Building safety: The role of construction unions in the enforcement of OSHA

Because unionized workers are more likely to exercise their rights under OSHA, it is hypothesized that OSHA is more stringently enforced at unionized construction workplaces than at comparable nonunion workplaces. A comparison of OSHA enforcement in union and nonunion construction sites demonstrates that union sites face higher probabilities of inspection and receive greater scrutiny during inspections than do comparable nonunion sites. Further, union employers are required to correct violations of safety and health standards more quickly and bear higher overall penalty costs than their nonunion counterparts. As a result, the construction industry operates under a “two-tiered” safety and health regulatory system. The author thanks Ronald B. Mitchell of Harvard University for comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Unionization and productivity in commercial banking

This paper examines the net effect of unions on productivity in the commercial banking industry. The focus of the study is on three methodological issues. First, an attempt is made to determine whether individual unions have a differential impact on banking productivity. The influence of unions on output per man-hour was initially estimated by including a union dummy variable in a Cobb-Douglas formulation of bank production. Separate binary variables were then entered into alternative specifications of the model to test the heterogeneity hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates differential productivity effects among the individual unions operating in the commercial banking sector. Second, the sample banks were paired on a case-by-case basis to assure the homogeneity of the two groupings: i.e., union and nonunion. Sample homogeneity is necessary because of the assumptions of identical production functions and output prices between the groups. Third, a complete covariance model was specified in order to estimate the impact of unionization on each parameter of the production function. In general, the unionized banks were less productive than their nonunion peers. It should be noted, however, that the standard errors were large in all the specifications. Moreover, the labor relations problems associated with one union had a large impact on the sector results.     

Formalization,collectivization, and the demand for union services

Formalized collective bargaining rather than individual employer-employee negotiation is the fundamental characteristic of a unionized labor market. Formalization involves the substitution of rules for employer discretion. Collectivization substitutes simultaneous decision making on behalf of all workers in a unit for a set of individual employee decisions. Formalization and collectivization are present in nonunion as well as union labor markets and their extent varies within as well as between these two sectors. In particular, individuals may negotiate where they belong in a union environment, and the presence of rules invites negotiation over their interpretation. Nevertheless, because formalization and collectivization are obvious concomitants of trade union organization, their costs to both employers and employees should explain the probability of union organization, as well as the incidence of such antecedents of the modern trade union as the Italian padrone who acted as foreman, pay-master, and employment agency for newly-arrived immigrants to the United States; and the Indianjamdar, a construction industry recruiter-foreman. Our occasional observations of union-induced costreductions may appear to counter the implicit assumption in much of the trade union literature that unions always induce suboptimal combinations of factor inputs and factor payments (nonunion firms could choose union-induced parameters on their own and do not). Because these cost reductions may be accompanied by increased costs imposed by unions, however, the cost reductions discussed below imply nothing about overall effects of unions on employers or employees. I wish to thank John Pencavel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. For further analysis of these points, see Flanders (1968). See Epstein and Monat (1973) for a discussion of the services provided by labor contractors.     

“Salting” the contractors’ labor force: Construction unions organizing with NLRB assistance

The sharp decline in construction union membership during the last twenty years has led to a number of programs by these unions and unionized contractors to reverse their losses of members and business. The union activities have included several novel approaches designed both to narrow the cost gap between unionized and “open-shop” (largely nonunion) construction as well as to regain members. This article deals with one such program, “salting,” that is, the placing of union organizers or members in a nonunion facility to disrupt, to increase the costs of, or to organize the open-shop contractor. Union salting programs are examined, using actual cases to demonstrate how they work in practice, and policies of the National Labor Relations Board, on which the success of salting is heavily predicated, are analyzed. Professor Emeritus of Management; formerly, Director, Industrial Research Unit, and Chairman, Labor Relations Council.     

Do unions always decrease wage dispersion? The case of Brazilian manufacturing

The literature on the impact of unions on wages has established that unionized workers earn a wage premium when compared to their nonunion counterparts and that the dispersion of wages within the union sector is lower than in the nonunion sector. I examine the validity of these findings in the context of a developing country labor market and show that unionism does create a positive wage differential but that wage dispersion is greater in the union sector. These findings are explained by the greater variance in the characteristics of unionized workers, the vulnerability of nonunion workers to market conditions, and the structure of wage bargaining.     

