Population statistics] as of July 1, 1998

This article presents estimates of relevant population numbers and vital rates in Thailand as of July 1, 1998. Utilizing the standard demographic techniques of analysis, the estimates provided are assured to be the most accurate demographic estimates possible. Total population was estimated at 61,143,000. Estimates by sex, locales, region, and by age group are included. In addition, the crude birth rate per 1000 population was estimated at 18.7; the crude death rate per 1000 population was 6.5. For the natural growth rate the estimate was at 1.2%, and the infant mortality rate was 25.0 per 1000 live births. In terms of life expectancy at birth, the estimate for males was 69.9 years, while for females it was 74.9 years. Additional years in life expectancy at age 60 were 20.3 years for males and 23.9 years for females. The total fertility rate per woman is 1.98, and contraceptive prevalence is 72.2%. The demographic data will be disseminated to Thai and international population researchers and planners.     

近50年来世界人口期望寿命的演变轨迹

进入21世纪以来,全球人口已经突破60亿,但是人口增长速度明显减慢。许多国家已经完成了人口转变,其总和生育率在更替水平以下。与此同时,人口健康状况得到明显改善,死亡水平显著降低,期望寿命在不断提高。本文利用联合国人口司发布的192个国家人口死亡信息,系统分析了世界人口平均期望寿命在过去50年里的演变态势、区域差异以及演变模式。结果显示世界人口期望寿命经历了半个多世纪的持续增长,有50%以上的人口或国家平均期望寿命达到了70岁。演变轨迹呈多样化的发展模式,区域发展不平衡。欠发达地区总体上较发达地区增幅大,人口比重上升幅度也很显著。人均期望寿命增幅最大的是亚洲国家,非洲国家与世界不同步,而且区域内差异较大。     

Population statistics] as of Oct 1, 1995

The publication of these statistics is part of an effort to provide current demographic estimates for Thailand every three months. The tabulated data pertain to October 1995. Estimates are provided for the following demographic measures: total population (59,627,000); male population (29,796,000); female population (29,831,000); urban population (18,830,000); rural population (40,797,000); population by region: northern region (11,978,000), northeastern region (19,413,000), southern region (7,464,000), central region excluding Bangkok Metro (12,936,000), and Bangkok Metropolis (7,836,000); population by age group: under 15 years (17,172,000), 15-59 years (38,102,000), 60 and over (4,353,000), 6-21 years (19,939,000), 18 years and over (38,528,000), 20 years and over (36,259,000), and women aged 15-44 years (15,393,000); crude birth rate per 1000 population (17.6), crude death rate per 1000 population (5.2); natural growth rate (1.2%); infant mortality rate per 1000 live births (30.8); male life expectancy at birth (66.6 years); female life expectancy at birth (71.7 years); male life expectancy at age 60 (18.8 years); female life expectancy at age 60 (22.0 years); total fertility rate (1.95); contraceptive prevalence rate (74.0%); and projected population for the year 2012 (71,860,000). A chart gives the estimated percentage of cumulative deaths from AIDS by age group in 2000 and 2005.     

中国少数民族人口发展形势分析

一、人口数量 20世纪80年代,中国少数民族人口一度高速增长,从1982年的6643万人增至1990年的9057万人,年均增长率达到3．89％,占全国人口的比例从6．62％提高到8．01％。1990—2000年,根据“五普”资料,全国（大陆）人口增加了9．92％,其中,汉族人口由103919万人增至113739万人,增加了9．45％,全国人口和汉族人口年均增长率分别为0．91％和0．87％;     

Continued Reductions in Mortality at Advanced Ages

Mortality data for 30 mostly developed countries available in the Kannisto–Thatcher Database on Old‐Age Mortality (KTDB) are drawn on to assess the pace of decline in death rates at ages 80 years and above. As of 2004 this database recorded 37 million persons at these ages, including 130,000 centenarians (more than double the number in 1990). For men, the probability of surviving from age 80 to age 90 has risen from 12 percent in 1950 to 26 percent in 2002; for women, the increase has been from 16 percent to 38 percent. In the lowest‐mortality country, Japan, life expectancy at age 80 in 2006 is estimated to be 6.5 years for men and 11.3 years for women. For selected countries, average annual percent declines in age‐specific death rates over the preceding ten years are calculated for single‐year age groups 80 to 99 and the years 1970 to 2004. The results are presented in Lexis maps showing the patterns of change in old‐age mortality by cohort and period, and separately for men and women. The trends are not favorable in all countries: for example, old‐age mortality in the United States has stagnated since 1980. But countries with exceptionally low mortality, like Japan and France, do not show a deceleration in death rate declines. It is argued that life expectancy at advanced ages may continue to increase at the same pace as in the past.     

