生育政策调整目标人群总量与预期效果再检验

本文回顾以往采用宏观汇总数据和微观个案数据研究生育政策调整中存在的问题,认为在缺少两代人生育史的数据条件下研究"单独"二孩生育政策目标人群总量、结构是非常困难的。本文以2005年1%人口抽样调查、2013年国家卫计委生育意愿调查、2014年人口变动抽样调查和2015年1%人口抽样调查数据为基础,对不同来源的相同队列"单独"、"双非"育龄妇女比例数据进行对比,分析结果显示国家统计局2014年和2015年抽样调查数据具有高度的一致性和可靠性。在"单独"二孩政策调整前,如果单纯使用2005年和2013年调查数据将高估独生子女比例和"单独"一孩育龄妇女总量。根据2014年、2015年调查数据推断这两年"单独"一孩育龄妇女占全部一孩育龄妇女的比例在10%左右,"单独"二孩政策目标人群在1 500万以内,达到或超过1 500万的可能性几乎不存在。2015年"单独"一孩育龄妇女生育二孩总量在50万左右,远远低于国家卫计委200万左右的预期。2015年"双非"一孩育龄妇女占全部一孩育龄妇女的比例为85%左右,全面两孩政策新增目标人群在8 500万左右,达到或超过9 000万的可能性很小。即使没有全面两孩生育政策,2015年非农业"双非"生育二孩也在130万以上,而农业"双非"生育二孩在250万以上。     

中国死亡独生子女母亲总量及变动趋势再研究

伴随我国生育水平降低,城镇地区独生子女家庭逐渐成为主流,面临较大的独生子女死亡风险。“七普”数据的公布为探究我国死亡独生子女母亲规模提供了更全面的数据资料,基于“四普”至“七普”数据,汇总不同子女数量的妇女规模,利用年龄移算的方法测算得到2020年已经退出育龄期的死亡独生子女母亲规模。结果显示,当前50岁及以上“曾生子女无子女”妇女规模约为288.8万人,其中50—59岁死亡独生子女母亲规模达到191.9万人,占当前死亡独生子女母亲总量的66.4%;“六普”数据中死亡独生子女母亲规模与“七普”数据缺乏一致性,基于“六普”数据到“七普”数据的打靶预测结果表明,“七普”数据可能高估当前死亡独生子女母亲规模;随着生育水平的下降、生育进度的推迟,未来妇女独生子女死亡风险提高,死亡独生子女母亲规模快速增长趋势将保持稳定。基于此,建议一方面加速构建生育支持体系,避免长期生育率低迷问题;另一方面也要进一步完善计划生育特殊家庭扶助制度,多部门协调扩大独生子女父母的养老扶助资源。     

失独家庭政策“去特殊化”探讨——基于媒介失独家庭社会形象建构的反思

文章通过新闻媒体对失独家庭的相关报道进行分析,关注新闻媒体对失独家庭形象的社会建构,结果发现存在单向的偏重失独家庭苦难的报道倾向,部分建构了一个"无解"、"苦难化"、"特殊化"的独生子女死亡家庭的"媒介形象"和"独生导致失独"的逻辑暗示。而在这种失独家庭媒介关注的"标签化"背后有部分学者研究定位、价值指向和政策建议的支持。媒体和学界对失独家庭的特殊化塑造,或将有碍失独家庭走出丧子之痛融入社会,也使计划生育政策受到误读和抨击。因此文章建议,失独家庭媒介报道首先要去"标签化",学界应把失独家庭放到大的人口结构背景下来研究;失独家庭特别扶助政策应逐渐整合于社会救助体系中;应特别关注独生子女的生命教育和关怀,失独家庭心理层面的社会支持、生命意义的再认知和再建构十分重要。     

生育政策调整研究中存在的问题与反思

文章对生育政策调整研究过程中存在的基础数据、数学模型、参数假设的问题及研究结果的争论与分歧进行了探讨,指出中国现有人口普查、抽样调查数据在生育水平、独生子女总量、育龄妇女总量与结构等方面存在比较突出的矛盾和偏差。作者认为宏观人口模型并不适于单独二孩等生育政策调整研究,建议采用微观随机人口仿真模型解决数据质量和区间估计问题。文章进一步分析单独二孩生育政策和全面二孩生育政策可能存在的出生人口堆积情况,反思生育政策调整研究面临的问题、困难和解决的办法,指出今后中国生育政策调整研究应该注意的主要问题。     

