EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

How do exchange rate regimes influence fiscal discipline? This important question has typically been addressed exploiting the classic dichotomy of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes assuming perfect capital mobility. However, the role of capital controls cannot be neglected, particularly in developing countries. This paper analyzes the effects of capital controls on fiscal performance by focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. In a model in which the fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a nonbenevolent fiscal authority, dual regimes induce politicians to have higher fiscal deficits than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. The model also shows this effect increases as fiscal authorities become more impatient. Dynamic panel regressions confirm that dual regimes lead to higher fiscal deficits than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates. Using a dummy for pre‐electoral year as an indicator of fiscal authorities' shortsightedness, we also confirm that dual exchange rate has a more adverse effect on fiscal deficits as the authorities become more impatient. (JEL E50, E60, F31, F41)     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

Fiscal Pressure of Migration and Horizontal Fiscal Inequality: Evidence from Indian Experience

This article examines the patterns and trends in inter‐State migration across the Indian States and observes that along with the demographic factors, migration is also affected by the fiscal profile of States. Controlling for the economic prosperity of States as reflected in their per capita Net State Domestic Product and the nature of fiscal policy stance, econometric estimation using the gravity model suggests that level of vertical federal transfers and its horizontal distribution is an important determinant of the pattern of inter State migration. To correct for the extant horizontal fiscal inequality across the Indian States, the article suggests a relatively more progressive transfer system and a developmental fiscal policy stance at the State level to reduce the pressure of out‐migration to prosperous regions of the country.     

Decision interactions of the monetary and fiscal authorities in the choice of policy mix

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of the states of equilibrium and Pareto optimality of the solutions in the monetary-fiscal games between the fiscal and monetary authorities each having either two or three qualitatively different strategies: expansive, neutral and restrictive. Two sets of assumptions about the influence, exerted by the instruments of the monetary policy (real interest rate) and by those of the fiscal policy (budgetary deficit related to the GDP), on the state of economy (rate of economic growth and inflation) are considered. The results obtained indicate that, along with the case of the prisoner's dilemma, to which the discussion in the major publications on the subject is limited, other situations may also occur, where the independent decisions of the central bank and the government do not necessarily lead to the choice of a Pareto non-optimal solution.     

Assessing Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a Small Open Economy: the Case Republic of Macedonia

The aim of this paper is to analyze empirically the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in a small open transition economies: the case the Republic of Macedonia. This paper employs SVAR methodology to examine jointly the impact monetary and fiscal policy on real GDP and prices. The result reveals that the monetary policy counteracts the effects of fiscal policy and persists until the effects of fiscal policy changes disappear. This causes a crowding out effect. In addition, the result shows that the best fiscal policy for stimulating the economy appears to be one of tax-cuts. The empirical research, in jointly analyzing fiscal and monetary policy also provides an additional, possibly interesting result. The sizes of the responses of real GDP and prices to monetary shock are not significantly reduced when fiscal shock is included into monetary SVAR.     

FISCAL STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

Our paper systematically examines the effects of fiscal structure on economic growth. We find that for developing countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure retard growth and tax-financed increases stimulate growth, while for developed countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure do not affect growth and tax-financed increases lower growth. We impose the government budget constraint on the regression equations so that the precise changes in fiscal policy can be identified (e.g., the effect of a debt-financed increase in health expenditure), employing a pooled cross-section, time-series sample and fixed- and random-effect methods. (JEL 04, E6)     

FISCAL STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL EXCHANGE RATE PASS‐THROUGH

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)     

The Scope for Fiscal Policy: A Case Study of Thailand

This article is concerned with the application of fiscal policy instruments in stabilisation policy. Theoretical and practical considerations suggest that the scope for fiscal policy may be limited, but analysis of the actual performance of Thailand shows that an active use has been made of it. Compared with advanced economies, the role of automatic stabilisers is relatively small; discretionary fiscal policy interventions have been more important. Particularly in the years after the Asian financial crisis fiscal policy has been actively used, first, under IMF programmes, to reduce aggregate demand, and later to stimulate the economy. The article focuses on the application of fiscal policy instruments, not on the impact of fiscal policy interventions on the real economy.     

THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY: FURTHER EVIDENCE

Simultaneous monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions are derived and estimated for the 1969:2–1984.3 period. The results suggest that the Reagan administration has abandoned fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Furthermore, although the average money growth rate declined in the Reagan administration, variation in the rate of money growth indicates that monetary policy has been used to combat unemployment. Finally, monetary and fiscal policies were not coordinated during this period. Rather, monetary and fiscal policy appear to be set by a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. In a Nash equilibrium, the policy chosen by each authority maximizes its payoff, given the policy choice of the other authority.     

RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. We present a model with three players (the central bark, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled. We show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. We also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank.     

Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case

This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a second step, we investigate the impact of direct democratic institutions and their usage on tax policy and redistribution. The results suggest that the effect of direct democracy on income tax redistribution is a multilayered process. First, the theoretical availability of direct democracy tools does not seem to have the same impact as the effective use of them. Second, fiscal referendums may – in the short term –reduce redistribution through lower tax rates and lead to less tax progression. Third, an increasing number of ballots on initiatives leads to more tax progression and more redistribution in the long run. It seems that the short-term dampening effects of fiscal referendums on redistribution may be overridden in the long run by the expansive effect of popular initiatives.     

