The polarizing effect of economic inequality on class identification: Evidence from 44 countries

Using cumulative logit mixed models fitted to World Values Survey data from 44 countries, we explore the impact of economic conditions – both at the individual-level and the national-level – on social class identification. Consistent with previous research, we find a positive relationship between household income and class identification in all countries that we explore, though this relationship varies substantially. Also corroborating previous research, we find that ‘low’ class identifications are more likely in poor countries than in rich ones. However, in contrast to previous research that has neglected the role of inequality, our results indicate that the effect of economic development diminishes if income inequality is considered in the same model. We further demonstrate that income inequality has an important polarizing effect on class identification. Specifically, the relationship between household income and class identity tends to be strongest in countries with a high level of income inequality.     

Is Inequality a Latent Construct? An Assessment of Economic Inequality Indicators and Their Relation with Social Cohesion in Europe

In this article, we analyse the relation between different economic inequality indicators and social cohesion. Previous research usually narrows down economic inequality to income inequality, or distinguishes several types of economic inequality. Little attention has until now been given to how different aspects of economic inequality might be related to each other and can have an effect on social cohesion. This article analyses several indicators of economic inequality and makes a distinction between indicators measuring income inequality, poverty, economic strain and unequal distributions of wealth. Arguing that these indicators represent different aspects of inequality, we hypothesise that they cannot be reduced to one latent concept of inequality and have specific relations with social cohesion. In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis. This resulted in two different factors: one associated with economic hardship, and one associated with imbalances in market outcomes. This would imply that inequality indicators can be classified into two underlying concepts. Secondly, we related the factor scores of the two latent concepts to the social cohesion indicators via regression analyses. This paper focuses on European countries and uses pooled data from the European Social Survey (period 2006–2012), in combination with macro-level data drawn from the OECD, Eurostat and the World Bank. The results demonstrate that the strength of the link between inequality and citizens’ attitudes depends on the type of inequality indicator we analyse: only the factor economic deprivation can be significantly linked to social cohesion.     

Income Inequality and Subjective Well-being: A Cross-National Study on the Conditional Effects of Individual and National Characteristics

In this study we raise the question how a nation’s income inequality affects subjective well-being. Using information on 195,091 individuals from 85 different countries from the World Value Surveys and the European Value Surveys, we established that in general, people living in more unequal countries report higher well-being than people from more equal countries. This association however does not apply to all people similarly. First, the positive effect of a nation’s income inequality is weaker when individuals express more social and institutional trust, and underscore egalitarian norms to a larger extent. Second, the positive association between national income inequality and subjective well-being is less strong for people from countries with high levels of social and institutional trust. So, our research predominantly indicates that there are far-reaching effects of an individual’s and a nation’s trust on people’s well-being.     

Problem shifts in the study of welfare states and societal inequalities

This paper takes stock of questions in the field of welfare states and societal inequalities and related areas in sociology. Within general sociology, Lenski offered the question of who gets what and why, and the first generation of studies on welfare and inequality ranging from Cutright to Hewitt replaced questions about income shares for percentile groups by questions about state social security expenditures. Korpi, who initiated a second generation of studies, affected a change towards questions about individual benefit levels relative to the income of members of the working population. Commentators like Baldwin have pointed out that these questions are questions about solidarity, another problem in general sociology. This paper concludes by arguing in favour of a third problem shift, in which questions about the solidarity disfavoured people receive are complemented with questions about the solidarity advantaged people give.     

The European 'Welfare Mix': Institutional Configuration and Distributive Outcome in Sweden and the European Union. A Longitudinal and Comparative Perspective

This paper explores the institutional configuration (the three welfare delivery systems: market, welfare state, family) and its distributional correlates (income inequality; poverty rates; inequality related to social cleavages such as social class, generation, gender, region and family). The analysis has a twofold perspective: comparative (comparing 14 EU member states) and longitudinal (comparing Sweden 1975--1995), using nations as statistical units. The European union appears to be divided in three distinct and homogeneous clusters: a Nordic cluster (Sweden, Denmark, Finland) exhibiting large social expenses, high labour market participation and weak family ties. Its distributional features are low income inequality, poverty rates and class inequality, but high levels of inequality between generations; a southern cluster (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) characterised by lower welfare provisions, low employment, but strong traditional families. Its distributional features are high levels of income inequality, poverty and class inequality, but low levels of generational inequality; a central European cluster in intermediate position. UK joins the southern cluster with high levels of income inequality, poverty and class inequality.     

