Ecological Risk Ranking: Development and Evaluation of a Method for Improving Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making

This article reports an extension of the Carnegie Mellon risk-ranking method to incorporate ecological risks and their attributes. On the basis of earlier risk-perception studies, we identified a set of 20 relevant attributes for describing health, safety, and environmental hazards in standardized risk summary sheets. In a series of three ranking sessions, 23 laypeople ranked 10 such hazards in a fictional Midwestern U.S. county using both holistic and multiattribute ranking procedures. Results were consistent with those from previous studies involving only health and safety hazards, providing additional evidence for the validity of the method and the replicability of the resulting rankings. Holistic and multiattribute risk rankings were reasonably consistent both for individuals and for groups. Participants reported that they were satisfied with the procedures and results, and indicated their support for using the method to advise real-world risk-management decisions. Agreement among participants increased over the course of the exercise, perhaps because the materials and deliberations helped participants to correct their misconceptions and clarify their values. Overall, health and safety attributes were judged more important than environmental attributes. However, the overlap between the importance rankings of these two sets of attributes suggests that some information about environmental impacts is important to participants' judgments in comparative risk-assessment tasks.     

Lay and Expert Interpretations of Cancer Cluster Evidence

Conflict frequently occurs between community members and environmental/public health officials when an unusual number of cancer cases is reported. This conflict may result from different ways in which laypeople and experts interpret facts to judge whether there is an environmental cause of the cancer cases, but little is known about this issue. Volunteer laypeople (N= 551) and epidemiologists (N= 105) read a hypothetical scenario about cases of cancer on one neighborhood block. Participants judged whether each of the 23 facts about the situation made it “much more likely” to “much less likely” that something in town was causing the cancer cases (7‐point scale). The facts were designed to be “alarming,”“reassuring,” or “neutral” (i.e., according to epidemiological principles, should increase, decrease, or have no impact on the likelihood of an environmental cause). The laypeople were alarmed by most of the facts (mean response significantly greater than the scale midpoint), including all of the neutral facts and over half of the reassuring facts. The experts were more balanced: they were alarmed by none of the neutral or reassuring facts. Their responses showed significantly less alarm than the laypeople's responses (p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). This study reveals that laypeople are not reassured by information that substantially lowers the chance of an environmental cause for cancer cases. Lay responses differ significantly and systematically from experts who are far less alarmed by relevant facts. These findings may help explain the conflicts between the two groups in situations where concern about cases of cancer arises in a community.     

Perceived Risks from Radiation and Nuclear Testing Near Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan: A Comparison Between Physicians, Scientists, and the Public

Determining the difference in perception of risk between experts, or more educated professionals, and laypeople is important so that a potential hazard can be effectively communicated to the public. Many surveys have been conducted to better understand the difference between expert and public opinions, and often laypeople exhibit higher perceptions of risk to hazards in comparison to experts. This is especially true when health risk is due to radiation, nuclear power, and nuclear waste. This article focuses on one section of a risk perception survey given to two groups of individuals with a more specialized education (scientists and physicians) and laypeople (villagers) in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. All of these groups live near the former Soviet nuclear test site. Originally, it was expected that the scientists and physicians would have similar perceptions of radiation risk, while the public perceptions would be higher, but this was not always the case. For example, when perceptions of risk pertain to the health impacts of nuclear testing or the dose-response nature of radiation exposure, the physicians tend to agree with the laypeople, not the scientists. The villagers are always the most risk-averse group, followed by the physicians and then the scientists. These differences are likely due to different frames of reference for each of the populations.     

Why Study Risk Perception?

Studies of risk perception examine the opinions people express when they are asked, in various ways, to characterize and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. This research aims to aid risk analysis and societal decision making by (i) improving methods for eliciting opinions about risk, (ii) providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards, and (iii) improving the communication of risk information among laypeople, technical experts, and policy makers.     

Experimental Evidence Against the Paradigm of Mortality Risk Aversion

This article deals with the question of how societal impacts of fatal accidents can be integrated into the management of natural or man‐made hazards. Today, many governmental agencies give additional weight to the number of potential fatalities in their risk assessments to reflect society's aversion to large accidents. Although mortality risk aversion has been proposed in numerous risk management guidelines, there has been no evidence that lay people want public decisionmakers to overweight infrequent accidents of large societal consequences against more frequent ones of smaller societal consequences. Furthermore, it is not known whether public decisionmakers actually do such overweighting when they decide upon the mitigation of natural or technical hazards. In this article, we report on two experimental tasks that required participants to evaluate negative prospects involving 1–100 potential fatalities. Our results show that neither lay people nor hazard experts exhibit risk‐averse behavior in decisions on mortality risks.     

