Husbands,wives, sons,and daughters: Fertility preferences and the demand for contraception in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, with nearly 65 millionpeople, is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility levels are among the highest in the world. Using the matched wife-husband sample from the 1990 National Family and Fertility Survey of Ethiopia we investigate the fertility desires of wives and husbands and the degree to which they are similar, including whether a preference for sons exists. We model the determinants of the desire to limit or space births, and estimate unmet need. Results indicate high levels of concurrence among husbands and wives on reproductive preferences. Where differences exist, husbands are more pronatalist than their wives. Both husbands and wives prefer to have sons and daughters, but more sons overall. Approximately 22% of wives and husbands desire to limit or space births but do not use contraception. More than half of wives and husbands with an unmet need for limiting are paired with a partner who has no such need. Three implications follow from these results: (1) differences in wives' and husbands' son and daughter preferences may help to explain discordant views among couples when it comes to the desire to limit or space births; (2) husbands' overall contribution to wives' unmet need can be substantial in African societies in the early stages of fertility transition; and (3) wives' preferences regarding children and contraception can result in unmet need on the part of husbands, even in highly gender-stratified societies where men are more pronatalist.     

Couple childbearing desires, intentions, and births

Using new panel data from the National Surveys of Families and Households, I investigate the effects of wives’ and husbands’ childbearing desires on their spouses’ intentions, and the effects of spouses’ desires and intentions on subsequent births. The results show clearly that husbands’ desires and intentions influence couples’ births, with approximately equal force to that of wives’ desires and intentions. When couples disagreed about wanting a child, each partners’ intentions were shifted toward not having a child; and disagreement in desires or intentions were reflected in birth rates that were lower than average. These patterns were generally not different for couples with more or less traditional gender roles or attitudes.     

Target Fertility,Contraception, And Aggregate Rates: Toward A Formal Synthesis

This paper develops a stock adjustment model relating total expected births to conventional aggregate fertility rates for married women over 25. Each year, cohorts bear about 20 percent of their additional expected births. Aggregate U.S. rates have been consistent with expectations as expressed in surveys between 1955 and 1975; indeed, total expected births may be inferred from aggregate fertility behavior. A peculiar empirical finding is that the additional expected fertility of nonterminators has not changed since 1955, despite the dramatic decline in total expected and actual fertility. The model leads to a dynamic expression for the duration pattern of current and cumulative fertility and for the proportion of couples who have terminated childbearing. The model is also used to analyze the effects of changing contraceptive failure rates on fertility patterns. For example, a decline in “timing” failure rates increases duration-specific fertility five years later.     

A joint model of marital childbearing and marital disruption

Married couples with children appear to be less likely to end their marriages than childless couples, especially when the children are young. Although this suggests that children affect the chances that their parents will divorce, the process may not be so simple: the chances that the marriage will last also may affect couples’ willingness to make the commitment to the marriage implied by having children. This paper uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test the hypothesis that the risk of disruption faced by a married woman affects the chances that she will conceive and bear a child. The model used takes into account the simultaneous relationships between marital dissolution and marital fertility by including the hazard of disruption as a predictor of timing and likelihood of marital conception, and by including the results of previous fertility decisions as predictors of disruption of the marriage. We find that the hazard of disruption has strong negative effects on the hazard of marital childbearing, lengthening the intervals between births and decreasing the chances that a child will be born. This effect appears to be strongest for women who have had at least one child, either before or during the current marriage, although it is also large for childless women. Explicitly including the hazard of disruption in models of marital childbearing has sizable and important effects on many predictors of fertility.     

Husbands’ and wives’ characteristics and fertility decisions: A diagonal mobility model

In this article a diagonal mobility model is used to describe the relative effects of husbands' and wives' characteristics on fertility. Compared with the characteristics of their wives, the characteristics of non-Hispanic husbands are nearly insignificant in their effect on fertility. The relative importance of husbands' attributes is much greater among Mexican-American couples. Although this suggests ethnic stereotypes about male dominance in Mexican-American families, differences in female educational attainment may offer a better explanation. The most immediate conclusion from this analysis pertains to the use of wives' characteristics as a proxy for couple data. This strategy is reasonable if female educational levels generally extend into high school. Relying on wives' characteristics to study marital fertility, however, may be problematic if the analysis involves respondents with a wide range of educational levels.     