Income inequality and self-rated health status: Evidence from the european community household panel

We examine the effect of income inequality on individualś self-rated health status in a pooled sample of 11 countries, using longitudinal data from the European Community Household Panel survey. Taking advantage of the longitudinal and cross-national nature of our data, and carefully modeling the self-reported health information, we avoid several of the pitfalls suffered by earlier studies on this topic. We calculate income inequality indices measured at two standard levels of geography (NUTS-0 and NUTS-1) and find consistent evidence that income inequality is negatively related to self-rated health status in the European Union for both men and women, particularly when measured at national level. However, despite its statistical significance, the magnitude of the impact of inequality on health is very small.     

Understanding material deprivation: A comparative European analysis

In this paper, taking advantage of the inclusion of a special module on material deprivation in EU-SILC 2009, we provide a comparative analysis of patterns of deprivation. Our analysis identifies six relatively distinct dimensions of deprivation with generally satisfactory overall levels of reliability and mean levels of reliability across countries. Multi-level analysis based on 28 European countries reveals systematic variation in the importance of within and between country variation for a range of deprivation dimensions. The basic deprivation dimension is the sole dimension to display a graduated pattern of variation across countries. It also reveals the highest correlations with national and household income, the remaining deprivation dimensions and economic stress. It comes closest to capturing an underlying dimension of generalized deprivation that can provide the basis for a comparative European analysis of exclusion from customary standards of living. A multilevel analysis revealed that a range of household characteristics and household reference person socio-economic factors were related to basic deprivation and controlling for contextual differences in such factors allowed us to account for substantial proportions of both within and between country variance. The addition of macro-economic factors relating to average levels of disposable income and income inequality contributed relatively little further in the way of explanatory power. Further analysis revealed the existence of a set of significant interactions between micro socio-economic attributes and country level gross national disposable income per capita. The impact of socio-economic differentiation was significantly greater where average income levels were lower. Or, in other words, the impact of the latter was greater for more disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Our analysis supports the suggestion that an emphasis on the primary role of income inequality to the neglect of differences in absolute levels of income may be misleading in important respects.     

On opulence driven poverty traps

Endogenous population growth, i.e., making the rate of population growth dependent on society's opulence, causes parametric changes to have a larger impact and can cause multiplicity of steady states in a dynamic intertemporal optimization framework. This provides a simple explanation for the possibility of differing growth paths between countries (using a standard production function) or another explanation of the poverty trap. We give two examples (opulence sensitivity and production sensitivity) that both give rise to three steady states in which poor (rich) countries will evolve over time to the low (high) income steady state. In both examples there are middle income countries that will choose the low (high) income steady state if they are impatient (patient), where patience is measured through the rate of time preference o. Foreign aid in the form of a large transfer of capital from abroad enables poor and impatient middle income countries to move to the high income steady state.We would like to thank Nico Heering, Martijn Herrmann, Theo Junius, Ngo van Long, Ad Pikkemaat, John Pitchford, Lakshmi Raut, Casper de Vries, an anonymous referee, participants of workshops at the University of Groningen and the University of Amsterdam and especially Harry van Dalen for valuable comments. The article was presented at the fifth annual conference of the European Society of Population Economics, Pisa 1991. The views expressed in the article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank.     

