Political Incorporation Among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence of Source Country Effects

Using four years of data from the Current Population Survey, this study examines the effect of country of origin on two types of political incorporation among immigrants ‐ citizenship and voting ‐ in the contemporary United States. Results show that country of origin is a statistically significant predictor of citizenship acquisition for nine of ten immigrant groups and for voter turnout for five of ten groups, net of income, education, length of residence in the United States, and other demographic characteristics. The findings also suggest that country of origin matters as much for how it interacts with other key characteristics, such as education and income, as for the independent influence it exerts on these two political processes. For immigrants from most countries under examination, lower levels of education and income discourage citizenship acquisition. An exception is found among Britons, for whom lower levels of income encourages naturalizing. In the voting process, higher levels of education encourage voter turnout for most immigrant groups. Though country of origin has a greater effect on naturalizing than on voting, it significantly impacts both types of political incorporation. The differing effects of country of origin and other demographic factors on naturalizing and voting, respectively, suggest the two processes are distinct from one another.     

Wahlbeteiligung im Lebensverlauf

This empirical investigation attempts to answer the question whether the change in voter turnout at the German general elections is related to cohort specific voting behavior of political generations, also taking into account age and period effects. Furthermore, it is asked whether the decline of voter turnout after the 1972 German general election is a statistical artefact of official statistics. Both questions are investigated with retrospective life history data about voting behavior of individuals from several birth cohorts. It is analyzed that the voter turnout has really declined in the 1980s because of the increased number of determined non-voters. There is evidence that the changes of the voting behavior of younger individuals in successive political generations results in the social change of the general voter turnout. While the effects of the citizens’ age on the voter turnout are minimal for the whole period between 1953 and 1987, the impact of period effects are less important for the historical change of voter turnout as often assumed.     

Reconsidering Explanations for Regional Convergence in Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States, 1956–20001

In the United States, voter turnout rates have been declining for the last 4 decades; however, this pattern differs substantially by region. Southern states have actually seen a fairly dramatic increase in turnout since the 1950s and currently the South and non‐South have almost identical rates of voter registration and turnout. Using a series of Heckman probit models, which examine voting as a two‐step process of registering and casting a vote, we systematically investigate differences in rates of registering and voting across regions and test explanations for regional convergence over time. Using data from the American National Election Studies (1956–2000), we find that regional convergence in voter registration is primarily due to the removal of formal and informal barriers to registration and voting in the South and declining efforts to mobilize potential voters in the non‐South. In addition, we find some fairly distinct differences in which predictors are important to each stage of the voting process; for example, race is a better predictor of registering to vote than voting. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these results.     

Good Excuses: Understanding Who Votes With An Improved Turnout Question

Utilizing studies which validate voter turnout, previous researchershave been able to identify a strong tendency for individualsto report voting when they in fact did not. In this article,we assess the effectiveness of a new turnout question on reducingvoter over-reporting in the National Election Study. Providingrespondents with socially acceptable excuses for not voting,we found that this alternate question significantly reducesthe over-reporting of turnout in the 2002 National ElectionStudy by about 8 percentage points. Moreover, our analysis revealsthat with the new question wording, estimates of the turnoutrate for those usually thought to be the least likely to voteare considerably lower than estimates using the traditionalquestion. Thus, not only did the experiment work to significantlyreduce over-reporting, the new question provides deeper insightsinto the voting behavior of the American electorate that hasimplications for both scholars and reformers.     

EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON WOMEN'S VOTING PARTICIPATION

This study investigates the effects of welfare reform in the United States in the 1990s on voting among low‐income women. Using the November Current Population Surveys with the added Voting and Registration Supplement for the years 1990 through 2004 and exploiting changes in welfare policy across states and over time, we estimate the causal effects of welfare reform on women's voting registration and voting participation during the period in which welfare reform unfolded. During this time period, voter turnout was decreasing in the United States. We find robust evidence that welfare reform led to smaller declines in voting (about 3 to 4 percentage points, which translates to about 10% relative to the baseline mean) for women who were exposed to welfare reform compared to several different comparison groups of similar women who were much less exposed. The robust findings suggest that welfare reform had prosocial effects on civic participation, as characterized by voting. The effects were largely confined to presidential elections, were stronger in Democratic than Republican states, were stronger in states with stronger work incentive policies, and appeared to operate through employment, education, and income. (JEL D72, H53, I38, J21)     

Why Is Turnout Down?

