销售不定期客票背景下双航班的联合机票控制研究

航空公司收益管理的基本思想是针对不同的细分市场,将同一舱位的座位以不同的价格进行销售,以实现机票收益的最大化.以前有关机票动态控制的研究基本上都是基于单个航班的,本文则考虑部分行程灵活的旅客在不同航班之间的可能转移行为,研究了两个航班的联合座位动态控制决策.在模型中,结合实际生活中航空公司提前以超低折扣价销售部分不定期客票的做法,本文将航空公司机票销售过程划分为五个阶段,并着重研究了最后两个阶段的(联合)机票控制策略,深入分析了收益函数的结构性质.     

考虑旅客跨区间流转的机票多预定区间折扣优化模型研究

多预定区间差异化折扣逐渐成为机票收益管理的重要分支。本文提出了一种新的收益管理模型：基于顾客跨区间流转的收益管理模型,并给出了二分法迭代求解方法。假设各个预订时间区间的潜在需求可以通过大数据手段进行预测,首先结合旅客的价格敏感和潜在需求跨时间段流转的特性分析了各区间的需求函数,然后结合需求函数构建了多预定区间折扣优化模型。由于该模型属于动态的收益管理模型,因此构建了一种动态求解方法——二分迭代法。最后,依据航空公司的实际情况设计了两个仿真实验。实验计算结果不仅验证了新模型和算法的有效性,而且得出一些比较有用的结论：（1）票价与提前购票时间不存在单调的线性关系;（2）预订区间远离离港日折扣逐渐变大,靠近离港日的折扣会逐渐减少,但是包含离港日的预订区间的折扣又会变大;（3）流转率越高则折扣越少;（4）价格敏感系数越高折扣越高;（5）流转率通过改变价格敏感系数而影响折扣的大小。本文给出的折扣优化决策模型符合旅游产品多预定区间折扣决策的实践,可以为机票、酒店、景区等多种旅游产品的票价决策提供有益参考。     

收入管理:时效性资源的管理科学

收入管理的产生和发展在上世纪60年代,美国许多航空公司的经营者都在为这样一件事情头疼:一部分旅客在预订了机票以后由于种种原因在飞机起飞前取消了预订,他们有的通过电话通知了航空公司,有的甚至在没有任何通知的情况下没有去机场签票。旅客临时取消预订机票的做法往往导致航空公司没有足够的时间将这些多余的座位卖给其他乘客,造成了一定程度的空载和收入上的损失。由于旅客对机票的预订大部分是口头承诺,航空公司无法追究旅客不兑现预订的责任。为了解决这个问题,航空公司采用超订策略,即接受的旅客预订人数超过飞机所能提供的座位数量…     

基于B-S期权定价模型的V2G备用合约协调机制研究

基于V2G备用市场的风险中性交易特点及实践中常用的“保底收购,随行就市”合约价格机制,构建了电网公司实施期权进行套期保值前后的电动汽车用户电量预留决策模型,并对比分析了Stackelberg博弈和合作博弈下渠道双方的反馈均衡策略与最优收益。研究结果表明：仅简单地采用市场保护性的合约价格机制,将使得V2G备用市场的交易风险完全由电网公司来承担,从而无法防止其在市场行情不好时的机会主义行为;在此基础上,电网公司选择购买期权以规避由V2G备用市场价格波动所带来的风险,但是分散决策时的均衡收益小于集中决策最优收益。为此,进一步引入“B-S期权定价+预留协作+保证金”契约机制使得合作系统达到完美协调,且渠道双方的期望收益都得到Pareto改进,并给出了均衡时的V2G备用预留协作系数、交易保证金以及合约电价之间满足的解析关系。算例分析结果验证了本文提出的模型与理论分析的可行性。     

“线上销售/回收+线下服务”的闭环供应链定价与服务决策

对于“线上销售/回收+线下服务”的闭环供应链模式,研究了制造商在正向和逆向渠道中都与服务商进行收益共享情况下的最优销售/回收定价决策和最优服务水平决策,并比较了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、服务商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商与服务商Nash均衡博弈三种情形下的最优决策和最优利润。结果表明：最优的新产品销售价格和正向渠道服务水平均与正向渠道收益分成比例呈正相关;最优的废旧产品回收价格与逆向渠道收益分成比例呈负相关,而最优的逆向渠道服务水平与之呈正相关。制造商和服务商的最优利润不仅受正逆向渠道收益分成比例的影响,而且与新产品生产成本的大小有关：当新产品生产成本较小时,处于领导地位的一方获得的最优利润最大,而当新产品生产成本增大到一定程度后,对方处于领导地位时自身获得的最优利润反而最大,而双方均势时各自获得的最优利润均不占优。     

