The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms

This study explores two ownership issues in private family firms. First, we investigate the relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance, and postulate that this relationship in private family firms is more complex than the inverted “U” relationship found in public family firms. Second, we predict a potential moderating effect of the second largest owner, who may exert a monitoring role on family CEOs. We focus on private family firms as recent studies show that private family firms have distinct features compared to public family firms, and that findings documented in public family firms may not apply to the ubiquitous, but much less studied, private family firms. We have applied agency theory to develop the two hypotheses, used secondary data on a large sample of private family firms, utilized an adjusted conventional quadratic technique to test the hypotheses, and validated the findings using a second method of piecewise linear specification. The results show that the non-linear relationship between the ownership of family CEOs and firm performance is more complicated than the often-documented inverted “U” shape from public firms. Meanwhile, the second largest owner with a high enough ownership stake can impose a positive moderating effect by mitigating potential agency problems caused by family CEOs.     

中国民营上市公司的家族治理与企业价值

本文以最终控制者可以追溯到家族或自然人的民营上市公司为研究对象,将广义家族上市公司区分为真正或狭义家族上市公司(FB)和自然人上市公司(PB)两类,从家族所有、家族控制和家族管理三个维度考察了民营上市公司的家族治理对企业价值的影响。实证结果表明:总体上,家族治理降低了民营上市公司的价值,但家族所有、控制、管理三个维度的影响各不相同,家族治理的绩效最终取决于不同维度之间的组合。鉴于不同类型家族上市公司的主要回归结果皆不相同,本文认为家族企业的不同界定标准会在很大程度上影响到相关实证研究的结论。     

Family Control and Stock Market Reactions to Innovation Announcements

Although family firms are common around the world, studies on family‐controlled business are limited. Prior studies mainly focused on the influences of family ownership on overall firm performance, and the results were mixed. In this study we attempted to explore the impacts of family ownership on innovation by examining the association of family control and stock market reactions to innovation announcements. We found that firms with greater family control experienced significantly more negative stock market reactions to innovation announcements. The results further indicated that divergence of cash flow and voting rights was strongly and negatively correlated with announcement‐period abnormal returns. In addition, the findings suggested a significantly positive moderating effect of institutional ownership. The conclusions were robust under various measures of family control, and remained valid after controlling other influential factors for stock market reactions to innovation announcements.     

Ownership structure,investors’ protection and corporate valuation: the effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms

Research on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance shows no convergent evidence concerning the sign and form of the above-mentioned relationship. Similarly, there is no homogeneous evidence documenting family ownership concentration is always positively or negatively correlated with firm value, or irrelevant. This paper analyses whether and how the de facto investor protection provided by the judicial system affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 1314 firms operating in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) over a five-year period, 2010–2014. Moreover, we analyse whether judicial system efficiency influences if and how family firms in the controlling coalition collude for expropriating minority shareholders. Our findings show that the level of shareholder protection, derived from judicial efficiency, is relevant to the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, thus corroborating literature in that institutional contexts matter in explaining such relations. The results suggest the need for more efficient external mechanisms of corporate governance to facilitate investment in equity capital, thus decreasing the country risk perceived by investors.     

The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms

A growing body of research shows that family firms are different from other organizations in significant ways. In this paper we review this literature by examining how family firms differ from nonfamily firms along five broad categories of managerial decisions. These categories encompass a set of key organizational choices concerning management processes, firm strategies, corporate governance, stakeholder relations and business venturing. We argue that socioemotional wealth or affective endowment of family owners explain many of these choices. We also examine some contingency factors (namely family stage, firm size, firm hazard, and the presence of nonfamily shareholders) that moderate the influence of socioemotional wealth preservation as a point of reference when making managerial decisions in family firms. Lastly, we explore the firm performance consequences of family ownership.     

Does family matter? Ownership,motives and firms’ environmental strategy

Extant research has primarily focused on the economic drivers and outcomes of corporate environmental performance. This trajectory oversimplifies the motives for environmental strategies across all firm types and particularly overlooks how firm ownership presents other motives for environmental strategies. In this study, we leverage institutional theory to examine how family motives, underpinned by family members' desire to gain or preserve family legitimacy and socio-emotional wealth, affect ISO 14001 certification. Using firm-level data, we find that family ownership has a positive effect on ISO 14001 certification. This effect is stronger for firms whose names include the family name and also for firms located closer to large cities. Our study contributes to nonmarket strategy literature by showing that family motives underpin firms’ environmental initiatives. It also contributes to institutional theory by delineating the levels of legitimacy that spur nonmarket strategy in family firms.     

