计生家庭状况及其生育补偿研究

通过大量的调查数据，本文重点考察、分析了我国计生家庭和计生父母面临的问题以及获得的救助、补偿等生育补偿情况，最后从转变生育补偿观念、改进生育补偿方法和加大生育补偿力度等方面提出相应的对策研究。     

我国家庭养育成本的研究述评与前景展望北大核心CSSCI

伴随着我国经济发展、社会变迁和人们生育观念的转变,家庭养育成本日益成为低生育时代育龄群体生育决策最为重要的影响因素之一。通过梳理与分析20世纪90年代以来家庭养育成本的相关文献资料,发现家庭养育成本研究的文献数量总体上呈递增趋势,并形成了研究内容丰富、方法多样、结论可靠的系列成果,相关研究方向主要集中在三个方面:一是在西方新家庭经济学理论基础上,对养育成本的概念界定及其测量;二是利用全国性或地方性调查数据,对养育成本的基本现状及其影响因素展开分析;三是从个体、国家和社会层面分别讨论养育成本与生育意愿及行为、生育率和生育政策间的相关关系与后果。尽管既有研究为更好理解家庭养育成本规律及其后果提供了参考,但还存在家庭养育成本概念测量多元且不一致、养育成本分担主体责任界限模糊、理论解释机制缺乏新意、实证调查数量偏少等不足。在未来的一段时间内,应从以下五个方面进一步深化家庭养育成本相关研究:第一,构建科学合理的养育成本测量指标体系,统筹考虑家庭、国家和社会层面长期投入的各项直接成本和间接成本;第二,正确认识我国养育成本责任分担主体的非均衡状态,剖析养育成本的责任分担模式与政策启示;第三,探讨养育成本与生育意愿和行为间的内在关系,深入分析养育成本对生育率和生育政策的作用机制;第四,重点关注女性机会成本,建立健全女性机会成本的补偿机制与体系;第五,开展实证调查,验证与评估相关生育政策的有效性。     

低生育水平下的生育成本收益研究——来自江苏省的调查

文章应用江苏生育意愿与生育行为调查结果,研究符合二孩生育政策妇女的生育行为、生育计划和生育观念,主要从妇女的角度分析生育威本和生育收益,并应用多元统计分析方法重点分析生育成本对妇女生育计划的影响.研究发现,育龄妇女大多认为满足精神需求是最重要的生育理由,而第二个孩子的养育成本是主要考虑因素.在控制了年龄、受教育程度、居住地、户口性质、婚姻状况、生育观念等特征后,生育的经济成本和心理成本对妇女生育二孩的计划有显著影响.     

中国生育率下降实践和生育政策成本——效益

生育政策成本-效益概念可定义为按一定生育政策规定,因超过或满足生育子女数而增加或减少的孩子成本与效益。应在经济发展、技术进步、收入提高的基础上,增大独生子女生育政策直接经济效益,增大超生子女生育政策直接经济成本,这是控制人口增长的关键所在。     

家庭负债、生育成本与二孩生育决策

家庭负债是影响二孩生育决策的重要因素，二者之间的关系对于研究我国生育水平和人口长期均衡发展等问题具有重要意义。本文运用2019年中国家庭金融调查数据（CHFS2019），从家庭资产负债率与债务收入比两方面对我国居民家庭负债进行度量，研究家庭负债与生育成本对二孩生育决策的影响及其异质性，同时考察生育成本对家庭负债影响二孩生育的调节效应。结果表明：家庭负债的增加对二孩生育具有显著抑制作用；生育成本的上升对二孩生育具有显著负向影响；从生育成本对家庭负债影响二孩生育的调节效应来看，生育成本的上升强化了家庭负债对二孩生育的抑制作用；从区域异质性来看，在东部和中部地区，家庭资产负债率和债务收入比的提升均显著抑制二孩生育，而在西部地区，家庭资产负债率对二孩生育的抑制作用显著；资产负债率提升对城镇和农村家庭二孩生育均存在显著抑制作用，而债务收入比提升仅对城镇家庭二孩生育具有显著的抑制作用。由此可见，家庭负债和生育成本对我国居民家庭的二孩生育决策具有较强的约束作用。我国积极生育政策目标应重点考虑提升居民收入，降低生育成本，减轻家庭负债压力，促进我国人口长期均衡发展。     

