中国环境下企业政治资源、政治策略和政治绩效及其关系研究

本文对中国环境下企业营造有利外部环境的政治活动进行了实证研究。研究结果表明(:1)企业为了实现其营造有利外部环境的目标,获得政治竞争优势,可能会积极建立自己的政治资源,制定和实施合适的政治策略,获得各种政治和经济利益,从而提高企业绩效水平(;2)企业政治资源可分为有形资源、无形资源、组织资源和关系资源(;3)企业政治策略包括政治经营、直接参与、政府关联、财务刺激、代言人、制度创新、信息咨询和调动社会力量等8个层面的策略(;4)企业获得的政治绩效可分为政府资源、企业政治竞争优势与能力以及市场绩效与财务绩效3个方面(;5)中国企业拥有的政治资源、实施的政治策略和获得的政治绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系(;6)中国环境下的政治行为与西方环境下的政治行为既有相似性又有显著差异。     

经营期望差距影响公司股价崩盘风险吗?

本文以中国沪、深上市公司为对象,研究了经营期望差距如何影响股价崩盘风险,以及上述影响在不同情境(市场化程度和政治关联)下的差异。结果表明,经营期望落差会促使管理层采取冒险活动与信息操控行为,增大了股价崩盘风险,且在两类冒险活动中,经营期望落差通过违规性冒险投机活动对股价崩盘风险的影响相对更大。经营期望落差作用的发挥会受市场化程度与政治关联的制约,市场化程度与政治关联负向调节经营期望落差对股价崩盘风险的影响。企业管理层在面临经营期望顺差时并没有明显的采纳或回避冒险决策的动机,经营期望顺差对股价崩盘风险没有显著的影响。     

官员晋升压力与企业创新北大核心CSCDCSSCI

以2000年~2012年A股上市公司为样本,选取地方官员晋升这一独特视角,实证考察地方官员的晋升压力对企业创新活动的影响,并分别从企业产权性质、地区市场化程度和企业政治关联三个维度对这一影响进行了更深层次的多角度研究.研究结果表明,地方官员晋升前期,企业创新数量和质量都会显著降低,这种抑制作用在地方国有企业、市场化程度更低和有政治关联的企业中表现更为显著.扩展检验发现,企业在官员晋升前会通过慈善捐赠而非寻租的方式与政府建立联系,从而进一步挤出创新.本文研究不仅从微观层面为揭示官员晋升的经济后果提供了新的经验证据,而且对我国深化科技体制改革和促进企业技术创新具有清晰的政策意义.     

官员晋升压力与企业创新

以 2000 年 ～ 2012 年 A 股上市公司为样本, 选取地方官员晋升这一独特视角, 实证考察地方官员的晋升压力对企业创新活动的影响,并分别从企业产权性质、地区市场化程度和企业政治关联三个维度对这一影响进行了更深层次的多角度研究． 研究结果表明,地方官员晋升前期,企业创新数量和质量都会显著降低,这种抑制作用在地方国有企业、市场化程度更低和有政治关联的企业中表现更为显著． 扩展检验发现,企业在官员晋升前会通过慈善捐赠而非寻租的方式与政府建立联系,从而进一步挤出创新． 本文研究不仅从微观层面为揭示官员晋升的经济后果提供了新的经验证据,而且对我国深化科技体制改革和促进企业技术创新具有清晰的政策意义．     

考虑零售商实行歧视行为的两阶段动态定价策略研究

消费者对产品使用的习惯性将影响其复购选择,而企业根据消费者的历史消费行为制定相应的价格策略也影响着消费者的行为。本文构建了一个两阶段动态定价模型,研究企业是否存在歧视行为及消费者的产品习惯程度对企业定价策略的影响,利用博弈方法得到了不同情境下的制造商和零售商的最优策略。研究表明:(1)消费者对产品的习惯程度不仅能够影响消费者行为,也能影响企业定价策略;(2)转移成本加大了企业对消费者的歧视程度;(3)企业倾向于采取歧视定价策略即给新客户提供价格优惠而给老客户收取高价有利于自身利益最大化;(4)企业第一阶段的市场份额不能影响第二阶段定价,但能够影响企业两阶段利润。     

基于政府角色转换的企业政治资源、策略与绩效之间的相互影响

认为政府在企业政治活动中主要扮演3种角色--消费者、投资者和裁判员,而这种角色转换反映了企业政治资源、企业政治策略、政府合同、竞争性战略与企业政治绩效之间的关系.因此,基于企业政治资源、企业政治策略与企业政治绩效相互影响的理论模型以及10个研究假设,以我国企业作为研究对象,利用问卷调查获得的数据,运用因子分析法验证并解释我国企业政治资源、企业政治策略以及企业政治绩效的类型与层次,采用结构方程方法对我国企业的这种关系进行分析,并验证了其中的大部分假设以及主要观点,对前人有关的部分结论提供了数据支持.     

