Your Place or Mine? Beliefs About Inequality and Redress Preferences in South Africa

This article examines the nature of and change in beliefs about inequality and preferences for redistribution in South Africa between 2003 and 2012 using data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey series and 2009 round of the International Social Survey Programme. Inequality aversion, stratification beliefs, perceptions of class tensions and legitimate earnings are tracked, together with support for government redistribution and for specific redress policies. Overall, the findings portray South Africans as keenly aware of the economic inequality that beleaguers their society, and express a preference for greater distributive fairness. Broad support is also reported in relation to state-led redistribution, though a moderate declining trend is observed over the interval. Race and class differences characterise the survey results, though a majority of better-off South Africans (white, tertiary educated and non-poor citizens) still tend to be inequality averse and voice support for redistribution. Greater polarisation is evident with respect to inequality-related social policy, especially those designed to overcome historical racial disadvantage, though these intergroup differences converge considerably when referring to class-based policy measures. One surprising finding is the evidence that South Africa’s youngest generation, known as the ‘Born Frees’, tend to adopt a similar predisposition to redress policy as older generations, thus confounding expectations of a post-apartheid value change. Nonetheless, even though South Africans may not fully agree about the specific elements comprising a socially just response to the country’s inequality problem, there does seem to be a stronger basis for a social compact for an inequality reduction agenda than is typically assumed.     

South African Quality of Life Trends Over Three Decades, 1980–2010

The South African Quality of Life Trends study has tracked the subjective well-being of South Africans in ten waves from 1983 to 2010. The paper presents the SAQoL trendline of life satisfaction, happiness and perceptions of life getting better or worse against the backdrop of the transition from apartheid to democracy. Subjective well-being peaked in the month following the first open elections in April 1994 when black and white South Africans were equally satisfied and happy at levels found in other democratic societies. But post-election euphoria was short-lived and levels of well-being dropped the following year and racial inequalities in evaluations of life re-emerged. The tenth and latest wave in the study was conducted a few months after South Africa’s successful hosting of the Soccer World Cup. In 2010, the proportions of all South Africans expressing satisfaction, happiness and optimism was among the highest since the coming of democracy—just over half stated they were satisfied, close on two-thirds were happy, and half felt life was getting better. Nonetheless, while the standard of living has increased for a minority of formerly disadvantaged South Africans and a small black middle class has emerged, there are still huge disparities in both material and subjective well-being. In 1997 and 2010, South Africans were asked what would make them happier in future. In 2010, the majority of citizens still hoped for basic necessities, income and employment, to enhance their quality of life.     

South Africa's 'Rainbow People', National Pride and Happiness

Since the first free elections were held in April 1994, South Africans are popularly known as the 'rainbow people'. The paper inquires whether South Africans who experienced pride in their nation in the first years of democracy also perceived a greater sense of subjective well-being. It is proposed that national pride in post-apartheid South Africa might be fused with or work through self-esteem to lift levels of happiness. The paper traces the history of the new integrating civil religion of the rainbow people and the acceptance of the rainbow as a political symbol of unity among the diverse people of South Africa immediately after the 1994 elections and two years later. The proposed link between national pride and happiness was explored with data from two independent national surveys, the 1995 South African World Values Survey conducted by Markinor and a June 1996 MarkData syndicated omnibus survey. The study found that the appeal of the rainbow as political symbol was inclusive of all groups in society and that feelings of national pride and support for the rainbow ideal were positively associated with subjective well-being. As indicated by intensity and frequency measures, the majority of South Africans were proud of their country and could name a national achievement that inspired pride. Better-off South Africans tended to be happier and more satisfied with life but less proud, while the poor were less happy but fiercely proud of their country. Results suggest that belief in South Africa's 'rainbow nation' ideal may have assisted in boosting happiness during the transition to a stable democracy, thereby preventing alienation among the losers under the new political dispensation. Supporters of the ideal of the rainbow nation were more optimistic than others about the future of their country.     

Social Anomie and Racial Segregation in South Africa

The concept of anomie is one of the classics of sociological theory. Developed by scholars such as Emile Durkheim and Robert K. Merton, the concept refers to the absence of clear social norms and values and to a lack of sense of social regulation. However, whereas Merton focused on features of relative deprivation that cause anomie, Durkheim was primarily interested in the link between rapid social change and social anomie. According to the latter, normative regulation is threatened with being undermined and people are likely to lack the social and psychological means for adjustment in times of rapid social change. Drawing on survey data from the South African General Household Survey polled in 2002, the article examines the ethnical differences in levels of social anomie in the South African society. In order to do so, we, first, place the South African levels of anomie into comparative context. In a second step, we look at the race specific levels of anomie. Third, we investigate whether the differences in anomie between the races are related to the still existing socio-economic inequalities or whether race can be regarded as an independent factor that impacts on anomie. Finally we scrutinize to what extent socio-economic factors account for different levels of anomie within the races.     

