政府补贴下考虑零售商不同竞争行为的闭环供应链决策及合同选择

本文考虑了由一个制造商和两个竞争零售商构成的闭环供应链,其中制造商是供应链Stackelberg博弈的领导者,两个零售商作为博弈的跟随者,研究政府再制造补贴下供应链的决策及合同选择问题。以集中决策为基准,分别建立零售商内部采用古诺双寡头博弈和Stackelberg博弈时的决策模型,分析了零售商的不同竞争行为、竞争强度及政府补贴对最优结果的影响,同时对零售商采用古诺双寡头博弈时成员间签订成本分担契约及收益共享契约后闭环供应链的决策及利润进行了对比,并设计出可以协调整个供应链的新契约。结果表明零售商之间的竞争行为会使其最优零售价格增大,最优废旧产品回收率及供应链最大利润降低,当零售商内部采用Stackelberg博弈时闭环供应链所获得的利润最低;竞争越激烈,三种模型下各成员的最优定价、回收率及利润都越低;政府补贴可以有效激励集中决策下的回收行为及促进该模式下供应链利润的增长;当零售商采用古诺双寡头博弈时,成本分担契约的签订可以提高闭环供应链的最优回收率,而收益共享契约能够使得供应链及制造商的最大利润有明显增长。     

碳补贴与零售商竞争下供应链合作方式的微分博弈研究

存在政府低碳补贴时,本文考虑由一个制造商和两个相互竞争的零售商组成的低碳供应链在集中决策、零售商横向合作、供应链纵向合作和分散决策下的动态最优决策。本文通过构建微分博弈模型并运用动态优化的求解方法得到了不同合作方式下的反馈策略,并且在此基础上比较不同合作方式的结果,讨论了竞争对最优决策的影响。研究表明,集中决策下的零售价格与纵向联盟零售价格相同,均处于最低水平,零售商横向合作下的零售价最高。不同合作方式下的批发价格相同。政府最优补贴比率与竞争程度成负相关。纵向联盟能够实现帕累托改进,而零售商合作不一定为供应链带来额外收益。     

零售商水平竞争下二层供应链协调策略设计

研究一个生产商和两个零售商组成的二层供应链,生产商首先决定批发价和零售商选址约束,然后两个零售商进行选址和定价二阶段动态博弈。利用Hotelling模型得到了零售商价格竞争均衡的存在性条件,分析了集中式控制下供应链的最优选址和定价决策,提出了带转移支付的批发价合同和选址约束来协调零售商选取供应链最优决策。同时,带转移支付的批发价合同能激励零售商降低销售成本。     

基于供应链间品牌竞争的库存管理策略研究

分析两个供应链间竞争的系统,每条供应链由一个供应商和一个零售商组成,供应商通过各自零售商销售具有品牌差异的产品,不同品牌产品之间存在替代度,零售商面临不确定性需求.在此系统上,存在供应商间的竞争、零售商间的竞争,和供应链内上下游之间的竞争,三种竞争交织.每条供应链有两种管理库存的方式,即零售商管理库存和供应商管理库存.通过对比不同库存管理方式下系统成员收益,发现,把不确定性需求风险从零售商转移给供应商,并非能增加零售商收益,或减少供应商收益;同时,通过分析了不同库存管理方式对供应链系统竞争均衡状态的影响,指出,在一定条件下,供应商管理库存方式能加强供应商端的竞争,使得零售商和供应商共同受益.     

考虑期权合同供应链的零售商订货研究

文章讨论了面向随机需求的两个独立的零售商.由于生产提前期长而销售期短,零售商通过期权合同从供应商订货.在销售期初,零售商可根据市场需求通过与另外一个零售商进行期权交易来调整自己的库存.讨论了期权交易对零售商最优订货和最大利润的影响,得到考虑期权合同的零售商的最优订货存在唯一的纳什均衡解,零售商的最优订货是期权交易价格的增函数.有期权交易的零售商的最大期望利润高于不进行期权交易的零售商的最大期望利润.当零售商面临相同的市场结构时,存在唯一的最优期权交易价格,并且有期权交易的零售商的最优订货高于没有期权交易的零售商的最优订货.当零售商面临相同的正态需求分布时,零售商的最优订货和最大期望利润是需求相关系数的减函数.     