企业集团财务资源配置、集中程度与经营绩效——基于现金在上市公司及其整体子公司间分布的研究

以现金在我国A股上市公司及其整体子公司之间的分布为考察对象,本文考察了企业集团财务资源配置的集中程度对企业经营绩效的影响。运用反映上市公司总体财务特征、母子公司业务特征等方面的指标,本文建立了财务资源适度配置的估计模型,并据此量化财务资源配置的集中程度。研究发现,财务资源配置的集中程度与企业经营绩效呈显著的倒U型关系,即过度集中或过度分散的财务资源配置都将对企业经营绩效产生不利影响。本文的经验证据将对我国企业内部资本市场的资源配置战略具有一定的启示性意义。     

政治关联、财务绩效与企业社会责任——来自中国化工行业上市公司的证据

以2007-2011年中国化工行业上市公司为样本,实证考察了政治关联、财务绩效和企业社会责任之间的关系。将政治关联划分为代表委员类和政府官员类两种类型。研究发现,不同类别的政治关联方式对企业社会责任的影响路径存在显著差异。具体表现为,高管的代表委员类政治关联正向作用于企业财务绩效,而财务绩效的提升会促使其更好地履行社会责任。而且,在控制了财务绩效的影响后,代表委员类政治关联对企业社会责任仍具有显著的正向影响,其政治关联的级别越高,企业的社会责任表现越好。这说明财务绩效在两者之间起着部分中介作用;然而,政府官员类政治关联会降低企业的财务绩效。在控制了财务绩效的影响后,其对企业社会责任的影响并不显著,表明了财务绩效在政府官员类政治关联和企业社会责任之间起着完全的中介作用。     

中国企业政治策略与行为研究

企业为谋求有利于自己的外部环境而影响政府政策与法规制定和实施过程的策略被称为企业政治策略 ,实施上述策略的行为称为企业政治行为。本文通过对企业高层经理的小组访谈和个别深度访谈 ,对我国企业政治策略与行为、政治资源和政治绩效进行了描述和分类 ,并对企业政治行为过程及政治行为的规范性进行了解释。进一步的比较分析发现 ,中外企业政治行为有很强的相似性 ,但也存在由于中外政治经济体制不同而产生的差别。文章最后提出了进一步研究的建议。     

协作模式下快递企业间利润分配问题研究

在电子商务的迅猛发展下,网购热潮使得社会对于快递行业的需求激增,快递企业之间的合作势在必行,文章重点对协作下快递企业间的利润分配问题进行了研究,根据协作下快递企业间收益分配的特点构建了收益分配的基础模型,并通过分析快递企业间进行协作时面临的风险及其影响因素,引进了风险修正因子,使提出的利润分配策略更贴合快递企业间协作的实际情况。     

FIRM DEFAULT AND AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS

This paper studies the relationship between macroeconomic fluctuations and corporate defaults while conditioning on industry affiliation and an extensive set of firm‐specific factors. By using a panel data set for virtually all incorporated Swedish businesses over 1990–2009, a period which includes a full‐scale banking crisis, we find strong evidence for a substantial and stable impact from aggregate fluctuations on business defaults. A standard logit model with financial ratios augmented with macroeconomic factors can account surprisingly well for the outburst in business defaults during the banking crisis, as well as the subsequent fluctuations in default frequencies. Moreover, the effects of macroeconomic variables differ across industries in an economically intuitive way. Out‐of‐sample evaluations show that our approach is superior to models that exclude macro information and standard well‐fitting time‐series models. Our analysis shows that firm‐specific factors are useful in ranking firms’ relative riskiness, but that macroeconomic factors are necessary to understand fluctuations in the absolute risk level.     

