ICT and institutional change at the British Library

The new information and communications technologies (ICTs) have stimulated a wide-ranging debate on the future of learning institutions in the age of the 'network society'. Recent academic commentary has tended to equate globalized information networks with commodification, the delocalization of learning, and threats to the public service traditions of higher education. This paper investigates the extensive programme of digitisation now under way at the British Library (BL), one of the world's largest knowledge providers and a key player in the UK research libraries network. The findings presented in the paper do not reflect the belief that the spread of global information networks will undermine the public service remit of large knowledge providers such as the BL - but the evidence does show that these providers are becoming more connected to other players in the digital environment, with inherently complex, and potentially far-reaching implications for the production of knowledge in the emergent 'network society'.     

Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

In Nachbar [20] and, more definitively, Nachbar [22], I argued that, for a large class of discounted infinitely repeated games of complete information (i.e. stage game payoff functions are common knowledge), it is impossible to construct a Bayesian learning theory in which player beliefs are simultaneously weakly cautious, symmetric, and consistent. The present paper establishes a similar impossibility theorem for repeated games of incomplete information, that is, for repeated games in which stage game payoff functions are private information. Received: 15 October 1997/Accepted: 17 March 1999     

Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence

The main aim of this article is to investigate the behavioral consequences of the provision of subject-specific information in the group effort levels chosen by players in an experimental CPR game. We examine two basic treatments, one with incomplete information and the other with complete information. In the former, subjects are informed only about their own individual payoffs and the aggregate extraction effort level of the group, and in the latter they are also informed about the individual effort levels and payoffs of each subject. Given this setting, the basic question we attempt to answer is: Will the provision of subject-specific performance information (i.e. individual’s effort levels and payoffs) improve or worsen the tragedy of the commons (i.e. an exploitation effort level greater than the socially optimum level)? In order to motivate our hypotheses and explain our experimental results at the individual level, we make use of the theory of learning in games, which goes beyond standard non-cooperative game theory, allowing us to explore the three basic benchmarks in the commons context: Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficient, and open access outcomes. We use several learning and imitation theoretical models that are based on contrasting assumptions about the level of rationality and the information available to subjects, namely: best response, imitate the average, mix of best response and imitate the average, imitate the best and follow the exemplary learning rules. Finally, in order to econometrically test the hypotheses formulated from the theoretical predictions we use a random-effects model to assess the explanatory power of the different selected behavioral learning and imitation rules.     

TEAM RACIAL COMPOSITION AND SPORTS ATTENDANCE

The premise that the racial composition of professional sports teams is a significant factor in explaining paid attendance variability is tested in this article. A model of the general determinants of sports attendance, including the percentage of black players on each team, is developed and applied to longitudinal samples of National Basketball Association teams from 1969 to 1983. This pooled cross-sectional panel model is analyzed within a generalized least-squares framework. While the empirical results are generally consistent with previous estimates for spectator attendance models, team racial composition has no discernible impact upon the level of attendance. Several interaction hypotheses are considered, but when these more complex propositions are evaluated, player race still has no noticeable effect upon attendance. Some implications of these results for race relations and for the structure of salary determination within professional basketball are discussed.     

Church organists: Analysing their willingness to play

There currently exists a scarcity of church organ players even though they have traditionally been paid. This paper presents an empirical investigation into the factors that affect the church organ player's willingness to play. Results suggest pay does not attract the organ player to the position but being paid in situ increases their willingness to play, as do larger choir sizes and a better instrument quality. We also identify that organ players should be taught when they are young, as the younger the church organ player starts learning the instrument then the greater their willingness to play.     

THE ATTACK‐AND‐DEFENSE GROUP CONTESTS: BEST SHOT VERSUS WEAKEST LINK

This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest link, whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best shot impact function (IF). We fully characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the coalition‐proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation, it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free‐ride completely on a group member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best shot or a weakest link but the other group follows an additive IF. (JEL C72, D70, D72, D74, H41)     

Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. We characterize internally stable coalitions on the proposed domains and show how these characterizations can be used for generating a strict core element in the first case and a core element in the second case. Moreover, we prove that an element of the strict core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.     

ACCOUNTING FOR COMPLEMENTARY SKILL SETS: EVALUATING INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL VALUE TO A TEAM IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION

Identifying an individual worker's contribution to firm production can be difficult in a team setting where spillovers in labor productivity exist among team members. This paper studies a model of labor productivity where workers have heterogeneous abilities, and can differently affect the productivity of their fellow teammates. Applying the model to the setting of the National Basketball Association (NBA), I can identify the marginal value that a basketball player brings to a particular team lineup, both through his own individual contributions and his complementary contribution to teammates' productivity. Estimates from the model imply that teammates have a significant impact on individual player productivity, and that taking into account spillovers across teammates is important to assessing both overall team productivity and an individual player's contribution to team productivity. I then evaluate whether player complementarities are valued in the NBA labor market in terms of higher salaries, and find that they are undervalued, and that players are instead paid mainly for their individual offensive production. This creates an asymmetry between player incentives and the team objective. To assess the size of this inefficiency, the top trading cycle algorithm of Shapley and Scarf (1974) is used to identify a Pareto optimal matching between players and teams, that accounts for the complementarities between heterogeneous players' skill sets. (JEL J30, L25, L83, M51)     

Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

In this experiment, I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment, a single player bids against a computerized player, eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover, impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.     

