A tentative discussion on population reproduction in U.S.A. after World War II]

Immigration is an important factor in America's population growth. In the last 200 years over 50 million persons immigrated to the U.S.; 99.6% of the current total population are descendents of those immigrants. In the 1930s, American population decreased by about 7.2/1000, but during the 1950s the annual rate of natural increase rose to 18.5/1000. In the 1960s, this rate began to decrease until the 1970s when it was about 9/1000. By 1981 and 1982, the rate of natural increase declined to 7/1000. These changes are due to the relatively slow decline in the mortality rate of the last 30 years (10.6/1000 in 1945 to 9/1000 in 1981) and to the fluctuations in birth rates (from 19.5/1000 in 1945 to a high of 25.3/1000 in 1957 and back to 16/1000 in 1981). Birth rates are influenced by factors such as the number of fertile women, age structure, fecundity, marriage, family, occupation, and education. In 1950 there were 38,920,000 women aged 15-49, and by 1980 there were 57,630,000. Of these, in 1950, 31.28% were aged 20-29, the most fertile period for women, as compared with 35.04% in 1980. Thus, in postwar America, the changes in birth rate did not follow changes in the number of fertile women. Marriage patterns also underwent changes, particularly in the last 20 years. From 1930 to 1935, the marriage rate was 8.6/1000. By 1945, it rose to 16.4/1000. But during the 1960s, an increasing number of women aged 20-29 years remained unmarried. At the end of the 1970s, there was also an increase in the number of married women who did not have children. Furthermore, the number of divorces increased, an additional reason for a declining birth rate. Changes in family structure also influenced postwar American reproduction. In the last two decades, the traditional family has almost disappeared and the nuclear fammily is on the decline. By 1970 there were more people living alone, single parent families, and unrelated people sharing a domicile, than there were family units. Also, educated women who worked often married at a later age, thus placing restrictions on the birth rate.     

The achievements in family planning work in Rudong County as suggested by the data of the Fertility Survey]

A 15% random sampling from Rudong County was recently taken to survey fertility rates. 1153 primary units were chosen, which included 160,832 people. Among this group were 57,050 women aged 15-67 years. Topics surveyed included: marriage, birth, contraception, and population structure. Rudong County, among the earliest counties in China to begin the work of birth control, started in the 1960s with birth control education. The natural rate of population increase by the early 1970s had already fallen. From 1974 to 1982 the average rate of natural population growth was 3.8/1000. Reproduction has gone from a rising trend to a stabilized trend. The base of the population structure pyramid has shrunk; the number of youths aged from birth to 14 years has fallen from 35.05% in 1964 to 21.77% in 1982. The number of people who must be supported (the old and the young) has decreased, lessening society's responsibility for them. 29.45% of the total population are over 65 years or under 14. Society's coefficient factor of support has fallen from 66.31% in 1964 to 41.75%. There is a decrease in the number of people marrying at a young age; the trend is toward marriage at a later age. The average age at marriage had risen from 23.81 years in 1980 to 23.89 years in 1981. The fertility rate has decreased, as has the number of offspring per woman. 1 child family is on the rise and multiple children family is on the decline. In 1981 the 1 child rate reached 92.98%, the 2 children rate was 6.63% and the multiple children rate was 0.49%. Prior to 1979 the 1 child rate was under 10%. The fertility rate fell from 136/1000 in the 1960s to 41.5/1000 in 1981.     

An analysis of the fertility of Chinese women]

