Fair (and not so fair) division

Drawbacks of existing procedures are illustrated and a method of efficient fair division is proposed that avoids them. Given additive participants’ utilities, each item is priced at the geometric mean (or some other function) of its two highest valuations. The utilities are scaled so that the market clears with the participants’ purchases proportional to their entitlements. The method is generalized to arbitrary bargaining sets and existence is proved. For two or three participants, the expected utilities are unique. For more, under additivity, the geometric mean separates the prices where uniqueness holds and where it fails; it holds for the geometric mean except in one case where refinement is needed.      

Living without state-independence of utilities

This article is concerned with the representation of preferences which do not satisfy the ordinary axioms for state-independent utilities. After suggesting reasons for not being satisfied with solutions involving state-dependent utilities, an alternative representation shall be proposed involving state-independent utilities and a situation-dependent factor. The latter captures the interdependencies between states and consequences. Two sets of axioms are proposed, each permitting the derivation of subjective probabilities, state-independent utilities, and a situation-dependent factor, and each operating in a different framework. The first framework involves the concept of a decision situation—consisting of a set of states, a set of consequences and a preference relation on acts; the probabilities, utilities and situation-dependent factor are elicited by referring to other, appropriate decision situations. The second framework, which is technically related, operates in a fixed decision situation; particular “subsituations” are employed in the derivation of the representation. Possible interpretations of the situation-dependent factor and the notion of situation are discussed.     

Choosers as extension axioms

We consider the extension of a (strict) preference over a set to its power set. Elements of the power set are non-resolute outcomes. The final outcome is determined by an “(external) chooser” which is a resolute choice function. The individual whose preference is under consideration confronts a set of resolute choice functions which reflects the possible behaviors of the chooser. Every such set naturally induces an extension axiom (i.e., a rule that determines how an individual with a given preference over alternatives is required to rank certain sets). Our model allows to revisit various extension axioms of the literature. Interestingly, the Gärdenfors (1976) and Kelly (1977) principles are singled-out as the only two extension axioms compatible with the non-resolute outcome interpretation.     

A theorem for Bayesian group decisions

This paper presents a natural extension of Bayesian decision theory from the domain of individual decisions to the domain of group decisions. We assume that each group member accepts the assumptions of subjective expected utility theory with respect to the alternatives from which they must choose, but we do not assume, a priori, that the group as a whole accepts those assumptions. Instead, we impose a multiattribute utility independence condition on the preferences of the group with respect to the expected utilities of its actions as appraised by its members. The result is that the expected utility of an alternative for the group is a weighted average of the expected utilities of that alternative for its members. The weights must be determined collectively by the group. Pareto optimality is not assumed, though the result is consistent with Pareto optimality.     

On Robust Constitution Design

We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. Decisions will be carried out by an individual who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested executive. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design. A robust mechanism is defined as maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which is at the same time immune from opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revelation of preferences by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown to be robust.      

Ambiguity and decision modeling: A preference-based approach

In this article, we develop a model that permits a decision maker's preferences to depend on the decision maker's ambiguity about the probability of an event that is relevant for decision-making purposes. We deal with ambiguity through preference modeling, with ambiguity leading to modifications in the utilities of outcomes. The behavior of ambiguity premiums and probability premiums as the payoffs are varied depends on the nature of the modifications in utilities. Particular forms of the model that arise under different sets of assumptions about preferences include additive, bilinear, and ratio forms. We conclude with a brief example and some thoughts about potential generalizations and implications of the model.     

Parametric multi-attribute utility functions for optimal profit under risk constraints

We provide an economic interpretation of the practice consisting in incorporating risk measures as constraints in an expected prospect maximization problem. For what we call the infimum of expectations class of risk measures, we show that if the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expectation of a random prospect under constraint that the risk measure is bounded above, he then behaves as a “generalized expected utility maximizer” in the following sense. The DM exhibits ambiguity with respect to a family of utility functions defined on a larger set of decisions than the original one; he adopts pessimism and performs first a minimization of expected utility over this family, then performs a maximization over a new decisions set. This economic behaviour is called “maxmin under risk” and studied by Maccheroni (Econ Theory 19:823–831, 2002). As an application, we make the link between an expected prospect maximization problem, subject to conditional value-at-risk being less than a threshold value, and a non-expected utility economic formulation involving “loss aversion”-type utility functions.     

Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution

We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to “bad” alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players’ current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme’s equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes’ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution’s outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility

Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi’s utilitarianism through all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarianism unfalsifiable, however, if agents’ all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified. This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness preferences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation examples.     

Mutual Fund Theorem for continuous time markets with random coefficients

The optimal investment problem is studied for a continuous time incomplete market model. It is assumed that the risk-free rate, the appreciation rates, and the volatility of the stocks are all random; they are independent from the driving Brownian motion, and they are currently observable. It is shown that some weakened version of Mutual Fund Theorem holds for this market for general class of utilities. It is shown that the supremum of expected utilities can be achieved on a sequence of strategies with a certain distribution of risky assets that does not depend on risk preferences described by different utilities.     

A new test of convexity–concavity of discount function

Discounted utility theory and its generalizations (e.g., quasihyperbolic discounting, generalized hyperbolic discounting) use discount functions for weighting utilities of outcomes received in different time periods. We propose a new simple test of convexity–concavity of discount function. This test can be used with any utility function (which can be linear or not) and any preferences over risky lotteries (expected utility theory or not). The data from a controlled laboratory experiment show that about one third of experimental subjects reveal a concave discount function and another one third of subjects reveal a convex discount function (for delays up to two month).

