“Population Invasion” versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western China

This article examines the confluence of local population transitions (demographic transition and urbanization) with non‐local in‐migration in the Tibetan areas of western China. The objective is to assess the validity of Tibetan perceptions of “population invasion” by Han Chinese and Chinese Muslims. The article argues that migration to Tibet from other regions in China has been concentrated in urban areas and has been counterbalanced by more rapid rates of natural increase in the Tibetan rural areas—among the highest rates in China. Overall, it is not clear whether there is any risk of population invasion in the Tibetan areas. However, given that non‐Tibetan migration to Tibet has been concentrated in urban areas, Tibetans have probably become a minority in many of their strategic cities and towns, and non‐Tibetan migrants definitely dominate urban employment. Therefore, while the Tibetan notion of population invasion may be a misperception, it reflects a legitimate concern that in‐migration may be exacerbating the economic exclusion of Tibetan locals in the context of rapid urban‐centered development.     

Deadly Cities? Spatial Inequalities in Mortality in sub‐Saharan Africa

We investigate whether sub‐Saharan African countries are affected by an “urban mortality penalty” repeating the history of industrialized countries during the nineteenth century. We analyze Demographic and Health Surveys from several sub‐Saharan African countries for differences in child and adult mortality between rural and urban areas. For the first decade of the 2000s, our findings indicate that child mortality is higher in rural than in urban areas for all countries. On average, child mortality rates are 13.6 percent in rural areas and 10.8 percent in urban areas. In contrast, average urban adult mortality rates (14.1 percent) have exceeded rural adult mortality rates (12.4 percent). Child mortality rates are on average 65 percent higher in urban slums than in formal settlements. Child mortality rates in slum areas are, however, still lower than or equal to those in rural areas for most countries in our sample.     

农地制度、土地依附效应与半城镇化问题研究 ——基于人口农村退出视角

研究的学术逻辑在于突破“城市融入”的惯常认识,从“农村退出”视角,探讨农地制度与半城镇化的关系,并试图破解劳动力意义上的“人地分离”与保障意义上的“人地依附”这一矛盾。中国的城镇化过程可以分解为农业退出、城市进入、农村退出三个阶段。本文重新修正了托达罗模型,并构建了人口农村退出模型。基于调查数据,本文通过构建logit、截面门槛、双Probit模型,证实农地制度引致农村人口对土地具有依附效应,土地禀赋对农村人口的退出决策具有显著抑制效应。     

New Evidence on the Urbanization of Global Poverty

One‐quarter of the world's consumption poor live in urban areas, and that proportion has been rising over time. Over 1993–2002, the count of the “$1 a day” poor fell by 150 million in rural areas but rose by 50 million in urban areas. The poor have been urbanizing even more rapidly than the population as a whole. By fostering economic growth, urbanization helped reduce absolute poverty in the aggregate. There are marked regional differences: Latin America has the most urbanized poverty problem, East Asia has the least; there has been a “ruralization” of poverty in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; in marked contrast to other regions, Africa's urbanization process has not been associated with falling overall poverty.     

Policies Addressing the Tempo Effect in Low‐Fertility Countries

The possible negative consequences of current low fertility levels are causing increasing concern, particularly in countries where the total fertility rate is below 1.5. Social inertia and self‐reinforcing processes may make it difficult to return to higher levels once fertility has been very low for some time, creating a possible “low‐fertility trap.” Policies explicitly addressing the fertility‐depressing effect of increases in the mean age at child‐bearing (the tempo effect) may be a way to raise period fertility to somewhat higher levels and help escape the “low‐fertility trap” before it closes. Reforms in the school system may affect the timing of childbearing by lowering the age at completion of education. A more efficient school system, which provides the same qualifications with a younger school‐leaving age, is potentially capable of increasing period fertility and hence exerting a rejuvenating effect on the age composition, even if the levels of cohort fertility remain unchanged. Such policies may also have a positive effect on completed cohort fertility.     

