Little Theories and Big Problems: Chicago Sociology and Ethnic Conflicts*

Since this society is oriented toward a specific theory, I thought I ought to say something about theories in general and our little theory in particular. Let me get that off of my chest. I am not overly fond of terms like “theory” and “theorist,” both of which seem to suggest the importance of the person who claims the identity more than anything else. They are pompous terms. To the extent that we are thoughtful about what we are doing and how we are going about it, all sociologists are theorists and methodologists. But if that is all we are, then we are literally people of no substance. We have no substantial knowledge of or concern for the empirical world. The little theory we share is extraordinarily empirical. It is, as one of its most prominent practitioners called it, a “grounded theory” ( Glaser and Strauss 1967 ). I confess that several years after receiving my degree I had no real sense of what symbolic interaction was and how it might differ from other theoretical orientations. Arnold Rose enlightened me on this when he asked me to submit a paper for a new collection he was editing ( Rose 1962 ). I was pleased and flattered. Rose was a mentor of mine, and I had never before been asked to contribute to an edited volume. But I was unsure of what would be appropriate for a book about symbolic interaction. I screwed up my courage and asked Arnold: “Exactly what is symbolic interaction”” He shrugged off my ignorance, turned on his heels, and muttered over his shoulder, “It is what they do at Chicago.”     

Thinking with the Mind,Syncing with the Body: Ballet as Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Interaction

Symbolic interactionist theory describes self‐consciousness as arising through symbolic interaction. I use one empirical case, ballet training, to suggest that symbolic interaction can, by producing self‐consciousness, cultivate unself‐consciousness. Using in‐depth interviews with twenty‐three individuals reporting on training experiences in six countries and twenty‐three American states, I show that dancers can learn, through self‐conscious symbolic interaction, how it feels to embody what an audience sees, as they strive to train their bodies to portray an institutionalized aesthetic. The embodiment of technique facilitates a markedly unself‐conscious “flow” experience while performing. In contrast, having an acute awareness of embodying an incompatible physiology inhibits flow and often motivates dancers to self‐select out of ballet. These interactionist sources of “nonsymbolic” interaction both evoke and suppress “mind” through social interaction.     

The Self as Self‐Fulfilling Prophecy

Using a combination of psychoanalytic and symbolic interactionist ideas, this article portrays the development of the self as a self‐fulfilling prophecy (SFP). A prominent psychoanalytic version of this idea is presented by Lacan's two mirror theories of the self. A prominent and more familiar symbolic interactionist account of the self as self‐fulfilling prophecy is the formulation by William I. Thomas and Dorothy Thomas, which suggests that once situations are defined as real, they are real in their consequences. The aim of this article is to show that these two perspectives can be reconciled in interesting ways, because both recognize that emotions are part of the world “out there” of external goals and the world “in here” of the person's inner life. Emotions are therefore “bilevel.” The SFP creates a fault line in the self and a consequent emotional vulnerability when that line is engaged or disturbed. This article explains how this self‐fulfilling prophecy works and explores the weaknesses it inflicts on the self.     

Yoshida Theory: Its Structure,Criticism and Advancement

Tamito Yoshida, a giant of theoretical sociology, passed away in 2009. Here, I give a concise review of his theoretical achievements, called “Yoshida Theory”, and foresee the future. The main features of Yoshida Theory are the following: information controls resources; there was evolution from the stage of only materials to that of materials controlled by generic information and also to that of materials controlled by symbolic information; the process of information procedures is divided into “to cognize,”“to evaluate” and “to order,” which are distinguished from one another, and from the theoretical standpoint called the “Information Processing Resources Paradigm”; i nformation is maintained as long as it is useful, and when it becomes useless it is selected or expected to be changed. There was much criticism against the theory. The most unrelenting opposition was that it was not a system of explanation in the conventional sense of scientific methodology. It was claimed not to be positive scientific theory because of the logical inconsistency. Yoshida's counter‐criticism was, contrary to his opposites' expectations, that sociological theory ought not to fulfill the criteria to be science. It seemed to support his evolutionalist assertion that the synchronically inconsistent theory will be corrected diachronically and achieve some consistency. The criteria of science themselves should be re‐constructed to thematize the fact that information or program‐controlling society has evolution, he thought. He called it “New Science”; however, the attempt was never completed. It is still our task to clarify whether sociological theory can remain in science or not.     

Some Consequences of the Meadian Self*

Mead's conception of the self is analyzed as an internal interaction process, with the “I” viewed as taking perspectives rather than being simply a biologic response. Conceptualizing the self as an intrapersonal process of interaction from differentiated perspectives permits a better understanding of false fronting, autonomy, and creativity. Emergence theory allows us to take a Phenomenological view of the self. Several levels of consciousness in Mead's theory are analyzed, and connections with Berger and Luckmann's conceptions of objectivation and the symbolic universe are suggested.     