     

A Method for Eliciting Utilities and its Application to Collective Choice

Designing a mechanism that provides a direct incentive for an individual to report her utility function over several alternatives is a difficult task. A framework for such mechanism design is the following: an individual (a decision maker) is faced with an optimization problem (e.g., maximization of expected utility), and a mechanism designer observes the decision maker’s action. The mechanism does reveal the individual’s utility truthfully if the mechanism designer, having observed the decision maker’s action, infers the decision maker’s utilities over several alternatives. This paper studies an example of such a mechanism and discusses its application to the problem of optimal social choice. Under certain simplifying assumptions about individuals’ utility functions and about how voters choose their voting strategies, this mechanism selects the alternative that maximizes Harsanyi’s social utility function and is Pareto-efficient.     

A decision theoretic model of the American war in Vietnam

This paper presents a decision theoretic model of the American side of the Vietnam war. That is, we only consider the U.S. government declared objectives and assign them utilities from that point of view. We assume that the involvement of the U.S. in this war was the outcome of a deliberate decision and, moreover, that this decision was taken on the basis of a careful weighing of goals and means. Hence decision theory is applicable in this case - and probably it was applied. We make hypotheses on the utilities of the goals and on those of the negative side effects. We also assess the probabilities of the four main possible courses of action available to achieve those goals: total war, advising, negotiating, and staying out. The total efficiencies of these turn out to be -0.30, -0.20, +0.51, and -0.11 respectively. This result explains why neutrality was not tried and why the advisory policy was eventually given up. But it does not explain why war, which has been not just inefficient but countereffective, was preferred over negotiating from the start or keeping neutral. Unless of course one assumes that the strategists either (a) paid no attention to any decision theoretic models or (b) used models that had fatal flaws. If the first alternative is discarded because of the prestige enjoyed by decision theory amongst American executives, we must conclude that the decision theoretic models employed by the U.S. high command had either of the following defects: (a) they ignored or underrated the negative side effects accompanying the implementation of every goal, or (b) they were not supplemented by mathematical models of the decisions likely to be made by the other side. In either case the decision to adopt the strategy with minimal expected utility was, at best, rational but extremely ill informed. It may have been one more victory of ideology over science.     

Coherent decision analysis with inseparable probabilities and utilities

This article explores the extent to which a decision maker's probabilities can be measured separately from his/her utilities by observing his/her acceptance of small monetary gambles. Only a partial separation is achieved: the acceptable gambles are partitioned into a set of belief gambles, which reveals probabilities distorted by marginal utilities for money, and a set of preference gambles, which reveals utilities reciprocally distorted by marginal utilities for money. However, the information in these gambles still enables us to solve the decision maker's problem: his/her utility-maximizing decision is the one that avoids arbitrage (i.e., incoherence or Dutch books).     

Min- and Max-induced rankings: an experimental study

The current paper is the first to report an experimental study of “Min- and Max-induced rankings” (MMIR), i.e., a family of set rankings that require preferences over sets to be induced from comparison of the best and/or worst elements within those sets. These MMIR do not perform well in predicting preferences over simple sets of monetary outcomes. In this paper, we investigate the axiomatic underpinnings of these models by means of pairwise choice experiments. From this investigation, some important conclusions can be drawn: Axioms that prevent rankings to be based on total-goodness, as well as monotonicity conditions (ensuring that replacing a set element with a better one results in a better set) cannot be refuted. Axioms that rule out any utilization of the relative difference in the values of the outcomes and axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness are all systematically violated. The Uniform Expected Utility (UEU) criterion seems to meet the apparent shortcomings of the MMIR. Some frequently occurring preference patterns, however, suggest that a significant portion of the participants uses neither a Min- or Max-induced ranking, nor UEU, but some other unspecified decision rule, possibly characterized by the tendency to prefer a diversification of uncertainty.     

A Philosophical Foundation of Non-Additive Measure and Probability

In this paper, non-additivity of a set function is interpreted as a method to express relations between sets which are not modeled in a set theoretic way. Drawing upon a concept called “quasi-analysis” of the philosopher Rudolf Carnap, we introduce a transform for sets, functions, and set functions to formalize this idea. Any image-set under this transform can be interpreted as a class of (quasi-)components or (quasi-)properties representing the original set. We show that non-additive set functions can be represented as signed σ-additive measures defined on sets of quasi-components. We then use this interpretation to justify the use of non-additive set functions in various applications like for instance multi criteria decision making and cooperative game theory. Additionally, we show exemplarily by means of independence, conditioning, and products how concepts from classical measure and probability theory can be transfered to the non-additive theory via the transform.     

Subjective probabilities and utility with event-dependent preferences

This article generalizes Savage's theory to include event-dependent preferences. The state space is partitioned into finitely many events. The induced preferences over consequences are assumed independent of the underlying states within, but not across, these events. This results in an additively separable representation of preferences over acts. The dependence of the preference relation over consequences on the events is represented by event-dependent mappings of the set of consequences onto itself. Given these mappings, the preferences on acts are represented by the expectation of event-dependent utilities on the consequences with respect to unique subjective probabilities on the states.Helpful discussions with David Schmeidler are gratefully acknowledged.     

The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types.      

On the foundations of decision making under partial information

We show how to model incompleteness in the decision maker's judgements, within a Bayesian context, providing axioms which lead us to work with families of values or probabilities and utilities. The proper solution concepts are suggested. On the whole, we provide a more robust decision theory, based on a weaker set of axioms, but embodying coherence, since it essentially implies carrying out a family of coherent decision analyses.