Crime and perceptions after a decade of democracy

Crime has become central to any discussion about the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Concerns about crime intensified in the years after 1994, as the country attempted to grapple with the apparent ‘crime wave’ that accompanied the transition. A decade later crime is still a priority for government and a concern among citizens, but the clamour that characterised both state and civil society responses in the early years of democracy has receded (See the article by the author in Social Indicators Research 41: 137–168, 1997). This may relate to the decrease in crime levels as reflected by various statistical sources. It is also possible that those whose voices were heard most loudly on the issue – the middle classes – have taken all available measures to protect their property and lives from crime. In all likelihood, South Africans have become accustomed to living in a violent society, and one in which other equally serious problems now require attention. Although the national obsession with crime has waned, the available data nevertheless indicate that the problem still affects many thousands of lives. The impact of crime – in terms of the costs of victimisation, negative perceptions and fear, and the cost of responding to crime – remains high for South African society. This paper considers how crime levels and perceptions about crime and safety have changed over the past decade, and what these trends tell us about the country 10 years into our democracy.     

Hope the Beloved Country: Hope Levels in the New South Africa

The concept of hope seems to have attracted increased attention in popular and academic discourse in South Africa. Despite this increased focus, no empirical studies on national hope levels have been conducted in South Africa to date. This article sought to address this gap by investigating national hope levels using data taken from the 2009 wave of the Human Sciences Research Council’s nationally representative South African Social Attitudes Survey of approximately 3,300 South Africans aged 16 and older. Using a slightly modified version of the widely used Snyder Hope Scale, this study found significant geographic and social differences in citizens’ average hope levels. Differences appear to attest to the continued negative association between hope levels and membership of groups that have historically been relegated to the margins of South African society. Contrary to most current political portrayals, however, there does not appear to be a significant age cohort effect. Self-perceptions of marginalisation also appear to be related to hope. In light of the paucity of South African empirical work in this area, the paper concluded by identifying possible future research needs.     

Youth and Well-Being: A South African Case Study

This paper was a result of an analysis from various data sources with a purpose to develop a better understanding of the level of socio-economic well being of young people in South Africa. Such understanding is aimed at enabling government to plan and implement well-structured and integrated development programmes that are relevant to the socio-economic needs of the youth and that will enable them to fully participate in all aspects of society. Two main sources of data were used for this analysis. The first is the Status of the Youth (SYR) data set. The second data set used in this study is the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) which is a national representative sample of 5,000 households. The study shows that the quality of life among majority of young people remains low, reflecting the historical racial cleavages of South African society. This is mainly due to the emergence of the AIDS pandemic in South Africa, and the fact that many young people remain outside the labour market.     

Satisfied and dissatisfied South Africans: results from the General Household Survey in international comparison

Who are the satisfied South Africans 10 years into democracy? How do material factors contribute to their life satisfaction? These are the questions addressed in this paper. Earlier South African research has consistently found a close positive relationship between life satisfaction and material standards of living in the apartheid and post-apartheid era. Recently, a new source of information has become available to shed further light on the association between material and subjective well-being. In 2002, Statistics South Africa, the country’s official source of statistical information, agreed to ask South Africans participating in the General Household Survey whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with life. The 2002 General Household Survey (n26’000) used a measure developed for the Euromodule that allows for international comparison. The wide-ranging information contained in South Africa’s official?household survey offers a unique opportunity to explore what makes for satisfied and dissatisfied South Africans in relation to their material living standards. Results indicate that the improved living standards afforded to many black South Africans under democracy are associated with increases in life satisfaction. Furthermore, habituation does not appear to have diluted the positive relationship between living standards and well-being. However, political factors continue to play an important role in shaping subjective well-being. In conclusion, it is argued that material gains might also have restored the pride and dignity denied to black South Africans in the past.     

Poverty,Inequality and Deprivation in South Africa: An Analysis of the 1993 SALDRU Survey

This paper analyses poverty and inequality in South Africa based on data from a comprehensive multi-purpose household survey undertaken in 1993 to provide baseline statistics on poverty and its determinants to the new government. The paper shows that South Africa has among the highest levels of income inequality in the world and compares poorly in most social indicators to countries with similar income levels. Much of the poverty in the country is a direct result of apartheid policies that denied equal access to education, employment, services, and resources to the black population of the country. As a result, poverty has a very strong racial dimension with poverty concentrated among the African population. In addition, poverty is much higher in rural areas, and particularly high in the former homelands. Poverty among female-headed households and among children is also higher than average. Moreover, poverty is closely related to poor education and lack of employment. The poor suffer from lack of access to education, quality health care, basic infrastructure, transport, are heavily indebted, have little access to productive resources, and are heavily dependent on remittances and social transfers, particularly social pensions and disability grants. The paper uses an income-based definition of poverty for most of the analysis. In addition, it develops a broad-based index of deprivation including income, employment, wealth, access to services, health, education, and perceptions of satisfaction as its components. While on average the two indicators correspond fairly closely, the income poverty measure misses a considerable number of people who are severely deprived in many of the non-income measures of well-being. This group of severely deprived not identified by the income poverty measure consists predominantly of Africans living in rural areas, concentrated particularly in the province of KwaZulu/Natal.     

