A CRITIQUE OF METHODOLOGICAL REASON

In this essay, we argue that, following their perception of practices in the natural sciences the social sciences have reified methodology, making it the chief imperative of social investigation and using it to ground their knowledge claims. We find this to be the case even in the work of social scientists who try to overcome or reject the dominant positivist paradigm. We argue that this obsession with method has led the social sciences to abandon thinking-beyond-the-given in favor of small, specialized studies whose justification is no longer substantive but methodology driven. After a review of the history of the role of method in traditional philosophies of science, the essay turns to the work of recent critics of social science who have become increasingly dissatisfied with modeling the social sciences after the natural ones. We distinguish between a hermeneutic and phenomenological critique of positivism, both of which, we argue, end up reproducing the scientism they reject. We identify this problem in our careful readings of some of the most influential critics of Popperian scientific philosophy. In the final section, we distinguish between contemporary social science, situated in what we term the epistemological paradigm, and our own critical science, stemming from an alternate, ontohistorical tradition in the history of ideas. Here, we begin to lay out what a critical, nonmethodology-driven, reflective and historical science might look like.     

The Sociologies of Knowledge,Science, and Intellectuals: Distinctive Traditions and Overlapping Perspectives

This article reviews sociological approaches to the production, evaluation, and diffusion of knowledge in the arena of scholarly production – the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. At first glance, sociological approaches to scholarly knowledge production seem to congeal around the hard sciences, on the one hand, and philosophy, on the other. I eschew this polarization and construct an analytic frame of reference for analyzing the sociological dimensions of scholarly production more generally. This article maps successive phases of sociological approaches to scholarly production, by overlaying and distinguishing among theories in the sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, and sociology of intellectuals. I analyze classical theorists’ emphases on class analysis and the social function of intellectuals; mid-century adaptations of functionalism, social structure theory, and institutional theory to analyze intellectual and academic life; critical and reflexive theories, including feminist critiques of science and knowledge; recent emphases on how social movement politics and social networks influence intellectual change; theories of the university as a professional arena and a field of culture production; and studies of knowledge-making practices in group research situations. In addition to arguing for more theoretical and methodological precision in analyses of scholarly and scientific knowledge-making, I conclude with cautionary tales and future prospects for sociological studies of modern academic life.     

Bourdieu's distinction between philosophical and sociological approaches to Science Studies*

Sociological inquiry into the natural sciences has shown that they are contingent, social constructions. However, Science Studies research has been obstructed by epistemological conflicts about the nature of science and theoretical perspectives upon studying it. Bourdieu's sociology of science is under‐utilized in this field, as he addresses these obstructions and offers a way forward. Bourdieu argues that researchers have failed to distinguish between sociological and philosophical approaches in social science, thus committing the ‘scholastic fallacy’. In conjunction with this fallacy, the logic of the Science Studies field produces a tendency towards disciplinary confusion, philosophical radicalization, and crisis. These patterns were expressed in the ‘science wars’. The field has followed a philosophical path rather than a sociological one, and its progress has been obstructed. While some of Bourdieu's philosophical arguments remain problematic, his reflexive sociology allows us to differentiate philosophical from sociological approaches, providing an alternative direction for Science Studies.     

The Structure of Scientific Fields and the Allocation of Editorships on Scientific Journals: Some Observations on the Politics of Knowledge*

This study examines editorial appointment patterns in journals representing seven scientific disciplines: physics, chemistry, biology, economics, psychology, political science, sociology. Social science editors-in-chief are more likely than physical and natural science editors-in-chief to employ “particularistic” criteria in the selection of editorial appointees. In the social sciences, Columbia and Harvard editors-in-chief are significantly more likely than editors-in-chief with other doctorates to select graduates from Columbia or Harvard when making editorial appointments. In the physical and natural sciences, editors-in-chief with doctorates from schools other than Columbia and Harvard are just as likely as Columbia and Harvard editors-in-chief to select editorial appointees with Columbia or Harvard doctorates. The findings suggest that since consensus on basic paradigms does not exist in the social sciences, positions of influence are awarded and achieved on much more “particularistic” criteria than those for the physical and natural sciences.     

