PLAYING THE BEER DISTRIBUTION GAME OVER THE INTERNET

This paper describes an Internet implementation of the Beer Distribution Game. Many teachers demonstrate the bullwhip effect that is often observed in supply chains by playing this game with their students. This implementation has the advantage of considerably reducing the time required to play the game.     

Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n‐person unanimity bargaining game. As is well‐known, in this game every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (also as a subgame perfect equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient and if n & 2). Moreover, delays in agreement are also possible in such equilibria. By limiting ourselves to a plausible notion of complexity that captures length of memory, we find that the introduction of complexity costs (lexicographically with the standard payoffs) does not reduce the range of possible allocations but does limit the amount of delay that can occur in any agreement. In particular, we show that in any n‐player game, for any allocation z, an agreement on z at any period t can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the game with complexity costs if and only if t≤n. We use the limit on delay result to establish that, in equilibrium, the strategies implement stationary behavior. Finally, we also show that ‘noisy Nash equilibrium’ with complexity costs sustains only the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocation.     

TEACHING THE PRODUCTION/OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT CORE COURSE: INTEGRATING LOGISTICS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

This paper discusses the benefits of restructuring the introductory undergraduate production and operations management (pom) course to improve its pedagogical effectiveness and to better convey the importance of integrating logistics planning activities. The introduction of a dynamic integrative semester-long case study which involves students in applying pom concepts and tools through a simulation game is reported.     

供应链中双重混合渠道分销的价格竞争及均衡分析

分销渠道决策是企业能否将产品送达市场并获利的决定因素,因此,分销渠道一直是商家的必争之地。随着网络及信息技术的快速发展,渠道之争也跃进到了虚拟分销渠道之上。本文针对制造商与零售商同时具有实体与网络两种分销渠道的双重混合分销渠道结构模式,分别基于分散控制和集中控制两种情况建立博弈模型,研究了制造商与零售商的价格竞争策略。最后通过数值实验分析了不同条件下制造商与零售商的均衡价格、销售量及利润的变化趋势,并得出了具有启发性结论。     

不同权力结构下制造商双渠道供应链的博弈分析

在单个拥有线下传统批发及线上直销双渠道的制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链中,基于供应链成员博弈权力的差异,构建制造商占优或零售商占优的两类Stackelberg博弈及双方同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响。研究发现：当制造商线下传统批发渠道所占市场份额较小时,（1）渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时和不为0时,三种博弈权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链均衡解的影响具有一定的鲁棒性;（2）三种博弈权力结构下,制造商线上直销渠道价格相同;两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下,线下传统批发渠道价格相同且大于Nash博弈下的传统渠道价格;制造商批发价格随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;（3）当渠道交叉价格弹性系数为0时,三种博弈权力结构对线上直销渠道需求的影响是无差异的;当渠道间交叉价格弹性系数不为0时,两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构下的线下传统批发渠道需求相同且小于Nash博弈下的传统渠道需求,线上直销渠道需求相同且大于Nash博弈下的线上直销渠道需求;（4）三种博弈策略下,制造商收益及零售商收益随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低;Nash博弈下,供应链总利润最大。     

考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究

在线下垂直实力对等、制造商主导和实体店主导三种渠道权力结构下，构建制造商、实体店和电商之间的博弈模型，探讨线下渠道权力结构与制造商线上销售模式的匹配关系。研究结果表明：（1）当电商要求的佣金比例较小时，在不同的线下渠道权力结构下，制造商都应该选择线上代销模式；而当电商要求的佣金比例较大时，在线下垂直实力对等结构下，制造商应该选择线上转销模式，而在制造商主导和实体店主导结构下，制造商应该选择线上代销模式。（2）当制造商选择线上转销模式时，在线下制造商主导的结构下，制造商给予实体店的批发价格最大，在垂直实力对等结构下次之，在实体店主导结构下最小。然而，线下渠道权力结构的差异并不会影响制造商给予电商的批发价格。（3）当制造商选择线上代销模式时，在线下制造商主导结构下，线下销售价格最高；在线下垂直实力对等结构下，线上销售价格最高。     

从分销到直销：销售渠道关系的经济分析

在制造商主导的供应链中,分销商与制造商合作的程度,即销售渠道关系的强弱在[0,1]内的连续分布,可以看作市场化同企业化的不同组合。文章利用Stackelberg博弈分析了不同渠道关系对渠道产生的经济影响,将分销和直销分别看作[0,1]分布的两个极端情形,进行了重点探讨。在产品没有销售模式倾向的情况下,得出的一般性结论是:直销无论在产量还是价格,无论对制造商、整个渠道还是消费者都将产生积极影响。在理论上为解释渠道中的冲突和直销的成功提供了一个工具。     