Welfare State Development,Individual Deprivations and Income Inequality: A Cross-Country Analysis in Latin America and the Caribbean

Several scholars have confirmed the role that the welfare state (WS) plays in reducing poverty, promoting equality and ensuring the common wellbeing. One of the limitations of the scholarship has been the conceptualization and operationalization of the WS and poverty as one-dimensional variables. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between welfare state development, single-dimensions deprivations and income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, before and after controlling for demographic and cyclical factors. The WS is operationalized as a one-dimensional variable, but also taking into account its multidimensional nature. Three individual deprivations suffered by people on poverty and two income inequality indicators are used as dependent variables. Three pooled time-series cross-section regression analyses with panel-corrected standard errors models were carried out on 18 countries in the region around 2000, 2005 and 2010. This paper shows that the development of social-welfare programs and institutions seems to be an effective way of tackling individual deprivations suffered by people on poverty in the region. On the other hand, the WS development didn’t appear to be effective to reduce income inequality. The outcomes of welfare institutions appear to be the pivotal dimension to reduce income inequality and income deprivations in the region.     

Assessing Changes Over Time in Inequality of Opportunity: The Case of Spain

The aim of this paper is to contribute both theoretically and empirically to the analysis of Inequality of Opportunity over time, providing some significant findings referred to the Spanish case. The analysis is carried out using microdata collected by the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which incorporate a wide variety of personal harmonised variables, allowing comparability with other countries. The availability of this database for the period 2004 and 2010 is particularly relevant for assessing changes over time in the main inequality indices and the contribution of circumstances to inequality of opportunity. We find that the effect of circumstances on income distribution has significantly intensified between the two years. To test the significance of the differences between years we perform bootstrap estimations.     

Support for democracy in cross-national perspective: The detrimental effect of economic inequality

Using survey data and national statistics on 35 modern democracies, this research explores the relationship between economic and political conditions and support for democracy. As expected from modernization theory, support for democracy tends to be highest in countries with a high level of economic development. More importantly, however, I contribute a new finding that income inequality matters much more. Specifically, citizens from countries with relatively low levels of income inequality tend to be more likely than others to support democracy. I also find that household income is positively related to support for democracy in most countries, though it tends to have its strongest effect if economic development is high and income inequality is low. Finally, even after taking into account the level of economic development in one's country, people from former Communist countries tend to have far less support for democracy than those from more established democracies.     

Reference Groups and Pensioners’ Subjective Economic Well-Being in Europe

This study contributes to the interdisciplinary debate over the effects of absolute and relative income on subjective well-being by introducing country-level measures of income into the analysis of pensioners’ economic well-being. Both the relevance of alternative reference groups for different phases of old age, measured through median incomes, and the effect of general income inequality within countries are explored. Analyses are based on the cross-sectional components of the survey European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions from 2005 to 2011, containing information on 458,769 pensioners from 31 European countries. With the multilevel linear regression analysis method, the effects of different income measures are analyzed both at the individual and country levels. The main result shows that the average income level of pensioners within countries hold spillover effects strong enough to conclude other pensioners constitute a relevant reference point. Pensioners’ high income level decreases individual income adequacy regardless of age. Results also indicated the labour market group having varying effects on different age groups. The general income inequality does not affect pensioners’ subjective economic well-being.     

Welfare Attitudes and Social Expenditure: Do Regimes Shape Public Opinion?

This article examines the link between regime types, social expenditure, and welfare attitudes. By employing data on 19 countries taken from the World Values Survey, the main aim is to see to what degree the institutions of a country affect the attitudes of its citizens. According to Esping-Andersen (The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990) welfare regimes can be classified into Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic categories. With this as my point of departure, I put forward two research questions: the first concerns the direct influence of regime type on people’s attitudes; the second seeks to trace the contours of the regime types by arguing that both social expenditure and welfare attitudes are products of a country’s institutional arrangements. These questions are answered through regression modelling and by examining the interplay between welfare attitudes, social expenditure, and welfare regimes. First, we see that there are significant differences in aggregated attitudes between countries belonging to the Liberal and the Conservative regimes, with the former’s citizens holding more rightist views than those of the latter. This is explained by the history and organization of welfare benefits of the two variations of Esping-Andersen’s classification. Second, by graphing welfare attitudes against social expenditure the outline of the three regime types mentioned above may be seen. Similar correspondence is not found with regards to an Eastern European category. All in all, this study renders some support for the regime argument.     

