Action Bias and Environmental Decisions

Individuals have a penchant for action, often for good reasons. But action bias arises if that penchant is carried over to areas where those reasons do not apply, hence is nonrational. Action bias is explored theoretically, and then empirically, using data from surveys of hypothetical environmental decisions. Quite apart from agency considerations, individuals like to affect outcomes when gains are reaped. Given the ability to help one of two sites, we find that decision makers choose to foster improvement rather than prevent deterioration, despite framing that makes it arbitrary which site is improved, which preserved. Strong action bias—individuals choosing to reap gains even though they must impose losses—is also observed. These concepts are related to loss aversion, status quo bias, omission bias for losses, and bright-line behavior.     

Status quo bias in decision making

Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status quo alternative—that is, doing nothing or maintaining one's current or previous decision. A series of decision-making experiments shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo. Data on the selections of health plans and retirement programs by faculty members reveal that the status quo bias is substantial in important real decisions. Economics, psychology, and decision theory provide possible explanations for this bias. Applications are discussed ranging from marketing techniques, to industrial organization, to the advance of science.     

Status-quo and omission biases

Bias toward the status quo, found in choice and in emotional reactions to adverse outcomes, has been confounded with bias toward omission. We unconfounded these effects with scenarios in which change occurs unless action is taken. Subjects reacted more strongly to adverse outcomes caused by action, whether the status quo was maintained or not, and subjects preferred inaction over action even when inaction was associated with change. No status-quo bias was found in a matching task, which did not require action. The observed status-quo bias is at least partly caused by a bias toward omissions.     

The disgust-promotes-disposal effect

Individuals tend toward status quo bias: preferring existing options over new ones. There is a countervailing phenomenon: Humans naturally dispose of objects that disgust them, such as foul-smelling food. But what if the source of disgust is independent of the object? We induced disgust via a film clip to see if participants would trade away an item (a box of unidentified office supplies) for a new item (alternative unidentified box). Such “incidental disgust” strongly countered status quo bias. Disgusted people exchanged their present possession 51% of the time compared to 32% for people in a neutral state. Thus, disgust promotes disposal. A second experiment tested whether a warning about this tendency would diminish it. It did not. These results indicate a robust disgust-promotes-disposal effect. Because these studies presented real choices with tangible rewards, their findings have implications for everyday choices and raise caution about the effectiveness of warnings about biases.     

The effects of loss aversion on deceptive advertising policies

We extend the deceptive advertising model of Piccolo et al. (RAND J Econ 46(3):611–624, 2015) to a framework in which consumers may be loss averse. There are two sellers, competing on prices and offering experience goods with some differences in quality. Prospective customers may be harmed by deceptive advertising: a marketing practice that can induce them to make bad purchases. We show that although deceptive advertising occurs depending on the degree of consumers’ loss aversion, this behavioral bias does not reflect on firms’ prices. Nevertheless, the presence of loss-averse consumers crucially changes the optimal deterrence rule that a Public Authority should adopt against false claims and misleading advertising. Unlike Piccolo et al. (2015), in this more general model, strong enforcements may improve the buyer welfare according to the degree of loss aversion.

     

Reevaluating evidence on myopic loss aversion: aggregate patterns versus individual choices

Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less frequently are said to exhibit myopic loss aversion (MLA). Several recent experimental studies found that, on average, subjects bet significantly higher amounts on a risky lottery when they observe only a cumulative outcome of several realizations of the lottery (long evaluation period). In this article, we reexamine these empirical findings by analyzing individual rather than aggregate choice patterns. The behavior of the majority of subjects is inconsistent with the hypothesis of MLA: they bet an intermediate fraction of their initial endowment and these bets, on average, are not significantly different across two treatments with short and long evaluation period. We discuss several alternative explanations of this finding, including the Fechner model of random errors and the financial asset pricing model.     

The influence of probabilities on the response mode bias in utility elicitation

The response mode bias, in which subjects exhibit different risk attitudes when assessing certainty equivalents versus indifference probabilities, is a well-known phenomenon in the assessment of utility functions. In this empirical study, we develop and apply a cardinal measure of risk attitudes to analyze not only the existence, but also the strength of this phenomenon. Since probability levels involved in decision problems are already known to have a strong impact on behavior, we use this approach to study the impact of probabilities on the extent of the response mode bias. We find that the direction in which probabilities influence measured risk aversion is the opposite in the certainty equivalence (CE) method versus in the probability equivalence (PE) method. Utilizing the CE elicitation approach leads to an increase of risk seeking for gambles involving high probabilities. For the PE method, subjects tend to behave risk averse with gambles of high probabilities. This behavior is reversed in the gain domain. This “tailwhip” effect is consistently replicated in several experiments, involving both loss and gain domains of lotteries.     