独生子女家庭育龄妇女生育意愿及其影响因素——基于湖北省鄂州、黄石、仙桃市的调查

文章基于2 421位独生子女家庭育龄妇女的调查数据,对18～45岁育龄妇女的二孩生育意愿进行了分析。结论表明,生活压力大及抚养成本高是制约育龄妇女生育二孩的重要因素;采用logit模型对独生子女家庭育龄妇女生育意愿影响因素进行的实证研究表明,个人、家庭、观念和政策是影响独生子女家庭育龄妇女生育意愿的主要因素。     

现行生育政策与未来家庭结构

本文从探讨“四二一”家庭数量研究的操作性困难入手，提出了“Ｘ二”家庭的研究命题，提高了分析的操作性，并使该研究具有一般意义。本文抓住独生子女属性这一关键，以１９９０年人口普查数据为基数，对中国现行生育政策不变条件下子女一代队列的终身独生子女比例进行了估计，进而计算了不同时期成年人口中的独生子女比例，在此基础上估计出时期城乡成年人口按独生子女属性划分的不同类型婚姻组合的期望概率，借以描述现行生育政策对未来家庭结构变化的影响和未来家庭结构变化的程度。     

失独风险、利益损害与政府责任

使用生命表和概率理论,分析了独生子女家庭与非独生子女家庭的丧子风险,二者的巨大差异证明原有的计划生育政策使独生子女家庭承担了额外的、非自愿的丧子风险.从这一角度来讲,我国政府此前实施的生育政策对失独家庭造成了利益损害,应当给予一定的补偿.本文认为,在失独问题上政府责任可以分为三个层次,分别是救助责任、补偿责任和优待责任.针对当前失独群体财政扶助中存在的问题,提出应当明确财政扶助的补偿属性,在扶助标准上实现城乡统一,以及由中央政府承担财政扶助的主要责任等政策建议.     

江西泰和县“天使行动”重圆失独家庭幸福梦

为帮助全县有再生育愿望和再生育能力的失独家庭实现再生育,江西省泰和县从2013年开始启动了＂天使行动＂,并把这项工作当作民生工程来抓。通过建立一户一档信息化档案、安排治疗补助专项资金、全程技术服务和跟踪随访,为失独家庭提供优质高效的再生育全程服务,重圆了失独家庭幸福梦。     

北京市昌平区计生特殊家庭现状分析及对策建议

当前,北京市昌平区有独生子女家庭12.3万户,约占全区户籍人口家庭总数的66%,伴随着独生子女家庭的高比例、大基数,失独家庭数量呈逐年递增趋势,由此带来的社会问题不容忽视。2013年4月份以来,区人口计生委、计生协以问卷调查形式,对全区失独家庭老人的生活、精神、养老状况进行了调查,旨在进一步完善失独者养老保障体系,为加大帮扶力度提供决策依据。     

“四关怀”情系“失独”家庭

河北省晋州市人口计生局积极开展情系＂失独＂家庭活动,通过心理关怀、再生育关怀、健康关怀、生活关怀＂四关怀＂,帮助＂失独＂家庭走出困境,切实解决＂失独＂家庭切身利益问题,提高了群众满意度。一是心理关怀。各乡镇计生办人员和爱心志愿者与＂失独＂家庭帮扶结队,定期上门探访,对＂失独＂家庭进行心理疏导和心灵交流,     

“单独”育龄妇女总量、结构及变动趋势研究

文章以"单独"育龄妇女为研究对象,通过建立随机微观人口仿真模型,研究"单独"育龄妇女总量、结构和变动趋势,结果表明,如果现行生育政策不变,"单独"育龄妇女总量在未来三四十年内持续增长的趋势不可逆转,且增长速度很快,年均增长速度在10‰以上,2050年"单独"育龄妇女占育龄妇女的比例将达到50%以上,总量超过1.2亿。如果放开"单独"二孩政策,2050年"单独"育龄妇女占育龄妇女的比例将在50%以下,总量仍超过1亿。如果全面放开二孩政策,2050年"单独"育龄妇女占育龄妇女的比例将在30%以上,总量在1亿以内。     

Advocating "one couple with one child" being an optimal choice]

