Impact of Retailers with Knowledge of Supplier's Inventory on Supply Chain Performance

We model a supply chain consisting of a supplier and multiple retailers facing deterministic demand. We denote some retailers as strategic in the sense that given the supplier inventory information, they will implement the optimal stocking policy by incorporating such information. On the other hand, some retailers are denoted as naïve in the sense that they ignore supply information and resort to a simplistic ordering policy. Naïve retailers learn the optimal policy over time and adjust their orders accordingly. We study the dynamics of this game and investigate the impact of such strategic and naïve retailers on the cost, ordering pattern and stocking policies of all parties. We analyze the supply chain under two scenarios: the centralized supply chain where the objective is to minimize the total supply chain cost, and the decentralized supply chain where each self‐interested player minimizes its own cost in a Stackelberg game setting. We fully characterize the optimal policies under both centralized and decentralized scenarios and show that, surprisingly, the supply chain might be better off by virtue of naïve retailers. The result is driven by the fact that strategic and naïve players’ decisions shift the positioning of inventory in the supply chain with its final impact being determined by the relative costs of different retailer‐types. Our results also offer managerial insights into how access to supply information can improve supply chain performance.     

基于决策者风险规避特性的供应链需求信息共享价值分析

在随机需求条件下,利用条件风险估值(conditional value-at-risk,CVaR)的风险度量准则建立了供应链的需求信息共享决策模型,着重分析了零售商的风险规避程度以及市场需求的不确定性信息对供应链各决策者以及供应链整体信息共享价值的影响。研究结果表明,需求信息共享价值与零售商的风险规避程度、市场不确定性大小以及市场不确定信息所预测的市场需求变化情况有关。数值分析结果表明,零售商越害怕市场的不确定性风险,需求信息共享越有利于提升分散供应链的运作效率;但当市场信息反映出未来的市场需求是消极且零售商接近风险中性时,供应链的需求信息共享价值反而小于零,此时没有进行信息共享的必要。     

库存成本变化的VMI供应链协调

提出了库存成本变化的经济订货批量(EOQ)模型，基于该模型研究了库存成本变化时供应商管理库存(VMI)系统的最优协议问题。在该系统中，订货商和供应商达成缺货成本共担协议：当缺货发生时，供应商需要向订货商支付缺货补偿。订货商和供应商分散决策，订货商通过设计协议来减少其成本，而供应商通过制定补货决策来缩小自身成本。通过与传统系统和整合系统的比较，得出了库存成本变化时VMI系统的最优补货决策和缺货成本共担协议。采用数值算例验证了分析结果。结果表明，当且仅当供应商预期成本等于整合系统的最小总成本与固定缺货罚金之和时，VMI系统与整合系统具有相同的补货决策和系统绩效，即能够实现供应链协调。     

Contracting Under Vendor Managed Inventory Systems Using Holding Cost Subsidies

Vendor managed inventory systems are becoming increasingly popular. An important issue in implementing a vendor managed inventory scheme is the contracting terms that dictate the ownership of the inventory and the responsibility of inventory replenishment decisions. Thus the performance of a vendor managed system crucially depends on these terms and on how inventory‐related costs are shared in a supply chain. We consider a system where a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer who faces random demand in a competitive market. The retailer incurs a fixed cost per order, inventory holding cost, and a penalty cost for a stockout (unsatisfied demand is back‐ordered). Further, the manufacturer incurs a penalty cost when there is a stockout at the retailer and a fixed replenishment cost. We assume that the players are rational and act noncooperatively. We compare the performance of retailer managed inventory systems, where the retailer places orders and makes replenishment decisions, with vendor managed inventory systems, wherein the vendor or manufacturer makes inventory and replenishment decisions. Specifically, in the vendor managed inventory system, we propose and evaluate holding cost subsidy‐type contracts on inventories offered by the retailer to improve system performance. We evaluate this contract in the context of three widely used inventory systems—deterministic economic order quantity, continuous review (Q, r) policies, and periodic review policies—and show when such contracts may improve channel performance.     

