Collective Wage Agreements and Firms’ Employment Policies

This paper provides evidence on the way collective wage agreements affect the adjustment of employment, working hours and other production factors when service‐sector firms are faced with demand shocks. The estimation results indicate that collective wage agreements significantly influence firms’ employment policies. It is shown that recruitment is a widespread instrument for service firms to cope with demand fluctuations which are negatively affected by collective wage agreements. The employment of freelance workers is also negatively affected by collective wage agreements, while their effect on using short‐term employment contracts as a reaction to demand shocks is positive.     

Efficiency Wage,Fixed Employment Costs,and Dual Labour Markets

The standard efficiency wage‐based explanation of labour market dualism hinges on the existence of differences in monitoring across sectors. The paper proposes fixed employment costs as an alternative source of wage differentials for homogeneous workers. It shows that firms with larger fixed costs pay higher wages in order to elicit more effort from their workers, and tend to have higher capital/labour ratio and labour productivity. The model generates both involuntary unemployment and involuntary confinement in the secondary sector: high effort–high wage jobs are preferred to low effort–low wage jobs and either are preferred to unemployment. The proposed framework can also account for the various types of treatment of marginal jobs in primary sector firms envisaged by Doeringer and Piore (Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, 1971). In particular, an increase in fixed costs beyond a certain level may induce primary sector firms to restructure, segment production, and enter the secondary sector, thus converting their jobs into secondary jobs. From a welfare point of view, we cannot state in general the desirability of subsidizing fixed employment costs; however, we show that an employment subsidy financed by a wage tax is able to increase employment with no loss in terms of production.     

Heterogeneous Firm Responses to Rising Teenage Wages

Substantial youth minimum wage changes in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 raised teenage average wages by 5–10 per cent relative to those for adults. We use Statistics New Zealand's Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED) to examine whether firms' teenage labour demand responses to these changes are greater for firms with higher teenage‐employment share. We find evidence that high teen‐employers reduced their teen employment relative to other firms and had lower survival rates over the period. However, firms that entered the main teen‐employment industries had higher teen‐employment shares than continuing firms. The results are consistent with endogenous technology adoption in response to non‐marginal changes in relative wages.     

Labour Flows as Determinants of the Wage–Price Spiral: An Empirical Analysis for The Netherlands

This study presents an empirical analysis of the influence of labour market flows on wage and price formation. A system of wage, price and employment equations after Nickell (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 49: 103–128, 1987) is estimated, including labour flows as indicators of labour market tightness in the wage equation. An impulse response analysis using this system shows how changes in the flow of layoffs (flow from employment to unemployment) may be the basis of short‐run Phillips curve effects in The Netherlands     

Wage Determination in Post-War Italy

ABSTRACT: A bargaining model is proposed and tested in order to explain the irrelevance of the general labour market conditions to wage settlements in the post-war Italian economy. The model is a “right to manage model”, but the solution cannot be improved, being both on the labour demand curve and on the contract curve. The reason for such an outcome is that both firms and unions have priorities, and distinguish the labour force between insiders and outsiders. Different definitions of insiders are used, but in the postwar Italian economy the employees and ex-employees of the industrial sector appear to be the share of the labour force which have been better protected by both contractual parties.     

New Firms as Employers: The Wage Penalty for Voluntary and Involuntary Job Switchers

According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms.     

Earning While Learning: When and How Student Employment is Beneficial

Although studies of student employment (‘earning while learning’) mostly find positive wage effects, they do not adequately consider the relation of the employment to the field of study. We investigate how different types of student employment during tertiary education affect short‐ and long‐term labour market returns. Beyond examining differences between non‐working and part‐time working students, we distinguish between student employment related and unrelated to the field of study. Our results show significant positive labour market returns of ‘earning while learning’ only for student employment related to the field of study. These returns consist of a lower unemployment risk, shorter job‐search duration, higher wage effects, and greater job responsibility.     