关于计划生育利益导向机制的几点理论思考

本文通过回顾总结我国计划生育利益导向机制产生与发展的实践，力图从理论上概括计划生育利益导向机制的内涵、形式、原则、类别、目的与特征；指出社会公平原则是计划生育利益导向的价值准则；人们生育需求可变性与可替代性是利益导向机制发挥作用的基础，有针对性地对育龄群众的生育需求进行调适是计划生育利益导向机制的基本特征；利益导向可分为直接补偿和间接补偿两类形式，以“三结合”为代表的计划生育利益导向具有间接补偿性质，它是计划生育工作新机制的核心内容；“三结合”主动利用经济高速增长阶段生育孩子机会成本和养育成本增高对过度生育的抑制作用，不仅具有使计划生育工作化难为易的策略性质，而且具有对多子多福、重男轻女等旧生育观念产生“釜底抽薪”作用的战略性质；本文最后探讨了利益导向机制在当前人口与计划生育工作思路和工作方法“两个转变”过程中的地位与作用。     

中国总和生育率为何如此低?——推延和补偿的博弈

目前对于我国生育水平的讨论主要关注对"真实生育水平"的估计,而较少关注为什么生育水平越来越低。本文根据推延效应和补偿效应博弈的原理,以图对我国生育水平不断走低给予人口学的回答。本文考察了2000年、2010年、2015年三次普查/小普查的分年龄生育率的变化,表明年轻人口生育率的大幅下降和年长人口生育率的微弱上升导致了生育率的不断走低。对2000—2017年的年度数据的进一步分析也表明,推延效应强劲和补偿效应微弱并不是普查时点的一时现象而带有一贯的趋势性。只要这种趋势没有根本扭转,中国的生育水平将不可避免地继续走低。此外,高龄生育已经成为不容忽视的生育现象。     

建立生育补偿、生育保障制度 稳定低生育水平——北京市顺义区农村社区的调查与思考

低生育水平标志着我国人口与计划生育进入了第二次创业的新时期;而建立生育补偿和生育保障制度,则是稳定低生育水平、启动再创业的重要物质条件。 基于这一思路,我们在北京市顺义     

人口行为外部性及外部性内在化的经济分析

本文利用制度经济学关于人类行为外部性及外部性内在化的理论观点 ,联系我国实践 ,对人口行为的外部性及外部性内在化关系进行经济分析 ,并主要从产权关系、决策参与和政府行为三个方面探索了生育行为外部性内在化的途径。本文认为 ,要在内在化过程中实现生育与社会控制的均衡 ,既减少生育对社会造成的外部损害 ,又不至于产生过大的制度成本 ,就必须依赖于制度设置的效率。     

农村妇女生育意愿影响因素分析

低生育水平不代表我国农村社会生育意愿已经完成了从传统型向现代型的转变,因为生育意愿的变化受到社会和家庭多种因素的影响。借助莱宾斯坦孩子"成本-效用"理论,通过农村妇女边际孩子的选择对农村妇女生育意愿的影响因素进行分析。结果发现,性别偏好、孩子的经济成本以及抵御家庭风险、扩大家庭规模的效用在影响妇女生育意愿中起着较为明显的作用。了解农村妇女生育意愿影响因素,对建设先进生育文化有重要意义。     

The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium

Many scholars have argued that deliberate birth spacing may have played a role before and during the modern fertility transition. There are good historical and theoretical reasons for this view, but it has proved to be hard to demonstrate convincingly that birth intervals were in fact partly determined by attempts at deliberate fertility control. This paper suggests a method of securing evidence on the issue for married couples. The method is applied to three cohorts living in a Belgian town in the nineteenth century. The findings indicate that, even before the fertility transition, couples in the working class were controlling their fertility by deliberate spacing.     