Imagined Rural/Regional Spaces: Non-Normative Sexualities in Small Towns and Rural Communities in Croatia

This research aims to critically examine how the complexity of the ongoing process of “coming out” in small towns and rural spaces in Croatia undermines the imagined hierarchical distinction between rural/urban spaces. The narratives of LGBQ individuals living in these spaces subvert imaginaries of their communities as homogeneously hostile and threatening. Some participants did, however, perceive other spaces as either “gay-friendly” or “deeply homophobic.” As Croatia is transnationally perceived to be a part of a larger “homophobic region,” the construction of the rural/urban hierarchical distinction is (re)produced and (re)configured within discourses that signify Western countries and so-called more developed regions within Croatia as “more open and liberal” as opposed to “more homophobic and backward” spaces. These distinctions between countries, regions, and the rural/urban spaces come into contradiction with each other and are undermined by my interviewees’ own incongruous experiences.     

Thailand’s urban population reconsidered

In lieu of any official definition of “urban population” in Thailand, researchers and policy makers have generally used a simple urban-rural dichotomy, relying upon the administratively designated municipal areas as urban and the remainder of the kingdom as rural. For administrative purposes, however, a more refined set of residence categories is available: the “urban” segment is subdivided into three categories of municipal areas; within the “rural” group, units of population concentration classified as sanitary districts are distinguished from the remainder of the rural population. Data from a 1970 census sample tape have been used to analyze a number of socioeconomic characteristics, as well as migration and fertility, for each of these five residence categories separately in an attempt to determine if the formerly used rural-urban dichotomy is valid. For each of the characteristics and for migration and fertility, a clear urban-rural continuum emerges, with the sanitary districts generally resembling the smaller urban places more than they do the rural areas under which they are usually subsumed. The evaluation thus suggests the importance to research and policy either of using an urban-rural continuum or of grouping sanitary districts with municipal areas when a dichotomy must be used. Doing so should facilitate evaluation of the interrelations between urbanization and demographic and development factors.     

Is There an Urban Advantage in Child Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence From 18 Countries in the 1990s

Evidence of higher child mortality of rural-to-urban migrants compared with urban nonmigrants is growing. However, less attention has been paid to comparing the situation of the same families before and after they migrate with the situation of urban-to-rural migrants. We use DHS data from 18 African countries to compare child mortality rates of six groups based on their mothers’ migration status: rural nonmigrants; urban nonmigrants; rural-to-urban migrants before and after they migrate; and urban-to-rural migrants before and after they migrate. The results show that rural-to-urban migrants had, on average, lower child mortality before they migrated than rural nonmigrants, and that their mortality levels dropped further after they arrived in urban areas. We found no systematic evidence of higher child mortality for rural-to-urban migrants compared with urban nonmigrants. Urban-to-rural migrants had higher mortality in the urban areas, and their move to rural areas appeared advantageous because they experienced lower or similar child mortality after living in rural areas. After we control for known demographic and socioeconomic correlates of under-5 mortality, the urban advantage is greatly reduced and sometimes reversed. The results suggest that it may not be necessarily the place of residence that matters for child survival but, rather, access to services and economic opportunities.     

Reassessing the Insurance Effect: A Qualitative Analysis of Fertility Behavior in Senegal and Zimbabwe

A number of prominent demographers have recently reiterated the argument that a lasting mortality decline is a key determinant of the fertility transition. Of the main hypothesized pathways linking fertility to mortality, the one least studied is the insurance hypothesis: the notion that, in high‐mortality contexts, people decide to have more children in order to anticipate possible future child deaths and lessen the risks of having too few surviving offspring. In‐depth interviews and focus groups from Zimbabwe and Senegal are used to examine this hypothesis and to extend it into a broader theory of reproductive decision making under uncertainty. Whereas insurance strategies are frequent in Zimbabwe and occur in urban Senegal, in the higher‐mortality settings—the rural Senegalese site and the recent past described by respondents in Zimbabwe and urban Senegal—deliberate fertility‐limitation strategies are rare. The data depict fundamental changes in attitudes, strategies, and behaviors concerning family size over time and, in Senegal, over space. Important reproductive goals and risks extend far beyond numbers of children and mortality. Parents seek to have healthy, successful children for many reasons including companionship, descendants, and old‐age support. Diverse investments in child quality (their education, health, etc.) and quantity (numbers of births) are the main means to attain these goals and, less recognized by demographers, are also important ways for parents to manage uncertainty in family‐building outcomes; the “classic” insurance mechanism is only one, often minor, aspect of the quantity option.     