Self and Society in Popular Social Criticism 1920–1980

Since the tumult of the 1960s, sociologists and cultural historians have suggested that a “new sensibility” has become more prominent in the United States and other advanced capitalist democracies. In most accounts, the core of the change is an increase in expressive individualism, popularly justified by discourse very much indebted to the language of academic and clinical psychology. Among symbolic interactionists, Ralph Turner's proposal that there has been a shift from “institutional” to “impulsive” anchorage of the self has been the single most influential contribution to this debate. Turner's analysis is placed in the larger context of his work and considered in the light of changes in social criticism and the rhetoric of self in popular “conduct-of-life” literature published between 1920 and 1980. Three relatively distinct waves of social criticism are found in that literature during that period, with each one more firmly based on individualistic and psychologistic views of self and society than its predecessor.     

What's in a Name? Causes and Consequences of Labelling Minorities as “National” or “Migrant”: Roma in Italy and Spain

This article analyses how Roma are represented in official policy narratives in Italy and Spain by comparing the four cycles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the two countries. By tracing the representations that the Italian and Spanish governments hold (and make) about the Roma, I sketch out the different categories that EU‐ropean countries recur to as organizing principles to “other” underprivileged minorities. Based on the tailored‐approaches in which both Italy and Spain engage in framing Roma as either a “national” minority or not, I suggest that constructing or “producing” a minority in our imagined communities as characterized by national, cultural, social or migrant characteristics relies more on political expediency than on objective analytical categories.     

The Interaction Order and Musical Sound: Shopping with Erving Goffman

Drawing on qualitative interviews and extending insights provided by Erving Goffman (1983, 1971), this article argues that music plays a crucial role in the interaction order of retail environments. I suggest music permeates these locations of consumption; shoppers are presented as perceiving musical sounds as both “territorial offenses” and sounds that can also represent an “intimate ally.” Crucial here is the nature of territoriality that manages an individual's exposure through the symbolic and literal placement of boundaries around the self, covering and protecting the self while navigating public space, tacitly securing rights in relation to others, and minimizing encroachments upon the “territories of the self.” I contend that when shopping, participants can feel “at home” in these locations thanks in part to the role of music but also in other cases actively avoid these situations, using privatizing music as a means of regaining auditory discretion. The contribution of this article extends Goffman's formulation of the interaction order, accounting for the dual role that music represents, as both a territorial offense and an intimate ally for shoppers.     

The Person Behind The Word: Mead's Theory Of Universals And A Shift Of Focus In Symbolic Interactionism

Careful consideration of Mead's theory of universals proves to be a corrective to a number of tendencies evident in the work of at least some influential contemporary symbolic interactionists. Mead avoids any realistic hypostatization of separate universals (“meanings,” “forms,” or “essences” while at the same time eschewing nominalistic and conventionalistic views of language. His principle of the objective reality of perspectives (1932:161-175) allows him to grant objective reality to universal characteristics of concrete objects, but entails neither hypostatization nor idealization of the universal. In addition to contravening nominalism and conventionalism, Mead's theory of universals provides a perspective from which the reality of the self, and the importance of intentional action for the development of a firmly felt sense of self and autonomy, can both be affirmed. Far from being an illusion or mer.e symbolic construct, the self is seen to be an objectively real universal within the perspective of social action.     

“I” and Self-Consciousness in the Japanese Language and in Sociology

Abstract It is often said that the Japanese lack the firm consciousness of “self” namely, they yield to groups and are absorbed in an anonymous state. Some ascribe this to the Japanese language, in which the first and the second person are expressed by various pronouns (or, in many cases, are even omitted) in accordance with the relationships between persons. By contrast the Westerner's “I,” which is usually the only pronoun for the first-person, is rarely omitted. They conclude from this that the Japanese individual does not possess as clearly defined a conception of “self” as does the Westerner. Underlying this issue are the fundamental, interwoven questions of language and self-consciousness: does “self” really exist, and does the analysis of the I in language pertain to the first question? This paper discusses these questions by considering Wittgenstein's argument that “I” does not refer to self-consciousness: rather, “self” is a metaphysical reification of “I.” These problems concern sociology, in which the “subject” of action has been the focal point of methodological arguments. I will show that Meadian interactionism and critical theory are deeply rooted in the metaphysical, subjectivist understanding of “I,” while ethnomethodology offers a perspective which overcomes both subjectivism and objectivism for studying communication.     

The Classification and Ordering of Responses to the Question “Who am I?”*

The question “Who Am I?” (WAI?) has generated considerable research by social psychologists concerned with self phenomena. “Self theory,” from which the “WAI?” technique was derived, hypothesizes an ordinal pattern among consensual self statements. Our data do not confirm this hypothesis nor do they confirm the widespread assumptions of a direct relationship between the salience and importance of self statements or between salience and positively evaluated self statements. We discuss the implications of these findings for the principles of “self theory” and for the validity and reliability of the “WAI?” question.     