Operationalizing De-commodification and De-familization Outcomes via the Relative Poverty Approach: An Application to Western European Countries

This article develops an approach with which to operationalise the outcomes of de-commodification and de-familisation processes. Since the de-commodification and de-familisation concepts share an emphasis on ‘a socially acceptable standard of living for individuals’ with the notion of relative poverty, the income-poverty indicator has been adopted to develop pertinent national rates. In particular, since de-commodification outcomes concern people with a socially acceptable standard of living independently of sale of their labour power, the national proportions of individuals with an equivalised disposable income above the poverty threshold who have stopped working have been accounted for. On the other hand, given that de-familisation outcomes regard individuals with a socially acceptable standard of living aside from family relationships, the national percentages of persons who actually live alone, or simulated as living alone, with an equivalised disposable income above the poverty threshold have been considered. Moreover, exploiting the equivalised disposable income computation, pertinent micro-simulations are developed to capture the role of the state and the family in de-commodification outcomes, and the contribution of the market and the state to de-familisation outcomes. On the basis of the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, an empirical application of this approach is then provided. Specifically, data for 16 European countries were used to compute the above-mentioned national rates. Furthermore, we checked whether our outcome figures exhibited any correspondence with the country-groups deriving from the classic welfare regime typologies or more in general with the measures resulting from the social policy structure.     

Does National Income Inequality Affect Individuals’ Quality of Life in Europe? Inequality,Happiness, Finances,and Health

This paper analyses the effect of income inequality on Europeans’ quality of life, specifically on their overall well-being (happiness, life satisfaction), on their financial quality of life (satisfaction with standard of living, affordability of goods and services, subjective poverty), and on their health (self-rated health, satisfaction with health). The simple bivariate correlations of inequality with overall well-being, financial quality of life, and health are negative. But this is misleading because of the confounding effect of a key omitted variable, national economic development (GDP per capita): Unequal societies are on average much poorer (r = 0.46) and so disadvantaged because of that. We analyse the multi-level European Quality of Life survey conducted in 2003 including national-level data on inequality (Gini coefficient) and economic development (GDP) and individual-level data on overall well-being, financial quality of life, and health. The individual cases are from representative samples of 28 European countries. Our variance-components multi-level models controlling for known individual-level predictors show that national per capita GDP increases subjective well-being, financial quality of life, and health. Net of that, the national level of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has no statistically significant effect, suggesting that income inequality does not reduce well-being, financial quality of life, or health in advanced societies. These result all imply that directing policies and resources towards inequality reduction is unlikely to benefit the general public in advanced societies.     

Inequality in Human Development: An Empirical Assessment of 32 Countries

One of the most frequent critiques of the HDI is that is does not take into account inequality within countries in its three dimensions. In this paper, we apply a simply approach to compute the three components and the overall HDI for quintiles of the income distribution. This allows a comparison of the level in human development of the poor with the level of the non-poor within countries, but also across countries. This is an application of the method presented in Grimm et al. (World Development 36(12):2527–2546, 2008) to a sample of 21 low and middle income countries and 11 industrialized countries. In particular the inclusion of the industrialized countries, which were not included in the previous work, implies to deal with a number of additional challenges, which we outline in this paper. Our results show that inequality in human development within countries is high, both in developed and industrialized countries. In fact, the HDI of the lowest quintiles in industrialized countries is often below the HDI of the richest quintile in many middle income countries. We also find, however, a strong overall negative correlation between the level of human development and inequality in human development.     

Is There a Trade-Off Between Economic Efficiency and a Generous Welfare State? A Comparison of Best Cases of `The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’

