From low to high fertility in Sulawesi (Indonesia) during the colonial period: explaining the 'first fertility transition'

This paper examines the past transition from low to high fertility which, in Indonesia as elsewhere, preceded the return to lower birth rates. Data from two parts of the island of Sulawesi where fertility rose during the colonial period are used to explain both why it rose, and why it was originally low. Economic conditions, it is argued, were the most important factors, affecting fertility via the supply of income and the demand for labour. Two schematic models of the 'first fertility transition' are proposed. In areas with low population densities and area-extensive forms of agriculture responsive to commercial stimuli, birth rates rose as the growth of commerce raised levels of prosperity, facilitated marriage, and undermined institutions such as debt-slavery which had previously acted to restrict marital fertility. In densely populated areas with labour-intensive agriculture and heavy state taxation in labour, fertility rose in response to demands for women's (and possibly child) labour that did not necessarily lead to gains in income.     

Fertility differentials as evidence of incipient fertility decline in a developing country

Abstract Age data from the 1960 and earlier censuses of Ghana allow the construction of child-woman ratios which appear to indicate the existence of a substantial urban-rural fertility differential. Plausible assumptions of urban-rural mortality differentials increase the apparent fertility differential. In this paper recently published data for Statistical Areas in the country's larger towns are used to demonstrate that one explanation for the fertility differential is almost certainly the enumeration of some females in the towns, while one or more of their surviving children were enumerated outside. Nevertheless, in 1960 the four largest towns exhibited birth levels which are likely to have been about 11% below those of the population in the surrounding regions. Roughly half the differential can be attributed to a general urban-rural differential and half to socio-economic differentials within the towns. It is shown that most fertility reduction within the towns may be explained by delayed female marriage, and that such delay is associated with extended education. It is also shown that amongst the higher socio-economic status groups a small part of the reduction can probably be attributed to the prevention of pregnancy within marriage, and that the making of such attempts is positively associated with extended education, urban birth, participation in first and monogamous marriages, Protestantism, and the holding of views about the harmful effect of high population growth rates on attempts to raise living standards. It is argued that these fertility differentials are evidence of some fertility decline among key groups in the population and that such declines are likely to become more widespread.     

Mortality,marriage, and growth in pre-industrial populations

It has been widely assumed that in pre-industrial European populations postponement of marriage was a major check on fertility, and that marriage was contingent upon access to a livelihood in the form of a homestead or a craft. Death made room for new families, and the age at inheritance might therefore be an index of the age at marriage. High mortality should then mean early marriage and high fertility. When the effect of a uniform increase in the force of mortality on the “natural rate of growth” is estimated quantitatively, it is found that fertility response is of the same magnitude as the change in mortality so that within a wide range mortality differentials alone would not suffice to account for persistent differentials in growth rates. The assumption of a reasonably effective control through the prudential check is thus strengthened.     

World fertility and the women's situation]

In 1981, total number of childbearing women in the world reached 9.8 hundred million. Their socioeconomic status and fertility level are very important data for the study of women's liberation and population control. Facing limited natural resources and a constant growing demand, many nations are studying how to control the population growth and achieve a "zero population growth." In nations with a high GNP, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and France, fertility is low. On the contrary, countries in central and south Asia and most parts of Africa are the poorest economically, and their fertility rate has remained very high. Another factor which is related to the fertility level is the degree of women's participation in the labor market. In Europe and North America, the percentage of women's participation in economic activities is high, and fertility is low. In Latin America and Africa, fertility is high, and the percentage of women's participation in economic labor is low. From the above, we may conclude that promotion of women's participation in the labor market and better employment conditions will reduce fertility. Another 2 factors related to fertility are marriage age and birth control rate. Late marriage and the extensive use of birth control measures are effective methods for reducing fertility. All the above mentioned factors are closely related to the woman's educational background. If women receive a better education and find better employment opportunities, delay their marriage age, and take birth control measures, fertility will be reduced and the population growth will be under control.     