我国战略性新兴产业间供应链企业协同创新演化博弈研究

在新兴技术深度交叉融合的新模式下,供应链企业协同创新是加快产业链向高端化延伸的重要途径。本文基于战略性新兴产业的战略性和新兴性,考虑社会效应及市场风险收益因素,构建战略性新兴产业之间供应链企业的演化博弈模型,研究数据库营销成熟度在内的多种因素的影响,通过案例仿真进行验证并分析在市场机制失灵时,政府调控的作用效果。研究结果表明：数据库营销成熟度、协同创新产生的信息流和技术量、技术收益系数和社会效益系数以及损益障碍因子等因素对系统趋于协同创新方向演化具有正向作用;在市场机制失灵时,政府采取成本补贴的激励效果更加高效快速,成果奖励的驱动力更加持久,两种激励手段相结合的方式最优;中等程度的监管力度及低于搭便车收益程度的惩罚并不能保证企业间的公平竞争,高于阈值的惩罚力度才能够有效抑制搭便车收益与前景损益的负向影响,驱动系统向协同创新的方向演化,且惩罚力度越高,系统的收敛速度越快。     

Does a firm’s exposure to ethical failures matter to financial markets? A governance perspective

This paper investigates if a firm’s ethical reputation, in conjunction with its governance, affects its standing within financial markets. A firm`s ethical reputation, as measured by ethical failures, arises from its involvement in ethical violations and incidents while a comprehensive index proxies for governance. We assess a firm’s standing within financial markets through two complementary perspectives, i.e., the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors, as inferred from analyst forecast dispersion and analyst forecast error, and the relation between a firm’s earnings and its stock market valuation or return (value relevance). Our results suggest that a firm`s ethical reputation affects financial analysts’ forecasts as well as the stock market value assigned to its reported earnings. Moreover, it appears that corporate governance moderates such relations, with strong (weak) governance compensating for a weak (strong) ethical reputation. Overall, our evidence shows that ethical failures do not seem to pay.     

The influence of patent protection on firm innovation investment in manufacturing industries

Countries enact various mechanisms, such as patent protection, to encourage, protect, and reward firm innovation. The degree to which these mechanisms afford firms protection over their intellectual property influences the innovation strategy that firms pursue and innovation investments they make. To date, empirical evidence on the relationship between patent protections and firm innovation is lacking, despite the relationship being the subject of intense theoretical and policy debate. To further consider the influences on firm innovation, we test the influence of a country's patent rights and changes in them on firm-level investment in innovation. Data for 706 firms competing in ten manufacturing industries across 29 countries were gathered and analyzed. Even after controlling for various firm, industry, and national factors, there is a strong positive influence of patent rights and changes in patent rights on a firm's propensity to invest in innovation. In addition, we consider the sensitivity of this result to alternative measures of patent and other intellectual property protection. We also find that the influence of patent rights on firm-level innovation varies across industries for example, the impact appears greatest in the scientific instruments and industrial chemicals industries.     

Corporate Governance and Performance During Consolidation of the United States and European Defense Industries

Under a market-oriented corporate governance system, the United States defense industry consolidate quicker and gained a comparative advantage in simple measures of firm performance, including profit margin and market share, than the continental European defense industry, which is more oriented toward stakeholder relationships in corporate governance. The defense industry in the United Kingdom, also characterized by market-oriented governance, performed well. On a wider set of measures related to firm performance and other stakeholders, the evidence is less clear. Concerns have been expressed about the European defense industry's survival in its current form. Likewise, concerns have been raised about the increasing level of concentration in the United States, its potential effect on innovation, and the erection of trade barriers. This paper concludes that corporate governance concepts are useful in analyzing firm conduct and performance in the defense industry and other traditionally -- 'national' industries. It also concludes that policy concerns might successfully be addressed through increased Transatlantic cooperation, attention to the flexibility inherent in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance, and recommendations to modify public procurement policies.     

CEO compensation and firm competitive behavior: Empirical evidence from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry

Executive compensation is one of the most critically evaluated aspects of a firm. Driving this attention is the debate into what exactly are the consequences of executive pay. Since a majority of prior compensation research has aggregated industries into a single omnibus sample, it has been difficult to detect compensation effects that are likely industry specific. Accordingly, we focus on a high technology industry and examine how CEO incentive compensation affects firm competitive behavior. Utilizing a sample of U.S. pharmaceutical firms, we find that both short- and long-term incentives of a CEO are positively related to firm competitive aggressiveness. Moreover, our results show a positive relationship between long-term incentives of the top executive and the diversity of competitive moves undertaken by the firm. This study contributes to technology management, compensation, and strategy literatures and generates interesting possibilities for future research.     