The South African fertility decline: Evidence from two censuses and a Demographic and Health Survey

Inadequate data and apartheid policies have meant that, until recently, most demographers have not had the opportunity to investigate the level of, and trend in, the fertility of South African women. The 1996 South Africa Census and the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey provide the first widely available and nationally representative demographic data on South Africa since 1970. Using these data, this paper describes the South African fertility decline from 1955 to 1996. Having identified and adjusted for several errors in the 1996 Census data, the paper argues that total fertility at that time was 3.2 children per woman nationally, and 3.5 children per woman for African South Africans. These levels are lower than in any other sub-Saharan African country. We show also that fertility in South Africa has been falling since the 1960s. Thus, fertility transition predates the establishment of a family planning programme in the country in 1974.     

The Role of Quality of Life Surveys in Managing Change in Democratic Transitions: The South African Case

The South African Quality of Life Project hastracked subjective well-being, lifesatisfaction and happiness, since the earlyeighties at the national level. In mostdemocratic countries around the globe, theaverage citizen says he or she is satisfiedwith life in general. In South Africa this isnot the case. Since the early 1980s, thetrend study shows up disparities between onesector of the South African population that issatisfied with life in general and variousaspects of life and another sector that is verydissatisfied. Generally, the better-off reporthigher levels of satisfaction and happinessthan the worse-off.The most plausible explanation for the SouthAfrican quality-of-life constellation is thehuge gap in living standards between rich andpoor, a legacy of the apartheid era, whichdiscriminated against blacks and to a lesserextent against Indian and coloured people.Euphoria following on the first democraticelections in April 1994, which registeredequally high aggregate levels of happiness andlife satisfaction among all sectors of thepopulation, was short-lived. Under democracy,expectations ``for a better life for all'’, theelection slogans for the 1994 and 1999 generalelections, has risen. South Africa has one ofthe most enlightened constitutions, whichguarantees basic human rights and supportsadvancement of the previously disadvantaged. Aslong as South Africans perceive barriers toaccessing the material rewards of democracy,they do not see justice has been done.South Africa is currently grappling withproblems common to other societies intransition to democracy. Since 1994, governmentprogrammes and policies have been devised toaddress the critical twin problems of povertyand inequality in society. The latest round ofresearch for the South African Quality of LifeTrends Project probes popular assessments ofthe policies and programmes aimed at improvingthe quality of life of ordinary South Africans.Interviews with a panel of 25 opinion leadersin the run-up to the June 1999 generalelections were followed by a nationallyrepresentative opinion survey in October 1999.The paper outlines the role of socialindicators in monitoring quality of life inSouth Africa and reports findings from theelite and rank-and-file surveys. Generally, thewinners and losers in the new politicaldispensation see changes from a differentperspective. The disadvantaged are more likelyto have seen material gains and recommendincreased delivery of services andopportunities for social mobility. Theadvantaged, who have mainly experiencednon-material or no gains since 1994, are morelikely to be pessimistic about the future. Itis concluded that the groundswell of optimismwill sustain the majority of South Africans whoare still dissatisfied with life until theirdreams of the good life are fulfilled.     

Monitoring Perceptions of the Causes of Poverty in South Africa

This study explored how people perceive the causes of poverty. Literature revealed that there are three broad theoretical explanations of perceptions of the causes of poverty, namely individualistic explanations, where blame is placed squarely on the poor themselves; structural explanations, where poverty is blamed on external social and economic forces; and fatalistic explanations, which attribute poverty to factors such as bad luck or illness. To examine South Africans perceptions according to these dimensions secondary analysis was employed on one of the Human Sciences Research Council’s (HSRC) national representative client surveys. Approximately 3,498 respondents across South Africa were surveyed between 18 April and 30 May 2006. The bivariate analysis revealed that South Africans in general attribute poverty to structural over individualistic and fatalistic dimensions of poverty. Ordinary least square regressions revealed that these perceptions of poverty interacted with a host of socio-demographic and economic variables such as race and peoples’ lived experiences of poverty. In this regard, all three ordinary least square regressions showed that lived poverty had a significant impact in predicting respectively structural, individualistic and fatalistic perceptions of the causes of poverty. The second regression predicted individualistic perceptions and showed that being white was the most significant predictor. The third regression predicted fatalistic perceptions and established that being coloured was the most significant predictor.     