代码共享协议选择非合作-合作两型博弈模型

代码共享是航空公司之间一种普遍的有效合作方式,而达成代码共享协议是代码共享机票定价以及代码共享航空公司获利的前提.由于自由销售代码共享协议与利润共享机制缺乏相关研究,本文着重研究了利润共享机制下自由销售代码共享协议优化选择问题.首先提出了辐条模型可以更贴近地描述现实中乘客对航空公司的偏好,其次构建一种融通非合作博弈与合作博弈于一体的非合作-合作两型博弈模型.在非合作博弈部分,航空公司从各自角度出发考虑所有可能的代码共享协议,即形成各种竞争局势;在合作博弈部分,代码共享航空公司通过机票联合定价可分得利润,而竞争局势需要根据航空公司所得利润才能进行比较.所构建的非合作-合作两型博弈模型的显著特点包括：在非合作博弈部分航空公司无法事先估计其在各种竞争局势下的利润,而在不同竞争局势下合作博弈部分的最大航空联盟是不同的,且任意航空子联盟具有外部性.针对最大航空联盟有可能分裂的情形,本文利用Shapley值与两步Shapley值作为合作博弈部分的利润分配方法.通过数值实验,验证了所建非合作-合作两型博弈模型与解法的有效性,并从对比结果中可以发现,利润共享机制下自由销售代码共享协议具有显著优势,特别...     

航空客运舱位控制和超售综合静态建模研究

本文研究航空运输收益管理的舱位控制和超售综合静态建模问题.通过将机票销售过程模拟成排队过程,以收益最大化为目标函数,首先给出了单航段单等级票价下的超售水平公式.然后将该思路推广到多等级票价情况,应用动态规划方法建立了舱位控制和超售综合控制静态模型,在建立了两个定理的基础上,由该模型进一步推导出了各等级舱位最优订座限制的决策方程.最后分析了一个实例以说明决策方程的应用.     

公开或隐藏未来市场价格对新品预售的影响研究

预售是新产品上市前，商家允许消费者提前预定产品的一种销售手段。本文以新产品预售为背景，建立了商家同时销售新旧两代产品时的预售模型，先对消费者最优购买策略进行了分析，在此基础上，分两种情况，即商家在预售阶段公开或隐藏新品未来市场价格，研究了商家最优预售价格折扣和最优订购量。最后，通过数值仿真分析了影响新品预售策略和商家收益的一些因素。结果表明，商家在预售阶段公开新品未来市场价格可以获得更高期望收益。     

考虑旅客选择行为的多舱位等级动态定价研究

通过实证方法研究了考虑旅客选择行为的多舱位等级动态定价决策问题。基于多元Logit选择模型,提出了考虑票价、售出数量、变更转签限制、退票费用限制和提前预订天数等因素的旅客选择行为模型,并结合航空公司历史运营数据使用马尔可夫蒙特卡洛方法对旅客到达率以及旅客选择行为模型中的属性参数进行了估计。在此基础上,构建了融合旅客到达率和旅客选择行为的多舱位等级动态定价决策模型,用以阐释考虑旅客选择行为的舱位等级最优价格决策过程,确定每个时期舱位等级的定价策略,评估基于旅客选择的定价策略相较于现行定价策略的收益改进。实证结果表明：当决策时间点临近航班出发日时,舱位等级价格会随之提高;在同一个决策时间点,舱位等级价格会随座位余量的减少而提高。相较于现行定价策略,基于旅客选择的定价策略预期收益提高了22.32%,证明了基于旅客选择的定价策略在现实环境中的可行性和经济性。     