Rural-urban mortality in developing countries: An index for detecting rural underregistration

This study begins with a brief analysis of past and present urban-rural mortality in those countries which are presently considered to be developed. The same analysis centers in developing countries, for it is thought that their rural mortality should be greater than their urban mortality. Since available statistics generally show the contrary, a way is presented for constructing possible means of sub-registering vital statistics in some areas of these countries. The index would vary to agree with the system of the registry of vital statistics in a given area. Mexico is used as an example-the result of constructing and analyzing the index is to show in which areas there should be a subregistry of deaths. Finally, the cases of India and Taiwan are analyzed in order to confirm the hypothesis that in developing countries there will be a higher mortality rate in. rural than in urban areas.     

Oswald Spengler on Cosmopolis and Depopulation

Historians are professionally averse to grand civilizational themes, especially where predictions may be entailed. The German historian Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), whose membership in the academic fraternity of his discipline has often been questioned, was an exception. His two‐volume magnum opus. The Decline of the West, published in 1918 and 1922 (English translation, 1928), in its time attracted much public and professional attention. (It remains in print.) It presents an enormously ambitious tableau of universal history seen as the unfolding of the fates of eight cultures, with a focus on four main strands: Indian, Classical, Arabian, and Western. In Spengler's interpretation, imbued with cultural and historical pessimism, the West was exhibiting symptoms found in earlier civilizations in decline. “Civilization,” in Spengler's vision, was a stage that follows cultural flowering—creative manifestations of the culture's unique soul expressed in art and thought. Civilization's preoccupation is with the enjoyment of material comforts; the sequence from “culture” to “civilization” represents the very antithesis of progress. Spengler saw the West as having entered that latter phase in the nineteenth century: a phase in which, in the words of the synoptic chart appended to Volume 1 of The Decline of the West, “The body of the people, now essentially urban in constitution, dissolves into formless mass.” Urbanism, the emergence of “megalopolis,” or “cosmopolis“—the world city—is a distinguishing and crucial feature of that declining civilization. A passage (section V, including some translator's notes) from the chapter titled The Soul of the City in Vol. II of The Decline of the West, which has the subtitle Perspectives of World History, is reproduced below. It offers arresting characterizations of the morphology of urban forms and of the rise of the world city. As longer‐term consequences (for the West “between 2000 and 2200”) Spengler foresaw the “formation ofCeasarism”; “victory of force‐politics over money”; “increasing primi‐tiveness of political forms”; and “inward decline of the nations into a formless population, and constitution thereof as an Imperium of gradually increasing crudity and despotism.” As to demographic consequences, Spengler highlights the emerging “sterility of civilized man“—“an essentially metaphysical turn toward death.”“Children do not happen, not because children have become impossible, but principally because intelligence at the peak of intensity can no longer find any reason for their existence.”“Prudent limitation of the number of births” eventually leads to a “stage, which lasts for centuries, of appalling depopulation.” Immigration apart, the time scale specified by Spengler for depopulation—“for centuries”—may be seen today as relatively cautious. Should Europe's current period fertility level—slightly below a TFR of 1.4—be translated into cohort performance, it would yield an intrinsic annual rate of population growth of roughly ‐1.5 percent. Within 200 years, such a growth rate would reduce a population to 5 percent of its original size. From The Decline of the West: Volume 2 by Oswald Spengler, translated by C. F. Atkinson, copyright 1928 and renewed 1956 by Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc.     