The 1982 census provided detailed information on fertility in China. It recorded 20,689,704 births in 1981, producing a birth rate of 2.1%, a decrease, respectively, of 43% and more than 50% in comparison with 1952 and 1963. The birth rate has varied widely over the last 30 years, from 3.6% in the early 1950's, to 1.8% in 1961, after a planned birth program was begun, to a record high of 3.7% in 1962 following the economic recovery, to 3.3% in 1970, after a gradual decline through the 1960's. By 1981 the birth rate had declined to 2.1%, clearly resulting from the intense planned fertility promotion begun in the early 1970's. In the mid- and late 50's, urban birth rate was consistently higher than rural, with the mass move to the cities at the beginning of the People's Republic. General economic development after 1957 brought simultaneous declines of both urban and rural rates, both reaching a low point in 1961. Age structure of the population also has an influence, depending on the proportion of childbearing women in the population. In 1981, the fertility of China's childbearing women was 8.3%, lower than that of the developing countries, but higher than the developed countries. By age group, the fertility rates reached 14.7% and 23.9% respectively in women between 20-24 and 25-29 years of age; the legal marriage age is 20. The fertility rate in large cities is generally lower than that of provinces. Higher educational and socio-economic level also exert an inverse influence on fertility rates; in low socio-economic areas the rate reached 3.5%, and in more advanced areas it was held to 2.2%. In all professions with the exception of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the percentage of families with 1 child was 81.8%. Since planned fertility was implemented, the overall fertility rate has dropped from 3% to 2%. China's fertility mode has changed to that of developed countries, with high intensity between 20 and 29 years of age. Appropriate measures should be taken to lower the fertility rate in different regions.     

The World Fertility Survey: charting global childbearing

Interviewing some 350,000 women in 42 developing countries and 20 developed countries representing nearly 40% of the world's population, the World Fertility Survey (WFS) is in a unique position to document the historic 1970s slowdown in global population growth. This Bulletin describes efforts begun in 1972 to ensure high quality, internationally comparable, accessible data, the data's importance for policymakers, planners and researchers, and major findings available by early 1982 from directly assisted WFS surveys in 29 developing countries and contraceptive use data from WFS-type surveys in 16 developed countries. Marital fertility has declined in all developing regions except Africa but still averages from 4.6 children/woman in Latin America to 6.7 in Africa, while preferred family size ranges from 3.0 children in Turkey to 8.9 in Senegal--far above the average 2.2-2.5 children/woman needed to end developing countries' population growth in the long run. However, women ages 15-19 prefer nearly 2 children fewer than the oldest women ages 45-49; 3.8 vs. 5.7 on the average. Nearly 1/2 (48%) of married women surveyed in 27 countreis said they wanted no more children. Preventing all unwanted births would reduce birth rates up to 15 births/1000 population in these countries. Overall, 32% of married, fecund women in developing countries are using contraception compared to an average 72% in 16 developed countries. Education, literacy, and more available family planning services increase contraceptive use. Age at marriage is rising in Asia, but this factor alone has little effect on fertility. Infant mortality is higher in many developing countries than previously thought. Breastfeeding is an important restraint on fertility in most developing countries but is declining among more educated, employed, and urban women which could raise fertility if not compensated for by gains in contraceptive use.     

Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.     

Retrospect and prospect of China's population

This discussion of the population of China covers the reproductive pattern and fertility rate, the death pattern and mortality, age-sex structure of the population, population and employment, urbanization, migration, and the aging of the population. During the 1949-83 period, China almost doubled her population with an annual natural growth rate of 19/1000. China's reproductive pattern developed from early childbearing, short birth spacing and many births to later childbearing, longer birth spacing and fewer births. China's total fertility rate (TFR) was 5.8 in 1950 and 2.1 in 1983 with an annual decrease of 3%. The annual national income grew at a rate of 7.1%, while the annual growth rate of population 1.9% from 1950-82. Consequently, the national income per capita increased from 50 yuan in 1950 to 338 yuan in 1982. The major factor responsible for the changes is the remarkable decline in the rural fertility rate. The crude death rate dropped from 27.1/1000 in 1963 to 7.1 in 1983 and the infant mortality rate from 179.4/1000 live births in 1936 to 36.6 in 1981. There was also a significant change in the causes of death. Population aged 0-14 in China account for 33.6%, 15-49 for 51.3%, and 50 and over for 15.1% of the total population. China is in the process of transition from an expansive to a stationary population. The age-dependency ratio declined from 68.6% in 1953 and 79.4% in 1964 to 62.6% in 1982. Sex ratios recorded in the 3 population censuses are 105.99 in 1953, 105.45 in 1964, and 105.46 in 1982. Employment in both collective and individual economies did not expand until 1978. Sectoral, occupational, and industrial structures of population started to change rationally with the adjustment and reform of economic management system in 1978. The strategic stress on the employment of China's economically active population should be shifted from farming to diversified economy and urban industry and commerce, from sectors of industrial-agricultural production to those of non-material production, and from expansion of employment to the rise of employment efficiency. The proportion of urban population in China accounted for 20.8% in 1982 with an annual growth rate of 4% during the 1949-82 period. The 1982 population census reveals that 94.4% of China's population resides on the southeast side of Aihui-Tengchong Line. Compared with the statistics in 1953, there was no notable change of the unbalanced population distribution on each side of the Line over the last 50 years. China is comparatively young in its population age structure. 1982 census data show that there were 49.29 million people at age 65 and over in 1982, representing 4.91% of the whole population. It is estimated from the age composition of 1982 and age-specific mortality rate of 1981 that there will be 88 million elderly persons by 2000, 150 million by 2020, and about 300 million as a maximum around 2040.     