考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道闭环供应链决策研究

双渠道闭环供应链存在制造商网络直销渠道和零售商实体店零售渠道。消费者会对购买不满意的产品进行退货，由于网上商店购买的产品缺乏现场体验故退货率较高。相比线下实体商店，线上退货流程更为复杂，这往往容易影响消费者购物体验。因此本文设计考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道闭环供应链结构，并分析跨渠道退货率以及渠道消费偏好对供应链的决策影响，基于Stackelberg博弈和Nash均衡博弈理论，从集中式决策与分散式决策两方面研究不同闭环供应链结构下的定价决策与利润分配，并结合数值算例进行分析。研究结果表明，跨渠道退货率以及消费者渠道偏好对闭环供应链的定价策略以及利润分配等决策具有显著影响。     

异质品双渠道供应链下制造商的渠道决策研究

研究由两个制造商、两个零售商以及消费者组成的双渠道供应链,制造商的最优产品分销渠道策略问题,通过构建Stackelberg主从动态博弈模型,分析制造商在不同渠道选择下的产品质量水平及定价决策,消费者三种不同渠道偏好下渠道竞争和品牌竞争激烈程度对制造商渠道选择均衡结果及帕累托最优选择的影响,以及对产品质量水平、产品价格、制造商及零售商利润的影响.研究表明：品牌和渠道双重竞争下,两种竞争之间存在相互作用的关系,并共同影响制造商最终渠道选择,制造商通过权衡价格决策的后动优势与消费者渠道偏好对其利润的贡献选择是否开辟双渠道,产品价格与产品质量水平正相关,与产品的替代率负相关,产品质量水平对渠道价格的影响程度等于消费者对该渠道的偏好程度.当消费者偏好某一渠道时,制造商可在该渠道上的产品采取优质高价策略,但渠道上产品性价比降低,当品牌竞争越激烈,产品价格越低,对制造商和零售商的利润挤压越严重.     

STRATEGIC PRODUCTION COMPETENCE: CONVERGENT,DISCRIMINANT, AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY

A resource-based construct of manufacturing competence, termed strategic production competence, is examined with respect to its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. The construct evaluates manufacturing performance across a comprehensive domain of competitive priorities relative to item importance and performance. Data from an earlier study of furniture firms (n = 65) are used for statistical testing. The results establish the convergent and discriminant validity of strategic production competence and show that it is positively related to business performance.     

Systems thinking and business process redesign: An application to the beer game

Managers are regrettably ignorant of the fact that their business organisations are ‘designable’. But recently, concepts such as business re-engineering and systems thinking, coupled with advances in methods of quantifying business systems, have enabled managers to scrutinise their business systems afresh.Ann van Ackere, Erik Reimer Larsen and John Morecroft use a well-known logistical system — the ‘beer game’ — to illustrate these re-engineering concepts and tools in a multi-stage production and distribution system involving a single brand of beer. This business game raises the fundamental question of why it is so difficult to match shipments and factory production to consumer demand.The authors conclude that such re-design concepts and tools can be applied successfully to full-scale business problems. Systems thinking, modelling and continuous time simulation can provide the framework for carrying the design process from mapping all the way through to redesign. The most effective CEOs of the future will be those who are competent to create corporate design in which employees are allowed to succeed.     

Average-case competitive analyses for one-way trading

Consider a trader who exchanges one dollar into yen and assume that the exchange rate fluctuates within the interval [m,M]. The game ends without advance notice, then the trader is forced to exchange all the remaining dollars at the minimum rate m. El-Yaniv et al. presented the optimal worst-case threat-based strategy for this game (El-Yaniv et al. 2001). In this paper, under the assumption that the distribution of the maximum exchange rate is known, we provide average-case analyses using all the reasonable optimization measures and derive different optimal strategies for each of them. Remarkable differences in behavior are as follows: Unlike other strategies, the average-case threat-based strategy that minimizes E[OPT/ALG] exchanges little by little. The maximization of E[ALG/OPT] and the minimization of E[OPT]/E[ALG] lead to similar strategies in that both exchange all at once. However, their timing is different. We also prove minimax theorems with respect to each objective function.     

Beliefs in Repeated Games

Consider a two‐player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three properties: learnability, a diversity of belief condition called CSP, and consistency. Loosely, if players learn to forecast the path of play whenever each plays a strategy that the other anticipates (in the sense of being in the support of that player's belief) and if the sets of anticipated strategies are sufficiently rich, then neither anticipates any of his opponent's best responses. This generalizes results in Nachbar (1997).     

联合促销下双渠道VMI供应链的竞争与协调

本文在双渠道VMI供应链中,假设制造商和零售商分别处于领导者和追随者的地位,考虑了制造商通过联合促销协调供应链上下游的策略以及双渠道需求之间的搭便车效应,以此为背景建立了制造商和零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并通过拉格朗日乘数法求解出了制造商的最优发货策略和零售商的最优定价与促销策略。研究发现制造商开辟网上渠道直销产品后,零售商缺货时间比例增大。进一步研究发现,制造商承担促销成本的比例,双渠道之间的搭便车效应对供应链成员的决策和利润有显著影响。另外,双渠道的需求越不稳定,则制造商开辟网上销售渠道后获利越高,同时零售商的利润越低。最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性并对模型中主要参数进行了灵敏度分析。     