A simulation of the impact of changes in age at marriage before and during the advent of industrialization in England

Summary The quantitative significance of changes in age at marriage on family size is assessed by applying a simple simulation model of family reproduction, using data broadly related to England in the period 1700-1850. Within this context, the impacts of parity-specific infant mortality, and an association between age at marriage and potential fertility are considered. The evidence concerning variations in marriage and mortality distributions over the period in question is examined and linked to the simulation results to produce some tentative conclusions relating to the impact of changes in the distribution of age at marriage on the birth rate and rate of population growth and to an assessment of such changes as an homeostatic adjustment mech-anism. In particular, it is argued that age at marriage played no more than a secondary role in the English demographic revolution.     

Altitude, fertility and mortality in Andean countries

Abstract Using the census data for Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, previous writers have investigated some possible determinants of inter-regional differences in fertility; language spoken, female participation rates, and altitude. This paper points out the many sources of inaccuracy in the census data used. It argues that the indicators of unusually low fertility in the highland, predominantly Indianspeaking areas fail to control effectively for the very high levels of infant mortality in these regions. Fragmentary survey results give some indication of the scale of infant mortality, and appear to refute the idea that fertility is exceptionally low in areas of high altitude. In an attempt to explain why such high mortality rates persist in the Andean region the main health problems of Bolivia are examined. It seems that the causes are economic and social, rather than physiological. Unfortunately a change of policy which reduced death rates would produce grave new social problems.     

Polygyny and the rate of population growth

Summary The roots, motives and feasibility of practising polygyny in societies with a balanced sex structure and the effect of polygyny on the rate of population growth are considered. High demand for labour combined with limited supply over the last several centuries, had been conducive to the evolution of a polygynous nuptiality pattern. The unprecedentedly high rates of population growth during the last several decades combined with progressive economic development have led to a change in the role of the labour factor and consequently diminished its impact upon polygyny. Polygyny is feasible because of a sex-age differential at first marriage, which enables younger cohorts of women to enter the marriage market, and thus results in a very early age at first marriage and universal incidence of marriage among women. A very young pattern of nuptiality inevitably evolves under polygyny, which tends to raise the rate of population growth. No significant variation in fertility between polygynous and monogamous women was found but substantial gaps in standards of living, child mortality, and educational attainment were noted for polygynous households. The findings imply that during the transition from polygyny to monogamy family size will tend to diminish, although initially fertility may not decline concurrently with changing socio-economic status. The most important effects on the rate of population growth thus result from the increase in age at first marriage and declining proportions of ever married women.     

贵州高原少数民族传统生育文化生成的地理背景——从地理环境与文化生成的角度阐述

由于贵州地理环境的特殊性,使民族传统生育文化积淀很深,影响和支配着人们的生育意愿和行为规范,导致了少数民族人口出现增长较快、生育水平偏高、早婚早育等问题,给贵州以及民族地区经济社会发展和生态环境带来较大压力。本文结合贵州高原地理环境的特征,从地理环境与文化生成的角度对少数民族传统生育文化的形成的地理因素进行初步探讨。     

Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia

The general decline in fertility levels in Pacific Asia has in its vanguard countries where fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. A related trend is toward delayed marriage and nonmarriage. When prevalence of cohabitation in European countries is allowed for, levels of “effective singlehood” in many countries of Pacific Asia have run ahead of those in northern and western Europe. This raises questions about the extent to which delayed marriage has been implicated in fertility declines, and whether the same factors are leading both to delayed marriage and to lowered fertility within marriage. The article argues that involuntary nonmarriage is likely to be more common in Pacific Asia than in Western countries, and that resultant involuntary childlessness plays a substantial role in the low fertility rates currently observed.     