Zero population growth within the next 5 years in China would be reached only if many couples were not allowed to have their own child. On the other hand, if every couple were allowed to have 2 children China's population would reach 1500 million within the next 50 years. It seems advisable to advocate the "1 couple 1 child" idea; couples will have to keep in mind both the national interest and the communist ideology; social welfare to assure good living conditions for the old people will relieve the worries of parents with 1 child only. Most people are willing to follow this decision made by the Communist Party; many people declare their willingness to stick by this rule during their wedding ceremony; many couples send back their permit to have a second child, and many women choose abortion when pregnant with a second permitted pregnancy. By the end of 1979 the proportion of "1 couple 1 child" couples was 90% in many large cities; people realize that the practice of "1 couple 1 child" is the best assurance for the future of the country and of their children. This policy will not result in aging of the population, lack of manpower and shortage of soldiers; even if birth rate were 1% in 1985 the proportion of older people for the next 25 years will still be lower than that in European countries. The problem of aging of the population will not occur in this century, and population policies can always be adjusted when needed. Today's problem is to control population through the "1 couple 1 child" policy, even if it may result in many lonely old people, which is a lesser problem than too many people. Even if China has reduced its population growth by 10 million births each year from 1970 to 1979, the necessity to control population growth is still present, in the interest of the country and economic development.     

独生子女家庭结构演变与养老方案选择研究①——以安徽省为例

独生子女家庭关系简单、脆弱,具有很强的风险性,为此引起学界和政府高度关注。文章利用2010年全国第六次人口普查数据资料,利用生命表方法构建独生子女家庭生命表．并推算丧子家庭、丧偶家庭、单人家庭等各类家庭结构演变趋势。得出：独生子女家庭中,丧子家庭在子女60岁时达到高峰,比例达到3．1％,其中丧子的父母单人家庭比例达到高峰值2．6％,丧子的父母空巢家庭在独生子女50岁达到高峰1．1％：独生子女单亲家庭（丧父或丧母）在独生子女55岁时达到峰值50％。不同的独生子女家庭,有着不同的养老需求,政府应该根据不同的家庭属性设置多样化的养老支持方案。     

Neo-natal and post-neo-natal mortality in a rural area of Bangladesh

Abstract An analysis of neo-natal and post-neo-natal mortality in 132 villages (population of 117,000) of Matlab thana indicates the following: (i) Neo-natal deaths accounted for 60% of the infant mortality rate of 125. This proportion was unexpectedly high since previous research had maintained that in countries with infant mortality rates over 100, neo-natal deaths account for less than one-third of all infant deaths. Since the present findings on the proportions of neo-natal deaths correspond exactly with results from an earlier registration system in East Pakistan, it is suggested that the long-accepted proposition, 'less developed' areas are characterized by lower proportions of neo-natal deaths than 'more developed' areas, be re-examined. (2) The infant death rate accounts for 36% of all deaths in the population. If the infant death rate were reduced by half the result would be a decrease in the current crude death rate from 16 to 13. Although this reduction would appear to be small, in the context of a current high growth rate of 3% (from 1966-67 to 1968-69) it exerts a sizeable impact. For example, it would take a reduction of eight points in the crude birth rate of 46 just to achieve a growth rate 2·5% under these circumstances. Obviously, continued efforts in death control without an effective birth control programme will perpetuate high rates of growth. (3) Neo-natal and post-neo-natal mortality exhibited the -expected 'U' shaped pattern with parity, and generally varied as expected with age and family size, except in the oldest age group and largest family size where the risk was smaller than in the preceding groups. An explanation for these findings is presented, based on the effect that births to high-parity women with low child mortality have upon the total neo-natal and post-neo-natal mortality rates. It was found that these births exhibit a much lower mortality risk than births to women of comparable parities and higher child mortality, and that their numbers account for the lower risk to the births in the oldest age group and largest family size. It was concluded that women with a combination of high parity and low child mortality most probably represent a group with superior socio-economic and or health conditions which contribute to the lower risk of neo-natal and post-neo-natal death.     

Grasp the work of family planning by unifying thinking and stabilizing the policy

The China Population Information and Research Center reported that in 1988 the number of childbearing women between 20 and 49 was 4.65 million above 1987, but the population growth rate was 0.19 lower than in 1987. Controlling the population is still a difficult problem. The 3rd baby boom of New China; economic, cultural, social, and other factors; and the uneven progress of family planning are cited as causes of the lack of control. The 13th Party's Congress in 1989 plans to work to reform family planning and control population growth. In particular, late marriages and childbearing will be promoted; in cities, one-child-per- couple will be policy; in rural areas, only girl households will be allowed another child only after several years; local family planning regulations will be supported; and research on family planning and safer, longer acting contraceptives will be financed.     