A Two-Period Repeated Game Advertising Investment Model for Oligopolistic Markets with an Application to the Beer Industry*

This paper proposes a simple analytical model of advertising competition in oligopoly markets. The widely used log-log sales response function underlies the model specification. Advertising carryover effects are assumed to persist for one period following the period in which the expenditure occurs. Firms are assumed to be engaged in a repeated competitive game in which in every period advertising levels are set such that they maximize current and next period (i.e., two-period) profits. A Nash equilibrium solution is sought for the game. Compared with previous empirical studies of advertising competition in a game theoretic framework, the proposed model offers the following advantages: (1) oligopoly, not duopoly, markets are analyzed; (2) industry sales is allowed to vary over time as a function of advertising expenditures; (3) non-zero discount rates are used for the players. An empirical application is provided using data from the beer market on sales and advertising expenditures of Anheuser-Busch and Miller Brewing. Comparisons are provided with policies that ignore the dependence of next period profits on current advertising levels, reaction function strategies and spending levels obtained from a market share game. Extension of the model formulation to multiple marketing instruments is briefly discussed.     

不同双渠道结构下制造商的定价决策与渠道选择

根据网上渠道不同销售模式的特征将其划分为网上直销双渠道、网上分销双渠道和网上代销双渠道。分析在制造商主导的双渠道供应链中，三种不同双渠道结构下价格竞争系数、网上直销成本和佣金比例系数对其他经济变量的影响，以及制造商的最优定价决策与渠道选择问题。研究表明：制造商在保证一定网上直销单位成本和佣金比例系数条件下，网上代销双渠道和网上直销双渠道中获取的利润高于网上分销双渠道；在网络代销双渠道中，制造商利润随着佣金比例系数增加而减少，而传统零售商和网络零售商的利润会随着佣金比例系数增加而增加。     

A SIMULATION GAME FOR TEACHING SERVICE‐ORIENTED SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: DOES INFORMATION SHARING HELP MANAGERS WITH SERVICE CAPACITY DECISIONS?*

For decades, the Beer Game has taught complex principles of supply chain management in a finished good inventory supply chain. However, services typically cannot hold inventory and can only manage backlogs through capacity adjustments. We propose a simulation game designed to teach service‐oriented supply chain management principles and to test whether managers use them effectively. For example, using a sample of typical student results, we determine that student managers can effectively use end‐user demand information to reduce backlog and capacity adjustment costs. The game can also demonstrate the impact of demand variability and reduced capacity adjustment time and lead times.     

IMPACT OF POS DATA SHARING ON SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We examine the impact of point of sale (POS) data sharing on ordering decisions in a multi‐echelon supply chain. In particular, we focus on how exposure to POS data may help reduce the “bullwhip effect,” the tendency of orders to increase in variability as one moves up a supply chain. Theoretical studies have shown that exposure to POS data can lead to a reduction in the bullwhip effect when suppliers have no prior knowledge of the demand distribution. The benefit of sharing POS data in stable industries, where the demand distribution is commonly known, is less clear. We study this phenomenon from a behavioral perspective in the context of a simple, serial, supply chain subject to information lags and stochastic demand. We find, using a controlled simulation experiment, that sharing POS information does help reduce some components of the bullwhip effect in a stable demand setting, namely the order oscillation of upstream members. We offer one possible explanation for this improvement by examining the relationship between order decisions and demand line information.     

Supply chain coordination through cooperative advertising with reference price effect

Cooperative advertising, which usually occurs in a vertical supply chain, is typically a cost sharing and promotion mechanism for the manufacturer to affect retail performance. Research in the literature, however, rarely considers the important phenomenon that advertising has a positive effect on the consumer's reference price. In fact, when a consumer makes a decision to buy a product or not, a reference price is usually in his mind and plays a determinant role. Taking into account the impact of advertising on the reference price, this paper proposes a dynamic cooperative advertising model for a manufacturer–retailer supply chain and analyzes how the reference price effect would influence the decisions of all the channel members. In our model, both the consumer's goodwill and reference price for the product are assumed to be influenced by the advertising and are modeled in differential dynamic equations. In addition, the advertising level, the consumer's goodwill and the reference price are all assumed to have positive effect on sales. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper formulates the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer in two different game scenarios: Stackelberg game and cooperative game. Also, this paper proposes a new mechanism to coordinate the supply chain in which both the manufacturer and the retailer share each other's advertising costs.     

SCIENCE-BASED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE MAINFRAME COMPUTER INDUSTRY

This paper reports on the results of an empirical study of product development in a complex and novel environment. The work is based on field investigations of recent product development projects performed by all leading mainframe computer producers. The projects focused on the development of complex products based on advanced technologies and probed deeply into their science base. The results show striking differences in development lead time and research and development productivity between different projects. The analysis relates these performance differences to the process for the integration of new technology. Organizations that emphasize the accumulation of system-level knowledge of product and production process and its use in technology evaluation and selection are associated with high productivity and short development lead times. This appears to have a greater impact on development performance in this novel environment than more traditional factors, such as processes for effective crossfunctional integration and for overlapping problem solving.