Efficiency‐wage Unemployment and Economic Welfare in a Model of Endogenous Growth

This paper examines positive and normative implications of efficiency‐wage‐induced unemployment within a model of endogenous growth. Sector‐specific impacts of the wage rate on labour efficiency establish a correlation between the growth rate and the rate of unemployment. The sign of this correlation is determined by the intersectoral wage differential. Despite the existence of unemployment, decisive positive properties of the full‐employment model are preserved. However, welfare implications of the full‐employment model may be reversed. The optimal policy can be to reduce growth, while at the same time raising unemployment.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

DO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AFFECT FIRMS’ DEMAND FOR DISABLED WORKERS?

A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This “threshold design” provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low‐wage firms than in high‐wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax.     

Evaluating the Introduction of a National Minimum Wage: Evidence from a New Survey of Firms in Ireland

Abstract. In April 2000 the Irish government introduced a national minimum wage of IR£4.40 (€5.58) an hour. We use data from a specifically designed survey of firms to estimate the employment effects of this change. Employment growth among firms with low‐wage workers prior to the legislation was no different from that of firms not affected by the legislation. A more refined measure of the minimum wage, however, suggests that the legislation may have had a negative effect on employment for the small number of firms most severely affected by the legislation. However, the size of these effects is relatively modest.     

Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage Bargaining

The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare‐maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage‐bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum.     

More Jobs Through Less Employment Protection? Evidence for West Germany

ABSTRACT: In reaction to growing criticism of the allegedly negative employment effects of job protection regulations (lay-off and dismissal restraints), the West German government in 1985 introduced new legislation facilitating the conclusion of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) work contracts in order to stimulate employment growth (‘Employment Promotion Act 1985‘AZPA). The research unit ‘Labour Market and Employment‘ at the WZB has evaluated the employment and labour market impact of the new legislation for the period 1985-1988, and apart from providing a detailed analysis of the socio-economic and institutional diversity of job arrangements covered by the category of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) employment, the project‘s focus has been on the impact of minor changes in the institutional frame- work as effected by the EPA on firms‘ employment policies, as well as on the overall level of employment. Results show that like in most other European countries the temporary work force in Germany has considerably grown over the past years in both absolute and relative terms, this increase, however, being largely due to cyclical factors as well as medium-term structural changes on the supply and demand side of the labour market rather than to changes in the regulatory framework as effected by the EPA. The impact of the new regulations on firms‘ hiring decisions and on the overall number of hirings in the total economy have to be regarded as rather modest, in fact amounting to not more than an estimated 25,000 additional hires per year or roughly 0.5|X% of all employment contracts concluded in the private sector. This marginal positive impact on firms‘ employment decisions, however, is counterbalanced by unintended substitution effects and an increase in involuntary quits arising from them when labour demand declines. Even under the overall positive employment development given in the period under investigation the net employment effects of the EPA temporary work legislation thus are shown to be at best marginal. In case of a deterioration of the overall economic situation, however, the increase in temporary job arrangements supported by the new legislation is likely to lead to accelerated workforce adjustments by firms and thus over time to result in a depression of the overall level of employment. From a theoretical point of view, the findings suggest that measures aiming at de-regulating labour relations such as the EPA largely fail to modify essential behavioral parameters of economic actors in economic environments which for decades have adjusted to a relatively high level of welfare state regulation, as has been the case in Western Germany.     

Short-Run Wage Flexibility and Labour Market Adaptation in Western Europe

ABSTRACT: This paper starts by reviewing some of the evidence relating to movements in relative wages, asking what have been their causes and whether they serve to allocate labour across labour markets. Much of the research has tended to focus on the statistical sources available, and therefore to focus on movements of pay between industries rather than firms, between occupations, and between workers with different levels of qualification. This has greatly constrained the possibility of linking these different dimensions to look at the ideal question, namely to what extent do relative wages respond to labour supply and demand pressures, and to what extent do they help to reconcile these two pressures. In addition, evidence from studies based on data obtained from individual firms also broadly supports the view that wage differentials are not very responsive to supply and demand pressures, and also that they are mostly not very effective in promoting the adaptation of labour supply and demand across labour markets. The paper ends by considering briefly some recent policy ideas for increasing the responsiveness of relative wages to demand changes.     