A look at Philippine population in the year 2000

The major subject areas explored by the University of the Population Institute were fertility, mortality, the Filipino family and nuptiality, migration and urbanization, and the structure and growth of the labor force. Data were extracted primarily from the Philippine Censuses (1903-1970) the National Demographic Surveys of 1968 and 1973, and special surveys conducted by the Institute research team. On the basis of the findings, a range of alternative population futures is projected for the year 2000, with their respective policy implications. The estimate of the crude birthrate for 1970 placed the range at between 39.3 and 42.7. The crude birthrate may have declined by 21-23% in the last 70 years, and by almost 13% in 1960-1970 alone. On the national level, fertility rates will continue to decline if the trend of delayed marriages continues. Fertility was found to decrease with the introduction of the positive socioeconomic factors that make some regions more developed than others. The present low levels of mortality have decreased its importance in relation to fertility. Mortality prospects can be improved by several policy actions which are presented here in the order of priority. Current evidence points strongly to an increase in the proportion of single individuals who delay marriage and those not planning to marry at all. The record of internal migration in the Philippines during the 20th century has been dominated by the phenomenon of urbanization, which increased from 13% in 1903 to 33% in 1970. An effort needs to be made to achieve greater rural-urban balance. The country's high population growth has increased the number of job seekers in recent years; the expansion of the regional labor force in the 1960-1970 decade was highly correlated with the growth of regional populations. Fertility, mortality, nuptiality, migration, and urbanization are the major factors determining the growth and structure of Philippine population. Alternative projections for each of these factors were combined in different ways and 3 alternative scenarios for population in the year 2000 are presented.     

Estimation of vital rates for Ghana

Abstract A complete and efficient registration system, of the type which would provide good data on births and deaths, does not exist in Ghana. However, registration of vital events is supposed to be compulsory in 39 towns in the country but the data collected in these areas are too inadequate and defective to provide a sound basis for the analysis of the dynamics of population growth. The results of the censuses conducted by the colonial governments are so defective and unreliable that they do not allow scientific research in the field of population analysis. Before 1960, therefore, when the national census and the post-enumeration survey (based on a 5% sample of the population) were carried out, estimates of fertility and mortality levels were little more than guesses. In this study an attempt has been made to utilize the information on the age-sex composition provided by the 1960 census and post-enumeration survey data on births and deaths to determine, as far as possible, the levels of fertility and mortality and the rates of population growth in Ghana. The fertility estimates-i.e. a crude birth rate of 50, total fertility rate of 6.9 and a gross reproduction rate of 3.4-show that Ghana's fertility is one of the highest in the world. An expectation of life at birth of 40 years, an infant mortality of 160 and a crude death rate of 23 appear to be the most plausible estimates. These estimates yield a rate of natural increase of 2.7% and a growth rate of 3.0% per annum.     

Future population growth: researchers in three countries quantify causes and propose policies

This article discusses Population Council analyses conducted by social scientists from India, Kenya, and the Philippines. These scientists agreed that population momentum would continue to increase population size, and that governments must strengthen and create a range of economic, health, and social programs and policies to slow population growth. Multiple approaches will be needed. John Bongaarts is credited with being the first to identify the key role of population momentum and to decompose growth into unwanted fertility, high desired fertility, and population momentum. Unwanted fertility is responsible for about 19% of projected population growth in India, 26% in Kenya, and 16% in the Philippines. High wanted fertility accounts for 20% of future growth in India, 6% in Kenya, and 19% in the Philippines. Population momentum can account for under 50% or over 90% of growth. Unwanted fertility can be addressed by fulfilling unmet need and increasing knowledge of methods, reducing the fear of side effects and disapproval, and eliminating poor service. Family planning programs need to be strengthened and integrated with maternal and child health services. Preferred and actual family sizes can be reduced by lowering infant mortality by means of increasing infant and child health services and girls' educational attainment. Population momentum can be addressed by delaying age at marriage and childbearing through improving social conditions. Investments in human development through education, training, and income generation can create the conditions for slowing population growth. Countries should decompose population growth into its components of unwanted and high wanted fertility and population momentum as a means of distributing resources most effectively.     

Empirical analysis of the contribution of age composition to population growth

The method of decomposition is applied to rates of natural increase in order to elucidate the role played by age composition in the growth of populations. A population’s age distribution and fertility schedule are contrasted to those in a "stationary" population having the same mortality rates and having a fertility schedule equal to that of the observed population divided by its net reproduction rate. In this manner it is shown that about one-quarter to one-third of the growth of most current high-growth populations can be attributed to non-stationarity of their age distributions. This fraction will rise, as it has in most industrialized countries, if fertility is reduced and age distributions become middle-heavy. In projections of the 1963 Venezuelan female population with fertility rates declining by 20/0 and 1% annually, more than half of the growth (in numbers) that occurs prior to zero-growth attainment is contributed by non-stationarity of its intervening age distributions.