What’s in a name? Decomposing corporate reputation to assess the relative impact of temporal, firm and industry level factors

While the perceptual nature of corporate reputation is rarely contested, the role of governance and firm financial performance does not have the same consensus. As reputation is an embedded capability that cannot be distinctly valued or traded, the ambiguity in reputation generation clouds researchers’ attempts to understand the relative importance of the underlying causal factors, particularly firm-specific attributes like board characteristics, governance and ownership—independent of the firm’s financial performance over time. Utilizing a resource—based view, we develop a theoretically grounded framework that enables us to deconstruct corporate reputation and parse out the impact at multiple levels and the factors therein. We decompose reputation into time, firm and industry level factors, offer hypotheses on the relative importance of the factors at each level, and thereafter we simultaneously assess within and across the temporal, firm and industry levels to quantify the impact of the causal factors. We find that 49.65 % of the variation in corporate reputation is firm-specific, independent of financial performance, while industry-specific variables account for just 5.04 %. The temporal factors including the multi-level interaction terms explain 46.06 % of reputational variation, of which financial performance accounts for only 18.53 % and the “halo effect” of prior financial performance is short-lived. Furthermore, the commonly accepted factors explain only 26.44 % of the total variation in corporate reputation, and some of the governance and ownership indicators contradict generally accepted agency expectations.     

职工薪酬分配比例、产权性质与企业价值

随着现代企业的发展，职工在企业中扮演的角色越来越重要，职工激励问题对企业的重要性也不言而喻。已有研究主要集中于薪酬和期权等绝对激励，关于职工激励对企业的影响程度的研究则较少。 利用2003年至2013年中国上市公司数据，基于公平理论构建职工薪酬分配比例与企业价值关系的OLS模型，对职工薪酬分配比例对企业价值的影响进行实证检验。 研究结果表明，全样本中职工薪酬分配比例越高，企业价值越低；区分产权性质后，国有企业薪酬分配比例明显高于民营企业，继续提高国有企业薪酬分配比例会降低国有企业价值，民营企业薪酬分配比例仍有提升空间；行业收入较高会弱化提高薪酬分配比例带来的激励作用；劳动密集度会提高薪酬分配比例带来的激励作用；薪酬分配比例显著影响企业价值，产权性质、行业收入差距和劳动密集度影响薪酬分配比例与企业价值的关系。研究结论在用工具变量和外生事件考虑二者的内生性问题后仍然成立。 研究结果丰富了企业价值的影响因素和薪酬契约激励经济后果方面的研究，也为职工薪酬分配比例对企业价值的影响提供了新的经验证据，同时对上市公司制定合理的薪酬激励政策和中国当前提高劳动分配比例的政策具有重要的借鉴意义。建议监管者在制定薪酬管制政策时应根据公司的实际情况(如产权性质和非货币性福利等)对不同的公司进行监管，以促进企业发展。     

高管薪酬行业差异的实证分析

为什么高管薪酬具有行业差异,高管薪酬与哪些行业特征因素有关?本文以2001-2008年沪深两市非金融类上市公司为样本,对这些问题进行了实证分析。结果表明,产品市场竞争、资产专用性、盈利性、企业规模以及财务风险是影响行业高管薪酬的行业特征因素,在产品市场竞争越激烈、资产专用性越高、盈利性越好、企业规模越大以及财务风险越高的行业,高管获得的薪酬越高。成长性、经营风险、代理成本、技术水平等行业特征因素对行业高管薪酬没有显著影响。     

同侪激励机制下政府补贴对制造商绿色研发影响的演化博弈分析

针对地方财政支付压力过大的问题,制定合理的补贴机制激励制造商绿色研发,是实现政企合作双赢的关键。在同侪激励视角下建立政府补贴和企业研发的演化博弈模型,结合静态激励和动态激励两种方案,分析双方博弈中的局部稳定性,探讨同侪激励基金、补贴系数等因素对群体演化路径的影响,从合作机制层面验证了同侪激励的可行性:较低的政府补贴支出仍能激励制造商绿色研发,较高的政府补贴支出可能导致补贴困局,动态调节的同侪激励机制可以协调政企双方不稳定的合作关系。