Expert and Layperson Perceptions of Ecosystem Risk

This research examines and compares perceptions held by laypeople and ecologists about risks to ecosystems, particularly risk from global climate change (GCC). A survey elicited perceptions of 31 risk characteristics for 13 GCC and 12 non-GCC risks to ecosystems. Factor analysis was used to examine the structure of layperson and expert risk perceptions. Both experts and laypeople tend to perceive GCC risks to ecosystems as less avoidable and more acceptable than risks from other causes. Compared to laypeople's perceptions, though, experts perceived GCC risks to have slightly lower impacts, be less avoidable, more acceptable, and less understandable than non-GCC risks to ecosystems. These findings may help guide efforts to communicate with laypeople about ecological risks from climate change.     

Human and Nature‐Caused Hazards: The Affect Heuristic Causes Biased Decisions

People are more concerned about the negative consequences of human hazards compared with natural hazards. Results of four experiments show that the same negative outcome (e.g., number of birds killed by an oil spill) was more negatively evaluated when caused by humans than when caused by nature. Results further show that when identical risk information was provided, participants evaluated nuclear power more negatively compared with solar power. The affect associated with the hazard per se influenced the interpretation of the new information. Furthermore, the affect experienced in the situation fully mediated the evaluation of the negative outcomes of a hazard. People's reliance on the affect heuristic is a challenge for acceptance of cost‐benefit analyses because equally negative outcomes are differently evaluated depending on the cause. Symbolically significant information and the affect evoked by this information may result in biased and riskier decisions.     

Experiments in Lay Cues to the Relative Validity of Positions Taken by Disputing Groups of Scientists

Risk analysis and hazard management can prompt varied intra‐scientific disputes, some which have or will become public, and thus potentially available for lay judgments of the relative validity of the positions taken. As attentive laypeople may include elites as well as the general public, understanding whether and how cues to credibility of disputing groups of scientists might shape those lay judgments can be important. Relevant literatures from philosophy, social studies of science, risk analysis, and elsewhere have identified potential cues, but not tested their absolute or relative effects. Two experiments with U.S. online panel members tested multiple cues (e.g., credentials, experience, majority opinions, research quality) across topics varying in familiarity subject to actual intra‐science disputes (dark matter, marijuana, sea‐level rise). If cues supported a position, laypeople were more likely to choose it as relatively more valid, with information quality, majority “vote,” experience, and degree source as the strongest, and interest, demographic, and values similarity as the weakest, cues. These results were similar in overall rankings to those from implicit rankings of cue reliability ratings from an earlier U.S. online survey. Proposed moderators were generally nonsignificant, but topic familiarity and subjective topic knowledge tended to reduce cue effects. Further research to confirm and extend these findings can inform both theory about citizen engagement with scientific and risk disputes, and practice in communication about science and risk.     

“Chemophobia” Today: Consumers’ Knowledge and Perceptions of Chemicals

This mixed‐methods study investigated consumers’ knowledge of chemicals in terms of basic principles of toxicology and then related this knowledge, in addition to other factors, to their fear of chemical substances (i.e., chemophobia). Both qualitative interviews and a large‐scale online survey were conducted in the German‐speaking part of Switzerland. A Mokken scale was developed to measure laypeople's toxicological knowledge. The results indicate that most laypeople are unaware of the similarities between natural and synthetic chemicals in terms of certain toxicological principles. Furthermore, their associations with the term “chemical substances” and the self‐reported affect prompted by these associations are mostly negative. The results also suggest that knowledge of basic principles of toxicology, self‐reported affect evoked by the term “chemical substances,” risk‐benefit perceptions concerning synthetic chemicals, and trust in regulation processes are all negatively associated with chemophobia, while general health concerns are positively related to chemophobia. Thus, to enhance informed consumer decisionmaking, it might be necessary to tackle the stigmatization of the term “chemical substances” as well as address and clarify prevalent misconceptions.     

