenized production timing, multiple productions and product holdback (or, equivalently, postponed production). For all these settings, we find structurally similar results; firms choose the same configuration, and the firms may miss Pareto‐improvements. Furthermore, through extensions to the basic model, we find that greater operational flexibility can make responsiveness look less attractive in the presence of product competition. In contrast to our basic model and other extensions, we find it is possible for one firm to be responsive while the other is efficient when there is either a fixed cost or variable cost premium associated with responsive delivery.     

超竞争环境下企业困境并购定价与时机研究

在超竞争环境下企业面临的竞争环境越来越动荡，企业的竞争优势呈现出短期性与临时性的特点，为了快速发展，越来越多的企业选择并购。本文以超竞争环境为研究背景，运用期权博弈理论，分析并建立了存在竞争对手的企业困境并购定价与时机选择模型，通过模型求解得到并购中主并企业给予目标企业的最优价值以及主并企业的最佳并购时机；此外，通过数值模拟重点分析了三个超竞争特征因子（竞争强度、竞争不确定性、企业价值损失因子）、企业困境因子以及竞争对手的溢价水平对企业困境并购时机的影响。本文研究发现：（1）被并企业得到的价值补偿比例及主并企业最佳并购时机均受到各超竞争特征因子、企业困境因子以及竞争对手溢价水平的综合影响；（2）竞争对手的存在会使目标企业得到的价值补偿比例增加；（3）超竞争环境下企业困境并购中主并企业的最佳并购时机取决于并购双方的相对价值比；（4）随着可能导致双方谈判破裂因素、事件的增多以及企业财务困境程度的增加，主并企业提前进行并购的可能性增加；（5）随着竞争强度、竞争不确定性、竞争对手造成溢价水平的增加，主并企业推迟并购时机的可能性增大。     

Corporate Governance: A New Limit to Real Options Valuation?*

Including real options in firms ’ value raises numerous difficulties. Limitations concerning the relevance of option pricing models outside financial markets are the most salient, but carrying out a valuation implies other assumptions, especially on firms’ governance. In particular, assessing whether a real option should be included within a firm’s boundaries and how its value should be shared, is difficult. Most of these issues result from the different property rights on real options: who creates and who can exercise the option? We discuss existing answers to these difficulties and propose a matrix based on property rights to help practitioners decide whether a real option can be valued appropriately or not by real options models. We support our discussion with a case study based on an R&;D firm valuation.     

Optimal Security Investments and Extreme Risk

In the aftermath of 9/11, concern over security increased dramatically in both the public and the private sector. Yet, no clear algorithm exists to inform firms on the amount and the timing of security investments to mitigate the impact of catastrophic risks. The goal of this article is to devise an optimum investment strategy for firms to mitigate exposure to catastrophic risks, focusing on how much to invest and when to invest. The latter question addresses the issue of whether postponing a risk mitigating decision is an optimal strategy or not. Accordingly, we develop and estimate both a one‐period model and a multiperiod model within the framework of extreme value theory (EVT). We calibrate these models using probability measures for catastrophic terrorism risks associated with attacks on the food sector. We then compare our findings with the purchase of catastrophic risk insurance.     

产品异质条件下排污权交易市场支配力对系统均衡的影响研究

日趋臻显的行业细分趋势和显著的外向型经济发展特点等在很大程度上决定了我国区域排污权交易系统内不存在显著的产品竞争。鉴于此,在产品异质条件下,通过考虑产成品市场与排污权交易市场之间的关联影响,首先从理论层面分析了社会最优的排污权配置状态;进而,构建了主导企业与从属企业之间的主从博弈模型,通过分析特定排污权市场价格下从属企业的最优行为特征,深入剖析了主导企业的策略性行为及其对系统均衡的影响。结果表明：市场支配力对系统均衡的影响具有多样性与复杂性;特别是,为了获取更大的额外收益,主导企业存在作为卖家时选择"溢价"与作为买家时"抑价"两种排污权价格操纵形式,并不可避免地导致系统均衡与社会最优配置状态的偏离,而从属企业却会蒙受巨大损失;其中,初始排污权禀赋是影响主导企业最优决策的重要因素。最后,通过量化分析对结论进行了验证,并细致展现了主导企业产污系数和治污成本等变动对系统均衡的影响。     