Total and partial Bivariate Risk Premia: An Extension

This paper investigates the link between the total bivariate risk premium and the sum of partial bivariate risk premia. Whereas in the case of small risks, the non interaction between risks is a sufficient condition to obtain the equality between the total risk premium and the sum of partial risk premia, the paper shows that this condition is not sufficient for large risks. The non interaction between risks occurs in two cases: if risks are independent or if individual's marginal utility of one good is independent of the endowment in the other. Without restriction on the utility function, none of these two conditions is sufficient for large risks. If attention is restricted to preferences that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, the non variability of the marginal utility of good one with respect to variations in endowment in the other remains a sufficient condition, while the independence between risks does not.     

The impact of risk sharing on efficient decision

A group of risk-averse members must choose among monetary risks and payoff-sharing rules. Departure from the status quo requires unanimous consent. Such groups drill for oil, bail out nations, and make hostile takeover bids. Assume agreement on probabilities. As is well known, if all members have identically shaped HARA utility functions, efficient group act-choices follow another such function independently of payoff sharing. We show that all other groups inevitably have complex efficient behavior, accepting gambles among individually unacceptable lotteries in almost every status quo position. We also develop proper risk aversion for groups, and treat disagreement on probabilities.Support of the Associates of the Harvard Business School (Pratt) and the Business and Government and Energy and Environmental Policy Centers (Zeckhauser) is gratefully acknowledged. We received helpful comments from Scott Johnson, Mark Machina, and a referee. Jay Patel provided assistance beyond the call of collegiality.     

Why does myopia decrease the willingness to invest? Is it myopic loss aversion or myopic loss probability aversion?

For loss averse investors, a sequence of risky investments looks less attractive if it is evaluated myopically—an effect called myopic loss aversion (MLA). The consequences of this effect have been confirmed in several experiments and its robustness is largely undisputed. The effect’s causes, however, have not been thoroughly examined with regard to one important aspect. Due to the construction of the lotteries that were used in the experiments, none of the studies is able to distinguish between MLA and an explanation based on (myopic) loss probability aversion (MLPA). This distinction is important, however, in discussion of the practical relevance and the generalizability of the phenomenon. We designed an experiment that is able to disentangle lottery attractiveness and loss probabilities. Our analysis reveals that mere loss probabilities are not as important in this dynamic context as previous findings in other domains suggest. The results favor the MLA over the MLPA explanation.     

On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games

In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses—are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (2000; Int. J. Game Theory 29(2):269) under the name of ‘myopic loss aversion equilibrium.’ There, the players’ reference points depend on the beliefs about their opponents’ strategies. The second type, the maximin loss aversion equilibrium, differs from the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium in that the reference points are only based on the carriers of the strategies, not on the exact probabilities. In the third type, the safety level loss aversion equilibrium, the reference points depend on the values of the own payoff matrices. Finally, a comparative statics analysis is carried out of all three equilibrium concepts in 2 × 2 bimatrix games. It is established when a player benefits from his opponent falsely believing that he is loss averse.     

Loss Aversion and Bargaining

We consider bargaining situations where two players evaluate outcomes with reference-dependent utility functions, analyzing the effect of differing levels of loss aversion on bargaining outcomes. We find that as with risk aversion, increasing loss aversion for a player leads to worse outcomes for that player in bargaining situations. An extension of Nash's axioms is used to define a solution for bargaining problems with exogenous reference points. Using this solution concept we endogenize the reference points into the model and find a unique solution giving reference points and outcomes that satisfy two reasonable properties, which we predict would be observed in a steady state. The resulting solution also emerges in two other approaches, a strategic (non-cooperative) approach using Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offers model and a dynamic approach in which we find that even under weak assumptions, outcomes and reference points converge to the steady state solution from any non-equilibrium state.     

Ambiguity aversion and familiarity bias: Evidence from behavioral and gene association studies

It is increasingly recognized that decision making under uncertainty depends not only on probabilities, but also on psychological factors such as ambiguity and familiarity. Using 325 Beijing subjects, we conduct a neurogenetic study of ambiguity aversion and familiarity bias in an incentivized laboratory setting. For ambiguity aversion, 49.4% of the subjects choose to bet on the 50–50 deck despite the unknown deck paying 20% more. For familiarity bias, 39.6% choose the bet on Beijing’s temperature rather than the corresponding bet with Tokyo even though the latter pays 20% more. We genotype subjects for anxiety-related candidate genes and find a serotonin transporter polymorphism being associated with familiarity bias, but not ambiguity aversion, while the dopamine D5 receptor gene and estrogen receptor beta gene are associated with ambiguity aversion only among female subjects. Our findings contribute to understanding of decision making under uncertainty beyond revealed preference.     