Sociology as a vocation

During the 1950s, when sociology modeled itself on the natural sciences, the vocational ideals that shaped the profession were also modeled on the natural sciences; objectivity, peer review, and other such ideals were linked to the epistemological assumption that reality existed out there in the world to be discovered by the techniques of science. With postmodern and other similar philosophical challenges in the air, it is no longer possible to believe that the relationship between reality and its representations is so uncomplicated. But what do these new epistemologies have to say about professional conduct? This paper argues that it would be a mistake to practice the deconstruction one preaches. Epistemological skepticism, far from leading to an attitude toward professional conduct that “anything goes,” requires an ever-greater belief in professional responsibility.     

Dreams of Pure Sociology

Unlike older sciences such as physics and biology, sociology has never had a revolution. Modern sociology is still classical—largely psychological, teleological, and individualistic—and even less scientific than classical sociology. But pure sociology is different: It predicts and explains the behavior of social life with its location and direction in social space—its geometry. Here I illustrate pure sociology with formulations about the behavior of ideas, including a theory of scienticity that predicts and explains the degree to which an idea is likely to be scientific (testable, general, simple, valid, and original). For example: Scienticity is a curvilinear function of social distance from the subject. This formulation explains numerous facts about the history and practice of science, such as why some sciences evolved earlier and faster than others and why so much sociology is so unscientific. Because scientific theory is the most scientific science, the theory of scienticity also implies a theory of theory and a methodology for the development of theory.     

Sociology and Science: The Making of a Social Scientific Method

Criticism against quantitative methods has grown in the context of “big-data”, charging an empirical, quantitative agenda with expanding to displace qualitative and theoretical approaches indispensable to the future of sociological research. Underscoring the strong convergences between the historical development of empiricism in the scientific method and the apparent turn to quantitative empiricism in sociology, this article uses content and hierarchical clustering analyses on the textual representations of journal articles from 1950 to 2010 to open dialogue on the epistemological issues of contemporary sociological research. In doing so, I push towards the conceptualization of a social scientific method, inspired by the scientific method from the philosophy of science and borne out of growing constructions of a systematically empirical representation among sociology articles. I articulate how this social scientific method is defined by three dimensions – empiricism, and theoretical and discursive compartmentalization –, and how, contrary to popular expectations, knowledge production consequently becomes independent of choice of research method, bound up instead in social constructions that divide its epistemological occurrence into two levels: (i) the way in which social reality is broken down into data, collected and analyzed, and (ii) the way in which this data is framed and made to recursively influence future sociological knowledge production. In this way, empiricism both mediates and is mediated by knowledge production not through the direct manipulation of method or theory use, but by redefining the ways in which methods are being labeled and knowledge framed, remembered, and interpreted.     

Für Einen Moderaten Relativismus in der Wissenschaftssoziologie

The new sociology of science makes the relativist claim that social factors influence the generation and evaluation even of valid scientific knowledge, and mainly for its relativism it is sharply criticized by philosophers. The central objections of the critics concern the philosophical presuppositions and consequences of relativism. It is thus objected, on the one hand, that the relativism of the sociology of science is based on wrong philosophical assumptions about science; and, on the other hand, that the reflexivity of this relativism leads to unresolvable problems. The article provides a critical examination of the arguments given for these objections, especially of Popper’s rejection of relativism. A differentiation of two forms of relativism is proposed, and it is argued that the objections raised against relativism in general are justified for only one variety of relativism. While extreme relativism, holding that the evaluation of scientific knowledge is solely dependent on social factors, is indeed untenable, moderate relativism, holding that social factors are co-determinants of evaluation, has plausible epistemological presuppositions and allows the reflexive turn of relativism. Since moderate relativism is coherent with the research programme of the new sociology of science and the philosophical point of view, sociology of science should opt for this form of relativism.     