WHY DO EUROPEANS WORK (MUCH) LESS? IT IS TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING

We develop and calibrate a theoretical model that explains per capita hours worked and output growth as a function of three fiscal policy variables. Differences in income taxes, productive government expenditures, and nonemployment transfers are sufficient to answer the question why Europeans work (much) less than Americans and why some Europeans work less than others. Differences in taste for leisure have little role to play given the actual variation of these three policy variables. ( JEL E24, E62, J22, O41)     

WHY THE SOCIAL INSURANCE BUDGET IS TOO LARGE IN A DEMOCRACY

This paper develops a majority voting model to analyze the determination of taxes and transfers in a system of pay-as-yougo social insurance. The major implication is that the equilibrium size of the system is too large if votes are fully aware of the consequences of the policy. In addition, it seems likely that voters are rationally ignorant of a large portion of the cost of social insurance due to the hidden nature of the employer contribution and to the effect of the system on capital accumulatoin. This fiscal illusion works to exacerbate the overexpansion of the social insurance system.     

Do private and public transfers received affect life satisfaction? Evidence from Romania

This paper uses Romanian survey data to investigate the determinants of individual life and financial satisfaction, with an emphasis on the role of public and private transfers received. A possible concern is that these transfers are unlikely to be exogenous to satisfaction. We use recursive simultaneous equations models to account both for this potential problem and for the fact that public transfers are themselves endogenous in the private transfer equation. We find that public transfers received have a positive influence on both life and financial satisfaction, while private transfers do not matter. People receive private transfers irrespective of their economic and demographic characteristics in Romania, which could be explained by some social norm motives.     

Do operating reserves stabilize spending by nonprofit organizations?

The public budgeting literature has a long and rich tradition that examines the role of budget stabilization funds as fiscal stabilizers for state and local governments during periods of declining revenues and deteriorating economic conditions. Similarly, nonprofit organizations may accumulate operating reserves that allow them to smooth out annual imbalances between revenues and expenses, especially when facing a fiscal shock. Agency theory, on the other hand, indicates that managers might use these reserves to enrich themselves at the expense of the organization. This article is a step toward addressing a gap in our knowledge by analyzing the implications of reserves on nonprofit spending in general and also on particular functions (program versus overhead spending). Using a long panel of data from 1995 to 2011 and controlling for sample selection bias, the empirical results suggest that operating reserves held by nonprofit organizations do reduce expense gaps during downturns, but the effect is small. The results also suggest that nonprofit managers value current spending more than reserving funds for the future. Further, operating reserves are not associated with agency problems as predicted by theory. The empirical results suggest that the current rule of thumb—that nonprofits ought to hold up to 6 months of operating reserves—is inadequate if these pools of savings are intended to maintain all spending at trend during poor fiscal times. If, however, reserves are intended to only offset trend deviations partially while alternative strategies are sought, then the current rule of thumb may be sufficient.     

MORE INFORMATION IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER: THE CASE OF VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

We use a new U.S. survey on pro‐environmental behaviors, attitudes, and knowledge and find that individuals engage in activities that they believe are more effective in reducing carbon emissions, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are accurate. We find that low provision of the public good is greater among people who believe they cannot do much for the environment and do not consider themselves environmentalists. A policy implication of our results is that the effect of more accurate information on the provision of the public good is ambiguous. (JEL Q50, Q54, C10)     

ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY

Existing analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in general equilibrium models have typically been conducted under the assumption that the long-run supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a fixed rate of time preference. These analyses have shown that the long-run response of the capital stock to changes in fiscal policy is crucial to generating the potential for “multiplier” effects in these models. In this paper we ask, what are the implications of relaxing the assumption of perfectly elastic capital supply for the analysis of fiscal policy? We show that with less than perfectly elastic capital supply, the potential for multipliers is actually enhanced. (JEL E62, D90)     

THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY

This paper i11ustrates the importance of the fiscal framework for monetary analysis by discussing three separate issues. I begin by examining how the fiscal framework changes the macroeconomic equilibrium associated with different steady state rates of money growth. This includes a summary of research that I have presented elsewhere and comments on several additional aspects of the way in which the fiscal structure destroys the neutrality of monetary policy.
The second section deals with the short-run impact of changes in monetary policy. Here again the fiscal structure complicates the economy's response to monetary policy.
The final section looks at the effect of the fiscal structure on the central banks choice of monetary policies. Fiscal structures are likely to influence the policies adopted because they affect the costs and benefits of monetary policies.     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)     

WHO BENEFITS FROM CHILD BENEFIT?

Governments, over much of the developed world, make significant financial transfers to parents with dependent children. For example, in the United States the recently introduced Child Tax Credit (CTC), which goes to almost all children, costs almost $1 billion each week, or about 0.4% of GNP. The United Kingdom has even more generous transfers and spends an average of about $30 a week on each of about 8 million children—about 1% of GNP. The typical rationale given for these transfers is that they are good for our children and here we investigate the effect of such transfers on household spending patterns. In the United Kingdom such transfers, known as Child Benefit (CB), have been simple lump sum universal payments for a continuous period of more than 20 years. We do indeed find that CB is spent differently from other income—paradoxically, it appears to be spent disproportionately on adult-assignable goods. In fact, we estimate that as much as half of a marginal dollar of CB is spent on alcohol. We resolve this puzzle by showing that the effect is confined to unanticipated variation in CB so we infer that parents are sufficiently altruistic toward their children that they completely insure them against shocks.