康德"自由意志"的不自由实质--阿多诺对康德自由观的批判

自由意志是康德实践理性体系的基石,也是资产阶级自由的理念。而阿多诺认为,自由意志是最大的不自由;自由意志是非确定和无效的;自由就是对包括自由意志在内的不自由的反思和抗拒。因此,人类在实践中要永远葆有对同一性的不自由的批判即非同一的自由维度。     

Plans And Decisions

Counterexamples are constructed for classical decision theory, turning on the fact that actions must often be chosen in groups rather than individually, i.e., the objects of rational choice are plans. It is argued that there is no way to define optimality for plans that makes the finding of optimal plans the desideratum of rational decision-making. An alternative called locally global planning is proposed as a replacement for classical decision theory. Decision-making becomes a non-terminating process without a precise target rather than a terminating search for an optimal solution.     

Conflicting Varieties of Realism: Causal Powers and the Problems of Social Structure

Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.     

Actions,habits and forms of life

After a survey on the work of prominent philosophers within the Western tradition, it can be noticed a tendency to view habits as automatic, unfree and unconscious behaviour. In this context, this article attempts to show that habits are actually much closer to the characteristics that are otherwise attributed to actions. That is, following the dialectical approach of Sartre, I develop arguments to support that habits are conscious actions carried out with a sense of identification towards the form of life that actions, in turn, project as a whole; in this way, each form of life requires a set of habits that the agent performs freely and rationally, understanding the latter as the dialectical procedure by which the act itself brings about a totalizing identity. This vision implies that habits are interrelated and codependent within a network of social behavior, so they cannot be discarded without discarding the form of life to which they belong. That is, a change of habit requires a change in the totality of which it is a part. But that change can only occur if social agents become aware that their habits are a product of their free acceptance and not of necessity. In the article, this latter is paradigmatically exemplified by neoliberal capitalism as a form of life.     

Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality

This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information. We define rationalizability and trembling- hand rationalizability (THR) for multi-stage games with observed actions. We show that rationalizability does not exclude perpetual disagreement or delay, but that THR implies a unique solution. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). Also, we reconsider an extension of Rubinstein's game where a smallest money unit is introduced: THR rules out the non-uniqueness of SPE in some particular case. Finally, we investigate the assumption of boundedly rational players. Perpetual disagreement is excluded, but not delay. Furthermore, we cannot use the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as an approximation of the alternating-offer bargaining model once the players are boundedly rational ones.     

关于推进当代中国马克思主义大众化的思考

当前,国内外局势与我国思想意识形态建设面临许多新问题,党中央一再强调推进当代中国马克思主义大众化。努力做到理论表述通俗化、宣传形式形象化、实际应用生活化、行动推进层次化、经验提升理性化,是推进当代中国马克思主义大众化的基本要求。     

论"有限度"的法律发展观——以中国转型期非现实性社会冲突为分析对象

非现实性冲突是基于价值观、信仰等对立形成的,两方或多方执著于"紧张释放"的冲突行动。法律作为控制社会冲突的手段,对非现实性冲突显示出"控制不能"的困境。科学的法律发展观不应该是刺激法律万能奢望的滋长,而应是对法律限度保有理性的自觉。     

Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: A critique

Rational play of Noncooperative Games is investigated under the assumptions that a particular form of Best Reply Principle holds, each player has at least one rational strategy and all strategies are either rational or irrational. These assumptions are shown to imply that (a) some weakly dominated strategies are rational (b) recursive reasoning can be misleading (c) only a Strict Nash Equilibrium can be a solution. A Supplementary Best Reply Principle is formulated. It sheds further light on which games have solutions and on rational play in games without them. The relationship between these results and those of other authors is discussed.     

从明代淫祠之禁看儒臣、皇权与民间社会

按照明代的宗教管理体制,并非所有不在国家祀典的民间信仰一概被视为淫祠。但地方官在实际的行政中往往过激,将祀典以外的神明和祭祀一概视为淫祠。明代的官方制度和禁毁淫祠活动非日常化的运动特征,都为民间信仰的存在留有空间。同时,明代国家祀典是一个开放发展的体系,不时将有影响的民间信仰纳入,扩大了该信仰在民间的影响。由于明代的国家既非依据民众的合意也非依据儒学的原理而成立,因此,代表国家意志的儒臣既要禁毁民间的淫祠,也要限制皇权的淫祀,但效力有限。     