Knowledge,boundaries, and bodies: Social construction between medical sociology and science and technology studies

Medical sociology and science and technology studies (STS) emerged from different positions, but often closely related concerns, within the broad discipline of sociology. Their interface and areas of overlap have mostly been shaped by theoretical positions broadly considered “social constructionist.” Taken together, these perspectives provide empirical and theoretical tools to analyze important questions about how social inequalities, forms of scientific knowledge, and patterns of human health come to be produced and feedback into one another. Examining their intersection enables sociological questions such as: How is medical and public health scientific knowledge produced, stabilized, and taken as fact? How are scientific facts about health and illness used, experienced, and challenged? What is the relationship between health inequalities and public health or medical knowledge? This article seeks to briefly trace the important contributions that social constructionist research has made at the interstices of medical sociology and STS, further clarifying the history, points of intersection, and areas of diversion between them. The current COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled the political struggles that constitute public health scientific knowledge and circulation. The interface between STS and medical sociology can help us to make sense of the interrelationships between politics, power inequalities, and public health scientific knowledge.     

Considerations on the ‘Replication Problem’ in Sociology

We re-examine the so-called “replication problem” in sociology—a scarcity of published studies dedicated to reproducing findings from prior research. We do this in part by considering the larger epistemological traditions of the natural sciences and humanities. We make three primary arguments: that (1) replication studies are more prevalent than is commonly perceived, (2) calls for and discussions of replication do not attend enough to issues of theory, and (3) we should reconsider as a discipline how we evaluate replications. In developing this third argument, we draw on the concept of episteme, discussing two epistemes that concurrently exist in sociology: the scientific project and the aesthetic object. The former overlaps with approaches to knowledge growth in the natural sciences, the latter with the humanities. We propose that sociology is situated between these extremes, presenting unique challenges for replication research. In particular, nuanced considerations of replications in sociology foreclose any simplistic accounts of a replication problem in the discipline.     

Science,technology, and sexuality: New directions in the study of sexual knowledge

The sociology of sexualities and the sociology of science, knowledge, and technology share many areas of theoretical and empirical interest, yet engagements between the fields have been limited. Work that has spanned both fields has tended to focus on sexuality from a biomedical perspective, neglecting other forms of knowledge production. This paper critically reviews existing areas of convergence between the fields, including measurement and classification, medicalization and risk, reproduction and families, politics and the state, and social movements. I offer suggestions for new avenues of research in these areas in addition to considering how greater theoretical exchange between the two fields could enrich both. I ultimately contend that analyzing forms of social knowledge making—such as law, religion, and the humanities and social sciences—and adopting a broader understanding of STS as method can provide a fresh direction in studying the production and circulation of sexual knowledge.     

Editorial

Abstract

The last century has been significant in terms of the development of the social sciences. Thus for instance, sociology, social psychology, politics, education and management have all taken their own pathways to reach some level of maturity. The relatively new addition to this group is, of course, management and its associated organisational theory that arose with Taylor at the turn of the nineteenth century. He pioneered the scientific movement and argued that management should be based on well-recognised, clearly defined and fixed principles, instead of depending on more or less hazy ideas. However, it seems that a management science has only in recent decades become substantive and rich enough to be able to think in the same terms as other branches of the social sciences. It has been enriched by the other social sciences through a process that I refer to as knowledge migration, a process in which knowledge that applies to one scientific area is migrated across to another in a way that validly transforms it to its new context. Thus, knowledge that takes a particular meaning in one of these sciences may end up with a quite different, though thematically related, meaning in another. Whenever a concept is shifted in a valid way from one paradigm that underpins a particular theory in one area of social science to another, the knowledge is migrated rather than transferred.     

The uses of social science in the history of dutch social work, 1900–1980

In this paper the author reviews the history of Dutch social work between 1900 and 1980 and tries to shed light on how Dutch social workers enlisted various insights developed by the social sciences to gain jurisdiction in dealing with social problems. He argues against the simplistic idea that scientific knowledge is merely applied in practical settings such as social work. Social workers did not just apply scientific insights; they also used scientific insights strategically to demarcate their position from various opponents both inside and outside the profession. It is useful to differentiate between the reflexive and strategic uses of social sciences: reflexive means that new interpretations of the social world and the nature of social problems are offered which imply different ways of doing social work; strategic means that with these new interpretations new boundaries are created between social work and competing actors in the field of dealing with social problems.     