Is Health Wealth? Results of a Panel Data Analysis

The objective of this paper is to determine whether health (measured by life expectancy at birth) contributes to economic growth and the functional form in which it influences per capita income. This links our study to the debate between neo-classical and endogenous growth theorists on whether investment in human capital can sustain growth indefinitely. Data on 216 countries for the period 1980–2009 has been obtained from World Development Indicators dataset. This enables us to focus on a period characterized by globalization and demographic transition manifested in the form of population graying. Our findings confirm the importance of investment in human capital. But, in contrast to conclusions of endogenous growth models, we find evidence that benefit from increasing longevity tapers off. We conclude by pointing out that it is necessary to extend this study further by incorporating other dimensions of health that are not captured by life expectancy.     

New african American life tables from 1935–1940 to 1985–1990*

New life tables for African Americans are presented from 1935 through 1990. They are based on a historical series of vital statistics data on deaths that have been corrected for age misreporting, on reconstructed population counts that have been adjusted for census underenumeration, and on births that have been corrected for underregistration. The new life tables show rapid mortality declines for both African American males and females from 1935 to 1950, and relatively steady reductions thereafter for females. The smaller declines in male mortality in young adulthood and middle age since the 1950s have led to exceptionally high ratios of male to female mortality at these ages. Corrections for census undercounts lead to higher values of life expectancy than in official life tables, but to less improvement over time. Official estimates of life expectancy at age 65 appear to be about 10% too high around 1940 but only about 1.5% too high in the late 1980s.     

A survey of population in the ESCAP region

In 1983, the ESCAP region added 44 million people, bringing its total population to 2600 million, which is 56% of the world population. The annual rate of population growth was 1.7% in 1983 compared to 2.4% in 1970-75. The urban population rose from 23.4% in 1970 to 26.4% in 1983, indicative of the drift from rural areas to large cities. In 1980, 12 of the world's 25 largest cities were in the ESCAP region, and there is concern about the deterioration of living conditions in these metropoles. In general, however, increasing urbanization in the developing countries of the ESCAP region has not been directly linked to increasing industrialization, possibly because of the success of rural development programs. With the exception of a few low fertility countries, a large proportion of the region's population is concentrated in the younger age groups; 50% of the population was under 22 years of age in 1983 and over 1/3 was under 15 years. In 1983, there were 69 dependents for every 100 persons of working age, although declines in the dependency ratio are projected. The region's labor force grew from 1100 million in 1970 to 1600 million in 1983; this growth has exceeded the capacity of country economies to generate adequate employment. The region is characterized by large variations in life expectancy at birth, largely reflecting differences in infant mortality rates. Whereas there are less than 10 infant deaths/1000 live births in Japan, the corresponding rates in Afghanistan and India are 203 and 121, respectively. Maternal-child health care programs are expected to reduce infant mortality in the years ahead. Finally, fertility declines have been noted in almost every country in the ESCAP region and have been most dramatic in East Asia, where 1983's total fertility rate was 40% lower than that in 1970-75. Key factors behind this decline include more aggressive government policies aimed at limiting population growth, developments in the fields of education and primary health care, and greater availability of contraception through family planning programs.     

New estimates of the vital rates of the United States black population during the nineteenth century

The difficulties of obtaining credible estimates of vital rates for the black population throughout the entire nineteenth century are overcome in this study. The methodology employed the notion of deviating networks of mortality rates for each general mortality level, which was taken from the United Nations studyThe Concept of a Stable Population. Period life tables and vital rates for intercensal periods were generated from the new estimates of the black population at each census date. The results of this study are highly compatible both with the life tables for the death-registration states in the twentieth century and the recent Coale and Rives reconstruction for the period from 1880 to 1970 and with several estimates of vital rates previously made for the mid-nineteenth century. This study places the mean life expectancy at birth for the black population during the nineteenth century at about 33.7 years for both sexes. The infant death rate (1000m (0)) is shown to have varied between 222 and 237 for females and between 266 and 278 for males. The intrinsic crude death rate centered on 30.4 per thousand during the century, while the birth rate declined from 53.2 early in the century to about 43.8 at the end.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

A tentative discussion on population reproduction in U.S.A. after World War II]