Differences in Child Health Across Rural,Urban, and Slum Areas: Evidence From India

The developing world is rapidly urbanizing, but an understanding of how child health differs across urban and rural areas is lacking. We examine the association between area of residence and child health in India, focusing on composition and selection effects. Simple height-for-age averages show that rural Indian children have the poorest health and urban children have the best, with slum children in between. With wealth or observed health environment held constant, the urban height-for-age advantage disappears, and slum children fare significantly worse than their rural counterparts. Hence, differences in composition across areas mask a substantial negative association between living in slums and height-for-age. This association is more negative for girls than boys. Furthermore, a large number of girls are “missing” in slums; we argue that this implies that the negative association between living in slums and health is even stronger than our estimate. The missing girls also help explain why slum girls appear to have a substantially lower mortality than rural girls, whereas slum boys have a higher mortality risk than rural boys. We estimate that slum conditions (such as overcrowding and open sewers), which the survey does not adequately capture, are associated with 20 % to 37 % of slum children’s stunting risk.     

关于南水北调工程建立被征地移民社会保障的问题思考

目前,党的十七大报告中明确提出“要实现社会就业更加充分,覆盖城乡居民的社会保障体系基本建立,人人享有基本生活保障”的大背景下,抓紧制定南水北调被征地移民社会保障相关的政策制度具有重大意义,本文从对南水北调的被征地移民的特点出发,分析了南水北调的征地补偿和移民安置办法,论述了南水北调工程被征地移民的建立社保政策依据以及必要性,针对实施被征地移民社会保障出现的问题提出了建议和对策。     

Charles Henry Pearson on the Decline of the Family

A common observation and frequent lament about family change in contemporary societies is of the shift of childraising responsibilities from parents to the state. This shift (and what might be done to reverse it) was a theme, for example, of James S. Coleman's 1992 presidential address to the American Sociological Association. In the new circumstances, said Coleman, “carrying the family's honor into the future is less important”; in many families adolescent children “are abandoned psychologically and socially.” The state, however, still has “strong interests in maximizing a child's value to society, or minimizing its cost.” A century before Coleman, Charles Henry Pearson, in the passage reproduced below from his book National Life and Character: A Forecast (1893), wrote of the decline of the family in quite similar terms. He argued that state intervention was undertaken only reluctantly, a byproduct of changes in conjugal relations from arranged marriages to “marriages of inclination,” along with easier divorce, and consequent lessening of parental interest in the family line. The state, almost by default, needed to assert the public interest in the raising of children, even though its measures, notably compulsory education, further eroded parents' rights over their children and children's sense of duty and obligation to their parents. While Pearson mostly welcomed the gender equity and individualism he saw emerging, he regretted their effect on the family—on what he termed (metaphorically) “the religion of household life.” His prescient forecast was of “a state of things in which marriages will be contracted without reflection, and broken up without scruple, in which children will be cared for when they are young with, it may be, even more tenderness than of old, but with incomparably less anxiety to fit them for the moral obligations of life, and in which the claim of parents to be obeyed will cease with the children's need of support.” His conclusion: “Family life will be a gracious and decorative incident in the system of such a society; but the family, as a constituent part of the State, as the matrix in which character is moulded, will lose its importance as the clan and the city have done.” Charles Henry Pearson (1830–94) was a British historian who had a second career as an educationist and politician in the colony of Victoria in pre‐Federation Australia. Educated in London and Oxford, he was appointed professor of modern history at King's College, London. His early work included travel writings and a well‐received History of England during the Early and Middle Ages (1867). When his academic career stalled (partly because of very poor eyesight) he emigrated to Australia, where he became closely involved with educational issues. He was elected to the Victorian legislature and was for a time minister of education, able to put into practice his firm views favoring secular education. (See his remark below that Church‐run schools “have generally been strong enough to exclude competition, [but] not rich or enlightened enough to use their monopoly well.”) In 1892 he returned to England, and the following year published National Life and Character. This work, widely read and praised at the time, went through several editions over the next two decades. It essayed forecasts in various domains of society and politics, including a prediction (couched in elitist language) of the passing of the ascendancy of European peoples as other nations grew in numbers and strength (“We shall awake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside,…”). The excerpt is from pages 261–270 of Chapter 5, “The Decline of the Family,” in National Life and Character: A Forecast (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893).     

