Now What Do People Know About Global Climate Change? Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople

In 1992, a mental‐models‐based survey in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, revealed that educated laypeople often conflated global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion, and appeared relatively unaware of the role of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in global warming. This study compares those survey results with 2009 data from a sample of similarly well‐educated laypeople responding to the same survey instrument. Not surprisingly, following a decade of explosive attention to climate change in politics and in the mainstream media, survey respondents in 2009 showed higher awareness and comprehension of some climate change causes. Most notably, unlike those in 1992, 2009 respondents rarely mentioned ozone depletion as a cause of global warming. They were also far more likely to correctly volunteer energy use as a major cause of climate change; many in 2009 also cited natural processes and historical climatic cycles as key causes. When asked how to address the problem of climate change, while respondents in 1992 were unable to differentiate between general “good environmental practices” and actions specific to addressing climate change, respondents in 2009 have begun to appreciate the differences. Despite this, many individuals in 2009 still had incorrect beliefs about climate change, and still did not appear to fully appreciate key facts such as that global warming is primarily due to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the single most important source of this carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels.     

Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.     

Can Property Values Capture Changes in Environmental Health Risks? Evidence from a Stated Preference Study in Italy and the United Kingdom

Hedonic models are a common nonmarket valuation technique, but, in practice, results can be affected by omitted variables and whether homebuyers respond to the assumed environmental measure. We undertake an alternative stated preference approach that circumvents these issues. We examine how homeowners in the United Kingdom and Italy value mortality risk reductions by asking them to choose among hypothetical variants of their home that differ in terms of mortality risks from air pollution and price. We find that Italian homeowners hold a value of a statistical life (VSL) of €6.4 million, but U.K. homeowners hold a much lower VSL (€2.1 million). This may be because respondents in the United Kingdom do not perceive air pollution where they live to be as threatening, and actually live in cities with relatively low air pollution. Italian homeowners value a reduction in the risk of dying from cancer more than from other causes, but U.K. respondents do not hold such a premium. Lastly, respondents who face higher baseline risks, due to greater air pollution where they live, hold a higher VSL, particularly in the United Kingdom. In both countries, the VSL is twice as large among individuals who perceive air pollution where they live as high.     

Not in My Backyard: CCS Sites and Public Perception of CCS

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology that counteracts climate change by capturing atmospheric emissions of CO₂ from human activities, storing them in geological formations underground. However, CCS also involves major risks and side effects, and faces strong public opposition. The whereabouts of 408 potential CCS sites in Germany were released in 2011. Using detailed survey data on the public perception of CCS, this study quantifies how living close to a potential storage site affects the acceptance of CCS. It also analyzes the influence of other regional characteristics on the acceptance of CCS. The study finds that respondents who live close to a potential CCS site have significantly lower acceptance rates than those who do not. Living in a coal‐mining region also markedly decreases acceptance.     

The 2003 Heat Wave in France: Dangerous Climate Change Here and Now

In an analysis of the French episode of heat wave in 2003, this article highlights how heat wave dangers result from the intricate association of natural and social factors. Unusually high temperatures, as well as socioeconomic vulnerability, along with social attenuation of hazards, in a general context where the anthropogenic contribution to climate change is becoming more plausible, led to an excess of 14,947 deaths in France, between August 4 and 18, 2003. The greatest increase in mortality was due to causes directly attributable to heat: dehydration, hyperthermia, heat stroke. In addition to age and gender, combinatorial factors included preexisting disease, medication, urban residence, isolation, poverty, and, probably, air pollution. Although diversely impacted or reported, many parts of Europe suffered human and other losses, such as farming and forestry through drought and fires. Summer 2003 was the hottest in Europe since 1500, very likely due in part to anthropogenic climate change. The French experience confirms research establishing that heat waves are a major mortal risk, number one among so-called natural hazards in postindustrial societies. Yet France had no policy in place, as if dangerous climate were restricted to a distant or uncertain future of climate change, or to preindustrial countries. We analyze the heat wave's profile as a strongly attenuated risk in the French context, as well as the causes and the effects of its sudden shift into amplification. Research and preparedness needs are highlighted.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

Does the market value corporate response to climate change?