产品组合竞争下远视互补品供应商联盟的稳定结构

考虑由4个远视供应商与1个零售商所组成的两层供应链系统,基于最大一致集的概念,探讨部分供应商可替代时互补品联合销售联盟的远视稳定结构。研究发现:当供应商的成本相差较小时,如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较小,则远视供应商会偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商;如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较大,则远视供应商会偏好形成一个由3个供应商联合销售的大联盟。当供应商的成本相差较大时,远视供应商会偏好形成联合销售的大联盟,或者偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商。但是,两个供应商形成的联合销售联盟不是远视稳定的。     

两阶段供应链中三种定价方式研究

本文考虑渠道一体化对品牌建设的作用,在一个制造商和两个零售商的两阶段供应链系统中,其中确定性的市场需求与产品的市场零售价格有关,通过分析以下三种定价方式下的最优定价和库存策略下供应链成员和系统的收益,1)商品市场零售价格由零售商各自决定,两零售商和制造商之间存在着竞争活动;2)商品市场零售价格由制造商统一制定;3)市场零售价格、转让价格和系统库存水平按渠道协调的最优原则确定,确定了同一产品品牌内部的市场竞争、定价控制权及转让价格对渠道性能及品牌自身造成的影响,并由此提出了分散决策系统中的一种激励机制.     

两级供应链中订货延迟的影响分析

基于报童模型,在1个供应商和2个零售商组成的供应链系统中,建模分析了零售商实行订货延迟策略对自身、供应商和供应链系统的利润影响,得出了它们各自的订货时机偏好,并根据服务水平描绘了供应商和零售商的订货偏好区域分布图,由此得到零售商订货时的Pareto最优区域。研究结果表明,在通常情况下供应商希望零售商预订,而零售商喜欢延迟订货,这和现实情况是相符的。结果还表明,在某些情况下零售商延迟订货对自身有利,但对系统不利;当供应商服务水平较高时,零售商延迟订货对自身、对系统都有利。     

考虑售后服务合作的双渠道营销定价决策研究

电子商务环境下线上零售商如何实现良好的售后服务是当前电商发展面临的重大问题.文章从售后服务合作视角出发, 研究在电商环境下由线上与线下零售商组成的双渠道营销系统的产品与服务定价决策问题.对比分散决策下的最优产品价格与服务费用, 以集中决策下的最优价格作为基准, 通过两部定价合作机制, 使线上线下双方在实现整体利润最大化的基础上进行利润分配, 从而达到双方共赢.通过两部定价下的售后服务合作, 一方面解决了线上零售商的售后服务需求, 另一方面也为线下零售商带来了额外的服务收入, 因此能使双方利润同时得到有效提升.不同于传统供应链中制造商与零售商之间的纵向合作, 文章创新性地研究了线上线下两个零售商之间的横向合作, 并证明存在竞争关系的零售商亦可通过合作实现共赢, 对当前线上零售商的产品售后服务及线上线下零售商之间的合作发展具有较强的理论与实践指导意义.     

双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价策略

在单制造商和两个具有竞争行为零售商的供应链系统中，本文研究了双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价决策问题。首先，在零售商间进行Stackelberg博弈假设前提下，分别针对双渠道零售商和传统零售商作为领导者的情况，构建了两种模式下的零售商定价决策模型，给出了零售商的最优定价策略；其次，分析了零售商在特定情形下的定价策略；最后，用数值算例分析了模型参数对最优结果的影响。通过对比研究和数值算例分析发现：对于零售商来说，作为Stackelberg的领导者时的总利润要比作为追随者时的总利润大；对于供应商而言，传统渠道的零售商做主导者时的总利润要比双渠道零售商做主导者时的总利润大。     