Job Tenure,Labour Mobility and Wage Profiles

Abstract. The features and the length of the attachment of workers to firms represent a central aspect of the labour relationship. The length of service is an important determinant of wages and of non-pecuniary benefits; it affects internal mobility in the firm, and insulates workers with long job tenure from unemployment. In this paper it is argued that the traditional “spot” labour market Characterization is difficult to reconcile with the existence of long term employment relationships. A number of alternative theories which predict the existence of an employer-worker attachment proposed, and their implications discussed. The relevance of long term employment relationships is then tested using micro-data for the Italian manufacturing industry. An appropriate methodology for the analysis of the duration of employment is developed. and separate “job tenure” equations for white and blue collar workers are estimated. A higher educational attainment - ceteris paribus- appears to increase the probability of a job separation; conversely, a higher working experience, previous to the current job, tends to reduce it. The effect of firm size is negative, as larger organizations seem to favour longer employment spells. Outside opportunities show a strong positive effect on the probability of separation. Finally, conditional on the current wage, the probability of leaving the job increases with the length of time worked. However, when the unconditional outcome is considered, separation decline with tenure; in this case. it is argued, the wage effect more than outweighs the conditional effect. This result is consistent with the predictions of both “specific” human capital and job matching theories.     

Efficient Labour Contracts: Impediments and How to Circumvent Them

Efficient labour contracts on wages and employment could contribute to a reduction in unemployment in Europe. Their implementation is hindered by institutional settings and asymmetric incentives at different levels of the bargaining process. Employed workers have no incentives to forego wage increases at the firm level for potential employment gains, while employers’ federations possess no means to guarantee an employment increase for the sector covered by a wage agreement. Decentralization of wage bargaining does not solve this incentive problem. It is demonstrated that the introduction of marketable certificates may reduce the asymmetric incentive effects enabling contracts with higher employment.     

Subsidies on Labour and Capital under Wage Bargaining

ABSTRACT: Micro-policy instruments are often grouped into labour subsidies and capital subsidies. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect on employment of labour and capital subsidies when the wage rate is endogeneous. The problem is studied within a sequential three-stage model, integrating the investment decision, wage-bargaining and the employment decision. The paper demonstrates that labour subsidies may fail, depending on technology and the risk aversion of the workers.     

Productivity,Real Wages and Worker Rights: A Cross-National Comparison

ABSTRACT: High unemployment in Europe has led many economists to recommend labour market deregulation — the removal of obstacles to labour market flexibility. These “obstacles” include union power, employment protection legislation and income security arrangements. We argue that such worker rights promote productivity and real wage growse effects. Policy-makers should be aware of these positive effects on productivity and real wage growth when considering curtailing worker rights in order to reduce unemployment.     

Price Effects of the Minimum Wage: A Survey Data Analysis for the German Construction Sector

Utilizing the link between employment and price changes as a result of minimum wages, we use firm‐level data to evaluate the effect of minimum wage introduction in the German construction sector. In East Germany we find significant positive price effects that exclude the possibility of rising employment. Rather, the results indicate the existence of a competitive sector‐specific labour market, and thus declining employment. In contrast, we cannot find any significant price reaction for West Germany. This suggests that the implemented minimum wage in West Germany is too low in comparison to the predominantly paid wages and is hence not binding.     

Labour‐market Institutions and Macroeconomic Shocks

Abstract. Macroeconomic shocks and labour‐market institutions jointly determine employment growth and economic performance. The effect of shocks depends on the nature of these institutions and the effect of institutional change depends on the macroeconomic environment. It follows that a given set of institutions may be appropriate in one epoch and not in another. We derive a dynamic model of labour demand in which the effect of firing costs on labour demand depends on the macroeconomic environment: when the level of macroeconomic activity is expected to drop and/or the trend rate of productivity growth is small, a rise in firing costs affects mainly (and adversely) the hiring decision and not the layoff decision. This makes firing costs harmful to employment when it may appear most appropriate. In contrast, firing costs can raise employment during periods of high growth and positive shocks. Our hypothesis is supported by empirical results using OECD data.