零售商提前支付与贷款担保下的供应商融资策略

在供应商面临资金约束的供应链中,通过零售商提前订购部分产品并支付货款的内部预订融资模式,与零售商为供应商提供担保向银行借款的外部信贷融资模式,可以缓解供应商的资金约束对零售商及供应链利润的影响,研究了两种模式下供应商和零售商的最优生产决策和融资决策,并分析了供应商的自有资金、零售商的资金成本、银行利率三种因素对于供应链融资绩效的影响。结果表明:两种融资模式要实现无资金约束下的最优生产量,都需要供应商拥有一定的初始资金,所需初始资金量的多少与各自的融资成本有关。所得的结论为供应链企业选择合适的融资方式和最优生产决策提供指导。最后通过数值分析对结论进行了验证。     

Outsourcing vs. in-house production: a comparison of supply chain contracts with effort dependent demand

We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in a two facility supply chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to increase demand. We consider an outsourcing model in which the supplier makes the effort decision and an in-house production model in which the manufacturer decides on the effort level and we compare these two models with each other. We analyze and compare several contracts for decentralized supply chain models and we aim to find which contracts are best to use in different cases. We find the optimal contract parameters in each case and perform extensive computational testing to compare the efficiencies of these contracts. We also analyze the effect of the powers of the parties in the system and the effect of system parameters on the performances of the contracts and on the optimal values of the model variables such as price, effort and demand.     

Assessing fairness of selfish revenue sharing mechanisms for airline alliances

Airline alliances offer flights including flight legs operated by different airlines. A major problem is how to share the revenue obtained through selling a flight ticket among the airlines in a fair way. Recently, Kimms and Çetiner [1] have proposed fair revenue allocations based on the solution concept nucleolus, which assumes that the decisions of the alliance are given centrally. However, in an alliance, each airline has a selfish behavior and tries to maximize its own revenue. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a method to evaluate the fairness of revenue sharing mechanisms applied in a selfish setting. The method includes a simulation model for the booking process of the alliance and uses the nucleolus-based allocations as benchmark. Second, we develop a revenue sharing mechanism based on the transfer of dual prices. The fairness of the new mechanism and several other existing approaches is assessed through a numerical study.     

The Role of Slotting Fees in the Coordination of Assortment Decisions

Large numbers of new products introduced annually by manufacturers may strain the relationship between retailers and manufacturers regarding assortments carried by retailers. For example, many retailers in the grocery industry will agree to broaden their assortments only if the manufacturer agrees to pay slotting fees for the new products. We investigate the role played by slotting fees in coordinating the assortment decisions in a supply chain. To do so, we study a single‐retailer, single‐manufacturer supply chain, where the retailer decides what assortment to offer to end customers. Double marginalization results in a discrepancy between the retailer's optimal assortment and the assortment that maximizes total supply chain profits. We consider a payment scheme that is analogous to slotting fees used in the grocery industry: the manufacturer pays the retailer a per‐product fee for every product offered by the retailer in excess of a certain target level. We show that, if the wholesale price is below some threshold level, this payment scheme induces the retailer to offer the supply‐chain‐optimal assortment and makes both parties better off.     

Improving Humanitarian Operations through Technology‐Enabled Collaboration

Humanitarian supply chains involve many different entities, such as government, military, private, and non‐governmental organizations and individuals. Well‐coordinated interactions between entities can lead to synergies and improved humanitarian outcomes. Information technology (IT) tools can help facilitate collaboration, but cost and other barriers have limited their use. We document the use of an IT tool to improve last‐mile supply distribution and data management in one of many camps for internally displaced persons after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and we describe other current uses of technology in camp management. Motivated by these examples and the interest among humanitarian organizations in expanding the use of such tools to facilitate coordination, we introduce a cooperative game theory model and explore insights about the conditions under which multi‐agency coordination is feasible and desirable. We also outline an agenda for future research in the area of technology‐enabled collaboration in the humanitarian sector.     

基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略

激励在复杂产品供应链中对主供协同合作关系及质量控制发挥了重要作用。本文研究基于主制造商在复杂产品生产研发前按照客户要求形成的质量意识的激励策略是否可以实现复杂产品质量控制问题。考虑具有质量意识的主制造商和其系统供应商组成的两级供应链,建立以主制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别讨论无激励和存在激励时的主供生产最优决策。基于激励方式的不同,将激励策略分为根据供应商产品质量水平激励以及根据主制造商质量意识水平激励两种方式。研究结果表明激励是供应商加强协同合作、改进产品质量的内在动力,主制造商根据质量意识激励供应商可以进一步促使双方协同合作,提高产品质量,使双方获得更高的利润从而实现供应链整体利润最大化。此外用灵敏度分析发现提高主制造商质量意识水平可以增加双方协同合作努力程度,有效提升产品质量水平并实现帕累托改进。     