The differential effects of husbands' and wives' statuses on marital fertility

As an extension of prior subjectively-oriented studies that predicted couples' fertility decisions or outcomes by the expected costs and benefits of childbearing to husbands and wives, this article examines the differentiated effects of husbands' and wives' objective statuses on marital fertility, using the cumulative 1972–1990 GSS data. An interesting finding is that wives' education has a significant, negative effect on fertility while the effect of husbands' education is positive and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the generalization of the negative effect of education on fertility may be misleading if one fails to make a distinction between marital partners. Meanwhile, this study finds no significant differences in the effects of husbands' and wives' occupational and work statuses on fertility. By and large, the husbands' status variables add little information to the models explaining fertility. It is also found that the effects of husbands' and wives' statuses are contingent upon their relative education.     

The Risk of an Unwanted Birth: The Changing Context of Contraceptive Sterilization in the U.S.

Life-table estimates indicate that one-quarter of U.S. women intend no more births by age 25, one-half by age 27, and three-quarters by age 30. The resulting long period at risk of unwanted fertility is argued to be an important underlying dimension of the revolution in attitudes to and practice of sterilization. Life-table estimates are then considered of the timing of sterilization after the last wanted birth. Almost one-quarter of all couples select sterilization within the first year after they have had the number of children they desire. Recent experience would imply that four-fifths of all couples will eventually use contraceptive sterilization. In order to examine the determinants of men's and women's sterilization, logistic regression is used with a polytomous dependent variable: sterilization of the woman, sterilization of the man, or no sterilization within four years of the last wanted birth. Covariates considered are age and parity at last wanted birth, year and duration of marriage at last wanted birth, wife's and husband's education, wife's and husband's religion, whether residence is in a central city, region, pill-use history and timing-failure histories before the last wanted birth, and unwanted birth. Large and significant effects are found for most of these variables, and these effects change in interpretable ways between early innovative behaviour and sterilization during the most recent period when it was widely accepted.     

Low fertility due to delay in -- not dearth of -- births

Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and his colleague Griffith Feeney argue that recent concern about a lack of births overlooks the fact that many women in developed countries are simply choosing to bear children later than women used to. So-called birth dearths are often caused by temporary delays in childbearing. The two demographers have designed a new way for demographers to account for the timing, or tempo, of childbearing in estimates of fertility. Their tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR) allows demographers to correct skewed fertility trends, such as those leading to projections of birth dearths. The new measure provides a better indication of women's true propensity to bear children. Standard measures of fertility are distorted by changes in tempo. Such changes occur when large numbers of couples delay or accelerate their initiation of family building. The authors used historical data and theoretical arguments to validate the tempo-adjusted TFR, which improves upon the two common measures of fertility. Flaws in the TFR and the completed fertility rate (CFR) are corrected by Bongaarts and Feeney's new measure. To demonstrate their new tool, they examined the below-replacement fertility seen in recent decades in the US. By the mid-1990s, the TFR in almost every developed country had fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman, and in Italy, Spain, and Germany it fell below 1.5. If such fertility persists, declining population size, extreme population aging, and financial pressure upon social security systems may result. However, if fertility preferences hold at current levels, the very low fertility rates observed in the developed world will approach 2 children/couple.     

Family composition preferences in a developing culture: The case of Taiwan, 1973

Abstract As fertility comes increasingly under voluntary control in a developing society, it can be argued that individual desires or preferences about children will become more salient and more significant for eventual fertility. Hence, the study of preferences is increasingly important as contraceptive use is extended and results in decreasing the number of unwanted births.(1) Further changes in fertility then depend on changes in preferences. The assumption is that people will at least try to achieve the families they want, if the means to do so are available. The fact that contraception is used at all is some evidence of the soundness of this assumption, although it should be recognized that family size desires operate in a complex of preferences, under varying degrees of conflict and control. To expect a one-to-one relationship between attitudes or preferences and overt behaviour would be simplistic.     