我国上市公司的实证研究：股权结构和高层梯队与公司绩效的关系

分析了股权结构和高层梯队对公司绩效的影响并进行了实证研究。股权结构与公司绩效的实证结果显示,流通股对公司绩效有显著负面影响,而法人股则与之呈弱的正相关关系。在国有股权控股的企业中,股权一定程度上的集中对公司是有利的,且政府直接控股比间接控股更有利于企业的整体价值。在论证高层梯队与公司绩效关系上,从团队的传记性特征方面作了实证分析,初步得出了公司绩效与高层梯队平均年龄和平均受教育状况正相关,而与年龄和教育背景的差异性呈负相关关系这一结论。此外,在不同股权结构下,高层梯队对公司绩效影响具有差异性。     

我国上市公司配股前后业绩变化及其影响因素的实证研究

本文首次系统考查了我国上市公司配股融资后的业绩表现及其影响因素。实证研究表明,我国上市公司配股融资后业绩出现显著的下降,和没有配股的配比公司相比,配股公司的业绩要好于配比公司,但在配股后第3年,开始逊色于配比公司,并且,公司配股后业绩的下降幅度大于配比公司。本文首次发现,自由现金流假说能很好解释我国上市公司配股后长期业绩下滑的影响因素,公司配股前的自由现金流量越多,公司配股后的业绩下降得越快,公司的股权集中度低与投资水平低的上市公司,配股后业绩下降得越快。另外,公司的成长性越高,资产规模越大,公司配股后业绩下降的更快。     

Capital structure,managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Egypt

This paper focuses on an important issue, which has generally received less attention in corporate governance literature, being the effect of managerial ownership on the relationship between debt and firm performance. By employing a sample of Egyptian listed firms, the generalized least squares method, as a panel data technique, is used to examine the joint effect of debt and managerial ownership on various measures of firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q and ROA). The results reveal that managerial ownership moderates the relationship between debt and firm performance, with the relationship being negative (positive) in presence (absence) of managerial ownership concentration. The implication of this finding is that the optimal capital structure is more likely to be contingent on contextual variables as well as the roles, power, and stakes of key internal and external actors. Put simply, the effectiveness of one corporate governance mechanism (i.e., debt) is more likely to be contingent on the effect of other existed corporate governance mechanisms, and hence, there is not one best arrangement of either capital structure or ownership structure, but different arrangements are not equally good.     

Ownership concentration,contestability, family firms,and capital structure

This study analyses the distribution of power among the several blockholders of a firm and the identity of those blockholders as a determinant of firm leverage. Using a sample of 694 firms from 12 Western European countries, our results support a negative relationship between ownership concentration in the hands of the main blockholder and firm leverage. Moreover, we detect that the presence of a second and third large shareholder (beyond the first blockholder) has a significant positive effect on the leverage ratio. In addition, the results show that contestability in family firms plays a more relevant role. Finally, we show that family firms do have significant impact on firm leverage level, and this impact varies depending on the legal framework and institutional environment. In our main sample the results show family firms negatively affect market leverage, supporting the theory that family firms are more averse to an increase in the debt level due to the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress as a result of having an under-diversified portfolio. In contrast, the opposite effect is found in the sample that excludes the United Kingdom. This last result cannot be explained by agency theory, given that family businesses are those that suffer less from Type I agency problems. This result suggests either some difficulty in financing their investments by issuing new equity or the need to use debt as a signal of the quality of its investments. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests.     

资本结构、股权结构、成长机会与公司绩效

本文在代理成本理论的架构下,以公司成长机会为背景,分析了资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,并利用 1998 年年底之前在上海和深圳两个交易所上市的 498 家上市公司 1999 至 2001 年三年间1494 个观察值为样本进行了实证分析。结果表明,对于不同成长性的公司而言, 资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响存在较大差异,从而为我们选择理想的资本结构和股权结构提供了有益的启示。     

To fit in or stand out? How optimal distinctiveness in technological diversification affects firm performance

Previous research has observed technological diversification from a strategic viewpoint and regarded it as a strategy used by firms to differentiate themselves from competitors. This perspective, however, overlooks the fact that firms' strategies can also be understood as conformity to institutional pressure to gain legitimacy. In order to study the technological diversification–firm performance relationship from a more comprehensive viewpoint, this paper starts from a strategic balance perspective and investigates how technological diversification conformity enhances firm performance. Using a unique dataset of Chinese listed firms' patenting activities from 2003 to 2014 and adopting ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, we produce empirical findings that reveal a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between firms’ conformity in technological diversification and their performance. Our results further delineate the boundary conditions that influence this relationship. We find that firm age positively moderates the relationship, that is the conformity-performance relationship is steeper with the older firms. Moreover, the result suggests that state ownership negatively moderates the relationship, that is, the relationship is flatter when firms are controlled by the state.     

为什么CEO解职如此罕见? 一种基于前景理论的解释

基于前景理论和公司行为理论,本研究将商业风险、所有权集中度及CEO解职后的继任来源整合于同一框架。基于中国上市公司数据所进行的大样本实证分析表明,商业风险、CEO与董事长兼任、所有权集中度与CEO解职率正相关,所有权集中度负向调节商业风险对CEO解职关系。但针对CEO解职后不同继任来源的分析显示,这种调节作用尽管在两类CEO解职中仍然得到保持,但其它所考察变量在外部继任型解职中则有着明显不同。这些发现,进一步加深了对高所有权集中度情境下,CEO解职这一极为重要的战略决策过程的理解。     

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm’s management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm’s management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.     