PENSIONS AND WAGE PREMIA

We hypothesize that the magnitude of the pension-wage compensating differential should vary by sector, because sectoral differences in firms 'technologies result in cost differences in providing non-wage benefits'. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we find that the pension-wage compensating differential is smaller in the union sector and large firms than in small, nonunion firms. Controls for sectoral selectivity do not alter the results. Thus, workers at unionized and large firms pay a lower implicit price for their pensions either because pensions have productivity-enhancing effects, or because these firms pay workers economic rents via pensions. (JEL 532, J31, 541)     

Collective bargaining,teachers, and student achievement

Approximately two-thirds of the nation’s elementary and secondary schoolteachers are represented by the American Federation of Teachers or the National Education Association. Surprisingly, however, relatively little is known of the impact of teachers’ unions on student achievement. The authors offer evidence on this point by estimating “college entrance exam production functions” for a national sample of 2,360 students. Of particular importance, the estimation includes a correction for the selectivity bias inherent if the analysis considers only the performance of test-takers. Results indicate that students in a unionized environment score about 4.7 percent higher on their college entrance exams (SAT and ACT) than their counterparts from a nonunion environment. This study was partially supported by the Joint Council on Economic Education through funding provided by the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust. Additional support was provided by the Dean’s Office and the Division of Business Research, College of Business and Industry, Mississippi State University. The authors thank Margaret Ray for her assistance.     

Withdrawing Divorce Petitions:

Social exchange theory is often used to explain why couples marry and divorce, but there are few attempts to test the theory. In this paper we test the empirical utility of an exchange model for predicting divorce or withdrawel of divorce petitions. The model used considers material, symbolic, and affectional rewards, costs and alternative attractions for relationships. Two data sets are used to test the model. The first is court records data for those who withdrew their petitions versus those who divorced. The second is interviews of suburban Cleveland, Ohio men and women who filed for divorce but subsequently withdrew their divorce petitions. Discriminant function analyses indicate that an exchange model can predict divorce versus petition withdrawel. Implications for therapeutic practice are discussed.     

Hospital pricing: cost shifting and competition

The issue of cost shifting has taken on enormous policy implications. It is estimated that unsponsored and undercompensated hospital costs--one measure of cost shifting--has totaled $21.5 billion in 1991. The health services research literature indicates that hospitals set different prices for different payers. However, the empirical evidence on hospitals' ability to raise prices to one payer to make up for unsponsored care or lower payments by other payers is mixed at best. No study has concluded that hospitals have raised prices to fully adjust for such actions. The extent of cost shifting is limited by the market. When a hospital has market power, it is able to set prices above marginal costs. However, when a buyer has enough patient/subscribers and a willingness to direct them to particular providers based on price considerations, hospitals have less flexibility in raising prices above costs. Thus, the extent of cost shifting is limited by the market. Cost shifting is not as easy as it may have been in the past because the nature of hospital and insurer competition has changed radically in the last decade. While hospital quality, services, and amenities still matter, some buyers are increasingly concerned about the price they pay. Evidence from studies of PPO and HMO negotiations with hospitals suggests that hospitals' market power is eroding, at least in some areas. In areas with relatively few hospital competitors and little PPO or HMO activity, Medicaid and Medicare price reductions and uncompensated care burdens will be partially absorbed by higher prices paid by private payers. In more price sensitive markets and in markets in which prices to private payers have risen to those commensurate with the market power of local hospitals, such cost shifting will not occur. A market-based approach in hospital pricing requires an explicit policy for the uninsured. In a competitive market, a hospital that traditionally cared for the uninsured by spending some of its profits on them will be unable to do so, at least to the same extent as it did in the past. Increased competition in health care without consideration of the uninsured will decrease the uninsured's access to care.     

Public transit wage rates: Pre-Reagan and Reagan-Bush eras

This paper examines the earnings of public transit bus drivers for both the pre-Reagan and Reagan-Bush eras using Current Population Survey data. The findings show that union drivers were consistently paid a significant wage premium over nonunion drivers, a premium which also exceeded that for unionized private nontransport operatives — suggesting that special institutional features of the public transit industry have collectively conferred market power on unionized public transit workers. During the Reagan years, the earnings of public transit drivers, union and nonunion alike, rose relative to those of private and public nontransport operatives in spite of federally-spearheaded cost containment policies. In 1990, these earnings fell relative to those of private and public nontransport operatives, suggesting that the effects of these policies may be beginning to be felt. Helpful comments were provided by Don Bellante and an anonymous referee     

Unions,firms, and the return to seniority

Wages generally rise more slowly with experience in union than in nonunion settings. It has been argued that the lower slope of the earnings profiles reflects the preferences of the median worker. It is shown in this paper that the median worker model (assuming a median worker exists) does not lead to a uniformly less steeply sloped earnings profile. Instead, the lower return to seniority reflects the firm’s rational response to the union’s monopoly power. Thus, the lower slope in unionized firms reflects the objectives of firms, not unions, in the bargaining process. I would like to thank Bill Dickens, Bernie Grofman, Shu Kahn, and Donald Martin for useful comments and suggestions.     

The Effects of Background Characteristics of Attorneys and Judges on Decision Making in Domestic Relations Court

The purposes of this research were: (1) to determine whether background characteristics of attorneys and judges affect the awarding of child support orders and (2) to determine whether institution of 1987 Ohio child support guidelines provides predictable and fair child support awards. It was concluded that the two sets of background characteristics had separate effects on the awarding of child support oders. Attorney's background characteristics affected receipt of child support awards. Judges' background characteristics affected amount of child support awards. Institution of the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines did not provide predictable and fair child support awards. Attorneys were found to be reluctant to win child support awards for their clients. Judges with low integrity scores were found to be deviating from the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines.     