Motivated by the controversial debate on mandatory reductions of greenhouse gases in the U.S., this study explores whether the market values corporate response to tackle carbon dioxide emissions. We measure corporate responses using the measure of media tone based on the positive and negative words in each news article. Our results show that the market reacts favorably to the negative media exposure of corporate response to climate change over the announcement period and the one-year period, which implies that the socially responsible action to tackle climate change is costly. We further find that the positive response is less pronounced for firms from polluting industries and firms with poor environmental performance.     

Risk or Efficacy? How Psychological Distance Influences Climate Change Engagement

Construal-level theory suggests that high-level abstract features weigh more in people's decision-making at farther distance, while low-level concrete features weigh more at closer distance. Based on this, we propose that psychological distance will influence the effect of risk versus efficacy framing on climate change engagement. In particular, risk perception related to the end-state expectancy of climate change mitigation should influence people's climate change engagement at farther distance. In contrast, efficacy perception related to the perceived feasibility of attaining end-state goals should influence engagement at closer distance. Results from an experimental survey based on a national sample that is both demographically and geographically representative (N = 1,282) supported our proposition. At closer spatial distance, perceived efficacy boosted by efficacy framing increased participants’ intention to perform climate mitigation behaviors. In contrast, at farther distance, risk framing increased behavioral intention through heightened risk perception. Based on these findings, we suggest that when communicating distant and abstract risks, highlighting their disastrous impacts may better motivate action. In contrast, when communicating impending and concrete risks, stressing the feasibility of action may have stronger motivational potential.     

大气污染协同治理能促进污染物减排吗?--基于城市的三重差分研究

大气污染具有流动性,跨区域特征明显,协同治理至关重要。基于2010-2015年275个城市的面板数据,运用三重差分法(DDD)研究了大气污染协同治理对污染物减排的影响。从全样本分析结果来看,大气污染协同治理降低了工业二氧化硫排放量和工业烟(粉)尘排放量,而此结果并没有通过显著性检验。从子样本分析结果来看,大气污染协同治理显著降低了工业二氧化硫排放量,但对工业烟(粉)尘排放量没有产生显著影响。城市在促进不同污染物减排时存在差异,减排难度较低的污染物往往被优先完成。从时间效应来看,大气污染协同治理对污染物减排的影响存在时滞性,而且这种时滞性在不同污染物减排之间存在差异。     

Change in Public Concern and Responsive Behaviors Toward Air Pollution Under the Dome

This study evaluates the effect of the documentary Under the Dome on the concern and responsive behaviors of the public regarding air pollution in China, with two surveys conducted before and after watching the documentary. Employing difference-in-differences regression, this study answers two research questions: (1) Does Under the Dome change public concern about air pollution? (2) Does Under the Dome change public behaviors in response to air pollution, including protective behaviors (i.e., wearing face masks) and mitigation behaviors (i.e., reducing car driving)? We find that the information campaign (1) protects against the decline of public concern about air pollution in Beijing and (2) moderates the degree to which people's perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, and sense of self-efficacy influence protective behaviors and moderates the degree to which people's belief in the cooperative behaviors by others influences mitigation behaviors. This study provides evidence that information campaigns of the Under the Dome type are effective in raising public awareness; however, the information campaign did not directly influence public protective and mitigation behaviors.     

What Do People Know About Global Climate Change? 2. Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople

Drawing on results from earlier studies that used open-ended interviews, a questionnaire was developed to examine laypeople's knowledge about the possible causes and effects of global warming, as well as the likely efficacy of possible interventions. It was administered to two well-educated opportunity samples of laypeople. Subjects had a poor appreciation of the facts that (1) if significant global warming occurs, it will be primarily the result of an increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere, and (2) the single most important source of additional carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels, most notably coal and oil. In addition, their understanding of the climate issue was encumbered with secondary, irrelevant, and incorrect beliefs. Of these, the two most critical are confusion with the problems of stratospheric ozone and difficulty in differentiating between causes and actions specific to climate and more general good environmental practice.     

