Income Inequality,Globalization, and the Welfare State: Evidence from 23 Industrial Countries, 1990–2009

The debate regarding the welfare state–weakening effect and the income inequality‐increasing effect of globalization remains a contentious issue among stratification scholars. For some, globalization increases income inequality, while for others, globalization has no, or a negligible, effect on income inequality. This study brings new evidence to bear on this debate by separately investigating effects of multiple indicators of globalization (international trade, foreign direct investment [FDI] and immigration), and of welfare state generosity (government social‐protection spending) on (1) income inequality before taxes and transfers and (2) income inequality after taxes and transfers, using data from 23 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries over 1990–2009. First, results show a positive effect of international trade, a negative effect of immigration, but no effect of FDI and government social‐protection spending on income inequality before taxes and transfers. Second, results show no effect of the globalization indicators but a negative effect of government social‐protection spending on income inequality after taxes and transfers. These findings suggest that (1) globalization has inequality‐increasing effects depending on measures of income inequality; (2) the welfare state, in many OECD countries, continues to shape income distribution; and (3) in contrast with the popular narrative, immigration may decrease income inequality.     

Carry a big stick,or no stick at all: Punishment and endowment heterogeneity in the trust game

We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocity), the capacity of punishment (i.e., the deterrence hypothesis) and hidden costs of punishment (i.e., models of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation). Our results are hardly coherent with the first two (inequality aversion and deterrence), but roughly consistent with the latter.     

On the welfare loss caused by inequality of opportunity

Based on the ethical principle of equality of opportunity, this paper presents a measure of the welfare loss that is caused by an unfair distribution of a particular outcome (income, health, education, etc). The key idea is that a fair society should produce outcomes that depend on individuals’ effort and not on their external circumstances such as gender, socioeconomic background, etc. We propose measuring inequality of opportunity as the welfare loss attributed to the outcome differences among individuals who exert a similar level of effort. Our results are in line with those aspects of fairness literature that give priority to the ex post compensation approach to equality of opportunity. Finally, we present an empirical application for the measurement of the welfare loss in the income distribution in Europe. We have observed a high degree of heterogeneity among European countries. The welfare loss due to inequality of opportunity ranges in those, from basically zero to almost one fifth of their potential welfare.     

Performance pay,the marriage market and rising income inequality in Taiwan

Taiwan expanded its college access significantly over the past two decades by converting 2-year junior colleges to 4-year colleges and relaxing entrance standards. The share of college graduates in the 22–24 years old population rose from 12 to 71% between 1990 and 2014. This should have suppressed returns to schooling and lowered household income inequality. Instead, Taiwan’s Gini coefficient rose. We show that rising use of performance pay and positive assortative mating in the marriage market jointly increase the household income inequality by 46.5% between 1980 and 2014. Our results suggest that uneven quality of the most recent cohorts of college graduates led to two sources of rising household income inequality: the increased use of bonus pay which increases residual inequality among college graduates; and matching on unobserved skills in the marriage market which increases inequality among married couples.

     

Taking empirical studies seriously: the principle of concentration and the measurement of welfare and inequality

The paper investigates the implications of empirical studies by Amiel and Cowell (J Public Econ 47:3–26, 1992) of the public’s attitude towards inequality. It demonstrates that the value judgments concerning the redistribution of income which have been revealed in these studies can be represented by the principle of concentration. A concentration is a redistribution of income which reduces the distance between each income and the average income in the same proportion. Imposing this principle and some other basic properties the paper characterizes several families of social welfare orderings which imply generalized Atkinson inequality measures. They do not necessarily satisfy the principle of progressive transfers. I thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Competition and cooperation in markets. The experimental case of a winner-take-all setting

The aim of this experiment is twofold. First of all, we want to investigate whether a winner-take-all scenario where subjects with homogeneous skills meet more than once stimulates subjects’ cooperation. Secondly, we want to compare agents’ tendency to cooperate in settings with different levels of competition. We ran three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public good game. The second environment represents a perfect competition market, while in the third treatment we consider a winner-take-all market. The most relevant result we obtain is that while perfect competition forces players to be efficient and to behave as they were self-interested, a winner-take-all market induces strategic cooperation.     

THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC INEQUALITIES: The Case of Israel

Three alternative trends of ethnic or racial inequality are formulated: diminishing inequality, rising inequality and stabilizing inequality. The last trend is hypothesized to hold for industrial ‘welfare states’ which lack both blatant discrimination against ethnic groups and systematic efforts to close the ethnic gaps.