Immigration is an important factor in America's population growth. In the last 200 years over 50 million persons immigrated to the U.S.; 99.6% of the current total population are descendents of those immigrants. In the 1930s, American population decreased by about 7.2/1000, but during the 1950s the annual rate of natural increase rose to 18.5/1000. In the 1960s, this rate began to decrease until the 1970s when it was about 9/1000. By 1981 and 1982, the rate of natural increase declined to 7/1000. These changes are due to the relatively slow decline in the mortality rate of the last 30 years (10.6/1000 in 1945 to 9/1000 in 1981) and to the fluctuations in birth rates (from 19.5/1000 in 1945 to a high of 25.3/1000 in 1957 and back to 16/1000 in 1981). Birth rates are influenced by factors such as the number of fertile women, age structure, fecundity, marriage, family, occupation, and education. In 1950 there were 38,920,000 women aged 15-49, and by 1980 there were 57,630,000. Of these, in 1950, 31.28% were aged 20-29, the most fertile period for women, as compared with 35.04% in 1980. Thus, in postwar America, the changes in birth rate did not follow changes in the number of fertile women. Marriage patterns also underwent changes, particularly in the last 20 years. From 1930 to 1935, the marriage rate was 8.6/1000. By 1945, it rose to 16.4/1000. But during the 1960s, an increasing number of women aged 20-29 years remained unmarried. At the end of the 1970s, there was also an increase in the number of married women who did not have children. Furthermore, the number of divorces increased, an additional reason for a declining birth rate. Changes in family structure also influenced postwar American reproduction. In the last two decades, the traditional family has almost disappeared and the nuclear fammily is on the decline. By 1970 there were more people living alone, single parent families, and unrelated people sharing a domicile, than there were family units. Also, educated women who worked often married at a later age, thus placing restrictions on the birth rate.     

How Long Do We Live?

Period life expectancy is calculated from age‐specific death rates using life table methods that are among the oldest and most widely employed tools of demography. These methods are rarely questioned, much less criticized. Yet changing age patterns of adult mortality in countries with high life expectancy provide a basis for questioning the conventional use of life tables. This article argues that when the mean age at death is rising, period life expectancy at birth as conventionally calculated overestimates life expectancy. Estimates of this upward bias, ranging from 1.6 years for the United States and Sweden to 3.3 years for Japan for 1980–95, are presented. A similar bias in the opposite direction occurs when mean age at death is falling. These biases can also distort trends in life expectancy as conventionally calculated and may affect projected future trends in period life expectation, particularly in the short run.     

Fertility decline in Bangladesh: an emerging family planning success story

Bangladesh has a population of 115 million people, and the economic growth rate of 3.7% during the 1980s was undermined by rapid population growth. The annual population growth rate was 3% in the 1960s and early 1970s, 2.5% between 1981-91 decreasing to 2.3% in 1991. The average of number of children is 4.6/woman compared with 7 in the 1960s. Infant mortality dropped from 150/1000 births in 1976 to 118/1000 in 1991. Life expectancy rose from 47 to 54 years. The 1991 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey showed that 39.9% of married women under 50 use contraceptives in 1991 vs. 18.6% in 1981. The use of modern methods increased from 10.9% in 1981 to 31.2% in 1991, while traditional methods rose from 7.7% to 8.7%. Sterilization was most prevalent in 1981. 29,000 female family planning (FP) workers were aggressively engaged in dispensing FP services in 1990. The Social Marketing Company sells pills, condoms, and oral rehydration salts through 130,000 retail outlets. The 1989 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey showed that 40% of pill and condom users obtained them from this network, and 95.4% of women knew about 4 methods of contraception. In 1990 there were 120 private organizations providing contraceptive services. Some of the components of the government FP program include field worker distribution door-to-door of injectable contraceptives (50% injectable usage rate in the Matlab project); recordkeeping activities; a satellite clinic network with access to contraceptive services; and decentralization through the Upazila (subdistrict) approach. The logistics system of FP has improved the warehousing, transportation, and management information system. Foreign aid (mainly USAID) financing of contraceptives helped avert 14.4 million births between 1974-90. The increase of contraceptive prevalence to 50% by 1997 would avert another 21.9 million births during 1991-96 (replacement fertility requires 70% prevalence.     