How Do We Understand Partnership Working? Experiences from a Telecare Project

Implementing telecare requires experience and knowledge from different disciplines and sectors; business, technology and care. The uptake of telecare has been slow, which is assumed to be caused by difficulties in co‐operation within telecare partnerships. This article presents a new approach to improve understanding of telecare partnerships. The approach builds on theories of trust and partnership working and is informed by rational choice theory. Within this article the approach is applied to recent experiences from a telecare project in Norway, to demonstrate how different ways of interpreting the complex social interactions in telecare partnerships yield new insight and understanding. Examples from the Norwegian project illustrate how different understandings of actions and choices affected trust and caused either improved or deteriorated co‐operation in the partnership. The partners that were able to develop trust through a common evaluation of the problems co‐operated better. However, when partners lacked or had insufficient knowledge, either of each other or of the situation, this led to disparate understandings that threatened trust and affected further co‐operation. The new approach presented here is helpful in analyzing and understanding the actions of different partners within a telecare partnership and identifying why things worked well or went wrong. The approach may have wider relevance for other partnerships.     

Autonomous Agency in Anti-Dualistic Social Ontologies: A Compatibilist Notion

Anti-dualistic social ontologies, those highlighting the intrinsic interdependency of agency and structure as two sides of the same coin, are sometimes criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of autonomous – capable and free – agency, or even denying the reality of such agency. This paper contests these claims, arguing that anti-dualistic ontologies only conflict with autonomous agency when the latter is understood in a highly voluntaristic sense, whose ideational roots go to what philosophers of free will call “incompatibilist” intuitions of freedom. Those intuitions suggest that actions (intentions, decisions) ultimately determined by extrinsic causes lack the kind of freedom presupposed by moral responsibility, so when agentive autonomy is presumed to involve such freedom, it does indeed cohere poorly with the anti-dualistic picture of intrinsically structured agency. Herein, however, an alternative, “compatibilist” notion of autonomy is advanced, such that does not conflict with extrinsic determination and is therefore congruent with anti-dualistic social ontologies.     

Rule utilitarianism,rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior

The paper first summarizes the author's decision-theoretical model of moral behavior, in order to compare the moral implications of the act-utilitarian and of the rule-utilitarian versions of utilitarian theory. This model is then applied to three voting examples. It is argued that the moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, and involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, and involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy (viz. to the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion) — even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy, when considered in isolation, should fail to maximize social utility.The most important advantage that rule utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization.The paper ends with a discussion of the voter's paradox problem. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradoxical conclusion that, in any large electorate, voting is always an irrational activity because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But it can be shown that, by using the principles of rule-utilitarian theory, this paradox can easily be resolved and that, in actual fact, voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior.     

On the existence of stable states in game problems

Each individual or group of individuals unified by some common interests often have to either accept an offer or reject it. The choice is made on the basis of not only individual or group preferences but on the basis of the reaction to this choice by other people whose preferences are dependent to some extent on this choice. The following question is to be answered: under what conditions is an offer stable, i.e. will it be accepted by each participant in a group with non-coincident interests? To answer this question is to specify in the set of all feasible offers (options or situations) those ones which would be rejected by no participant. According to this intuitive understanding of stable offers a sequence of weak and strong equilibria referred to as active equilibria was defined. A weak equilibrium satisfies the following conditions: (1) It defines stable situations which cannot be changed by a participant because of certain retaliatory actions by the other participants, which would worsen his initial situation. (2) It always exists. (3) Under comparatively wide conditions it has a non-empty intersection with the Pareto set. (4) It includes non-cooperative equilibria well known in the game theory and does not lead to any paradoxes (as, for example, the Nash equilibrium does). These conditions, and especially the third and fourth ones, indicate that the active equilibria can be successfully used in the game theory as well. Strong equilibria define a more stable situation but they do not necessarily meet all four conditions listed above.     