The monotonic decline in turnout in presidential elections since1960 is the subject of this analysis of survey data. After somecommon explanations for this decline were rejected, it was discoveredthat the decline occurred mainly among low-income and low-educationwhites. Two explanatory hypotheses were examined, but appropriatedata for testing themwere unavailable; however, in the 1970snonvoters were more likely than voters at all income levelsto express dissatisfaction with the political system. Nonvotingwhites are not always a Democratic group, and their voting behavioris unpredictable over time. Their failure to vote may have anespecially significant impact on Democratic party policies,and implies that palliatives like reform of voter registrationlaws may not have the desired effect.     

A TEST FOR THE EFFECT OF CONFORMITY ON CRIME RATES USING VOTER TURNOUT

Using voter turnout to measure conformity, this article examines whether conformity with social norms moderates the crime rate in the United States at the state and county levels. If people are fairly consistent in their response to the perceived local degree of conformity with norms about voting and against crime, analysis predicts a unique quadratic relationship between reported crime rates and voter turnout. A pooled multivariate regression analysis of state crime rates for several index crimes in 1960, 1970, and 1980 confirms the predicted relationship, as do county-level analyses of the violent crime rate in 1985 and 1991. This method might also be used to assess the effect of social conformity on other social choices.     

A second look at partisanship’s effect on receptivity to social pressure to vote

Social pressure can exert a powerful, but sometimes counterproductive, influence on compliance with the social norm of voting. Scholars have tested several implicit social pressure techniques to reduce negative reactions to these methods. Among the most innovative is the use of ‘watching eyes’ in voter mobilization messages. Using three large randomized field experiments, this study attempts to reproduce Panagopoulos and van der Linden’s finding that political partisanship moderates the effect of watching eyes messages on voter turnout. Our findings diverge from previous findings statistically and substantively and indicate partisanship may have limited influence on the effectiveness of watching eyes in mobilizing voters.     

VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)     

Conditions for Exercising Residents’ Voting Rights in Long-Term Care Residences: A Prospective Multicenter Study

To assess voting conditions in long-term care settings, we conducted a multicenter survey after the 2009 European elections in France. A questionnaire about voting procedures and European elections was proposed in 146 out of 884 randomized facilities. Sixty-four percent of facilities answered the questionnaire. Four percent of residents voted (national turnout: 40%), by proxy (58%) or at polling places (42%). Abstention related to procedural issues was reported in 32% of facilities. Sixty-seven percent of establishments had voting procedures, and 53% declared that they assessed residents’ capacity to vote. Assistance was proposed to residents for voter registration, for proxy voting, and for voting at polling places, respectively, in 33%, 87%, and 80% of facilities. This survey suggests that residents may be disenfranchised and that more progress should be made to protect the voting rights of residents in long-term care facilities.     

Empirics of the median voter: democracy, redistribution and the role of the middle class

This paper improves the empirical investigation on the effectiveness of the median voter theorem. Using high quality data, it is possible to directly observe individual net cash transfers in several countries and to investigate the effects of taxes and transfers on different social classes and in aggregate. This allows testing of both the “redistribution hypothesis” (more inequality leads to more redistribution in aggregate) and the “median voter hypothesis” (the middle class plays a special role in policy making). Results suggest acceptance of the former and reject on, or at least questioning, of the latter. Not only the gains from redistribution are negligible for the middle class, but also the link between income and redistribution is also lower for it than for any other class of income. Moreover, the strength of the median voter seems to fall over time. Finally, the amount of redistribution targeted to the middle class is lower in more asymmetric societies, a result that contrasts strongly with the median voter theorem.     

How does inequality aversion affect inequality and redistribution?

We investigate the effects of inequality aversion on equilibrium labor supply, tax revenue, income inequality, and median voter outcomes in a society where agents have heterogeneous skill levels. These outcomes are compared to those which result from the behavior of selfish agents. A variant of Fehr-Schmidt preferences is employed that allows the externality from agents who are “ahead” to differ in magnitude from the externality from those who are “behind” in the income distribution. We find first, that inequality-averse preferences yield distributional outcomes that are analogous to tax-transfer schemes with selfish agents, and may either increase or decrease average consumption. Second, in a society of inequality-averse agents, a linear income tax can be welfare-enhancing. Third, inequality-averse preferences can lead to less redistribution at any given tax, with low-wage agents receiving smaller net subsidies and/or high-wage individuals paying less in net taxes. Finally, an inequality-averse median voter may prefer higher redistribution even if it means less utility from own consumption and leisure.     