Second Births and the Second Shift: A Research Note on Gender Equity and Fertility

In a set of propositions on fertility transition, Peter McDonald recently proposed that the decline from replacement‐level fertility to low fertility is associated with a combination of high levels of gender equity in individual‐oriented institutions, such as education and market employment, and low levels of gender equity in the family and family‐oriented institutions. Similarly, the “second shift,” or the share of domestic work performed by formally employed women, forms a critical piece of current cross‐national explanations for low fertility. Building on this scholarship, the authors explore whether there is empirical evidence at the individual level for a relationship between gender equity at home, as indicated by the division of housework among working couples with one child, and the transition to a second birth. Results, based on a sample of US couples, indicate a U‐shaped relationship between gender equity and fertility. Both the most modern and the most traditional housework arrangements are positively associated with fertility. This empirical test elaborates the family‐fertility relationship and underscores the need to incorporate family context, including gender equity, into explanations for fertility change.     

A Theory of Marital Fertility Transition

In this paper a theory of marital fertility transition that treats birth control diffusion processes and the effects of mortality decline and economic and social development on fertility within a common analytical framework is developed. Utility-cost concepts provide the means for an integrated treatment. Family size utility functions are used and the theory is focused on the effects of development and diffusion on the utilities and costs of alternative family sizes. The principal innovation lies in the conceptualization and analysis of diffusion of birth control, in which the psychic costs of violating social norms against birth control play a central role. When norms shift in favour of birth control, the psychic costs of birth control fall, causing a decline in the demand for children. In highly integrated populations this process can occur very rapidly, resulting in rapid diffusion of birth control and sudden and rapid fertility decline.     

On Postponement and Birth Intervals

Much of the literature on fertility transition presumes that birth control is practiced either to limit family size or to space births. This article argues that women also use birth control to postpone pregnancy. Postponement is not synonymous with spacing. It arises when women delay their next birth for indefinite periods for reasons unrelated to the age of their youngest child, but without deciding not to have any more children. Postponement has a distinctive impact on the shape of birth‐interval distributions that differs from the impacts of family size limitation, birth spacing, or a mixture of the two behaviors. Some populations, such as that in South Africa, have developed fertility regimes characterized by birth intervals far longer than can be accounted for by birth spacing. Postponement of further childbearing that eventually becomes permanent may be an important driver of the transition to lower fertility in sub‐Saharan Africa.     

We must pay attention to the difference between the original intention and the current status of family planning]

Due to imperfections in the current family planning (FP) policy, and the differences un program implementation in urban and rural areas, the fertility of the urban population with higher IQ scores is under control but this is not the case for the rural population. Among rural couples, one child is rare and two or three are commonplace, while in cities over 70% of couples are having one child. In the metropolitan cities, this figure is about 90%. In the rural areas, provision of education is a serious problem because of insufficient resources, a lack of qualified teachers and inadequate facilities. At the present, at least 3 million school age children in rural areas can not go to primary school. Besides there is a big contrast in FP practice between Han nationality and minorities. Population growth is basically under control among the more advanced Han nationally but not among the less advances minority nationalities. This growth rate among the minority population was about 50.27/1000 in the past five years, which is alarming. Furthermore, the couples given opportunity to have a second child are often those whose first child had birth defects or is mentally retarded, whereas couples with a normal child can have only one child. This has become a vicious circle, since subsequent children are more likely to have the same birth defects. It was discovered from a 1983-85 survey that the prevalence of birth defects was 12.8/1000. The current situation is that the fertility of urban, educated, and healthy people is restricted while the less educated, those living in less developed areas, and those with health defects are having more children. The outcome of this situation is the decline of national population quality, which greatly deviates from the original intention of the FP.     

Equity,Security and Fertility: A Reaction to Thomas

This paper assesses recent arguments that sustained fertility decline cannot occur in circumstances of inequality, insecurity, and injustice. Naturally, these conditions are to be abhorred. However, the empirical record suggests that none of them acts as an absolute barrier to mass adoption of birth control and subsequent fertility decline. Recent trends in Bangladesh illustrate this point most vividly. One of the greatest fallacies of many fertility theories has been the assumption that there is an economic or social imperative in underdeveloped countries for couples to have many children. To the contrary, the historic norm for all societies has been an average of only about two surviving children per woman, implying an adaptation to low, not high, net fertility.     