Does International Economic Integration Lead to a Cleaner Production in China?

In contrast to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, the Trade‐Up Hypothesis holds that international integration helps improve firms' environmental performance in developing countries. Using firm‐level data from Shanghai, this article examines how international linkages, in the form of foreign direct investment or international trade, affect firms' environmental compliance and performance. We find that firms with international linkage via ownership exhibit better compliance with environmental regulation and emit less pollution than firms with no international linkage. We also find that firms with international linkage via market exposure are more likely to exhibit better compliance with environmental regulation than firms with no international linkage, but find no evidence that the former emit less pollution than the latter. This provides a piece of empirical evidence for the Trade‐Up Hypothesis.     

Ownership Structure and Value of the Largest European Firms: The Importance of Owner Identity

The paper examines the relationship betweenownership structure and value of the largestEuropean firms. Using simultaneous estimationand controlling for nation and industry effectswe find that ownership concentration (measuredby the fraction of ``closely held' shares) hasa positive effect on firm value (market-to-bookvalue of equity), when the largest owner is afinancial institution or another corporation. If the largest owner is a family or a singleindividual, ownership concentration has noeffect on firm value, and the effect isnegative if the largest owner is a governmentorganisation. Firm value is found to have apositive feedback effect on ownershipconcentration except for governments, whichhold higher stakes in low-value firms. Inother words, owner-identity matters,particularly in a Continental Europeaninstitutional setting where ownershipconcentration is high and minority investorprotection is low.     

Innovationsverhalten in Familienunternehmen

Family businesses are publicly believed to be highly innovative and to be the “Hidden Champions” of the German industry. In recent times scholars have begun to examine this thesis and have come to starkly opposing results. On the one hand family businesses are attested to have a special ?entrepreneurial “spirit” which makes them highly innovative. On the other hand the lack of separation of ownership and control and insufficient diversification of family-investors are said to lead to less innovation activity. In this study we investigate the innovation activity of 384 German manufacturing firms differing in legal structure, size, age, industry, and—most importantly—in the degree of family ownership, family management and family control. The results of our analysis reveals differentiated results. Fundamentally, family ownership and family management are detrimental to firm innovation, at the same time family control has a positive impact on innovation activities. Our Results point to the fact that owner-managed businesses tend to innovate less due to risk aversion while a focus on controlling instead of managing a corporation by the owning family lead to an increase in innovations.     

Entrenchment in publicly traded family firms: Evidence from the S&P 500

Family involvement in corporate governance through ownership, management, and board membership presents a unique dilemma for understanding the strategic impetus and costs of entrenchment decisions. The presence of shared family ties and the family-centered goals of firm principals call to question the applicability of extant agency arguments regarding the nature and antecedents of managerial entrenchment. Exploring this, we develop and test a model of family firm-specific determinants (i.e., family ownership and family's involvement in management and governance) of entrenchment in publicly traded firms by drawing upon principal-principal agency theory. Findings of the empirical analysis of family owned S&P 500 firms suggest family firms are motivated to entrench managers when doing so supports the pursuit of family-centric goals. However, the extent to which entrenchment supports such goals varies at different levels of family ownership.     

Ownership concentration beyond good and evil: is there an effect on corporate performance?

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, while accounting for the endogeneity of the ownership structure, a potential curvilinearity of the performance effect, differences in corporate governance systems, and alternative performance measures. Using a sample of 1,079 firms from 8 countries we find evidence for a curvilinear effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, which becomes insignificant after controlling for endogeneity. Hence, our results support the findings by Demsetz and Villalonga (J Corp Fin 7(3):209?C233, 2001). More research is needed to disentangle the contradictory findings in prior works.     

Does strategic corporate performance depend on corporate financial architecture? Empirical study of European,Russian and other emerging market’s firms

Performance of the firm depends on its structural dimensions: capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Their interactions are known as corporate financial architecture according to S. Myers. In this paper we analyze financial architecture which is a mix of ownership structure, capital structure, control and board’s composition, and therefore, provides the given framework for improving corporate performance. We contribute to the literature by different attributes of our study. In contrast to most empirical papers on performance, we develop integrated rather than segmented approach combining the intrinsic components of corporate financial design in one research model. We introduce new variable to capture the structure of ownership for the purpose of performance analysis. Our third contribution is based on comparative analysis of the influence of financial architecture over corporate performance in rather different capital market environment: developed European and emerging (developing) capital market’s countries. We start with a classic empirical model of the impact of ownership structure, capital structure and other components of financial architecture on the corporate performance. Further we verify the validity of exogenous nature of key variables of the classic model when applying it to companies in developed and emerging market environment. Our results could have some important policy implications for the firms in normal economic environment as well as in the period of global economic crisis. We found that the higher proportion of related ownership which indicates investors with significant voting power and the board’s composition affect firm performance positively. The related shareholders and independent directors seem to add more value to firms while the impact of government ownership differs depending on the country. The emerging market’s sample versus the one from developed countries proves the stronger influence of corporate financial architecture over performance.