参照群体、相对位置与微观分配公平感:都市户籍移民与流动人口的比较分析

本文详细考察和比较了都市户籍移民和流动人口分配公平感形塑过程中参照群体选择及相对位置效应的内在逻辑，揭示了社会比较机制的具体作用机理。研究发现，在报告分配公平感时，户籍身份成为都市移民选择参照对象的制度性基础，拥有都市户口者方可成为户籍移民的参照对象，而流动人口的参照群体更为开放和多元，倾向于与所有都市常住居民进行比较。与此同时，即便考虑到社会网络结构、迁移时长、迁移世代等因素，结论仍具稳健性，来源地居民均不会被二者视为参照群体。另一方面，实证结果显示，相对位置距离对分配公平感的形塑作用之于户籍移民和流动人口并无显著差异，同时呈现非对称性特征：参照优势地位者体现了“平等主义”心态，参照劣势地位者则表现出“损失厌恶”的特征；相对位置距离的拉大给参照劣势者因损失带来的厌恶情绪大于参照优势者因获益而产生的满足感知。     

An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion

This paper experimentally investigates a preference condition for loss aversion in the framework of cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We propose the concepts of absolute and relative loss premiums in order to measure the extent of loss aversion and to derive notions of increasing, constant, and decreasing loss aversion. While in only one of the 28 choice situations analyzed loss neutrality and loss seeking can be rejected, about 51% of all choices are loss averse and, due to the large extent of loss aversion revealed by these choices, the average loss premium is positive for most choice situations. Female subjects exhibit both a more frequent occurrence and a larger extent of loss aversion.     

Risk Aversion and Self-Insurance-cum-Protection

Self-insurance and self-protection have been discussed separately in the literature. However, as observed in practice, many actions individuals take to modify a potential loss serve both as self-insurance and as self-protection. Given this practical importance of self-insurance-cum-protection activities, this paper examines the effect of increased risk aversion on such activities. The analysis shows that the effect depends in part on the shape of the loss function and that of the probability function.     

On probabilities and loss aversion

This paper reviews the most common approaches that have been adopted to analyze and describe loss aversion under prospect theory. Subsequently, it is argued that loss aversion is a property of observable choice behavior and two new definitions of loss averse behavior are advocated. Under prospect theory, the new properties hold if the commonly used utility based measures of loss aversion are corrected by a probability based measure of loss aversion and their product exceeds 1. It is shown that prominent parametric families of weighting functions, while successful in accommodating empirical findings on probabilistic risk attitudes, may not fit well with the theoretical implications of the new loss averse behavior conditions.     

What is Loss Aversion?

A behavioral definition of loss aversion is proposed and its implications for original and cumulative prospect theory are analyzed. Original prospect theory is in agreement with the new loss aversion condition, and there utility is capturing all effects of loss aversion. In cumulative prospect theory loss aversion is captured by both the weighting functions and the utility function. Further, some restrictions apply for the weighting functions involved in the latter model.We are indebted to Michèle Cohen and Peter Wakker for helpful comments. The suggestions of an anonymous referee have improved the presentation of the paper.     

资源禀赋会转化为制造业竞争力吗？--来自空间面板杜宾模型的经验证据

推动“中国制造2025”的实现是提高中国制造业国际竞争力的关键。以影响区域制造业竞争力的因素为视角,分别选取储量、产量进行资源禀赋双维测度,并在利用显性对比优度指数探析区域制造业竞争总体分布态势的基础上,通过引入FDI溢出、单位劳动力成本构建空间面板杜宾数据模型,对资源禀赋与制造业竞争力之间的动态关系及溢出响应进行了系统估计。结果表明：区域制造业竞争力提升过程中存在“资源诅咒”效应,并会扩散及影响周边地区制造业的发展;而在单位劳动力成本产生负向外溢效应的背景下, FDI正向溢出效应作用发挥有限,且难以有效弥补由于区域资源的开发利用不当造成的制造业竞争力不足的困境。实施行之有效的破解制造业“资源诅咒”措施迫在眉睫。     

Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance: Insurers’ Attitude to Imprecise and Conflicting Probability Estimates

This article presents the results of a survey designed to test, with economically sophisticated participants, Ellsberg’s ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and Smithson’s conflict aversion hypothesis. Based on an original sample of 78 professional actuaries (all members of the French Institute of Actuaries), this article provides empirical evidence that ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty about the probability) affect insurers’ decision on pricing insurance. It first reveals that premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is ambiguity regarding the probability of the loss. Second, it shows that insurers are sensitive to sources of ambiguity. The participants indeed, charged a higher premium when ambiguity came from conflict and disagreement regarding the probability of the loss than when ambiguity came from imprecision (imprecise forecast about the probability of the loss). This research thus documents the presence of both ambiguity aversion and conflict aversion in the field of insurance, and discuses economic and psychological rationales for the observed behaviours.