On Net Intergenerational Wealth Flows: An Update

Almost 30 years have passed since I introduced the concept of “net intergenerational wealth flows” in a PDR essay, “Toward a restatement of demographic transition theory.” A great deal of research has been published since then, and accordingly an update is needed. That research suggests the following propositions. Immediately before fertility transition, children's farm labor may not quite offset their consumption, although much depends on how far into adulthood they continue to perform at least some work for their parents. In premodern times children may have paid their way because of lower consumption. Research on the pre‐transitional value of children's work produced contradictory results because it examined both hunter‐gatherer societies, in which both adults and children worked comparatively few hours, and farming societies, in which both worked longer hours. In pre‐transitional societies, the insurance value of children was almost unlimited. For most people in most societies, alternative ways of maintaining savings from the earlier to the later stage of the life cycle first became available only when large‐scale investment in children's education was possible. The costs and gains from that investment played a major role in the onset of the fertility transition.     

Social Security in China: Government White Paper

The largest financial problem faced by many aging societies is how to support their older, retired members. That support was once wholly a matter for individual families, with perhaps a minimal safety net offered by charitable institutions. Increasingly, in the usual course of economic development, the requisite transfers become a responsibility of the state—financed either through tax revenues or by pensions offered by (or required of) employers. The combination of lengthening life expectancy at later ages and falling fertility, however, makes those transfers ever more onerous as fewer workers are expected to support greater numbers of retirees. The situation is often likened to the approaching collapse of a Ponzi scheme. Not surprisingly, governments see an attractive solution in what is in effect a reprivatization of responsibility—not back to the family but right to the individual, through a system of individual retirement accounts (albeit with considerable state supervision). The financial trans‐fers—savings and later dissavings—then take place over each person's life cycle. Establishing a social security system—through pay‐as‐you‐go transfers, individual retirement accounts, or some combination of the two—is a major institution‐building and administrative task for a developing country, the more so in the context of rapid population aging. China is certainly a case of rapid aging, with the proportion of the population over age 60 projected to rise from 10 percent in 2000 to 20 percent by 2025 and 30 percent by 2050. The document excerpted below, a 2004 White Paper issued by the government of China, describes China's current social insurance provisions and the proposed expansion of coverage (beyond government employees and the urban formal sector) over coming years. In urban areas, it envisages pension coverage of “all eligible employees,” with an increasing emphasis on personal accounts. (Not mentioned is the situation of the large “floating population” of informal rural‐to‐urban migrants.) In rural areas, reliance on family support perforce continues: in 2003, only 2 million farmers are reported as drawing old‐age pensions. A safety‐net provision for the destitute elderly with no family provides for another 2.5 million. The document mentions various experimental schemes in rural areas. One, for medical insurance, covers 95 million residents; another offers an annual “reward” to those over 60 who have only one child (or two girls). The excerpts comprise sections I (Old‐age Insurance) and X (Social Security in Rural Areas) and the Conclusion of the White Paper, China's Social Security and Its Policy, issued by the Information Office of the State Council, Beijing, September 2004.     

The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a Debate

The household registration (hukou) system in China, classifying each person as a rural or an urban resident, is a major means of controlling population mobility and determining eligibility for state‐provided services and welfare. Established in the late 1950s, it was initially used to bar rural‐to‐urban migration. After the late 1970s reforms, an inflow of rural migrant workers was allowed into the cities to meet labor demands in the burgeoning export industries and urban services without, however, changing the migrants' registered status, thus precluding their access to subsidized housing and other benefits available to those with urban registration. While there have been many calls for reforming this system, progress has been limited. Proposed reforms have attracted increasing academic and media attention.     