A Stochastic Inventory Model With Fast‐Ship Commitments

We present a multiperiod model of a retail supply chain, consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer, in which regular replenishment occurs periodically but players have the option to support fast delivery when customers experience a stockout during a replenishment period. Because expedited shipments increase the supplier's transportation cost, and possibly production/inventory costs, the supplier typically charges a markup over and above the prevailing wholesale price for fast‐shipped items. When fast shipping is not supported, items are backordered if customers are willing to wait until the start of the next replenishment period. We characterize the retailers and the supplier's optimal stocking and production policies and then utilize our analytical framework to study how the two players respond to changes in supply chain parameters. We identify a sufficient condition such that the centralized supply chain is better off with the fast‐ship option. We find a range of markups for fast‐ship orders such that the fast‐ship option is preferred by both the supplier and the retailer in a decentralized chain. However, a markup that is a win–win for both players may not exist even when offering fast‐ship option is better for the centralized chain. Our analysis also shows that depending on how the markup is determined, greater customer participation in fast‐ship orders does not necessarily imply more profits for the two players. For some predetermined markups, the retailer's profit with the fast‐ship option is higher when more customers are willing to wait. However, the retailer may not be able to benefit from the fast‐ship option because the supplier may choose not to support the fast‐ship option when fast‐ship participation increases due to the fact that the fast‐ship participation rate adversely affects the initial order size.     

供应链库存协调策略研究

研究和分析了直运型供应链通过共同补给期协调库存的策略问题。在该供应链中,单一供应商提供单一产品给面临随机需求的单一零售商。在所提出的库存协调策略条件下,供应商指定共同补给期,当零售商按供应商指定的共同补给期作为其订货周期时,供应商提供零售商一定的价格折扣。这种协调策略可以视为Stackelberg博弈。在阐述了解决该博弈问题的方法后,进行了数值实验,分析了采用这种协调策略的利益。     

不同货架空间分配顺序下农产品供应链优化问题研究

货架是超市和生鲜便利店的重要资源，不仅具有储存和展示农产品的功能，同时货架空间大小对农产品的销量具有重要影响。针对产品需求受货架空间与零售价格共同影响的两级农产品供应链，在考虑供应商主导和零售商主导的情况下，分别对零售商在销售季节来临前和来临后分配货架空间四种分散式农产品供应链的最优决策与利润进行了分析，并与一体化供应链的最优决策进行了比较。研究发现，不论是在供应商主导还是在零售商主导的农产品供应链中，零售商在销售季节来临前分配货架空间，相比在销售季节来临后分配货架空间，农产品的批发价格与零售价格更高，分配的货架空间更小，供应商和零售商均获得更少的利润，相应的农产品供应链整体利润更少。因此，零售商在销售季节来临后分配货架空间对农产品供应链更有利。相比一体化供应链，分散式供应链的零售价格更高，分配的货架空间更小，供应链整体利润小于一体化供应链的最优利润，本文给出了基于利润共享与成本共担的合同对分散式供应链进行协调。最后，通过数值算例研究了参数变化对最优决策和供应链利润的影响。     

供应商保鲜努力的生鲜农产品双渠道供应链协调决策研究

在互联网迅猛发展的时代,生鲜农产品双渠道营销模式是供应商的最佳选择,如何发挥双渠道优势,实现渠道共赢是目前研究的热点。以供应商主导的双渠道供应链为研究对象,考虑新鲜度衰减且扰动需求和供应商保鲜努力,对比分析集中和分散决策模型,论证构建协调模型的必要性。从渠道合作和利润最大化的角度出发,设计两部定价契约、批发价协调契约和由成本分担与补偿策略构成的混合协调契约,三种契约均能在一定范围内有效实现供应链协调,提高各成员的利润。最后,对比分析所设计协调契约以认识其本质,并通过数值分析验证其有效性。     

物流联合外包下库存管理模式对供应链运作的影响

针对由供应商、第三方物流服务商和零售商组成的供应链,考虑供需双方将物流服务联合外包给第三方物流服务商、共同承担运费的情形,探究供应商管理库存和寄售库存两类库存管理模式的引入对供应链运作及合同设计的影响。分别在传统的零售商管理库存、仅引入寄售库存的零售商管理寄售库存以及同时引入供应商管理库存和寄售库存的供应商管理寄售库存三种模式下,构建了第三方物流服务商主导、供应商和零售商跟随的序贯非合作博弈模型,证明了所有模式下均衡的订购量/寄售量均存在且唯一,并探讨了均衡结果随零售商运费分摊比例、转移支付价格两个关键参数的变化。横向对比三种模式下的均衡结果和集中决策下的最优结果,发现：零售商管理库存模式下的均衡订购量总是低于零售商管理寄售库存模式以及集中决策下的结果,而其他库存管理模式下的订购量并非一定低于集中决策下的结果;不同库存管理模式下,均衡状态下的订购量/寄售量及供应链总的期望收益大小关系取决于供应商和零售商的类边际(毛利)贡献率,从而表明,供应链环境下,上下游成员企业的收益结构、盈利水平等对于库存决策及库存模式的选取有重要影响。此外,在绝大多数情形下,不同库存管理模式下的均衡订购量与集中决...     