A crucial debate in policy-making as well as academiccircles is whether there is a trade-off betweeneconomic efficiency and the size/generosity of thewelfare state. One way to contribute to this debate isto compare the performance of best cases ofdifferent types of state. Arguably, in the decade198594, the US, West Germany and the Netherlands were best cases best economic performers in whatEsping-Andersen (1990) calls the three worlds ofwelfare capitalism. The US is a liberalwelfare-capitalist state, West Germany a corporatiststate, and the Netherlands is social democratic in itstax-transfer system, although not its labor marketpolicies. These three countries had rates of economicgrowth per capita as high or higher than other richcountries of their `type, and the lowest rates ofunemployment.At a normative or ideological level the three types ofstate have the same goals but prioritise themdifferently. The liberal state prioritises economicgrowth and efficiency, avoids work disincentives, andtargets welfare benefits only to those in greatestneed. The corporatist state aims to give priority tosocial stability, especially household incomestability, and social integration. The socialdemocratic welfare state claims high priority forminimising poverty, inequality and unemployment.Using ten years of panel data for each country, weassess indicators of their short (one year), medium(five year) and longer term (ten year) performance inachieving economic and welfare goals. Overall, in thistime period, the Netherlands achieved the bestperformance on the welfare goals to which it gavepriority, and equalled the other two states on most ofthe goals to which they gave priority. This resultsupports the view that there is no necessary trade-offbetween economic efficiency and a generous welfarestate.The three panel studies are the American Panel Studyof Income Dynamics (PSID), the German Socio-EconomicPanel (GSOEP) and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel(SEP). They all have samples of over 15,000 and arethe only national panels to have run for tenconsecutive years or more, so making it possible toassess the longer term performance ofwelfare-capitalist states.     

Utilitarian tradeoff between population growth and income growth

Utilitarian social welfare functions were devised for a world with a fixed population. With endogenous population, Edgeworth conjectured that the Benthamite principle of maximizing total utility (classical utilitarianism) would lead to a larger population size and a lower standard of living than the Millian principle of maximizing per capita utility (average utilitarianism). One objection to the Benthamite criterion was that its application to a world with finite resources often implied large population size in conjunction with an embarrassingly low average standard of living. In a static environment with altruistic parents, this may not be warranted. In a growth situation, this criticism is even less likely to be supported. This paper extends the comparison of classical and average utilitarianism from a static to a dynamic and endogenously growing economy. Using a stylised endogenous growth framework, it confirms that the Benthamite population growth rate exceeds the Millian growth rate. In terms of the rate of growth of per capita income, the reverse is true. Having the standard of living often increasing under the Benthamite criterion, our results thereby depart significantly from the repugnant conclusion levelled against classical utilitarianism.We would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.     

Inequality, Wealth and Health: Is Decreasing Income Inequality the Key to Create Healthier Societies?

The idea that the level of stratification of societies contributes to the well-being of their members is gaining popularity. We contribute to this debate by investigating whether reducing inequalities in the income distribution of societies is a strategy for improving population health, especially appropriate for those countries that have reached the limits of economic growth. We test this idea on a dataset covering 140 countries and 2360 country-year observation between 1987 and 2008 and formulate hypotheses separately for countries with different level of economic development. We indeed found that countries with higher levels of income inequality also have lower levels of life expectancy (our measure of population health), and this result was consistent both in cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. However, the relationship was found only among low- and middle-developed countries. In the group of high-developed countries, the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy was non-significant, which contradicts the literature. Expectations on the relationship between a country’s wealth and health were confirmed: economic growth does contribute to improving population health, but this effect is weaker in more economically developed countries. These results imply that a decrease in a country’s income inequality parallel with an increase in its wealth can help to improve health in economically lesser-developed countries, but not in high-developed countries.     

Unequal transitions: Selection bias and the compensatory effect of social background in educational careers

Previous studies have shown that social background inequality differs among educational transitions and it is stronger for those transitions that involve a higher risk of social demotion. This paper focuses on two processes that may account for part of the observed differences in social background inequality across educational transitions. First, it studies how the family of origin might compensate for a ‘false step’ in the early stage of young people's educational careers. This compensatory effect of social background can be described as the likelihood of having ‘a second chance’ for unsuccessful educational transitions. Second, it focuses on two unobserved factors that might potentially bias the effect of social background across educational transitions. These are the students’ unobserved cognitive and non-cognitive skills and their unobserved anticipated choices of dropping out of the education system. Two issues – the compensatory effect of social background and selection bias in educational transitions – are addressed by estimating a probit model with sample selection for the transition to post-compulsory education in Spain.