Current primary investigation on the view of family planning of Chinese peasants]

The ideal number of children for 850 couples among 10 cities or counties and 20 villages in China were surveyed. Of the 850, only 1 wanted unlimited children, which accounted for 0.12% of the couples. About 33 desired more than 5, which accounted for 3.9%. However, most of the couples, about 81.4%, prefer 2 or 3 children. 3.2% of the couples were happy with 1 child in their life. In China, peasants still want more children because of their economic situation. There is no retirement and health insurance in the countryside, and the major labor force is in field work. Some consider males as better able to keep family heritage intact. Also, there is difference between agricultural and nonagricultural couples. Comparing the percentage of couples who want 2-3 children, 80% in agricultural sector and 92% in nonagricultural sector desired this number. The remainder of the agricultural group desired more than 3 children. Since economic reform started in the countryside in the early 80s, effects on fertility are seen. One is that peasants want more children because of a rising need for labor. On the other hand, many more opportunities are available to change careers and obtain more education, lowering fertility. However, a rise in fertility is predicted as people concentrate more on economic reform and economic development, increasing their need for children.     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

The Quality of Male Fertility Data in Major U.S. Surveys

Researchers continue to question fathers’ willingness to report their biological children in surveys and the ability of surveys to adequately represent fathers. To address these concerns, this study evaluates the quality of men’s fertility data in the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79 and NLSY97) and in the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG). Comparing fertility rates in each survey with population rates based on data from Vital Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau, we document how the incomplete reporting of births in different surveys varies according to men’s characteristics, including their age, race, marital status, and birth cohort. In addition, we use Monte Carlo simulations based on the NSFG data to demonstrate how birth underreporting biases associations between early parenthood and its antecedents. We find that in the NSFG, roughly four out of five early births were reported; but in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, almost nine-tenths of early births were reported. In all three surveys, incomplete reporting was especially pronounced for nonmarital births. Our results suggest that the quality of male fertility data is strongly linked to survey design and that it has implications for models of early male fertility.     

The impact of class,education, and health care on infant mortality in a developing society: The case of rural Thailand

Demographic and social factors affecting infant mortality in rural northern Thailand are examined using log-linear modifiedmultiple regression models and data drawn from a representative sample of married couples in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. Demographic factors do not account for the effects of variations in parental ability or willingness to provide adequate infant care. The final model estimated incorporated both these social dimensions of child care. Parental ability, measured by father’s social class, mother’s health information, and local community development levels, continued to have significant independent effects upon infant survival. Parental willingness, measured by parent’s beliefs about intergenerational wealth transfers, no longer had a significant effect net of other social variables, but infant survival was still affected by whether both parents wanted a birth.     

Husbands’ versus wives’ fertility goals and use of contraception: The influence of gender context in five Asian countries

Using data from Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, we explore how gender context influences (1) husband-wife concordance in the demand for children and (2) the impact of each spouse's fertility preferences on contraceptive use. We also explore whether the husband's pronatalism can explain the wife's unmet need for contraception. The results suggest that gender context has little net effect on couples' concordance, but influences the relative weight of husbands' and wives' preferences in determining contraceptive use. Analysis of women's unmet need for contraception suggests that the husbands' pronatalism contributes to wives' unmet need, but only to a relatively small degree, especially in settings where unmet need is high. This is the case because the proportion of couples with differing fertility goals is small in most communities.     

Pathways to a Stable Union? Pregnancy and Childbearing Among Cohabiting and Married Couples

This study analyzes the stability of cohabiting and marital unions following a first birth. But unlike previous research, it compares the subsequent trajectories of unions that began with a pregnancy to those in which conceptions came after coresidence. The U.S. data from the 2006–2010 and 2011–2013 cross-sectional files of the National Survey of Family Growth indicate that roughly 1-in-5 first births were associated with rapid transitions from conception into either cohabitation or marriage. Moving in together following a pregnancy—especially an unintended one—is unlikely to lead to marital success or union stability. Compared with marital unions, dissolution rates following birth were particularly high for couples who entered a cohabiting union following conception. Only a small minority of these couples married (i.e., less than one-third), and these marriages experienced high dissolution rates. The results also suggest that the most committed cohabiting couples got married after finding themselves pregnant, leaving behind the most dissolution-prone cohabiting couples. The American family system is being transformed by newly emerging patterns of fertility among cohabiting couples.     