Instrumental versus bounded rationality: a comparison of Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association

The professional team sports industry is characterized by an abundance of information, defined objectives, and clear consequences. Given these characteristics, researchers have generally assumed that economic actors follow the dictates of instrumental rationality. The purpose of this research is to present evidence that in professional baseball, where player statistics have historically been tabulated and utilized, information is employed efficiently. However, economic agents in professional basketball, where player statistics are less intuitive and not historically tabulated, fail to process information in a fashion consistent with the precepts of instrumental rationality.     

The experience of learning Emotionally Focused Couples Therapy

This study examined the process of learning Emotionally Focused Couples Therapy (EFT) as reported by 122 EFT therapists and therapists-in-training. Participants completed an online questionnaire assessing their experiences of learning EFT, with particular emphasis on EFT theory, alliance, interventions, perceived impact on clients, and impact on self. Findings suggest that therapists are drawn to the attachment-based model of EFT, appreciate the EFT framework and structure, that clients endorse the usefulness of the model and that learning the model has contributed to personal healing and improved relationships for the trainees. Results also show that the transition to EFT from another model can be taxing and requires time, support, and additional supervision/training to increase comfort level and competency with EFT. Nevertheless, results also highlight that learning EFT can be a rewarding and worthwhile endeavor.     

Intertemporal decision making with present biased preferences

I study the behavior of individuals with present biased preferences who are involved in costly, long-run projects. By using generic cost and reward functions, I characterize the behaviors of the sophisticated, partial naive and naive types. It is shown that there may arise cases where naives needlessly put effort on projects they never complete. Moreover, in endogenous total cost projects, the naive types always end up completing projects of lesser quality than originally intended. By introducing a bonus motive, it is shown that agents with higher self-control problems should be given a higher bonus to prevent inefficient procrastination. I, then, characterize the behavior of partially naives who potentially learn self-preferences. It is found that without learning self-preferences, partial naives behave either like sophisticates or naives depending on the level of naivete; with learning, if the learning pace is fast enough, procrastination until the deadline does not occur.     

NOT ALL RIVALS LOOK ALIKE: ESTIMATING AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE RELEASE DATE TIMING GAME

I develop a new empirical model for discrete games and apply it to study the release date timing game played by distributors of movies. The results suggest that release dates of movies are too clustered around big holiday weekends and that box office revenues would increase if distributors shifted some holiday releases by one or two weeks. The proposed game structure could be applied more broadly to situations where competition is on dimensions other than price. It relies on sequential moves with asymmetric information, making the model particularly attractive for studying (common) situations where player asymmetries are important. (JEL C13, C51, L13, L15, L82)     

The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items

We propose a procedure for dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We assume that each player’s preference over subsets of items is consistent with a strict ranking of the items, and that neither player has information about the other’s preferences. Our procedure ensures an envy-free division—each player receives a subset of items that it values more than the other player’s complementary subset—given that an envy-free division of “contested items,” which the players would choose at the same time, is possible. We show that the possibility of one player’s undercutting the other’s proposal, and implementing the reduced subset for himself or herself, makes the proposer “reasonable,” and generally leads to an envy-free division, even when the players rank items exactly the same. Although the undercut procedure is manipulable and its envy-free allocation may be Pareto-inferior, each player’s maximin strategy is to be truthful. Applications of the procedure are discussed briefly.     

Does generosity generate generosity? An experimental study of reputation effects in a dictator game

Previous experimental literature on reputation studies its effects in environments where they are often confounded with strategic behavior. This paper explores how information about the paired subject’s previous action affects one’s own behavior in a non-strategic environment of a dictator game. The experiment consists of two treatments in which dictators can give money to the paired player: one where the recipient is a stranger and the other where the dictator has information on the recipient’s reputation. The data provide evidence that on average the dictators send more money to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients with no reputation. The results contribute to our understanding of how impulses towards generous (or selfish) behavior might arise.     

Predictors of Return Rate Discrimination in Slot Machine Play

The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which accurate estimates of payback percentages and volatility combined with prior learning, enabled players to successfully discriminate between multi-line/multi-credit slot machines that provided differing rates of reinforcement. The aim was to determine if the capacity to discriminate structural characteristics of gaming machines influenced player choices in selecting ‘favourite’ slot machines. Slot machine gambling history, gambling beliefs and knowledge, impulsivity, illusions of control, and problem solving style were assessed in a sample of 48 first year undergraduate psychology students. Participants were subsequently exposed to a choice paradigm where they could freely select to play either of two concurrently presented PC-simulated slot machines programmed to randomly differ in expected player return rates (payback percentage) and win frequency (volatility). Results suggest that prior learning and cognitions (particularly gambler’s fallacy) but not payback, were major contributors to the ability of a player to discriminate volatility between slot machines. Participants displayed a general tendency to discriminate payback, but counter-intuitively placed more bets on the slot machine with lower payback percentage rates.     

AN ESTIMATE OF THE RENT GENERATED BY A PREMIUM COLLEGE FOOTBALL PLAYER

The National Collegiate Athletic Association limits the payments athletes can receive for their services. Colleges are effectively monosony employers so players will not be paid their marginal revenue product. Therefore, colleges capture an economic rent from players. This paper measures these rents by estimating the marginal revenue product of a top college football player. The empirical results suggest that a premium college player generates over $500,000 in annual revenues for his team.     

Marginal revenue and labor strife in major league baseball

An improved model of baseball player performance and revenue generation shows that, overall, major league players are paid more than the marginal revenue they generate from spectators at the ballpark. Broadcast revenue is shown to be a factor in player salaries, although this revenue is not sensitive to individual player output. Under the current bargaining procedure, collective action in baseball is therefore viewed as the only way to entice owners to pay players for the broadcast revenue they generate.