The change of fertility and factors impacting it in Shanghai City in the past thirty years]

In 1981 a 3% random sampling of women born between 1931-66 was taken in Shanghai to study their menstrual and marital histories, pregnancies, contraceptive use, education, and occupation. In the last 30 years the fertility rate and the rate of natural population increase began to decline beginning around 1957-58. The changes in fertility rate fall into 3 periods: 1) between 1958-61 the fertility rate fell from 238.6/1000 to 159.2/1000, averaging 26.5/1000 annually; there was a slight period of stability from 1961-63; 2) between 1963-67 it fell from 155.8/1000 to 56.3/000, averaging 24.9/1000 annually and between 1967-68 there was a slight increase; and 3) between 1968-74 it fell from 63.2/100 to 26.4/1000, averaging 6.1/1000 annually. The fertility rate of various age groups also declined during the last 30 years. The average number of children for married women was 1.92. Factors influencing the fertility rate include: 1) birth control policy: the changes in the fertility rates were dominated by the birth control policy; for instance, from 1956-60, after late marriages were officially advocated, the average age at 1st marriage for men was 1.64 years older than before; between 1962-64, those women with more than 3 children were sterilized. 2) Education: the higher the educational attainment, the later was the age at 1st marriage, the more effective was the use of contraceptives and the lower the standard was for fertility; 3) occupation: the type of job influenced the age at marriage, as well as the frequency of miscarriage and live births; 4) attitude towards children: the total number of children women reported they would like averaged out to be 1.7; 5) urban and rural differences: the fertility rate for Shanghai City was not only lower than for Shanghai County, it fell at a faster rate; 6) changes in the age structure of fertile women affected the fertility rate; and 7) others: nutrition, the ability to propagate, age at 1st marriage, plus economic and social factors all affected fertility.     

Change of marital fertility in China from 1964 to 1981]

In 1982 the Chinese National Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide (excepting Taiwan and Tibet) .001 random sampling of the total population to gather data on the fertility and age structures of married women. In comparing general marital fertility and standardized fertility, findings show that from 1964 to 1970 both rates averaged 225.1/1000. When family planning work began on a wide scale in 1971, the rates steadily declined, reaching 116.7/1000 in 1980. However, in 1967-68 the standard fertility rate rose by 21.34% due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and in 1980-81 the rate increased by 13.2%, indicating that problems still remain in family planning. The total marital fertility rate dropped 2.84/1000 from 1964 to 1981. The rate of decline in rural areas was greater than in the cities, but the cities had a larger percentage decline than the countryside. In the 5-year periods of 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980, marital fertility rates tended to decline in 1970 and 1975 among women aged 30-40 years because during those periods greater control was placed on women having multiple children. For 1980 and 1975, combined total rates for 15-19 year olds dropped 17.1%, but the combined total rates of 30-49 year olds dropped by 61.2%, indicating that in recent years the drop in marital fertility is mostly among those over 30 years of age.     