Social Contagion of Risk Perceptions in Environmental Management Networks

An important requisite for improving risk communication practice related to contentious environmental issues is having a better theoretical understanding of how risk perceptions function in real‐world social systems. Our study applied Scherer and Cho's social network contagion theory of risk perception (SNCTRP) to cormorant management (a contentious environmental management issue) in the Great Lakes Basin to: (1) assess contagion effects on cormorant‐related risk perceptions and individual factors believed to influence those perceptions and (2) explore the extent of social contagion in a full network (consisting of interactions between and among experts and laypeople) and three “isolated” models separating different types of interactions from the full network (i.e., expert‐to‐expert, layperson‐to‐layperson, and expert‐to‐layperson). We conducted interviews and administered questionnaires with experts (e.g., natural resource professionals) and laypeople (e.g., recreational and commercial anglers, business owners, bird enthusiasts) engaged in cormorant management in northern Lake Huron (n = 115). Our findings generally support the SNCTRP; however, the scope and scale of social contagion varied considerably based on the variables (e.g., individual risk perception factors), actors (i.e., experts or laypeople), and interactions of interest. Contagion effects were identified more frequently, and were stronger, in the models containing interactions between experts and laypeople than in those models containing only interactions among experts or laypeople.     

Augmenting the Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) characterized and prioritized the physical cross‐border threats and hazards to the nation stemming from terrorism, market‐driven illicit flows of people and goods (illegal immigration, narcotics, funds, counterfeits, and weaponry), and other nonmarket concerns (movement of diseases, pests, and invasive species). These threats and hazards pose a wide diversity of consequences with very different combinations of magnitudes and likelihoods, making it very challenging to prioritize them. This article presents the approach that was used at DHS to arrive at a consensus regarding the threats and hazards that stand out from the rest based on the overall risk they pose. Due to time constraints for the decision analysis, it was not feasible to apply multiattribute methodologies like multiattribute utility theory or the analytic hierarchy process. Using a holistic approach was considered, such as the deliberative method for ranking risks first published in this journal. However, an ordinal ranking alone does not indicate relative or absolute magnitude differences among the risks. Therefore, the use of the deliberative method for ranking risks is not sufficient for deciding whether there is a material difference between the top‐ranked and bottom‐ranked risks, let alone deciding what the stand‐out risks are. To address this limitation of ordinal rankings, the deliberative method for ranking risks was augmented by adding an additional step to transform the ordinal ranking into a ratio scale ranking. This additional step enabled the selection of stand‐out risks to help prioritize further analysis.     

Taxonomic Analysis of Perceived Risk: Modeling Individual and Group Perceptions Within Homogeneous Hazard Domains

Previous studies of risk perception have typically focused on the mean judgments of a group of people regarding the riskiness (or safety) of a diverse set of hazardous activities, substances, and technologies. This paper reports the results of two studies that take a different path. Study 1 investigated whether models within a single technological domain were similar to previous models based on group means and diverse hazards. Study 2 created a group taxonomy of perceived risk for only one technological domain, railroads, and examined whether the structure of that taxonomy corresponded with taxonomies derived from prior studies of diverse hazards. Results from Study 1 indicated that the importance of various risk characteristics in determining perceived risk differed across individuals and across hazards, but not so much as to invalidate the results of earlier studies based on group means and diverse hazards. In Study 2, the detailed analysis of railroad hazards produced a structure that had both important similarities to, and dissimilarities from, the structure obtained in prior research with diverse hazard domains. The data also indicated that railroad hazards are really quite diverse, with some approaching nuclear reactors in their perceived seriousness. These results suggest that information about the diversity of perceptions within a single domain of hazards could provide valuable input to risk-management decisions.     

Explosion Probability of Unexploded Ordnance: Expert Beliefs

This article reports on a study to quantify expert beliefs about the explosion probability of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Some 1,976 sites at closed military bases in the United States are contaminated with UXO and are slated for cleanup, at an estimated cost of $15–140 billion. Because no available technology can guarantee 100% removal of UXO, information about explosion probability is needed to assess the residual risks of civilian reuse of closed military bases and to make decisions about how much to invest in cleanup. This study elicited probability distributions for the chance of UXO explosion from 25 experts in explosive ordnance disposal, all of whom have had field experience in UXO identification and deactivation. The study considered six different scenarios: three different types of UXO handled in two different ways (one involving children and the other involving construction workers). We also asked the experts to rank by sensitivity to explosion 20 different kinds of UXO found at a case study site at Fort Ord, California. We found that the experts do not agree about the probability of UXO explosion, with significant differences among experts in their mean estimates of explosion probabilities and in the amount of uncertainty that they express in their estimates. In three of the six scenarios, the divergence was so great that the average of all the expert probability distributions was statistically indistinguishable from a uniform (0, 1) distribution—suggesting that the sum of expert opinion provides no information at all about the explosion risk. The experts' opinions on the relative sensitivity to explosion of the 20 UXO items also diverged. The average correlation between rankings of any pair of experts was 0.41, which, statistically, is barely significant (p= 0.049) at the 95% confidence level. Thus, one expert's rankings provide little predictive information about another's rankings. The lack of consensus among experts suggests that empirical studies are needed to better understand the explosion risks of UXO.     