A comprehensive study of inequalities in income, occupation, education and power between Oriental (non-European) and Ashkenazi (European) Jews in Israel has shown that the thesis of ‘stabilizing inequality’ fits Israel best. The various areas of Oriental-Ashkenazi inequality are conducive to conflict not only because of their persistence, but also for being appreciable and discrepant. It is concluded that more radical means are needed if greater ethnic equality is desired.     

Affect and fairness: Dictator games under cognitive load

We investigate the impact of affect and deliberation on other-regarding decisions. In our laboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini-Dictator games while under varying degrees of cognitive load. Cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation and therefore enhance the influence of affect on behavior. In each game subjects have two options: they can decide between a fair and an unfair allocation. We find that subjects in a high-load condition are more generous – they more often choose the fair allocation than subjects in a low-load condition. The series of mini-Dictator games also allows us to investigate how subjects react to the games’ varying levels of advantageous inequality. Low-load subjects react considerably more to the degree of advantageous inequality. Our results underscore the importance of affect for basic altruistic behavior and deliberation in adjusting decisions to a given situation.     

NON‐MONETARY INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A LABORATORY PUBLIC GOOD GAME

This study reports data from a laboratory experiment that investigates the incentive effect of three distinct social communication schemes on free‐riding behavior. We use performance‐based approval and disapproval ratings and a linear public good game to address the above issues. The treatments vary in terms of subjects' opportunities to anonymously assign (1) only the approval ratings to other group members, (2) only the disapproval ratings to other group members, and (3) either the approval or the disapproval ratings to other group members (but not both to the same group member), after they play a standard linear public good game. Despite the Nash prediction of zero individual contribution in all three treatments, the data show that the disapproval points generate significantly higher contribution than the approval points. The treatment in which subjects could communicate either the approval or the disapproval points produces the highest level of contribution. We discuss the implications that these findings may have for efficient design of organizations. (JEL D03, H41, C72, C92)     

The measurement of structural and exchange income mobility

Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985) present operational axioms for an ethical index of income mobility that are best suited for a two period world. This paper suggests a decomposition of this index into two terms: (i) an index of structural or snapshot mobility, which captures the welfare effect of differences in the inequality of the cross-section income distributions; and (ii) an index of exchange or rerankings mobility, which captures the welfare impact of rank reversals between the first- and the second-period income distributions. Income inequality reductions and rank reversals are always welfare enhancing. The properties of all the income mobility concepts introduced in the paper do not require any new value judgements beyond the traditional ones.     

THREAT AND PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC GOOD EXPERIMENTS

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre‐play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non‐binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the latter periods. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation, and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats. (JEL C92, H41, D63)     

Home Ownership, Social Insurance, and the Welfare State

Home ownership has potentially significant consequences for welfare state policy. High owner-occupancy rates may function as private insurance where social spending is low (a substitution effect). Alternatively, state income redistribution policies could raise the number of home owners (an income effect). Cross-national time-series data show that social spending is negatively related to home ownership, and mediates the positive relationship between income inequality and owner-occupancy rates. This suggests that owner-occupancy acts as a form of social insurance over the life course. Future welfare state researchers should consider the issue of home ownership in analyses of inequality and the social safety net.

PROCEDURAL UNFAIR WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR

In this paper, we investigate how payment procedures that are deemed unfair can spur unethical behavior towards innocent coworkers in a real-effort experiment. In our Discrimination treatment, a highly unfair payment procedure with wage differentials, half the workforce is randomly selected and paid by relative performance whereas the remaining receives no payment. A joy-of-destruction game measures unethical behavior subsequently. Non-earners in Discrimination destroy significantly more than in the non-discriminatory control treatments. In Discrimination, unethical behavior is generally high for all non-earners, independent of individual inequality aversion and relative performance beliefs. In the control treatments, inequality aversion is the main driver of destructive behavior. (JEL C91, D03, J33, J70, M52)     

Income inequality,welfare and poverty in a developing economy with applications to Sri Lanka

This paper explores how the behaviour of welfare, income inequality and poverty changes during the course of a country's economic development. the analysis is based on Kuznet's model of sectorial dualism. The various propositions proved in the paper provide conditions under which the modern sector enlargement and enrichment will lead to higher social welfare and lower income inequality and poverty. It is demonstrated that Kuznet'sU-shaped curve may not exist or even if it does, the turning point may occur at a later stage of development. The paper provides numerical illustrations of the results using Sri Lankan data.This paper was written while I was a Senior Fellow at the World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland. I am grateful to Juhani Holm for providing me with expert computational assistance. A referee of this Journal made some useful comments which led to considerable improvement in the paper.     