Uncertainties in the Link Between Global Climate Change and Predicted Health Risks from Pollution: Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) Case Study Using a Fugacity Model

Industrial societies have altered the earth's environment in ways that could have important, long-term ecological, economic, and health implications. In this paper, we examine the extent to which uncertainty about global climate change could impact the precision of predictions of secondary outcomes such as health impacts of pollution. Using a model that links global climate change with predictions of chemical exposure and human health risk in the Western region of the United States of America (U.S.), we define parameter variabilities and uncertainties and we characterize the resulting outcome variance. As a case study, we consider the public health consequences from releases of hexachlorobenzene (HCB), a ubiquitous multimedia pollutant. By constructing a matrix that links global environmental change both directly and indirectly to potential human-health effects attributable to HCB released into air, soil, and water, we define critical parameter variances in the health risk estimation process. We employ a combined uncertainty/sensitivity analysis to investigate how HCB releases are affected by increasing atmospheric temperature and the accompanying climate alterations that are anticipated. We examine how such uncertainty impacts both the expected magnitude and calculational precision of potential human exposures and health effects. This assessment reveals that uncertain temperature increases of up to 5°C have little impact on either the magnitude or precision of the public-health consequences estimated under existing climate variations for HCB released into air and water in the Western region of the U.S.     

Parenthood and Worrying About Climate Change: The Limitations of Previous Approaches

The present study considers the correlation between parenthood and worry about the consequences of climate change. Two approaches to gauging people's perceptions of the risks of climate change are compared: the classic approach, which measures risk perception, and the emotion‐based approach, which measures feelings toward a risk object. The empirical material is based on a questionnaire‐based survey of 3,529 people in Sweden, of whom 1,376 answered, giving a response rate of 39%. The results show that the correlation of parenthood and climate risk is significant when the emotional aspect is raised, but not when respondents were asked to do cognitive estimates of risk. Parenthood proves significant in all three questions that measure feelings, demonstrating that it is a determinant that serves to increase worry about climate change.     

Public Perception of Climate Change: The Importance of Knowledge and Cultural Worldviews

The importance of knowledge for lay people's climate change concerns has been questioned in recent years, as it had been suggested that cultural values are stronger predictors of concern about climate change than knowledge. Studies that simultaneously measured knowledge related to climate change and cultural values have, however, been missing. We conducted a mail survey in the German‐speaking part of Switzerland (N = 1,065). Results suggested that cultural worldviews and climate‐related knowledge were significantly related with people's concern about climate change. Also, cultural worldviews and climate‐relevant knowledge appeared important for people's willingness to change behaviors and to accept climate change policies. In addition, different types of knowledge were found to have different impacts on people's concern about climate change, their willingness to change behaviors, and their acceptance of policies about climate change. Specifically, causal knowledge significantly increased concern about climate change and willingness to support climate‐friendly policies. We therefore concluded that risk communication should focus on causal knowledge, provided this knowledge does not threaten cultural values.     

Perception of Climate Risk among Rural Farmers in Vietnam: Consistency within Households and with the Empirical Record

Rural farmers in Vietnamese communes perceive climate risk and potential impacts on livelihood within a complex context that may influence individual and household decisions. In a primary survey of 1,145 residents of the Thach Ha district of Ha Tinh province, we gathered data regarding perception about stability in climate, potential risks to livelihood, demographic characteristics, orientation toward risk, and interest in expanding economic activity. Temporal analysis of meteorological and economic indicator data forms an empirical basis for comparison with human perception. We ask the basic question: Are rural farmers’ perceptions of climate consistent with the historical record and reproducible within households? We find that respondents do perceive climate anomalies, with some anchoring on recent extreme events as revealed by climate observational data, and further that spouses disproportionately share perceptions relative to randomly simulated pairings. To put climate‐related risk perception in a larger context, we examine patterns across a range of risks to livelihood faced by farmers (livestock disease, pests, markets, health), using dimension reduction techniques. We find that our respondents distinguish among potential causes of low economic productivity, with substantial emphasis on climate‐related impacts. They do not express uniform concern across risks, but rather average patterns reveal common modes and distinguish climate concern. Still, among those expressing concern about climate‐related risks to livelihood we do not find an association with expressed intention to pursue changes in economic activity as a risk management response.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.