A Deliberative Method for Ranking Risks (II): Evaluation of Validity and Agreement among Risk Managers

A deliberative method for ranking risks was evaluated in a study involving 218 risk managers. Both holistic and multiattribute procedures were used to assess individual and group rankings of health and safety risks facing students at a fictitious middle school. Consistency between the rankings that emerged from these two procedures was reasonably high for individuals and for groups, suggesting that these procedures capture an underlying construct of riskiness. Participants reported high levels of satisfaction with their groups' decision-making processes and the resulting rankings, and these reports were corroborated by regression analyses. Risk rankings were similar across individuals and groups, even though individuals and groups did not always agree on the relative importance of risk attributes. Lower consistency between the risk rankings from the holistic and multiattribute procedures and lower agreement among individuals and groups regarding these rankings were observed for a set of high-variance risks. Nonetheless, the generally high levels of consistency, satisfaction, and agreement suggest that this deliberative method is capable of producing risk rankings that can serve as informative inputs to public risk-management decision making.     

Aggregate, Disaggregate, and Hybrid Analyses of Ecological Risk Perceptions

Laypeople's perceptions of health and safety risks have been widely studied, but only a few studies have addressed perceptions of ecological hazards. We assembled a list of 39 attributes of ecological hazards from the literatures on comparative risk assessment, ecological health, environmental conservation and management, environmental psychology, and risk perception. In Study 1, 125 laypeople evaluated 83 hazards on subsets of this attribute set. Factor analysis of attribute ratings (averaged over participants) revealed six oblique factors: ecological impacts, human impacts, human benefits, aesthetic impacts, scientific understanding, and controllability. These factors predicted mean judgments of overall riskiness, ecological riskiness, acceptability, and regulatory strictness. In Study 2, 30 laypeople each evaluated 34 hazards on 17 attributes and 3 dependent variables. Aggregate-level factor analysis of these data replicated the appropriate portion of the factor solution and yielded similar regression results. Parallel analyses at the individual-participant level yielded factors that explained less variance in judgments of overall riskiness, ecological riskiness, and acceptability. However, the decrease in explanatory power was much less than is often reported for disaggregate-level analyses of psychometric data. This discrepancy illustrates the importance of distinguishing between the level of analysis (aggregate versus disaggregate) and the focus of analysis (distinctions among hazards versus distinctions among participants). In a hybrid analysis, aggregate-level factor scores predicted individual participants' riskiness judgments reasonably well. Psychometric studies such as these provide a sound empirical basis for selecting attributes of ecological hazards for use in comparative risk assessment.     

Deliberative Disjunction: Expert and Public Understanding of Outcome Uncertainty

Many environmental and risk management decisions are made jointly by technical experts and members of the public. Frequently, their task is to select from among management alternatives whose outcomes are subject to varying degrees of uncertainty. Although it is recognized that how this uncertainty is interpreted can significantly affect decision‐making processes and choices, little research has examined similarities and differences between expert and public understandings of uncertainty. We present results from a web‐based survey that directly compares expert and lay interpretations and understandings of different expressions of uncertainty in the context of evaluating the consequences of proposed environmental management actions. Participants responded to two hypothetical but realistic scenarios involving trade‐offs between environmental and other objectives and were asked a series of questions about their comprehension of the uncertainty information, their preferred choice among the alternatives, and the associated difficulty and amount of effort. Results demonstrate that experts and laypersons tend to use presentations of numerical ranges and evaluative labels differently; interestingly, the observed differences between the two groups were not explained by differences in numeracy or concerns for the predicted environmental losses. These findings question many of the usual presumptions about how uncertainty should be presented as part of deliberative risk‐ and environmental‐management processes.     