Demand uncertainty and manufacturer returns policies for style-good retailing competition

This paper investigates the role of the returns policy in the co-ordination of supply chain: A manufacturer provides a return policy for unsold goods to two competing retailers who face uncertain demand. The problem is described with a game theory structure: The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, first commits a returns price to the retailers under a given wholesale price. Upon receiving this information, two competing retailers, as followers, make decisions for their retail price and order size, in which the process of pricing and ordering is played as Nash equilibrium. Anticipated the retailers’ responses, the manufacturer designs his returns policy. Adopting the classic newsboy problem model framework and using numerical study methods, the study finds that the provision of a returns policy is dependent on the market conditions faced by the retailers. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on the decisions of optimal retail price and order quantity and profit reallocation between the manufacturer and the retailers. Finally, it investigates how the competing factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

Quality‐Speed Competition in Customer‐Intensive Services with Boundedly Rational Customers

We consider a system in which two competing servers provide customer‐intensive services and the service reward is affected by the length of service time. The customers are boundedly rational and choose their service providers according to a logit model. We demonstrate that the service provider revenue function is unimodal in the service rate, its decision variable, and show that the service rate competition has a unique and stable equilibrium. We then study the price decision under three scenarios with the price determined by a revenue‐maximizing firm, a welfare‐maximizing social planner, or two servers in competition. We find that the socially optimal price, subject to the requirement that the customer actual utility must be non‐negative, is always lower than the competition equilibrium price which, in turn, is lower than the revenue‐maximizing monopoly price. However, if the customer actual utility is allowed to be negative in social optimization, the socially optimal price can be higher than the other two prices in a large market.     

基于预期网络规模的双寡头质量竞争

考虑一种具有网络效应特征的产品,本文研究当产品预期网络规模主要受质量影响时,双寡头企业如何进行质量竞争。本文建立了一个两阶段博弈模型的方法分析了这种问题。结果表明,市场领导者获得大于其预期网络规模的市场份额,而市场跟随者获得小于其预期网络规模的市场份额。对于弱网络效应产品,随着网络效应的增强, 两企业的产品质量分化加剧,价格及利润差异随之扩大。当网络效应的强度足够低时,市场跟随者利用后发优势得到较大利润。而对于强网络效应产品,市场领导者利用先发优势得到更大利润。     

TPLSPs竞争模式下的物流合同

本文研究了一个客户企业与两个竞争的第三方物流服务提供商（TPLSP）、且两个TPLSPs的努力水平同时影响市场需求的模型。利用博弈理论,研究了存在两个TPLSP竞争时,系统集中决策、独立决策两种情况下,客户企业与TPLSPs的最优决策.探讨了TPLSPs的最优努力水平与其市场占有率、服务价恪、服务成本之间的动态关系,为了协调该模型,给出了客户企业与两个TPLSPs之间的收入共享与成本共担的组合合同,讨论了合同使得系统达到协调的条件;由系统协调条件可以看出,市场占有率越高的TPLSP越容易接受TPLSP分配客户企业收益比重较小的合同;证明了竞争能提高努力水平、提高客户订货量。     

随机需求下考虑不同竞争情形的网约车平台动态定价

针对乘车需求波动下网约车平台间存在乘车需求竞争和乘运供应竞争的最优定价问题，以平台期望收益最大化为目标，运用最优控制论方法，构建不同竞争情形下的网约车平台动态定价模型，并利用哈密尔顿函数及模型推导，求得最优动态竞争价格解以及乘运供应率与需求率的变化轨迹。结果表明：平台最优动态竞争价格随市场需求的波动而动态变化，且最优价格可以有效调控平台供应能力，促使平台供需匹配，优化平台期望收益。此外，乘车需求市场竞争越激烈，平台最优价格越低，而乘运供应市场竞争越激烈，最优价格越高。平台间竞争的加剧将降低平台的期望收益，且平台期望收益随着固定佣金报酬率的提高先增大后减小。     

