Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Economic blessings seen in Z.P.G

According to S.F. Singer and Bradley W. Perry in their study published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the U.S. and its individual workers will be better off economically if population growth is reduced to zero. Making use of a computer, the researchers tested 3 fertility rates in mathematical models simulating the U.S. economy, population, and resources. They found that decreased childbearing would lead eventually to a smaller overall Gross National Product, but the share of economic welfare per person would increase. Lower fertility would have the following advantages according to Singer and Perry: 1) reduced requirements for business investment to keep up with an expanding labor force; 2) reduced depletion of and demand for the finite amounts of natural resources, resulting in lower costs and less need for marginal resources; 3) smaller expenditures for pollution control and less degradation of the environment; 4) a higher proportion of Americans in the usual working ages; and 5) smaller expenditures therefore, for schooling and child care, but without significantly increased medical expenditures for the elderly. The lower fertility option tested by computer was a completed fertility rate of 1.7 children/woman, along with net immigration of 400,000. This option would lead to an end of population growth in 50 years.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Diverging Demography: Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Contributions to U.S. Population Redistribution and Diversity

The substantial growth and geographic dispersion of Hispanics is among the most important demographic trends in recent U.S. demographic history. Our county-level study examines how widespread Hispanic natural increase and net migration has combined with the demographic change among non-Hispanics to produce an increasingly diverse population. This paper uses U.S. Census Bureau data and special tabulations of race/ethnic specific births and deaths from NCHS to highlight the demographic role of Hispanics as an engine of new county population growth and ethnoracial diversity across the U.S. landscape. It highlights key demographic processes—natural increase and net migration—that accounted for 1990–2010 changes in the absolute and relative sizes of the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations. Hispanics accounted for the majority of all U.S. population growth between 2000 and 2010. Yet, Hispanics represented only 16 % of the U.S. population in 2010. Most previous research has focused on Hispanic immigration; here, we examine how natural increase and net migration among both the Hispanic and non-Hispanic population contribute to the nation’s growing diversity. Indeed, the demographic impact of rapid Hispanic growth has been reinforced by minimal white population growth due to low fertility, fewer women of reproductive age and growing mortality among the aging white population America’s burgeoning Hispanic population has left a large demographic footprint that is magnified by low and declining fertility and increasing mortality among America’s aging non-Hispanic population.     

Future population growth: researchers in three countries quantify causes and propose policies

This article discusses Population Council analyses conducted by social scientists from India, Kenya, and the Philippines. These scientists agreed that population momentum would continue to increase population size, and that governments must strengthen and create a range of economic, health, and social programs and policies to slow population growth. Multiple approaches will be needed. John Bongaarts is credited with being the first to identify the key role of population momentum and to decompose growth into unwanted fertility, high desired fertility, and population momentum. Unwanted fertility is responsible for about 19% of projected population growth in India, 26% in Kenya, and 16% in the Philippines. High wanted fertility accounts for 20% of future growth in India, 6% in Kenya, and 19% in the Philippines. Population momentum can account for under 50% or over 90% of growth. Unwanted fertility can be addressed by fulfilling unmet need and increasing knowledge of methods, reducing the fear of side effects and disapproval, and eliminating poor service. Family planning programs need to be strengthened and integrated with maternal and child health services. Preferred and actual family sizes can be reduced by lowering infant mortality by means of increasing infant and child health services and girls' educational attainment. Population momentum can be addressed by delaying age at marriage and childbearing through improving social conditions. Investments in human development through education, training, and income generation can create the conditions for slowing population growth. Countries should decompose population growth into its components of unwanted and high wanted fertility and population momentum as a means of distributing resources most effectively.     

Empirical analysis of the contribution of age composition to population growth

The method of decomposition is applied to rates of natural increase in order to elucidate the role played by age composition in the growth of populations. A population’s age distribution and fertility schedule are contrasted to those in a "stationary" population having the same mortality rates and having a fertility schedule equal to that of the observed population divided by its net reproduction rate. In this manner it is shown that about one-quarter to one-third of the growth of most current high-growth populations can be attributed to non-stationarity of their age distributions. This fraction will rise, as it has in most industrialized countries, if fertility is reduced and age distributions become middle-heavy. In projections of the 1963 Venezuelan female population with fertility rates declining by 20/0 and 1% annually, more than half of the growth (in numbers) that occurs prior to zero-growth attainment is contributed by non-stationarity of its intervening age distributions.

     

How responsive is U.S. population growth to immigration? A situational sensitivity analysis

There has been public concern about the effect of immigration on population growth in the U.S. But how responsive is population growth to immigration? This paper examines the sensitivity of intrinsic population growth to immigration and situates such sensitivity in fertility and survival changes. The application of second derivatives on a modified Leslie matrix facilitates the analysis of situational sensitivity of U.S. population growth to immigration. The results show that the sensitivity to immigration is not as influential as the sensitivity to fertility, and that the sensitivity to immigration further depends on changes in fertility and survival.     