Quantitative aspects of marriage,fertility and family limitation in nineteenth century America: Another application of the coale specifications

This paper deals with three aspects of the decline in the fertility of white women in the United States from 1800 to 1920. The first concerns the portion of the secular decline in the total fertility rate which was due to changes in marriage rates and the portion due to decreases in marital fertility rates. The second concerns the fraction of couples in the nineteenth century who acted effectively to reduce their fertility and the third deals with the importance of abortion as a family-limiting practice among white couples in the nineteenth century.     

Can NFP be taught in two short,easy lessons? Simplified NFP for isolated and/or busy couples

Researchers used life table rates from study and comparison groups from rural and urban areas of Cagayan de Oro City, the Philippines to test a simplified method of teaching natural family planning (NFP) defined by calendar, mucus, and cervix indicators. This method included a 6 page booklet, 2 30-minute training sessions, and a question and answer period. Fear of side effects from other contraceptive methods was the leading reason for using NFP (79.4% urban, 85.8% rural). Religious motivation and fear of side effects followed for urban couples, but the percentage was low (14.6%). In rural areas, religious motivation place 3rd (4.1%) preceded by other reasons (6.9%). User error resulted in low accidental pregnancy rates (.8%). Method failure was responsible for higher failure rates than user error, but they were still relatively low (3.4% total). In rural areas, the reason for failure was unclear in 2.6% of couples, but it was only .9% among urban couples. Rural couples who used NFP to space births (spacers) had 2 times the failure rate of those rural couples who used NFP to limit births (limiters) [69% vs. 31%]. Urban spacers had a higher failure rate than urban limiters, but the difference was smaller than it was for rural couples (54.8% vs. 45.2%). Lactation did not have a clear effect on failure rates. For example, in urban areas, partially lactating women had a lower failure rate than nonlactating women (41.9% vs. 58.1%), but in rural areas, lactation had the opposite effect (63.6% for lactating women and 36.4% for nonlactating women). Risk taking resulted in more 6 month pregnancy rates among urban couples than rural couples (12.3% vs. 8.2%). At the end of 6 months, 67.5% of all couples still used the new simplified NFP method (70.3% rural vs. 64.7% urban). Therefore the new simplified NFP method was an effective method for spacing or limiting births.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

Birth month,school graduation,and the timing of births and marriages

We investigated the timing of fertility and marriage in Sweden using exogenous variation in the age at school graduation that results from differences in birth month. Our analysis found that the difference of 11 months in the age at leaving school between women who were born in two consecutive months, December and January, implies a delay in the age at first birth of 4.9 months. This effect of delayed graduation also persists for the timing of second births and first marriages, but it does not affect completed fertility or the overall probability of marriage before age 45. These results suggest the existence of a relatively rigid sequencing of demographic events in early adulthood, and the age at graduation from school emerges as an important factor in determining the timing--but not the quantum--of familyformation. In addition, these effects point to a potentially important influence of social age, defined by an individual's school cohort, instead of biological age. The relevance of social age is likely due to social interactions and peer-group influences exerted by individuals who are in the same school cohort but are not necessarily of the same age.     

India’s North–South divide and theories of fertility change

Economic condition and women’s status have been considered important elements in understanding fertility change. In this study, we examine their influence on North–South differences in parity-specific fertility intentions and births in India using the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) conducted in 1998–1999. The results show the persistence of spatial variations in fertility intentions and births, net of economic and women’s status factors. The influence of these factors is more pronounced in the high fertility region. This study argues that changes in fertility desires and their actualization may be better understood when situated within the broader socio-political context.