Assessing End‐Of‐Supply Risk of Spare Parts Using the Proportional Hazard Model

Operators of long field‐life systems like airplanes are faced with hazards in the supply of spare parts. If the original manufacturers or suppliers of parts end their supply, this may have large impacts on operating costs of firms needing these parts. Existing end‐of‐supply evaluation methods are focused mostly on the downstream supply chain, which is of interest mainly to spare part manufacturers. Firms that purchase spare parts have limited information on parts sales, and indicators of end‐of‐supply risk can also be found in the upstream supply chain. This article proposes a methodology for firms purchasing spare parts to manage end‐of‐supply risk by utilizing proportional hazard models in terms of supply chain conditions of the parts. The considered risk indicators fall into four main categories, of which two are related to supply (price and lead time) and two others are related to demand (cycle time and throughput). The methodology is demonstrated using data on about 2,000 spare parts collected from a maintenance repair organization in the aviation industry. Cross‐validation results and out‐of‐sample risk assessments show good performance of the method to identify spare parts with high end‐of‐supply risk. Further validation is provided by survey results obtained from the maintenance repair organization, which show strong agreement between the firm's and the model's identification of high‐risk spare parts.     

Effect of Providing the Uncertainty Information About a Tornado Occurrence on the Weather Recipients’ Cognition and Protective Action: Probabilistic Hazard Information Versus Deterministic Warnings

Currently, a binary alarm system is used in the United States to issue deterministic warning polygons in case of tornado events. To enhance the effectiveness of the weather information, a likelihood alarm system, which uses a tool called probabilistic hazard information (PHI), is being developed at National Severe Storms Laboratory to issue probabilistic information about the threat. This study aims to investigate the effects of providing the uncertainty information about a tornado occurrence through the PHI's graphical swath on laypeople's concern, fear, and protective action, as compared with providing the warning information with the deterministic polygon. The displays of color‐coded swaths and deterministic polygons were shown to subjects. Some displays had a blue background denoting the probability of any tornado formation in the general area. Participants were asked to report their levels of concern, fear, and protective action at randomly chosen locations within each of seven designated levels on each display. Analysis of a three‐stage nested design showed that providing the uncertainty information via the PHI would appropriately increase recipients’ levels of concern, fear, and protective action in highly dangerous scenarios, with a more than 60% chance of being affected by the threat, as compared with deterministic polygons. The blue background and the color‐coding type did not have a significant effect on the people's cognition of the threat and reaction to it. This study shows that using a likelihood alarm system leads to more conscious decision making by the weather information recipients and enhances the system safety.     

The Distinction Between Risk and Hazard: Understanding and Use in Stakeholder Communication

A major issue in all risk communication efforts is the distinction between the terms “risk” and “hazard.” The potential to harm a target such as human health or the environment is normally defined as a hazard, whereas risk also encompasses the probability of exposure and the extent of damage. What can be observed again and again in risk communication processes are misunderstandings and communication gaps related to these crucial terms. We asked a sample of 53 experts from public authorities, business and industry, and environmental and consumer organizations in Germany to outline their understanding and use of these terms using both the methods of expert interviews and focus groups. The empirical study made clear that the terms risk and hazard are perceived and used very differently in risk communication depending on the perspective of the stakeholders. Several factors can be identified, such as responsibility for hazard avoidance, economic interest, or a watchdog role. Thus, communication gaps can be reduced to a four‐fold problem matrix comprising a semantic, conceptual, strategic, and control problem. The empirical study made clear that risks and hazards are perceived very differently depending on the stakeholders’ perspective. Their own worldviews played a major role in their specific use of the two terms hazards and risks in communication.     

Examining the Relationship Between Affect and Implicit Associations: Implications for Risk Perception

It has been suggested that affect may play an important role in risk perception. Slovic et al. argued that people make use of the “affect heuristic” when assessing risks because it is easier and more efficient to rely on spontaneous affective reactions than to analyze all available information. In the present studies, a single category implicit association test (SC‐IAT) to measure associations evoked by different hazards was employed. In the first study, we tested the extent to which the SC‐IAT corresponds to the theoretical construct of affect in a risk framework. Specifically, we found that the SC‐IAT correlates with other explicit measures that claim to measure affect, as well as with a measure of trust, but not with a measure that captures a different construct (subjective knowledge). In the second study, we addressed the question of whether hazards that vary along the dread dimension of the psychometric paradigm also differ in the affect they evoke. The results of the SC‐IAT indicated that a high‐dread hazard (nuclear power) elicits negative associations. Moreover, the high‐dread hazard evoked more negative associations than a medium‐dread hazard (hydroelectric power). In contrast, a nondread hazard (home appliances) led to positive associations. The results of our study highlight the importance of affect in shaping attitudes and opinions toward risks. The results further suggest that implicit measures may provide valuable insight into people's risk perception above and beyond explicit measures.