THE ECONOMICS OF CARPOOLS

The paper shows how separate parts of a work trip enter the decision to carpool, and examines how the size of a carpool is related to the gasoline price, the wage rate, speed limits, and other factors. The paper also suggests that policies designed to promote carpooling may produce perverse effects on gasoline consumption.     

THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM

This paper treats terrorism as an economic phenomenon— as a way to understand it and to control it. It uses the tools of substitution, innovation, and cycles and concludes by noting the importance of intelligence and that the most valuable approach to defeating terrorism is that of denying resources to the terrorists rather than attempting to protect assets at risk. It notes that we are probably not any safer than before the implementation of the post–9/11 strategies and emphasizes that new initiatives must be undertaken to prevent terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.     

THE ECONOMICS OF AEROBICS

This study presents a simple model that weighs the benefits and costs of aerobic exercise to the individual. The model assumes that adding years to life serves as the primary benefit of exercise, and that hours of exercise over a lifetime serve as the cost. Given previous estimates of individual rates of time preference this study finds that people act rationally when they choose to watch a track event rather than choose to run themselves. (JEL I1)     

THE ECONOMICS OF EMERGENCY MEETINGS

In this article, we examine the timing of emergency meetings. Meetings are critical to the success of organizations, allowing them to coordinate information, discuss strategies, and realign policies to meet their objectives. We treat the emergency meetings between scheduled meetings as real options. The optimal strategy involves time‐varying threshold values that, when exceeded, trigger an emergency meeting. The model explains why organizations need both scheduled and emergency meetings. The model also predicts more frequent emergency meetings during periods of high volatility and a hump‐shaped distribution for the timing of emergency meetings. We find empirical support for these predictions using data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Federal Open Market Committee of the U.S. Federal Reserve system. (JEL C44, C61, C63)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF THE ARAB SPRING

There were large differences in the responses of Arab dictators to the Arab Spring protests. To understand these differences, I present a stylized model of how a dictator responds to mass protests for democratization in a polarized country with two ethnic or religious groups. In this model, the dictator's response crucially depends on oil revenues and his affiliation to either the majority or the minority group. I document that the model's predictions are consistent with the observed differences in the Arab dictators' responses. Hence, ethnic politics and religious divides may play an important role in political transitions and regime changes. (JEL D72, D74)     

THE ECONOMICS OF FAMILY FORMATION*

In this article an economic model of the determinants of first marriage is formulated and then empirically tested. The model incorporates household production theory and search theory in order to explain the incentives to marry and the determinants of the age at first marriage. Age at first marriage is viewed as depending on the determinants of entry into the marriage market and the duration of search for a spouse. Empirical results from the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity show a negative effect of male wages and a positive effect of female wages on own age at marriage. Additionally, education and urbanization are found to have positive effects and number of children a negative effect.     

THE PLACE OF ECONOMIC HISTORY IN THE DISCIPLINE OF ECONOMICS

Despite the dominance of the field of economic history by trained economists who use the tools of economics, the output and services of economic historians are declining in demand. The explanation advanced in this address is that economic historians have not proved their value to economics. To play an essential role in economics, we must broaden the questions we ask and concommittently devise a set of theoretical tools to provide meaningful and testable theories about the structure and performance of economies over time. This address suggests the direction that such theory should take in order to make the field an indispensable part of the discipline of economics.     

THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON ANTITRUST LAW

Economists today play prominent roles in formulating antitrust policy and litigating antitrust cases. This paper explains why economics influences antitrust law and describes how economic theories enter and shape the antitrust system. Antitrust policy and doctrine change over time in response to developments in economic theory, and the decentralization of the antitrust adjudication system and the wide latitude accorded judges in interpreting antitrust statutes ensure that legal rules will reflect advances in the economic literature concerning the appropriate content of standards governing business conduct.     

EDWIN CHADWICK AND THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME

"⃛Among all the administrative questions which you have touched (and they are both numerous and of the highest importance), there is hardly one on which you have not originated thoughts and suggestions of the greatest value ⃛"     

THE IMPACT OF BAD WRITING IN ECONOMICS

We find significant style differences between articles written by economists for their professional journals and articles by the same economists in the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that style influences the professional success of economists, which suggests that the private rewards to improving the quality of writing are low. Indeed, each community of scholars has probably adopted a "professionally correct" writing style, from which its members diverge little. However, scholars do alter their rhetorical style to communicate effectively with audiences other than the professional community. This suggests that intra- and inter-group (written) communication by economists is efficient.     

AT THE MOVIES: THE ECONOMICS OF EXHIBITION CONTRACTS

We describe a real-world profit sharing contract—the movie exhibition contract—and consider alternative explanations for its use. Two explanations based on difficulties with forecasting fit the facts better than asymmetric information models. The first emphasizes two-sided risk aversion; the second emphasizes measurement costs. Transaction costs and long-term relationships also affect contractual practices. We use an original data set of all exhibition contracts involving 13 theaters owned by a prominent St. Louis exhibitor over a two-year period to inform our theories and test hypotheses. The findings question traditional contract theory and may be relevant for other contracting environments.(JEL L14 , L82 , D45 , D80 )     

THE ECONOMICS OF JOB SEARCH: A COMMENT

This paper expands the conventional model of job search by relaxing the assumption that uncertainty about the job offer disappears once search is completed. Instead, we hypothesize that uncertainty continues even after search since the job offer contains not only an observable money wage but also an unobservable job consumption component. We show that the reservation wage decision rule is robust even under these very general conditions. The paper also analyzes the effect of this type of residual uncertainty on the level of the reservation wage.