The family planning work in Yiyang prefecture as suggested by part of the data of the sample fertility survey]

The National Committee on Family Planning conducted a sample survey of fertility in the Yi-yang area in September 1982. The survey was focused on the marriage and fertility status of women between the ages of 15 and 67. Results from this survey show that early marriage is still very popular. Only 40% of those surveyed delayed their marriage to a later age. There is a need to educate the people on the benefits of late marriage. In addition, statistics show that the average fertility rate for a woman was 6.8 children in 1970 and 2.35 children in 1982. This recent figure is still too high when compared with the under 1.2 figure suggested by the central government. Among the total number surveyed, only 77% have taken birth control measures, and the other 23% still have not taken any birth control measures. The phenomenon shows that popular education on late marriage and having children at a later age is still urgently needed in order to further reduce the fertility rate. Married couples of childbearing age should be taught effective birth control measures and knowledge of eugenics with better education for the next generation. In this way, the masses may participate actively and positively in the national family planning campaign.     

Trends in fertility level in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the years of Soviet rule

The birth rates of the USSR within its present boundaries are reconstructed for the period 1918-1940 on the basis of incomplete data and taking into consideration several changes in frontiers. Estimates for the years 1941-1945 are derived from data on school attendance during the 1949-1954 period, as well as from data provided by the censuses of 1959 and 1970 concerning cohort survival. Deriving an "effective fertility rate," which adjusts for the mortality wastage of young children, discussion focus is on fertility trends until 1976 and the changes in age patterns of reproduction at the national level and in the various republics. During the 1918-1940 period, the birth rate in the USSR never fell below 30/1000 and never exceeded 45/1000. There was a significant drop in the birth rate in the 1931-1936 period, and this is attributable to the problems of the period of collectivization and to the large-scale processes of migration involved in the country's industrialization. After the late 1940s, the overall birth rate in the USSR stabilized at a level of 25-27/1000, but from 1960 onwards, there was a steady decline in the rate. The level reached its lowest in 1969 and then rose somewhat. This increase reflects the transient influence of changes in the age-marriage structure of the population and in the "timetable" of births. A comparison of the present fertility level with the level in the 1920s indicates that the birth rate has declined by a factor of approximately 2.5, but in evaluating this decline the sharp decline in mortality, particularly infant mortality, must also be considered. The child mortality level in prerevolutionary Russia was very high. The overall mortality rate for the 20 provinces of European Russia in 1920-1922 was 33.2/1000, namely, 1/4 higher than it was before the Revolution. In subsequent years infant mortality continued at a high level and was 18.2% in 1940. In the last 25 years mortality in children under age 5 has markedly declined. In 1976 the overall birth rate was 18.5/1000 and the "effective" birth rate was 18.0/1000. The practice of birth control in families is spreading in various ways. In some cases the proportion of married couples using family planning is increasing, while in other cases couples already using birth control are beginning to use it after the birth of a child lower in birth order. In most areas of the country birth control is being practiced predominantly in such a way as to keep families down to 1 or 2 children. For the whole of the USSR in 1973-1974, the gross reproduction rate was 1.178, while the net rate was 1.118. Although there is ample population replacement in the country as a whole, in a number of republics even mere replacement is threatened.     

婚姻形式与男孩偏好:对中国农村三个县的考察

应用在招赘婚姻高度流行区、中度流行区和低度流行区的调查数据 ,本文研究了严格生育控制下婚姻形式以及个人、家庭和社会因素对男孩偏好的影响及其区域差异。研究发现 ,嫁娶婚姻的生育行为有明显的男孩偏好倾向 ,而招赘婚姻的生育行为则不存在性别偏好 ;男孩偏好存在显著的区域差异 ,招赘婚姻的流行显著降低了当地的男孩偏好水平。研究结果为政府在农村降低男孩偏好水平、稳定低生育率提供了新的思路和途径