On Pricing and Composition of Bundles

This paper addresses the problem of how to determine the composition and price of a bundle so as to maximize the total expected profit. To motivate the problem, we use as a setting a high‐tech manufacturing company that operates in a competitive environment, is not a leader in the industry, and is constantly reacting to bundles introduced by the leader. Bundles are sets of components that must meet technical constraints. The company's objective is to build a bundle and offer it in a market where it will compete with other bundles. Consumers purchase the bundle that maximizes their utility after examining all available bundles. The company selection of the bundle's components and its price is made in light of the bundles against which it will be competing and the uncertainty in the consumer choice process. The optimal decision could be found by solving a nonlinear mixed integer program, which is difficult to solve. Instead, we propose an efficient solution procedure to determine the optimal composition of the bundle and the price at which it should be offered. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of extensions of the research to cases that consider multiple segments of customers and/or multiple bundles.     

EXPLORING MARKET PRICING STRATEGIES VIA DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

Price determinants as well as strategies can be studies by use of simulation, particularly if cost and price relationships can be related to market activity [1] [9] [11]. But, through the use of dynamic programming, given the market conditions, one can extend the analysis to include an optimal strategy. This paper describes a dynamic programming approach to studying price strategy. A model is developed to show that in a market characterized by cost/volume and price/volume relationships, profitability can be extended beyond that resulting from a dominant market strategy to an optimal maximizing strategy. Extension of the model is suggested for studying (a) sensitivity of a strategy (solution) to price level and cost changes, (b) optimal timing of withdrawal, and (c) present value analysis.     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand

This article presents a review of the issues associated with a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain that comprises one manufacturer and two competing retailers, with warranty period-dependent demands. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, specifies wholesale prices to two competing retailers who face warranty period-dependent demand and have different sales costs. The manufacturer considers three pricing options: (1) setting the same price for both retailers, while disregarding their difference with regard to sales cost; (2) setting a different price to each retailer on the basis of their sales cost; and (3) setting the same price to both retailers according to the average sales cost of the industry. In this article, the retailers' optimal warranty periods and their optimal profit, manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, and his/her optimal profit associated with different pricing strategies have been derived using the game theory. Our analysis shows that the results for retailers are the same with Strategy 1 or Strategy 3. In addition, we compared the effects of different pricing strategies of the manufacturer on supply chain decisions and profit. We conclude from the results that the manufacturer should either adopt Strategy 2 with symmetrical sales cost information or Strategy 3 if retailers' sales costs are asymmetrical.     

有竞争产品时改进型新产品最优上市策略

技术进步推动新产品以更快的速度进入市场,企业为了抢占更多的市场份额,往往会选择推出老产品的改进型新产品,以完成产品的更新换代.针对企业不断推出改进型新产品的情况,考虑双寡头环境下新老两代产品共存时的需求变动,研究改进型新产品的最优上市时间和新产品上市后老产品的最优调整价格问题,并分析改进型新产品的最优上市时间、老产品的最优调整价格与技术水平、产品价格等因素的关系.研究表明:老产品的市场潜力越大、技术水平越高,改进型新产品的最优上市时间越晚;改进型新产品的技术水平越高,其最优上市时间越早;竞争企业产品的价格和技术水平对改进型新产品最优上市时间起反向作用;改进型新产品的价格和技术水平对老产品的最优调整价格起反向作用;竞争企业产品的价格和技术水平对老产品的最优调整价格起反向作用.     

基于异质性顾客群的零售商补货及反应性定价策略研究

基于消费者对相似产品的不同支付意愿,研究了零售商补货及反应性定价策略。通过两阶段模型的建立和求解,找出反应性定价的规律并确定产品的补货量。归纳了在清仓定价(延迟定价的特例)和无延迟定价下零售商的定价和补货策略。借助数值仿真,讨论了市场波动性和产品接受度对最优决策及利润的影响并比较了不同定价模式(反应性定价、清仓定价、无延迟定价)的影响。