Symbolic Interactionism in Canada: Shared Meaning and the Perpetuation of Ideas

In this paper I critically discuss Helmes‐Hayes and Milne's institutional perspective, as well as Neil McLaughlin's emphasis on scientific intellectual movements and Coserian intellectual sects, in explaining the emergence and potential future of symbolic interactionist theory in Canada. I contest claims that the interactionism is on the verge of disappearing and instead offer an explanation grounded in insights about shared meaning. I conclude that it is ironic that debates over the presumed demise of symbolic interaction may well contribute to its continued existence within the canon of Canadian sociology.     

Is sociology the science of the irrational? Conceptions of rationality in sociological theory

This paper explores the role of the concept of rationality in (especially classical) sociological theory. This exploration is prompted by widely held views, especially among economists and rational choice theorists, that classical sociology is the science of the irrational lacking a conception of rationality. By using pertinent examples (mostly) from classical and post-classical (or early contemporary) sociological theory, the paper casts serious doubt on such claims. Specifically, classical sociological theory is characterized by the following features in analyzing rationality: conceptual and methodological pluralism, theoretical and empirical richness, treating rationality as a complex social phenomenon, differentiating economic and noneconomic rationality, acknowledging the social character and foundation of (economic) rationality, and contrasting epistemological or scientific rationality and ontological or reallife irrationality, including the revelation of the irrationality of extreme (economic) rationality.     

Authorizing Family Science: An Analysis of the Objectifying Practices of Family Science Discourse

Contemporary objectifying practices in family science discourse, grounded in an objectivist epistemological framework, often deauthorize the scientific text and fail to frame the constructs in an explicit argumentative and theoretical context. Such practices contribute to the marginalization of theory and the acceptance of insufficiently analyzed empirical claims about families. Adopting an alternative set of objectifying practices, grounded in a constructionist epistemological framework that aims to fully authorize and advance its knowledge claims in an open, self‐reflexive, argumentative process will invigorate the importance of theory in the field and promote the production of more empirically justifiable and scientific knowledge claims about families.     

SOCIOLOGY IN AN ERA OF FRAGMENTATION:From the Sociology of Knowledge to the Philosophy of Science, and Back Again

In this article we revisit Alvin Gouldner's The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970). In part, this article is an attempt to apply Gouldner's own lessons about the sociology of knowledge to his own work, situating it with respect to the dominant epistemological unconscious of late 1960s American sociology as well as the broader historical context of a still-vibrant Fordist mode of societalization. Gouldner's critique of positivism was limited because he was still partially caught up within the dominant epistemological framework in American sociology at that time, a formation we call methodological positivism. With thirty years of hindsight, it is not surprising that contemporary readers interested in following up Gouldner's call for a reflexive sociology of knowledge will find certain aspects of his own program unsatisfactory. We propose an alternative sociology of knowledge based on a more explicit philosophy of scientific understanding, namely, contemporary critical realism. We also trace the vicissitudes of the trope of a "crisis in sociology" which Gouldner unleashed into the world and unpack the tensions between the "western" sociology referred to in the book's title and Gouldner's actual focus on the United States.     

Ecological metaphors as scientific boundary work: innovation and authority in interwar sociology and biology

The development of human ecology during the interwar period was a significant scientific innovation enabled by the sociological use of biological concepts as tropes for social organization. This examination of the connections between biology and sociology illuminates a process whereby new scientific knowledge is generated, new scientific communities are formed, and individuals become scientists. These relationships were arranged around the negotiable boundaries between the social and the natural in 20th-century science. This process is examined through an analysis of scientific texts, metaphor transaction in science, and mentoring practices that reveal the transmission and bounding of knowledge and authority.