决策者过度自信视角下考虑质量控制的供应链库存策略

研究了由单个供应商和零售商组成的供应链中,零售商进行质量控制的条件下,供应链成员对市场需求的过度自信如何影响其库存管理决策和供应商的质量投资。分析了零售商管理库存、供应商管理库存和集中决策三种供应链库存管理模式下供应链成员库存和质量投资决策的博弈均衡,并通过与完全理性下均衡结果的比较探讨了过度自信对供应链成员库存决策、质量投资和利润等的冲击。研究表明,在零售商管理库存模式下,过度自信的决策者对库存量的决策受其心理预期市场需求的正向影响,而在供应商管理库存和集中决策模式下则相反。     

基于货架空间成本共担的不同权力供应链均衡分析

针对产品需求受货架空间与零售价格共同影响的两级供应链,通过比较供应商主导、零售商主导和权力均等三种不同权力结构供应链均衡结果,分析了供应商与零售商共同承担货架空间成本对供应链定价、货架空间分配和利润的影响。研究结果表明:供应商与零售商共同承担货架空间成本会减少供应商主导供应链的整体利润,但会使零售商主导和权力均等供应链通过分配更多的货架空间增加产品销量,在一定范围内使得供应链整体利润得到提高。由于三种不同权力结构供应链均未达到整体最优,提出了基于货架成本共担的收入共享合同,并给出了供应商和零售商均能接受的分配方案。     

Coordinated Logistics: Joint Replenishment with Capacitated Transportation for a Supply Chain

In this study, we consider the integrated inventory replenishment and transportation operations in a supply chain where the orders placed by the downstream retailer are dispatched by the upstream warehouse via an in‐house fleet of limited size. We first consider the single‐item single‐echelon case where the retailer operates with a quantity based replenishment policy, (r,Q), and the warehouse is an ample supplier. We model the transportation operations as a queueing system and derive the operating characteristics of the system in exact terms. We extend this basic model to a two‐echelon supply chain where the warehouse employs a base‐stock policy. The departure process of the warehouse is characterized in distribution, which is then approximated by an Erlang arrival process by matching the first two moments for the analysis of the transportation queueing system. The operating characteristics and the expected cost rate are derived. An extension of this system to multiple retailers is also discussed. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the performance and the sensitivity of the models and the value of coordinating inventory and transportation operations.     

Dynamic Pricing,Production, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning

We consider a decentralized two‐period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price‐dependent demand. The manufacturer's second‐period production cost declines linearly in the first‐period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the resulting problems as two‐period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium solutions explicitly. We then examine the impact of mean learning rate and learning rate variability on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the manufacturer's production decisions, and on the retailer's procurement decisions. We show that as the mean learning rate or the learning rate variability increases, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. In particular, when the manufacturer may hold inventory, we identify two major drivers for inventory carryover: market growth and learning rate variability. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results by examining a model in which cost learning takes place continuously.     

供应商管理库存下基于消费者行为偏好的全渠道运营策略

在供应商管理库存背景下,研究了消费者线上参考效应、线下库存效应以及渠道偏好对供应链成员运营策略的影响。利用微分博弈和连续型动态规划理论获得了独立运营、基于供应商服务成本分担契约的部分合作运营以及协同运营三种模式下的成员策略及绩效。由比较静态分析和对比分析发现：库存效应对生产量具正向影响,对产品质量、大数据营销服务和线下服务具负向影响;消费者不同条件下的线上偏好对企业决策有不同的影响;供应商服务成本分担契约能激励零售商提升线下产品服务,一定程度上改进企业独立运营的绩效水平。为进一步协调分散式供应链,在上述契约基础上设计了供应商收益分享及双边成本分担契约。数值算例发现：新契约在一定条件下可实现分散式供应链的完美协调;消费者参考质量过度依赖品牌商誉易产生"锚定心理",不仅会抑制成员生产和服务积极性,造成库存积压,阻碍品牌商誉积累,损害企业利润,也不利于消费者获得更好的购物体验。     