     

China's demographic dilemmas

The year 2000 marks the end of a tumultuous century in China's population history, which weathered the demographic effects of devastating famines, wars, and epidemics and population growth and change. This paper examines the effect of population policies on the demographic dilemmas of China. In the 1950s, China had seen the fastest demographic transition in history, with a dramatic decline in mortality rates, followed by a decrease in fertility rates. However, in the 1970s, revisions in population control measures, changes in age structure, and fluctuations in age at marriage resulted in lower fertility rates. The struggles encountered by China in regulating fertility are described; these include the different methods of birth control, gender preference, marriage, population aging, and minority populations. Population and development issues within the context of urbanization, employment, education, health care, economy, and environment are also discussed. Future implications of these findings indicate the need for a systematic, effective, and complete environmental clean-up, as well as fertility and population policies.     

The demographic transition in the Korean peninsula, 1910-1990: South and North Korea compared

North and South Korea have both experienced demographic transition and fertility and mortality declines. The fertility declines came later in North Korea. In 1990, the population was 43.4 million in South Korea and 21.4 million in North Korea and the age and sex compositions were similar. This evolution of population structure occurred despite differences in political systems and fertility determinants. Differences were in the fertility rate and the rate of natural increase. The total fertility rate was 2.5 children in North Korea and 1.6 in South Korea. The rate of natural increase was 18.5 per 1000 in North Korea and 9.8 in South Korea. Until 1910, the Korean peninsula was in the traditional stage characterized by high fertility and mortality. The early transitional stage came during 1910-45 under the Japanese annexation. Health and medical facilities improved and the crude birth rate rose and then declined. With the exception of the war years, population expanded as a function of births, deaths, and international migration. Poor economic conditions in rural areas acted as a push factor for south-directed migration, migration to Japan, and urban migration. Next came the chaotic stage, during 1945-60. South Korean population expanded during this period of political unrest. Repatriation and refugee migration constituted a large proportion of the population increase. Although the war brought high mortality, new medicine and disease treatment reduced the mortality rate after the war. By 1955-60, the crude death rate was 16.1 per 1000 in South Korea. The crude birth rate remained high at 42 per 1000 between 1950-55. The postwar period was characterized by the baby boom and higher fertility than the pre-war period of 1925-45. Total fertility was 6.3 by 1955-60. The late transitional stage occurred during 1960-85 with reduced fertility and continued mortality decline. By 1980-85, total fertility was 2.3 in the closed population. The restabilization stage occurred during 1985-90, and fertility declined to 1.6. In North Korea, strong population control policies precipitated fertility decline. In South Korea, the determinants were contraception, rising marriage age, and increased use of abortion concomitant with improved socioeconomic conditions.     

A look at Asia's changing youth population

This report summarizes findings from a recent East-West Center study on demographic and social changes among young people aged 15-24 years in 17 countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Nearly every country in Asia has experienced fertility decline. Decline began in Japan and Singapore during the 1950s, followed by declines in Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China during the 1960s. Declines occurred during the 1970s in Indonesia, India, and Myanmar. A "youth bulge" occurred about 20 years later due to declines in infant and child mortality. This bulge varies by country with the timing and magnitude of population growth and subsequent fertility decline. The proportion of youth population rises from 16% to 18% about 20 years after the beginning of fertility decline and declines to a much lower stable level after several decades. The bulge is large in countries with rapid fertility decline, such as China. Governments can minimize the effects of bulge on population growth by raising the legal age at marriage, lengthening the interval between first marriage and first birth, and increasing birth intervals. School enrollments among adolescents are rising. In South Korea, the population aged 15-24 years increased from 3.8 to 8.8 million during 1950-90, a rise of 132% compared to a rise of 653% among school enrollments. It is expected that the number of out-of-school youths will decline from 5.1 to 3.6 million during 1990-2025. Youth employment varies by gender. Policies/programs in family planning and reproductive health will need to address the changing needs of youth population.     