Natural population decrease in Iowa counties

As a follow-up on the studies by Dorn and Beale, this paper examines differences between Iowa counties with natural decrease and those with natural increase and analyzes the part that migration and fertility played in bringing about an excess of deaths over births in Iowa counties. The county groups are distinctly different in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Out-migration as a mode of response adopted by the rural population in Iowa is by far the most dominant factor leading to natural decrease. Sustained net out-migration is more likely to touch off natural decrease in counties of comparatively low fertility than in those with higher fertility. Low fertility is, therefore, a contributing factor to the imbalance between births and deaths, but the amount of influence of fertility adjustment over the fertility differentials among county groups cannot be ascertained in this study because of the correlation between fertility and Catholic Church membership in counties. The data of this study were obtained from the population censuses and vital statistics.     

On the dynamics of the age structure,dependency, and consumption

We examine the effects of population aging due to declining fertility and rising elderly life expectancy on consumption possibilities in the presence of intergenerational transfers. Our analysis is based on a highly tractable continuous-time overlapping generations model in which the population is divided into three groups (youth dependents, workers, and elderly dependents) and lifecourse transitions take place in a probabilistic fashion. We show that the consumption-maximizing response to greater longevity in highly developed countries is an increase in fertility. However, with larger transfer payments, the actual fertility response will likely be the opposite, leading to further population aging.     

Aging in Japan: population policy implications

This article was prepared for the International Conference on Aging in the East and West in 1995. The focus is on trends in aging in Japan and demographic determinants and consequences. Findings are presented from a 1990 study conducted by the Institute of Population Problems on acceptance of alternative population policies aimed to slow population aging in Japan. Japan is the seventh most populous country in the world, and the current growth rate is around 0.3%. Declines in fertility and mortality have contributed to the low growth rate. Population aging accelerated over the decades. The present share of aged population is 14.1%. The aged population is expected to continue to increase from 14.9 million in 1990 to 32.7 million in 2020 (25.8% in 2025). Decreases in the aged population are not expected until after the mid-2040s. The proportion of very old (ages 75 years and older) will dramatically increase to 14.5% in 2025. The primary demographic determinant of population aging and fertility decline is identified as the higher proportion of never-married and the higher age at marriage. One of the consequences of population aging is the increase in the age dependency ratios and the aged-child ratios. The proportion of intergenerationally extended households declined over time, but the pace of decline has slowed recently. The proportion of aged in one person or couple only households has risen but not to the same extent as the West. The majority of older old still live with a married child. Logistic analysis of 1985 survey data reveal that the custom of the elderly living with the eldest child remains. The 1985 survey also revealed much indecision about a pronatalist policy or a fertility policy. Logistic analysis of 1990 public opinion survey data shows acceptance of immigration as a policy alternative to slowing population aging. Acceptance varied by socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors. A pronatalist policy received stronger acceptance. However, reference is made to Kojima's literature review, which suggests that indirect policies on fertility and a comprehensive family policy would be more effective in raising fertility than a population policy.     

Income inequality and fertility: A comparative view

Summary Most studies pertaining to the relationship between population and economic development suffer from a major flaw. Researchers use aggregate measures like income or energy consumption per head as indicators of economic development. Such aggregate measures fail to take into account the nature of the distribution of income or energy consumption to the population. The present study attempts to demonstrate the importance of incorporating the nature of distribution of resources as an important intervening variable in the study of the overall relationship between population and economic development. A measure of income inequality is developed which represents the difference between rural and urban incomes. This measure is justified in terms of the distinctiveness of urban and rural sectors in the process of development. The data used relate to societal measures of fertility, income, income inequality, etc. Consistently with existing literature, we observe that, generally speaking, economic development does entail a reduction in rural-urban income inequalities. On the other hand, a substantial part of the negative effect of an increase in income per head can be nullified if such an increase were not also accompanied by a reduction in rural-urban income inequality. Also, a substantial part of the negative effect of an increase in income per head and the level of education in reducing the level of infant mortality would be nullified if it did not also result in a reduction of rural-urban income inequality. On the other hand, it is quite possible for the level of education in a society to increase together with an increase in income per head without substantially altering the extent of inequality of income between the rural and the urban population. It is suggested that the positive relationship between rural-urban income inequality and the level of fertility is due to higher rural fertility rates in a high-inequality country. By implication, this would mean that higher standards of living for the rural population compared with its urban counterpart will have a favourable impact in reducing rural fertility.     

The effects of demographic factors on age composition and the implications for per capita income

Multiple regression analysis techniques are used to measure the impact of variations in fertility and mortality rates on the population of labor-force age. The results of this analysis suggest that the impact of reductions in mortality on age composition are dependent on the level of mortality already attained, whereas reductions in fertility, as expected, increase the population in the nondependent age groups. The direct effect of vital rates on potential per capita income is assessed using the results of the regression equations, and such results suggest that variations in per capita income as large as 20 percent could be accounted for by variations in vital rates.     