The role of forecast in planning

Planned courses of action are illustrated, described, and analysed. The analysis distinguishes the following ten components: background knowledge, general policy, practical problem to be solved by the course of action, overall decision, research planning, day by day decisions, action, end result, and evaluation of the latter. Forecast is included in the very first stage, i.e. the background knowledge concerning the system, as well as in the fifth, i.e. the acquisition of fresh knowledge.The role of forecast in programming is examined with some detail. It is recalled that forecast can be intuitive or rational. If rational, forecast can be scientific (predicting facts) or technological (predicting human actions and their outcome). In either case it rests on theories and data. But technological forecast, which is the one on which planning is based, has peculiarities of its own, such as self fulfilment and self defeat.In addition, the paper examines two popular mistakes. One is the confusion of technological forecast with the prognosis (or rather prophecy) of technological developments. The latter cannot be rigorous since it is based on trends (that can be bent) not on objective laws: it is, at its best, an educated guess. A second mistake is to regard futurology as an independent new science engaged in predicting the future of man with the help of sui generis projection tools at variance with those used in normal science and technology. It is argued that serious futurology is an interdisciplinary effort to make certain large scale and long term forecasts on the basis of either present trends or definite theoretical models of macrosystems.Inaugural lecture of the faculty course on Policy Planning, Cornell University, Spring 1970. For details on scientific prediction, technological forecast, scientific hypothesis, theoretical model, and scientific data, see the author's Scientific Research, 2 volumes, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag, 1967, and Method, Model and Matter, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973.     

State of the Union addresses and presidential position taking: Do presidents back their rhetoric in the legislative arena?

Politicians and presidents are routinely criticized for the mismatch between their policy statements and their legislative actions. While a few studies explore presidents’ support for policy commitments made during their election campaigns, no study systematically examines this relationship for presidents throughout their terms. To determine whether presidents follow through on their policy statements, I examine presidential mentions of three policy areas in State of the Union addresses from 1953 to 2000 and presidents’ subsequent positions on floor votes in Congress. The results indicate that rhetorical attention to economic policy and foreign relations in these speeches increases the chances that presidents will take positions on legislation in these same areas, but there is a disconnect between the rhetoric and their actions on health and social welfare policy. I suggest that this difference can be attributed to their anticipation of success in each policy area because presidents do not want to attach themselves to legislative defeats.     

The Elements of Rationality and Chance in the Choice of Human Action

The focus in this paper is on deliberate human action. The central questions addressed are: whether purely rational choice is possible; whether choices may be induced by chance alone; or whether there is always a mixture of rationality and chance, as well as other factors such as habit, emotion, imitation and irrationality. The approach is a factualist one, upholding the view that, although human action can be explained by its antecedents, this is not incompatible with the notion of "free choice". It is the actual choosing process that determines the final choice of action. Whatever the sources of the elements involved in the choosing process, the choice of action is a specific outcome created by the acting agent. It is in this choosing process and decision making that both rationality and chance enter. The conclusion is that rationality is the element which links intentionality with goal seeking and attainment, but that the actual choice is determined by a complex interactive process in which both logic and chance play a part.     

丁玲：最富现代品格的先进文化之杰出代表——为纪念丁玲诞辰一百周年而作

丁玲是20世纪中国文学发展史上最具有现代品格的"真的人"和文学大师.她辉煌而独异的创作历程,表明她不仅平生始终犹如"飞蛾扑火,不死不止"般地执著追求光明与自由世界,而且以非凡的直觉感应力和理性透析力,审视与摒弃一切"金玉其外,败絮其中"的事物.     

Goals of Action and Emotional Reasons for Action. A Modern Version of the Theory of Ultimate Psychological Hedonism

In this paper we present a modern version of the classic theory of “ultimate psychological hedonism” (UPH). As does the UPH, our two‐dimensional model of metatelic orientations also postulates a fundamentally hedonistic motivation for any human action. However, it makes a distinction between “telic” or content‐based goals of actions and “metatelic” or emotional reasons for actions. In our view, only the emotional reasons for action, but not the goals of action, conform to the UPH. After outlining our model, we will elucidate the similarities and differences between our model and classic UPH. In this context we will clarify several basic misconceptions regarding classic UPH. In a next step, two major criticisms of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism will be discussed, that is (1) the statement that the hedonistic principle has no motivating effect at all and (2) the argument that the hedonistic motivation is only one of many motivations of human actions. We believe that both of these arguments can be refuted. Finally, we will discuss the compatibility of our model with evolutionary theory.     

韦伯“英国法悖论”的理性观反思

韦伯的"英国法悖论",是指按韦伯的理性化标准,英国法的理性化是程度较低的.然而事实上英国法又能较好地保障英国人的确定性、自由和秩序."英国法悖论"的产生,在于韦伯将理论理性视为唯一的理性并将其作为标准尺度来衡量英国法.事实证明,英国法的实践理性不但是一种理性化道路,而且是一种较为合理的理性化之路.反倒是韦伯的理论理性存在诸多问题.因此,需要认真反思韦伯的理论理性法治观.