Socio-economic status and fertility decline: Insights from historical transitions in Europe and North America

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre-transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations.     

Socio-economic correlates of fecundability in a sample of taiwanese women

Estimates of fecundability (monthly probability of conception) in the absence of contraception are derived from the frequency distribution of conceptive delays immediately following marriage, reported by 2,443 married women aged 20 to 39 included in the Taichung (Taiwan) Intensive Fertility Survey of 1962. Average fecundability of women is positively associated with their socio-economic status. These differentials are not accounted for by differences among socio-economic groups with respect to memory and truncation biases (associated with the marriage duration), wife’s age at marriage, or unreported premarital conceptions. A Multiple Classification Analysis suggests that among the socio-economic characteristics, husband’s education, rural background, and modern family type are the more important predictors of fecundability. The importance of genetic factors as opposed to cultural factors in producing these socio-economic differences in fecundability can not be evaluated systematically. Moreover, the relation of a couple’s privacy, their attitude toward family building, and patterns of mate selection to their socioeconomic status would have to be taken into account before the differences in fecundability could be attributed to factors such as nutrition, health, or infections which might directly influence their physiological ability to conceive.     

Environmentally Responsible Happy Nation Index: Refinements and 2015 Rankings

Fifty years have elapsed since Cantril (1965) published his work on The Pattern of Human Concerns. His line of inquiry has stood the test of time. In late 2012, the nationally representative South African Social Attitudes Survey replicated Cantril’s 1960s questions and methodology to elicit South Africans’ hopes and aspirations and worries and fears for self and country and their ratings of where self and country stood—past, present and will stand in future. Although Cantril’s ‘ladder-of life’ scale is still regularly used as a measure of subjective well-being, to our knowledge his full line of preliminary questioning has not been fielded again to date. Our study found that South African aspirations for self were mainly material ones for a decent standard of living and the means to achieve this goal. Hopes for the nation concentrated on economic and political progress to consolidate South Africa’s democracy. A large number of personal and national hopes were mirrored in fears that these aspirations might not be met. Cantril’s method also allowed us to review the main concerns and ratings across the diverse groups of citizens that make up the ‘rainbow nation’. There was a substantial degree of consensus on top hopes and fears but levels of standing on the Cantril ladder of life were still graded according to apartheidera inequalities with black South Africans scoring lower than other race groups. Nonetheless, the majority of South Africans rated their present life better than 5 years ago and projected life to get better in future. Such optimism may place considerable pressure on the state to deliver on personal and societal hopes as the country enters its third decade of democracy.     

Drinking,Smoking, and Morality: Do ‘Drinkers and Smokers’ Constitute a Stigmatised Stereotype or a Real TB Risk Factor in the Time of HIV/AIDS?

This paper follows up an unexpected finding from a community survey that identified drinking and smoking as the most important tuberculosis (TB) risk factor, far ahead of ones commonly associated with TB such as poverty, overcrowded living conditions, and HIV-positive status. It reports perceptions of drinking and smoking from a three-phased study of the stigma associated with TB, consisting of a qualitative pilot study using focus-group discussions (2006), a larger-scale community survey (2007), and follow-up group discussions (2009). The community attitude survey was conducted with a sample of 1,020 adults living in a low-income township in the Eastern Cape Province, South Africa. The study found that the moral and the biomedical understanding of TB risk are intertwined. In the community survey, perceptions of drinking and smoking as TB risk were predicted by fear of contracting TB and being a self-reported born-again Christian. In the follow-up study, heavy drinking and smoking in shebeens (unlicensed township liquor outlets) was associated with a risky lifestyle that can spread both TB and HIV. The paper discusses the similarities and differences in the roles of church and shebeen in providing social support to township dwellers to cope with problems of daily life. It is tentatively concluded that the stereotypical shebeen ‘drinkers and smokers’, alternatively pitied and maligned by moral society, might serve as the scapegoat that deflects pollution from the ‘new’ TB linked to the AIDS epidemic.     

Differences in life expectancy by education and occupation in Italy, 1980-94: indirect estimates from maternal and paternal orphanhood

In the present study, we use the modified orphanhood method to analyse mortality differences by socio-economic status in Italy. This technique permits the indirect estimation of adult mortality from survey-based information on parents' survival in developed populations and helps to overcome several limitations of conventional studies on mortality differences by social class. We estimate a time series of life tables by education and occupation and analyse the differences in life expectancy by socio-economic status along with their changes between 1980-84, 1985-89, and 1990-94. Whereas mortality differences between the highest social class and the other socio-economic status groups increased among men, they decreased among women. We speculate about the reasons for these sex-specific trends and evaluate the application of indirect estimation techniques to the populations of developed countries.