VMI供应链下考虑补货策略的的契约设计

结合(r,Q)和(s,S)两种库存补货策略,提出了货权属供应商的VMI供应链的契约设计问题。采用风险分担的思想,给出了两种可行的风险分担的契约形式。在离散需求下,通过参数试验的形式,分别研究了两种契约形式对供应链效率的影响。研究结果表明,两种契约能够使得供应链的效率达到满意,同时对于影响效率的参数有一定的鲁棒性,并且在一定情况下能协调供应链。相比收益分享契约,引入风险分享的契约形式能够使得供应链协作的效率更高。研究结论对VMI契约设计有参考意义。     

Quick response and supply chain structure with strategic consumers

This work explores the impact of quick response on supply chain performance for various supply chain structures with strategic customer behavior. By investigating pricing and inventory decisions in decentralized supply chains under revenue-sharing contracts and in centralized supply chains, we study the performance of four various systems and compare the value of quick response in different supply chain structures. The results show that if the extra cost of quick response is relatively low, the value of quick response would be greater in centralized systems than in decentralized systems. On the other hand, if the extra cost is high, decentralized supply chains reap more incremental profits from adopting quick response. We also find that revenue-sharing contracts enable a decentralized supply chain to outperform a centralized supply chain, but only allow limited flexibility of allocating total profits between a manufacturer and a retailer.     

考虑策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策模型

在两期销售环境下,研究了面向策略型消费者的在线零售商库存信息披露及联合定价、库存决策问题。考虑在线零售商库存信息共享和隐藏两种库存披露策略,构建了在线零售商两期销售利润模型。通过分析消费者的购买行为,讨论了在具有策略型消费者的市场中,在线零售商应如何选择库存信息披露策略,以及如何制定最优定价和库存决策。在此基础上,分析了相关参数对在线零售商决策及利润的影响。研究结果表明,在线零售商的最优定价及库存决策受消费者估值折扣系数和第二期定价策略的影响。特别地,当在线零售商选择第一期缺货时,更倾向于共享其库存水平信息;当在线零售商选择第二期缺货或者两期均不缺货时,消费者估值折扣系数存在一个阈值,当低于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择隐藏库存水平信息,当高于该阈值时,在线零售商会选择共享库存水平信息。     

供应链渠道协调的收入共享契约模型

研究了委托销售条件下的供应链收入共享契约协调问题。在该契约下,零售商决定收入共享比例,供应商决定产品零售价格和生产数量,并保留产品所有权,双方所有关于需求、成本等信息都是对称的。综合考虑了产品残值收益和缺货损失情况,建立了以零售商为主方、供应商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型,分析了委托销售下分散供应链决策同集中供应链决策的关系,探讨了系统参数对供应链及其成员利润的影响,并进行了数值计算。研究表明,供应链及其成员绩效受两个系统参数,即需求价格弹性和零售商成本分摊比例的影响,从而为契约双方针对不同产品和各自成本结构签订最优契约提供决策依据。     

Order Progress Information: Improved Dynamic Emergency Ordering Policies

Technologies such as radio‐frequency identification and global positioning systems can provide improved real‐time tracking information for products and replenishment orders along the supply chain. We call this type of visibility order progress information. In this paper, we investigate how order progress information can be used to improve inventory replenishment decisions. To this end, we examine a retailer facing a stochastic lead time for order fulfillment. We characterize a replenishment policy that is based on the classical (Q, R) policy and that allows for releasing emergency orders in response to the order progress information. We show that the optimal structure of this policy is given by a sequence of threshold values dependent on order progress information. In a numerical study we evaluate the cost savings due to this improved replenishment policy.     

时间价格敏感型需求下的二阶段供应链协调模型

本文讨论时间价格敏感型需求环境下,两阶段供应链中供应商和零售商的最优决策,其中供应商的决策为供应提前期和批发价格,零售商的决策为零售价格.通过分析集中决策模式和分散决策模式下的决策过程,进行优化求解给出了两种模式下最优决策的数学表达式;并设计了实现供应链完美协调的组合契约.