Slum Residence and Child Health in Developing Countries

Continued population growth and increasing urbanization have led to the formation of large informal urban settlements in many developing countries in recent decades. The high prevalence of poverty, overcrowding, and poor sanitation observed in these settlements—commonly referred to as “slums”—suggests that slum residence constitutes a major health risk for children. In this article, we use data from 191 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) across 73 developing countries to investigate this concern empirically. Our results indicate that children in slums have better health outcomes than children living in rural areas yet fare worse than children in better-off neighborhoods of the same urban settlements. A large fraction of the observed health differences appears to be explained by pronounced differences in maternal education, household wealth, and access to health services across residential areas. After we control for these characteristics, children growing up in the slums and better-off neighborhoods of towns show levels of morbidity and mortality that are not statistically different from those of children living in rural areas. Compared with rural children, children living in cities (irrespective of slum or formal residence) fare better with respect to mortality and stunting but not with respect to recent illness episodes.     

An Italian Statement on International Migration

Increasing realization of the implications of persisting below‐replacement fertility in Europe—shrinking absolute numbers combined with a rising proportion of the elderly—is giving new salience to policy considerations regarding immigration in the countries most affected by low fertility. The recent United Nations report on “replacement migration” (see the Documents section in the June 2000 PDR) highlighted the issue through illustrative calculations showing the size of immigrant streams that would be needed for achieving specified demographic targets in selected lowfertility countries, given continuation of present fertility and mortality trends. For example, the UN report suggested that in Italy—which has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world—maintaining a constant population over time would require a net influx of some 12.6 million immigrants during the next 50 years, and maintaining a constant labor forceage population (ages 15–64) would require a net inflow of 18.6 million. Yet immigration policy in Western Europe has become increasingly restrictive during the last quartercentury, and the official policy stance that regulating immigration is strictly within the domain of a country's sovereign right has been assiduously maintained. (International treaty obligations qualify that right in the case of bona fide asylum seekers; however, the definition of that category is also subject to the discretion of the receiving countries.) Thus, although within the European Union national borders are open to EU citizens, the power of regulating immigration from outside the EU is retained by the individual countries rather than subject to EU‐wide decisions. Suggestions coming from the developing countries to follow up the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development with an intergovernmental conference on international migration and development were set aside by the potential immigrant‐receiving countries as overly contentious. A statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Lamberto Dini, delivered at the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations, 13 September 2000, may be a sign of a notable shift in official approaches to immigration policy by at least one EU member state. The statement, in a departure from the practice of touching lightly upon a wide range of issues in international affairs, typical in high‐level ministerial speeches given at that UN forum, is devoted essentially to a single topic: international migration. It characterizes migration “between or within continents” as an international problem and advocates “coordinated and integrated” instruments in seeking a solution. It suggests that “today, with a declining birth rate and an aging population, Europe needs a strategy that embraces the complex process of integrating people from different regions of the world.” The rules for international migration, the statement claims, should be set in a global framework, such as provided by the United Nations. In the “age of globalization,”“a solidarity pact is needed to find the best and most effective way of balancing the supply and demand of labor.” With the omission of opening and closing ceremonial passages and a brief comment on the problem of debt relief, the statement is reproduced below.     

The spread of urbanization in England and Wales, 1851-1951

Abstract Each county in England and Wales has been classified as rural or urban for each of the decennial census years 1851-1951. One index has been used as the basis for these classifications, the percentage of adult males occupied in agriculture. Thus, for each census year a value, in term of this index, was fixed as the criterion to determine whether a county was rural or urban in that year. This criterion of classification varies, over time. This is to allow for the reduction in the percentage of adult males occupied in agriculture as a result of structural changes in the occupational distribution (associated with general modernization), rather than through a shift away from agriculture. The geographical patterns of urbanization in England and Wales during the period 1851-1951, and some associated social and economic changes, are discussed in the paper.