Policy options when population growth slows: The case of Thailand

Thailand reached replacement-level fertility almost a decade ago, although there has been a lag in measuring and recognising the implications of this benchmark event. Fertility could well sink still lower. The momentum of population growth will ensure substantial further increase before the population levels off, but this is not true in all regions. For example, earlier and faster fertility decline in the North, and net outmigration, have led to a situation where some geographical and age segments of the North's population are decreasing. Population policy in Thailand since 1970 has had two major planks: to reduce fertility through an active family planning program, and to distribute population away from the large primate city of Bangkok. The paper discusses whether these policies may need to be modified as a result of the major demographic and socio economic changes that have been taking place. It also discusses the limits to population policy in terms of the likely efficacy of various measures that could be adopted, based on both an assessment of the Thailand situation and the experience of other low-fertility countries.     

Immigrants’ ages and the structure of stationary populations with below-replacement fertility

A sustained regime of low fertility plus immigration yields an unusual kind of stationary population. The author demonstrates that all stationary populations have a common structure, and that the familiar replacement-level fertility population is the youngest among the many stationary populations corresponding to a particular life table. This finding has important consequences for policy because although fertility increase and immigration are equally effective at halting population decline, immigration is inferior as a means of rejuvenating low-fertility populations. In fact, an immigration-based policy could make a low-fertility population older rather than younger. The paper includes examples using U.S. and West German vital rates.     

China’s Demographic Future Under the New Two-Child Policy

China implemented the two-child policy in 2016, however, potential impacts of this new policy on its population reality have not been adequately understood. Using population census data and 1% population sampling data during the period of 1982–2015, this study develops a fertility simulation model to explore the effects of the two-child policy on women’s total fertility rate, and employs Cohort Component Method in population projections to examine China’s demographic future with different fertility regimes. The fertility simulation results reveal that the two-child policy will make significantly positive effects on China’s total fertility rate through increasing second births, leading to a sharp but temporary increase in the first 5 years after the implementation of the new policy. In addition, population projections using simulated total fertility rates show that the Chinese population would reach its peak value around the middle 2020s and be faced with the reduction of labor force supply and rapid aging process, featured with remarkable increases in both size and share of the elderly population. The findings suggest that the two-child policy would undoubtedly affect China’s fertility rates and demographic future; however, the effects are mild and temporary.

     

Post-War trends in Maori population growth

Abstract Recent levels and trends of mortality and fertility of the minority Maori population of New Zealand are analysed. On this basis two projections for the year 1976 are presented, the first assuming a further rise in life expectation, which has already increased rapidly over the last two decades; and the other that both mortality and the consistently high fertility levels will be reduced. The conclusion is that, regardless of which projection one accepts, growth will be rapid (an increase of 60% to 70% in the period 1961-76), although the age distribution will be different at the youngest ages. Unless fertility is reduced, as in Projection 2, the dependency burden of Maori family heads will be extremely heavy.     

人口始终是我国经济持续增长中的一个重大问题

本文旨在研究控制人口增长与我国当前经济持续、快速增长之间的相互关系。文章首先确定两个事实:一是用进出口贸易的资料证实中国近年来的经济不是泡沫经济,而是实际增长;二是通过中国各种人口统计指标,特别是总和生育率(TFR)论证中国近年来生育率下降和人口增长率的下降。笔者认为当前TFR值1.8是可接受的。其次,通过减少人口投资,提高人均GDP,提高人力资本和改善人民生活等方面论证生育率和人口增长率下降是促进经济发展的重要条件,并指出人口是我国构建资源节约型和人与自然友好型社会的关键性因素。     

What is natural fertility? The modelling of a concept

The value and importance of the concept of natural fertility have been widely debated since Henry's work in the late 1950s. Whereas Henry regarded natural fertility largely as a useful concept for model building, Coale-Trussell demonstrated that this concept could also be used to analyze patterns of age-specific fertility. The set of age-specific marital fertility schedules assembled by Henry and then used by Coale and Trussell involved largely small populations drawn from disparate sources. Nonetheless, from this diverse and fragmentary data, Henry was able to construct a standard of natural fertility which, in the operational form developed by Coale-Trussell, has proved remarkably general in its application and utility. This in turn suggests that the physiological forces shaping fertility are exceedingly strong, especially the incidence of physiological sterility. There appears to be no single universal pattern of natural fertility. Rather, there is a set of closely related age profiles, the exact shape of which is determined by specific behavioral and social factors that influence childbearing. The increase in physiological sterility with age serves to give an upper limit to fertility at each age, while other factors determine how close a given population comes to that maximum. Although no society has ever demonstrated Henry's ideal notion of a purely physiological fertility pattern, the effect of the intervening factors is often weak. In terms of the Coale-Trussell model, maximum likelihood estimation offers the most informative method of implementation and a time series for 1 population is more readily interpretable than a cross-section comparing several populations.