Replacement Decisions for Potentially Hazardous Substances

As public awareness of environmental hazards increases, a growing concern for corporations is the potential negative environmental impact of their products and the chemicals these products contain. In this study, we analyze the optimal decisions of a firm when a substance within its product is identified as potentially hazardous. Although the substance is not currently regulated, regulation may occur in the future. Therefore, the firm must devise a strategy for the development and implementation of a replacement substance. In an environment where replacement costs can be millions of dollars, regulation is uncertain, and both consumer and non‐governmental organization pressures exist, a carefully developed plan that balances costs and risks is critical for a firm. Our results demonstrate that as long as a threat of regulation exists, a firm should always dedicate resources toward developing a replacement substance. However, it is not always optimal for a firm to implement a developed replacement. Regarding competitive dynamics, we find that competition between firms can offset a low chance of a shift in consumer perception about a substance and compel firms to replace; however, competition can lead to inefficient outcomes in which firms incur avoidable costs to implement ahead of potential regulation.     

航空公司交叉持股对产能共享策略的影响研究

产能共享与交叉持股是航空公司常用的运作与财务策略,两种方式都能在一定条件下起到缓和竞争的作用。本文考虑两家航空公司的两种交叉持股模式,构建了包含顾客忠诚度的价格竞争模型,依据产能是否对称以及是否实施产能共享策略形成八种不同的情形,求解并分析了不同情形下的最优价格决策及对应期望利润。通过对比不同情形下的利润,本文发现,在单向持股模式下,当产能对称时,两家企业始终愿意采用产能共享策略,而当产能不对称时,如果存在产能共享,产能较小的企业将更愿意降低产品价格,导致市场竞争加剧,从而损害产能较大企业的盈利能力。因此,只有当持股比例相对较小时企业才愿意实施共享产能策略。在交叉持股模式下,当产能对称时,企业在交叉持股比例适中时才愿意实施产能共享策略。而当产能不对称时,企业始终不愿意采用产能共享策略。这也表明产能共享和交叉持股策略之间存在一定的相互替代作用,企业应根据不同市场状态协调使用两种策略。     

The Impact of Trade on Intra‐Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity

This paper develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to analyze the intra‐industry effects of international trade. The model shows how the exposure to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market (while some less productive firms continue to produce only for the domestic market) and will simultaneously force the least productive firms to exit. It then shows how further increases in the industry's exposure to trade lead to additional inter‐firm reallocations towards more productive firms. The paper also shows how the aggregate industry productivity growth generated by the reallocations contributes to a welfare gain, thus highlighting a benefit from trade that has not been examined theoretically before. The paper adapts Hopenhayn's (1992a) dynamic industry model to monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium setting. In so doing, the paper provides an extension of Krugman's (1980) trade model that incorporates firm level productivity differences. Firms with different productivity levels coexist in an industry because each firm faces initial uncertainty concerning its productivity before making an irreversible investment to enter the industry. Entry into the export market is also costly, but the firm's decision to export occurs after it gains knowledge of its productivity.     

Process Improvement,Learning, and Real Options

We use a real‐options approach to analyze investments in process improvement. We develop a simple, stochastic model of a firm making investment decisions in process improvement. Our analysis offers several interesting insights into investments in process improvement. First, early investment in process improvement results in valuable knowledge, which helps increase the value of the option to invest in process improvement in future periods. This may motivate a firm to invest in process improvements as early as possible. Second, it may be optimal for a firm to stop investing when such investments do not create enough value in the later stages of the investment horizon. Third, although one would expect the state of a firm's process relative to that of other firms to impact a firm's decision to invest in process improvement, this study finds that the impetus is conditional and identifies these conditions. Finally, in such an environment, the delay of investment in process improvement incurs an opportunity cost for a firm, and we show that the traditional net present value rule must incorporate this opportunity cost and the knowledge‐induced change in future option values to lead to a correct investment decision.