Supply chain coordination with information design

We consider the coordination of a supplier–retailer supply chain where, in addition to classical contract considerations, a supplier decides the adoption of an information structure (IS) for the supply chain, with a higher-quality IS allowing the supply chain parties to obtain a more accurate demand forecast. Because a wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain due to misaligned incentives of supply chain parties, we explore what common coordinating contracts in the classical coordination literature can continue coordinating the supply chain with the IS adoption. Interestingly, our analysis appears to reveal the power of simplicity: some simple classical coordinating contracts (e.g., the buy-back and revenue-sharing contracts), though not designed with the IS consideration, still coordinate the supply chain, whereas other more complicated classical contracts (e.g., the quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts) fail to do so. We derive a general condition for supply chain coordination and show that any contract with a newsvendor-like transfer payment can coordinate the supply chain.     

Planning of a decentralized distribution network using bilevel optimization

This paper proposes a bilevel optimization problem to model the planning of a distribution network that allows us to take into account how decisions made at the distribution stage of the supply chain can affect and be affected by decisions made at the manufacturing stage. Usually, the distribution network design problem decides on the opening of depots and the distribution from the depots to customers only and pays no attention to the manufacturing process itself. By way of example, the paper discusses the implications of formulating a bilevel model to integrate distribution and manufacturing, maintaining the hierarchy existing in the decision process. The resulting model is a bilevel mixed integer optimization problem. Hence, only small instances can be optimally solved in an acceptable computing time. In order to be able to solve the optimization model for realistic large systems, a metaheuristic approach based on evolutionary algorithms is developed. The algorithm combines the use of an evolutionary algorithm to control the supply of depots with optimization techniques to determine the delivery from depots to customers and the supply from manufacturing plants to depots. A computational experiment is carried out to assess the efficiency and robustness of the algorithm.     

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

We study ex ante information sharing in a supply chain consisting of a downstream retailer and a make-to-stock upstream manufacturer. The retailer has imperfect demand information and may choose to share it with the manufacturer. Based on the information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer makes the wholesale price and the stocking level decisions. Then the retailer decides the order quantity and the manufacturer fulfills the order up to the available stock level. We find that the retailer has an incentive to voluntarily share the information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate. This stands in sharp contrast with the existing studies which show that the retailer never shares information when the manufacturer is make-to-order. Our results highlight the interdependence between the retailer׳s incentive to share information and the manufacturer׳s operational and marketing decisions.     

Competitive and Collaborative Quality and Warranty Management in Supply Chains

Product quality and product warranty coverage are two important and closely related operational decisions. A longer warranty protection period can boost sales, but it may also result in dramatically increased warranty cost, if product quality is poor. To investigate how these two decisions interact with each other and influence supply chain performance, we develop a single‐period model with a supplier that provides a product to an original equipment manufacturer, which in turn sells it to customers. Customer demand is random and affected by the length of the product warranty period. Warranty costs are incurred by both the supplier and the manufacturer. We analyze two different scenarios based on which party sets the warranty period: manufacturer warranty and supplier warranty. Product quality is controlled by the supplier, and the manufacturer determines the ordering quantity. We analyze these decentralized systems and provide the structural properties of the equilibrium strategies. We also compare the results of centralized and decentralized systems and identify the conditions under which one system provides a longer warranty and better product quality than the other. Our numerical study further shows that, in decentralized settings, when the warranty period is determined by the firm sharing the larger proportion of total warranty costs, the supply chain can achieve greater system‐wide profit. Both parties can therefore benefit from properly delegating the warranty decision and sharing the resulting additional profit. We further design a supplier‐development and buy‐back contract for coordinating decentralized supply chains. Several extensions are also discussed.     

供应链中信息共享的管理激励研究

信息共享是供应链成功运营的关键,那么如何激励供应链上的成员进行信息共享,提出有效的激励机制成为这一问题的焦点.本文以一个两阶段供应链为研究对象,建立了多目标、多因素管理激励机制模型.研究结果表明通过建立良好的供应链信息共享条件及有效的信息共享管理激励机制,可以提高供应链的性能,实现供应链成员"双赢".