Competition-induced punishment of winners and losers: Who is the target?

We elicit punishment after competition. Our experiment creates a setting in which winners and losers are assigned in a pairwise speed-based calculation task. As in Abbink and Sadrieh’s (2009) joy-of-destruction game punishment is executed by burning parts of another participant’s endowment. We manipulate the target of punishment to investigate whether it is driven by discrimination of the direct opponent, the outgroup or by joy of destruction. Furthermore, we analyze the role that the clarity of victory or defeat plays for punishment after competition. Our findings suggest that losers face punishment from particularly dominant winners and—to a lesser degree—from particularly frustrated losers. Winners face undifferentiated punishment from all sides. Our results have implications for the prevention of destructive behavior within organizations which use competitions in order to induce effort.     

Non-anonymous growth incidence curves, income mobility and social welfare dominance

The distributional incidence of growth is generally analyzed by comparing the quantiles of the pre- and post-growth income distribution—e.g. the so-called Growth Incidence Curves. Such an approach based on an implicit re-ranking of individual incomes ignores income mobility by assuming that only post-growth income matters in social welfare. By contrast, this paper takes the view that “status quo matters” and that social welfare should logically be defined on both inital and terminal income. This leads to consider ’non-anonymous’ Growth Incidence Curves that plot income growth rates against the various quantiles of the initial distribution. Dominance criteria that generalize those available for standard growth incidence curves are derived, which account for the inequality of individual income changes, conditional on initial income. An application to the cross-country distributional feature of global growth illustrates the analysis.     

Group diversity and salience: A natural experiment from a television game show

We take advantage of a naturally occurring experiment in a television game show to study the impact of group characteristics on the group's ability to select salient solutions in a matching game. The Family Feud features families seeking to earn prizes by matching the results of public opinion surveys on various subjects. Our main result is that, controlling for task difficulty, families that are more diverse, as measured by both the intra-family generational gap and the relatedness of their members, are more successful at matching wider ranges of survey responses. This highlights the importance of member diversity in expanding information and decision frames of reference within a group.     

The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach

We consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. First, conditional on a given ranking of individual opportunity sets, we define the notion of an equalizing transformation. Then, assuming that the opportunity sets are ranked according to the cardinality ordering, we formulate the analogues of the notions of the Lorenz partial ordering, equalizing (Dalton) transfers, and inequality averse social welfare functions – concepts which play a central role in the literature on income inequality. Our main result is a cardinality-based analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement: one distribution Lorenz dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a finite sequence of rank preserving equalizations, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse social welfare functions. In addition, we characterize the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of our cardinality-based Lorenz inequality ordering. Received: 2 May 1995 / Accepted: 11 October 1996     

Charitable conservatism, poverty radicalism and inequality aversion

In his Presidential Address to the European Economic Association, Tony Atkinson introduced the idea of a “charitable conservatism” position in public policy, which “exhibits a degree of concern for the poor, but this is the limit of the redistributional concern and there is indifference with respect to transfers above the poverty line.” This contrasts with the perspective of poverty indices, which give zero weight to those above the poverty line, which we call “poverty radicalism,” and with standard “inequality aversion” where the weights decline smoothly as we move up the income scale. The object of this paper is, first, to clarify the interrelationships between charitable conservatism, poverty radicalism and inequality aversion. We do this by showing how the patterns of welfare weights to which each of these gives rise are related to each other. Secondly, we are concerned to demonstrate the implications of these different views for optimal income taxation. In terms of levels and patterns of marginal tax rates, we show that charitable conservatism and poverty radicalism are on a continuum, and by choice of low or high inequality aversion one can approximate either outcome fairly well.     

Inequality orderings and unit consistency

The paper examines the implications of the newly proposed unit consistency axiom for partial inequality orderings. We first show that some intermediate Lorenz dominance conditions violate the axiom. We then characterize a class of intermediate Lorenz orderings and demonstrate that the only unit-consistent member is the one related to Krtscha (Models and measurement of welfare and inequality. Springer, Heidelberg, 1994)’s intermediate notion of inequality which has recently been investigated by Zoli (A surplus sharing approach to the measurement of inequality. Discussion paper no. 98/25, University of York, 1998; Logic, game, theory and social choice. Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, 1999) and Yoshida (Soc Choice Welf 24:557–574, 2005). Finally, we provide a general characterization for unit-consistent Lorenz orderings and the Krtscha-type dominance again turns out to be the only one that is intermediate and unit-consistent.