出生性别比失调对中国未来男性婚姻挤压的影响

对中国2000年-2050年因出生性别失调对男性婚姻挤压的影响进行的测算结果显示,现在的出生性别失调将造就大批无法婚配的单身男性,这将对未来的婚姻市场、家庭安全、社会稳定产生极为不利的影响。出生性别比失调是人们的生育意愿、国家的生育政策、以及育龄夫妇从家庭角度进行理性选择的结果,我们应该采取综合措施包括完善生育政策来应对这一挑战。     

The evolution in China's fertility and an analysis of population development]

There have been numerous projections on China's population at the end of century. Their differences are due to different estimations on the effects of fertility determinants. 2 simulation models have been developed, both from micro and macro levels, to estimate the population at the end of the century on the basis of 6 different fertility patterns. 3 possible options for fertility patterns are discussed. 1.) The 1 child per family option means that every couple has 1 child by the year 1989, the population of China will be 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Even if this is a ideal situation, it would not be a feasible policy, as the pressure from the rural population to have more than 1 child has been increasing in recent years. Nevertheless, it is still possible for urban couples to accept having only 1 child. Therefore, encouraging more people to have 1 child should be held as a basic policy. 2.) Under the option of 2 children per family with 2 or 3 years of spacing, the total population in the year 2000 would be 1.2 - 1.4 billion, which is unacceptable in terms of the development situation. 3.) Following a differential fertility policy towards urban, rural, and minority populations would mean that urban couples would have 1 child, rural couples whose first child is a girl or those who are in special circumstance would have 2 children. Minorities would have 2 or 3 children. AMong the above options, number 3 is more likely to be achieved in view of current socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors.     

Pakistan's population growth: the need for action

Despite the existence of a national family planning program that dates to 1965 Pakistan has not seen a reduction in the fertility rate. One of the poorest countries in the world, Pakistan has 1 of the highest population growth rates in the world at about 3.0% annually. For over 2 decades, the average woman in Pakistan has given birth to more than 6 children. At the current fertility rate, the country's current population of 120 million will increase to over 150 million by the year 2000, and it will increase to 280 million by 2020. And even if today every woman were to begin having only 2 children, the population would still reach 160 million before leveling off. But reducing fertility in Pakistan will prove difficult. One of the leading obstacles is the low status of women. Few women in Pakistan have advanced education or professional jobs. Only 1/4 of those women without education or who are not working have any knowledge concerning contraception. Family size and composition also fuel the high rate of fertility. On the average, women desire 5 children (the fact that women average more than 5 suggests an unmet need for contraception). And due to social, cultural, and economic conditions, Pakistanis generally prefer male offsprings. Islamic opposition to family planning has also contributed to the continued high rates of fertility. Finally, administrative and management weaknesses have hindered Pakistan's family planning program. In order to overcome these obstacles, Pakistan will have to enlist the commitment of political, religious, and community leaders. The status of women will have to be improved, and the attitudes of people will need to change.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Birth rate of Beijing population drops nearly 60% in 20 years

The birthrate of the Beijing (China) population dropped by 60% in the last 20 years. Consequently, population reproduction is characterized by a pattern of low birthrate, low mortality rate, and a low growth rate. The birthrate of the Beijing population was 36.30/1000 in 1950 and rose to 43.41/1000 in 1963. During the 1950-63 period, the average annual birthrate of Beijing population reached 36.71/1000 and the number of births was 2.23 million. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the rapid population growth has been effectively checked by great efforts made in practicing family planning. Over the 1970-83 period, the average annual birthrate dropped to 14.9/1000 and the number of births totaled 1.75 million. With the advance of the family planning effort, particularly acceptance of the concept of practicing family planning for the modernization drive, the people's reproductive notion has changed for the better. At this time, more and more men and women of reproductive age have broken away from the influence of old ideas such as "the earlier the couples have their sons, the soonner they will be helped." By 1982, the average age at 1st marriage was 25.8 years for males and 24.7 years for females. This was a remarkable change as compared with the 1960s. According to the 1982 population census, Beijing women over 60 years had 4.83 children, while those in the age groups 55-59, 50-54, 45-49, 40-44, 35-39, 30-34, and 25-29 has 4.81, 4.50, 3.72, 2.95, 2.32, 1.58, and 0.57 children respectively. Today, 0.66 million couples in Beijing volunteer to have only 1 child.