An empirical study of the effects of socioeconomic development on fertility rates

Recent studies by Adelman and by Friedlander and Silver, which have investigated whether regression equations derived from cross-section data can be used to predict the impact of socioeconomic development on changing levels of fertility, are reviewed critically. Regression analyses based on data for 57 countries c. 1960 show that fertility (gross reproduction rate) varies cross-sectionally with region as well as with level of development (as measured by per capita income, percent labor force in primary sector, expectation of life, illiteracy rate). Using equations derived from the cross-section study and time-series data for five European countries during the period that their fertility rates fell, it is shown that predictions about past fertility changes are in error. The results suggest caution in the use of cross-section relations to predict the course of fertility in developing countries.     

Communique of the State Family Planning Commission on a nationwide fertility sampling survey of every person per thousand

In 1982, the Chinese State Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide fertility survey of 1 person/1000 in 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. 815 sample units were selected and 310,462 women aged 15-67 were interviewed, 99.9% of those identified. 252,094 (24.77%) were of childbearing age (15-49) with 24.76% 15-19 years old. Among women of fertile age, 31.46% were unmarried, 64.53% were married to their 1st husbands, 2.89% were remarried, .19% were divorced, and .94% were widowed. Average age of 1st marriage increased from 18.4 in the 1940s to 22.8 in 1981. Total fertility rate dropped from 5.44 in the 1940s to 2.63 in 1981. In 1981, the birth rate was 85/1000 women of fertile age. Fertility was much higher among minority nationalities. 118 million of China's 170 million married couples of reproductive age (69.46%) use birth control at present; 50.2% use the IUD, 25.4% tubal ligation, 10.0% vasectomy, 8.2% oral contraceptives, and 2.0% condoms. About 21 million married women should have begun using contraception but have not. 14 million or 42.3% of 33 million 1 child couples have pledged to have only 1 child. If the fertility level of 1981 is maintained and the average woman continues to have 2.63 children, 2.91 in rural areas, China's population will reach 1.2 billion by 1993 and will exceed 1.3 billion by 2000. The Central Committee has a target population of 1.2 billion by 2000.     

The population and economic issues in West Asia after WW II]

Using statistical data, this report analyzes population and economic issues in West Asia after World War II. The high rate of development as witnessed in West Asian countries after their gaining of political independence following World War II was accompained by an accelerated population growth. This population growth spead unevenly among different areas. Based on surveys of 17 countries in West Asia, the socioeconomic development and rapid rate of population growth have largely affected the population age, sex, urban and rural residential, and economic sector employment structures. With the help of indicators and mathematical methods to plot population development, these countries can be divided into 3 categories based on population development features. The semiindustrial countries demonstrate a gradually slowing population growth rate, most of these countries having experienced a peak period in the growth rate during the time of population transition. The agricultural countries show a natural population growth rate which is generally considered low. The 3rd category, the oil-producing countries, are currently experiencing a peak in population growth. In general, the popuation growth rate has dramatically accelerated in West Asia since World War II. Between 1950-1960 this rate was 2.58%; between 1960-1970, 2.75%; and between 1970-1980, 2.92%. This rate shows an increase of 6.6% between 1950-1960 and 6.2% between 1960-1970. It surpasses the average world population growth rate and most of the developing country growth rates. It has been augmented by post-World War II economic and social developments.     

The threshold hypothesis: evidence from less developed Latin American countries, 1950 to 1980

Historical research among European countries finds large differences in the level of social, economic or demographic development among countries, or regions within countries at the time marital fertility rates began their decline from traditional high levels. This research tests a threshold hypothesis which holds that fertility will decline from traditional high levels if threshold levels of life expectancy and literacy are surpassed. Using a pooled regression analysis of 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980 crude births rates (CBRs) in 20 less developed Latin American countries, in conjunction with 10-year lagged measures of social, economic and family planning program development, analyses reveal statistically significant effects of passing Beaver's (1975) threshold levels of 1950 literacy, or 1950 life expectancy, that are independent of levels of lagged literacy (or lagged life expectancy), economic and family planning program development, as well as measures that control period effects.     