HIV/AIDS and Cross-National Convergence in Life Expectancy

This article analyzes the effect of HIV/AIDS on the cross-national convergence in life expectancy as well as infant and child survival rates by comparing three scenarios. One is based on historical and future best-guess estimated values given the existence of the epidemic. The second scenario assumes that the effect of the epidemic is much worse than expected. The final scenario is based on hypothetical values derived from estimations where the mortality caused by the epidemic is removed. For life expectancy, convergence becomes stalled in the late 1980s (without weighting by country population size) or 1990s (with weighting). Convergence in infant and child survival rates does not become stalled, but slows down. These results are mainly attributable to the epidemic since all signs of stalled convergence or even divergence disappear in the “No AIDS scenario.” Given the existence of the epidemic, however, the reduced degree of inequality in life expectancy attained by 1985 is only expected to be achieved again by 2015 at the earliest. If the epidemic turns out much worse than expected, divergence could continue to 2050. No divergence is to be expected in infant and child survival rates in any of the scenarios.     

Perspectives on the recent upturn in divorce and remarriage

The divorce rate per thousand married women under 45 years of age in the United States increased by two–thirds between the mid-1950’s and 1970. During the same period, the remarriage rate per thousand divorced or widowed women under 55 years of age rose about one-third. By contrast, first marriages per thousand single women under 45 years of age declined by one-tenth since the mid-1950’s. These changes reinforce the general impression that a fundamental modification of life styles and values relating to marriage has been taking place. An analysis of nationwide data on birth cohorts from 1900 to 1954 demonstrates that early marriage has declined since the mid-1950’s but leaves open the question as to whether lifelong singleness is becoming more prevalent. The cohort study shows that the upward trend in divorce is not “phasing out” yet, as it did after World War II. An estimated 25 to 29 percent of all women near 30 years old now have ended or will end their first marriage in divorce. About four-fifths of these divorced women have remarried or probably will do so. Of all women around 30 years old now, some five to ten percent may be expected to experience divorce at least twice during their lifetime.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

俄罗斯人口发展状况及对中国的启示

本文利用俄罗斯的历史人口数据,对俄罗斯人口数量和结构变动状况进行了分析,并对俄罗斯三次人口转型中的社会经济情况变化对人口变动状况的影响进行了分析。结果表明,俄罗斯的人口出生率下降很快,人口死亡率升高,总和生育率已远低于替代水平,因此人口自然增长率迅速下降,总人口数长期处于下降通道,出生预期寿命不增反降,特别是男性出生预期寿命远低于女性出生预期寿命。在推动人口增长的社会经济相关措施实施后,俄罗斯人口数量仍不能增加,这对目前总和生育率已经很低的中国有一定的借鉴意义。     

Anatomy of a Municipal Triumph: New York City's Upsurge in Life Expectancy

Over the period 1990–2010, the increase in life expectancy for males in New York City was 6.0 years greater than for males in the United States. The female relative gain was 3.9 years. Male relative gains were larger because of extremely rapid reductions in mortality from HIV/AIDS and homicide, declines that reflect effective municipal policies and programs. Declines in drug‐ and alcohol‐related deaths also played a significant role in New York City's advance, but every major cause of death contributed to its relative improvement. By 2010, New York City had a life expectancy that was 1.9 years greater than that of the US. This difference is attributable to the high representation of immigrants in New York's population. Immigrants to New York City, and to the United States, have life expectancies that are among the highest in the world. The fact that 38 percent of New York's population consists of immigrants, compared to only 14 percent in the United States, accounts for New York's exceptional standing in life expectancy in 2010. In fact, US‐born New Yorkers have a life expectancy below that of the United States itself.     

预期寿命增长、年龄结构改变与我国国民储蓄率

人口年龄结构趋于老龄化和人均预期寿命逐步增长是目前我国人口发展的两个典型特征,而年龄阶段不同,个人的收入、消费与储蓄行为也不同。基于生命周期理论,在选定相关分析指标的基础上,文章使用我国省际平衡面板数据,实证分析了我国人口预期寿命增长和年龄结构改变对国民储蓄率的影响。分析结论表明,人口预期寿命增长提高了我国国民储蓄率;不考虑时间效应时,幼年人口负担比提高会减少国民储蓄率,而老年人口负担比提高会增加国民储蓄率;在考虑时间效应时,幼年人口负担比提高会增加国民储蓄率,而老年人口负担比提高会减少国民储蓄率。对此,文章给出了合理的解释。通过使用多种估计方法,我们发现所得到的结论是基本稳健的。     

The problem of the aged population in China]

The situation regarding the population of China over age 60 is reviewed. From 1953 to 1980 the aged population doubled in size, with the population in urban areas growing at a faster rate than in rural areas. The author notes that declining birth and mortality rates and longer life expectancy will cause the absolute number of the aged to increase. For China, each percentage point increase in the aged means an increase of 10 million aged people. As the ratio of the aged to the rest of the society becomes increasingly larger, China will become an aged society. Tables on age distribution and life expectancy are included.