Fertility decline and female chances of marriage in Malaya

A feature of the demographic pattern of post-World War II Malaya has been its high rate of natural growth, which reached 31/2 per cent per annum in the mid-1950s. However, the average age at marriage of the female population has been rising for most of this period, and since 1956 there has been a considerable and sustained fall in the birth rate.

In this paper simple models are developed to show that in a closed population a continuing high rate of population growth is incompatible with a pattern of universal female marriage, monogamy and a culturally imposed age difference of considerable size between spouses. The demonstration provided by the models is then offered as at least a partial explanation of the fertility and female marriage trends in contemporary Malaya. Discrepancies between the population of Malaya and the models have to be taken into account. A pattern of polygamous and unstable marriage does exist amongst the Malaysians and, to a much lesser extent, in the Chinese community. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed the passing of the large surplus of single males built up in the Chinese sector of the population during the years oflarge scale immigration. Such a transition is well under way in the Indian community too.

It is suggested that a substantial average age gap between spouses may be an aspect of many contemporary societies which reacts against the persistence of extremely high rates of natural increase. Even where demographic pressures in the ‘marriage market’ act towards a lessening of this gap, there is a cultural lag, during which period many females are forced to marry late or not at all.

Most of the study was made on a pan-Malayan basis (i.e. combining the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore) to achieve comparability with earlier censuses and as a recognition that with unrestricted migration between these areas they still form a single demographic unit. The terms Malaya and Malayans will be used when referring to this area or its inhabitants. The so-called major races of the country are Malaysians, Chinese and Indians. The first will be used in accordance with the census definition to cover the indigenous inhabitants of Malaya or the Malay Archipelago (Indonesia, British Borneo and the Philippines). As most of these people are either indigenous or have been in Malays for some generations they are usually called Malays (except for the aborigines). However, the all-embracing census term will be used here. Indians, in conformity with most local usage, will be used for the groups classified as Indians and Pakistanis at the 1957 censuses of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. The group was very small.     

Marriage at an earlier than ideal age in six Latin American capital cities

Abstract The study of nuptiality has taken on urgency, for demographers as well as for sociologists, with the increased world concern over sustained high fertility and the evident contribution of early marriage to that high fertility. Moreover, along with despair over the efficacy of conventional family planning programmes has come an expectation that more basic institutional changes, such as changes in marriage patterns, will be necessary in order finally to achieve a tolerably low world population growth rate. Yet our understanding of the determinants of such primary nuptiality dimensions as age at first marriage is very imperfect and unlikely to give much guidance in policy formation.     

Sub-Saharan Africa: population pressures on development

The population of sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 434 million in 1984, is expected to reach 1.4 billion by 2025. The birth rate, currently 48/1000 population, continues to increase, and the death rate, 17/1000, is declining. Rapid population growth has curtailed government efforts to provide adequate nutrition, preserve the land base essential for future development, meet the demand for jobs, education, and health services, and address overcrowding in urban areas. Low education, rural residence, and low incomes are key contributors to the area's high fertility. Other factors include women's restricted roles, early age at marriage, a need for children as a source of security and support in old age, and limited knowledge of and access to modern methods of contraception. Average desired family size, which is higher than actual family size in most countries, is 6-9 children. Although government leaders have expressed ambivalence toward development of population policies and family planning programs as a result of the identification of such programs with Western aid donors, the policy climat is gradually changing. By mid-1984, at least 13 of the 42 countries in the region had indicated that they consider current fertility rates too high and support government and/or private family planning programs to reduce fertility. In addition, 26 countries in the region provide some government family planning services, usually integrated with maternal and child health programs. However, 10 countries in the region do not support family planning services for any reason. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet produced a family planning program with a measurable effect on fertility that could serve as a model for other countries in the region. Social and economic change is central to any hope of fertility reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Lower infant and child mortality rates, rising incomes, higher education, greater economic and social opportunities for women, and increased security would provide a climate more conducive to fertility decline. Given the limited demand, great sensitivity must be shown in implementing family planning programs.