Union premiums in the federal and private sectors: Alternative evidence from job queues

Although traditional wage estimates indicate a larger union-nonunion differential in the private sector compared to that in the federal sector, the role of non-wage benefits is ignored in such comparisons. A job queue approach shows that premiums to unionized employment (in terms of both wage and non-wage benefits) are lower in the federal sector than in the private sector. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of wage studies in examining the relative superiority of union over nonunion jobs in both sectors, but also strengthens their conclusions through a more appropriate alternative method. The author thanks John Heywood, Neil Garston, Richard Roseman, and Miles Finney for helpful comments. I also thank the editor and the referee for extremely useful suggestions.     

The economic effects of faculty unions

The relationship between faculty salaries and unionism at Ph.D.-level universities is investigated. Unlike previous attempts at analyzing this topic, the model endogenizes the union-nonunion choice using appropriate techniques for analyzing limited dependent variables. These techniques allow computation of average salaries for all schools under the assumption that they are unionized and also under the assumption that they are not unionized. Subtraction of the predicted nonunion salary from the union salary provides an estimate of salary differences, which is corrected for selectivity bias.     

Union effects on productivity,personnel practices,and survival in the automotive parts industry

We estimate the effects of unions on productivity and compensation in the automotive engine and non-ornamental body parts manufacturing industry using data obtained from a detailed questionnaire and a series of personal interviews. We find no significant union productivity effect but a significant 30 percent compensation premium in firms organized by the United Auto Workers. Individual personnel policies were shown to differ significantly in the expected manner between the union and nonunion sectors. Finally, we use data on bankrupt firms to show how the failure to correct for sample selection bias might yield upwardly biased estimates of the union productivity effect. We would like to thank Elizabeth Savoca and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions.     

Parenthood and Life Satisfaction: Why Don't Children Make People Happy?

Previous research on the association between parenthood and life satisfaction has shown that parents of minor children are not more satisfied with their lives than childless people. This study addressed the question of why children do not enhance their parents' life satisfaction. A major objective of this study was to determine whether and to what extent the costs of raising children act as suppressors of life satisfaction. The empirical analysis applied fixed‐effects models and used data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (1994–2010, N = 16,021). The 3 primary findings of this study were that (a) parenthood by itself has substantial and enduring positive effects on life satisfaction; (b) these positive effects are offset by financial and time costs of parenthood; and (c) the impact of these costs varies considerably with family factors, such as the age and number of children, marital status, and the parents' employment arrangements.     

International competition and the labor market prospects of union and nonunion workers

We investigate the relationship between international competition and the labor mar-ket prospects of a representative sample of British workers. Our analysis, which sets out the first explicit test of both the wage and employment implications of increased international competition, highlights an interesting asymmetry with competition neg-atively affecting the wage, but not the employment, prospects of unionized workers and the employment, but not the wage, prospects of nonunion workers. We have benefited from discussions with Monojit Chatterji, Michael Devereux, Lisa Grobar, Alan Man-ning, Chris Milner, and Ian Walker. Helpful comments were also received from seminar participants at the Universities of Aberdeen, City, Keele, and Loughborough. We are grateful to Daniel Kwok for excellent research assistance. The normal disclaimer applies.     

DETERMINANTS OF TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION IN THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO‐OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

This paper empirically investigates the relative importance of productivity, factor endowments, trade costs, and tastes in determining the current pattern of trade and specialization. The results show that productivity and taste differences are the first and second most significant determinants of trade and specialization. Factor endowments are the least influential for the average country in the data set, but their effects are much greater in the poorer than richer countries. The results also show the substantial role of trade costs, which is amplified through interactions with other determinants of trade. Trade costs affect the relative costs of intermediate inputs and final goods, link preferences with specialization, and reduce the geographical range of comparative advantages. (JEL F1, F10)     

Teachers’ unions, productivity, and minority student achievement

I estimate the unionlnonunion productivity differential for minority students attending public high schools. Education production functions are estimated for minority students attending union schools and for minority students attending nonunion schools using achievement scores as the measure of output and the individual student as the unit of observation. The union/nonunion productivity differential for average minority students is positive. However, the productivity differential is negative for minority students attending schools where the majority of students are nonminority, but the productivity differential is positive for minority students attending schools where the majority of students are minorities.     

THE IMPACT OF UNIONIZATION ON MOTOR CARRIER COSTS

Union trucking firms have significantly different cost structures than non-union firms. Further, average costs for union firms are higher than for non-union firms even after controlling for higher unionized labor costs. The translog cost function approach used here incorporates a unique dummy variable technique to test not only for overall differences in union/non-union costs, but also to identify which individual cost function parameters differ between the two types of firms. Results suggest that unionized trucking firms are at a competitive disadvantage in the less regulated, post-1980 trucking industry.