Income inequality,redistribution and the position of the decisive voter

A large literature explaining patterns of redistribution makes use of the median voter theorem. Using a novel approach, this contribution shows that in OECD countries the decisive voter, determined by the earner who sees her preferred tax rate being implemented, on average sits around the 50^th percentile in the income distribution, although significant within and between country differences exist. Under the assumption of a lognormal distribution of gross income, we derive the required tax rate to align the observed gross and net Gini coefficients in OECD countries. This estimated tax rate is compared to the tax rate preferred by the median income earner, which gives a new index capturing a nation’s deviation from the median voter position, measured as the difference between the estimated percentile position of the decisive voter and the 50^th percentile position of the median voter. We provide a comparative overview of this index over time and between countries. We also locate the positions of alternative versions of the decisive voter, among which following the ‘one dollar, one vote’ rule, in a Lorenz curve diagram.     

A group majority voting model of public good provision

A model of public good provision by majority rule selection incorporating the behavior of rational group voting is formulated. Two probability maximizing candidates are assumed. If voters are risk averse in public sector preferences, then a unique symmetric (both candidates offering identical platforms) equilibrium exists. If certain additional conditions hold on the group cost functions of political support, this equilibrium will lie at the public good levels which maximizes the sum of voter utility. It is further demonstrated that it is unlikely for those conditions to be satisfied and therefore more realistic asymmetric equilibria with positive voter turnout is predicted.This paper is based on an essay of a dissertation submitted to Tulane University under the supervision and invaluable assistance of Steven Slutsky, Jonathan Hamilton, and William Oakland. The advice of Gerald Whitney, Michaels Johnson, and an anonymous referee is also gratefully acknowledged. All errors remain the authors.     

Gender and social conformity: Do men and women respond differently to social pressure to vote?

In this paper, we re-analyze data from a large-scale field experiment (N = 344,084) on voter turnout in order to determine whether men and women respond differently to social pressure aimed at voter mobilization. To date, there have been mixed results regarding the interaction between a person’s gender and receptivity to social influence. On the whole, our analyses confirm prior findings that social pressure increases voter turnout but uncover little to no evidence of gender differences in receptivity to social pressure cues in the context of political participation.     

Ambivalent citizenship and extraterritorial voting among Colombians in London and Madrid

In this article, we explore the nature of extraterritorial voting among Colombian migrants in the 2010 elections in London and Madrid. To address the neglected issue of why voter turnout from abroad has been so low, we take into account the views of voters and non‐voters alike to show that, while the external vote privileges the professional and well educated, this does not mean that migrants are not interested in politics back home. Drawing on Bauman (1991), we conceptualize ambivalent citizenship as the paradoxical manner in which, through the external vote, states impose hegemonic notions of citizenship from above, which people embrace in an ambivalent manner from below. We show that the workings of the state make voting a difficult process; they create structural ambivalence for migrants who, even if they practise their citizenship in other ways, exercise individual ambivalence because they find it difficult to engage with a political system back home that they do not trust. The conceptualization of ‘ambivalent citizenship’ therefore encompasses the contradictory complexities inherent in the provision of external voting rights that actively privilege and exclude migrants in mutually constitutive ways.     

Voting in professional associations: The case of the American sociological association revisited

Who votes in ASA elections? This article examines data on voter turnout from two recent presidential contests of the American Sociological Association in an analysis of the determinants of election participation. Extending the 1981 Ridgeway and Moore study of voting dynamics in the ASA, we hypothesize that intraorganizational networks and particular demongraphic characteristics link ASA members to the discipline in a manner analogous to the way such factors operate in the national electorate. On the basis of data compiled from 1985 and 1986 ASA election returns, we find that network factors are the most salient determinants of voting behavior. We conclude that those organizational ties that effectively link members, however directly or indirectly, to the larger Association are the most predictive of propensity to vote.     

Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments

A voting rule maps voter preferences into outcomes, and is called sophisticated if there exists a voting tree whose sophisticated outcomes coincide with the voting rule for every voter preference. As yet, no complete characterization of such rules is available. In this paper, we provide an important step toward this characterization by completely solving the problem when there are two possible sets of voter preferences.The second author was supported by the Office of Naval Research, Grant N00014-92-J-1387.