Family planning achievements as suggested by changes of total fertility and party birth rate]

The dynamic characteristics of China's 5 distinct stages of population development since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, namely, 1950-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1970, 1971-1981, and 1982-present, are outlined and discussed. By tracing both the overall rate of population growth and age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-45 (5-year groups), a clear pattern emerges which indicates that the rates of early and late fertility (ages groups 15-19 and 30-45) are significantly declining. This is interpreted as a key factor in the overall decline in fertility rate. Annual statistics showing the number of children per woman of childbearing age and interval between 1st marriage and 1st birth are compared and discussed. It is concluded that the overall decline in birth rate and fertility rate since the 1970's is attributable to China's successful family planning campaign.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.     

Adolescent fertility: worldwide concerns

There is growing concern over the adverse health, social, economic, and demographic effects of adolescent fertility. Morbidity and mortality rates ar significantly higher for teenage mothers and their infants, and early initiation of childbearing generally means truncated education, lower future family income, and larger completed family size. Adolescent fertility rates, which largely reflect marriage patterns, range from 4/1000 in Mauritania; in sub-Saharan Africa, virtually all rates are over 100. In most countries, adolescent fertility rates are declining due to rising age at marriage, increased educational and economic opportunities for young women, changes in social customs, increased use of contraception, and access to abortion. However, even if fertility rates were to decline dramatically among adolescent women in developing countries, their sheer numbers imply that their fertility will have a major impact on world population growth in the years ahead. The number of women in the world ages 15-19 years is expected to increase from 245 million in 1985 to over 320 million in the years 2020; 82% of these women live in developing countries. As a result of more and earlier premarital sexual activity, fostered by the lengthening gap between puberty and marriage, diminished parental and social controls, and increasing peer and media pressure to be sexually active, abortion and out-of-wedlock childbearing are increasing among teenagers in many developed and rapidly urbanizing developing countries. Laws and policies regarding sex education in the schools and access to family planning services by adolescents can either inhibit or support efforts to reduce adolescent fertility. Since contraceptive use is often sporadic and ineffective among adolescents, family planning services are crucial. Such programs should aim to reduce adolescents' dependence on abortion through preventive measures and increase awareness of the benefits of delayed sexual activity. Similarly, sex education should seek to provide a basis for intelligent, informed decision making. Programs tailored to reach teenagers in schools, recreational centers, and the workplace have particular potential.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.     

Birth rate of Beijing population drops nearly 60% in 20 years

The birthrate of the Beijing (China) population dropped by 60% in the last 20 years. Consequently, population reproduction is characterized by a pattern of low birthrate, low mortality rate, and a low growth rate. The birthrate of the Beijing population was 36.30/1000 in 1950 and rose to 43.41/1000 in 1963. During the 1950-63 period, the average annual birthrate of Beijing population reached 36.71/1000 and the number of births was 2.23 million. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the rapid population growth has been effectively checked by great efforts made in practicing family planning. Over the 1970-83 period, the average annual birthrate dropped to 14.9/1000 and the number of births totaled 1.75 million. With the advance of the family planning effort, particularly acceptance of the concept of practicing family planning for the modernization drive, the people's reproductive notion has changed for the better. At this time, more and more men and women of reproductive age have broken away from the influence of old ideas such as "the earlier the couples have their sons, the soonner they will be helped." By 1982, the average age at 1st marriage was 25.8 years for males and 24.7 years for females. This was a remarkable change as compared with the 1960s. According to the 1982 population census, Beijing women over 60 years had 4.83 children, while those in the age groups 55-59, 50-54, 45-49, 40-44, 35-39, 30-34, and 25-29 has 4.81, 4.50, 3.72, 2.95, 2.32, 1.58, and 0.57 children respectively. Today, 0.66 million couples in Beijing volunteer to have only 1 child.