A slightly slummier area? Negotiations of place‐bound identities through social spatializations and unofficial toponyms

In the article, spatializations (discourses of ideal or stereotyped spaces) are conceptualized as powerful discourses of the surrounding society, providing resources for place‐bound identity construction in interaction. We combine a sociolinguistic analysis with Bakhtinian dialogism to understand how such “third” voices in dialogue empower and pluralize self‐ and other‐positionings embedded in the evocations of unofficial place names. Empirically, the focus is on toponyms that divide the socially mixed Vuosaari suburb in Helsinki into “older” and “newer” territories. The results show that when the stereotypes of “good” and “bad” neighbourhoods or other spatializations interpenetrate the uses of “Old” and “New Vuosaari,” they open room for the (re‐)voicing of the meanings of these toponyms for highly differentiated social ends. With the Bakhtinian framework bridging between socio‐spatial theory and sociolinguistics, the article develops a spatially sensitized approach to analyse the entanglements of the micro‐level contexts of interaction with the macro‐level discourses of meaning‐giving.     

The Human Habitat: a Systemization and Critique of Park’s Theory from a Radical Interactionist Perspective

When Park died, he left his theory of the human habitat not only incomplete, but in considerable disarray. Although few present-day scholars have demonstrated much interest in building on this critical body of Park’s work, which he based on dominance, it probably represents his most important contribution to American sociology. I argue that the key to systemizing his highly discursive account of the human habitat is to view it from an emergent social evolutionary perspective, which makes it possible to differentiate his notion of “community” from “society,” as well as explain how the two concepts can logically be viewed as both separate and unified entities. A community is not only a necessary stage in the social evolutionary process of producing a society, but it also provides the habitat needed for a society’s later emergence. Among other things, Park’s theory of the human habitat is also criticized for its failure to (1) distinguish dominance from domination, (2) identify the reciprocal relationship existing between power and domination, (3) accurately characterize the nature of the economic order operating in communities, and (4) demarcate a pre-lingual, lingual and literate communal stages that precedes in the social evolutionary process the possible development of a society. In passing, I also point out critical, but often overlooked aspects of Park’s theory of the human habitat that contradict popular characterizations of his work as being purblind to the operation of dominance and power, social Darwinist, conservative, sexist, and racist. Finally, I deduce the implications of his theory for the future emergence of a “world society.”     

SIGN,SYMBOL, AND METALANGUAGE: AGAINST THE INTEGRATION OF SEMIOTICS AND SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Dean MacCannell's proposal for a “rapprochement” between symbolic interaction-ism and semiotics, in which the “generality” of symbolic interactionism's conception the sign is “raised” to that of semiotics, is examined. By turning exclusively to Saussurian semiotics, MacCannell does not adequately reflect the distinction between “natural” and “arbitrary” representation in Peirce's semiosis that is the most fruitful link with Mead's symbolic interactionism. Consequently, MacCannell's argument at the level of terminology is flawed. Rather than merging, the perspectives might benefit from a radical rethinking of representation. This would involve preserving the distinction between the “natural” and “arbitrary,” while at the same time recognizing that in mass society “arbitrary” representation has become a kind of “second-order” (Barthes) indexical metalanguage of membership within which symbolic interaction may occur. As Baudrillard claims, “commutation of signs” has replaced “interaction of symbols,” yet strains against an unfulfilled symbolic demand. Efforts should be directed at generating a theory of representation capable of addressing the tension that produces this symbolic demand.     

Cyclops Cave

Written in the post‐structural traditions of symbolic interactionism, Cyclops Cave is a biographic‐interview‐based and fact‐and‐fiction‐plotted ethnodrama of anti‐Semitism in Soviet higher education. This project is premised on the theories of the “social self”—namely, the “looking‐glass racialized self,” constructed by the dominant ethnic “supremacy,” and the theories of racial stigma as an outcome of the racialized “me” production. Showing the stigma experiences of former Soviet Jewish academics from 1970 to the 1980s, the play adds a new illuminative and self‐interpretive case of a race‐situated symbolic interaction and deconstructs the “root image” of Soviet anti‐Semitism through interpreting the informants' stigma incidents and interactional conflicts between their “selfhood” symbols.     

Mind,Self, and Human-Animal Joint Action

Abstract

Because Herbert Blumer maintained that symbolic interactionism was useful in examining all realms of social behavior, and advocated what Martin Hammersley refers to as “critical commonsensism,” this paper focuses on one of the most common contemporary social relationships—that between people and companion animals. I first examine the basis for Blumer's (like Mead before him and many interactionist scholars today) exclusion of nonhuman animals from consideration as “authentic” social actors. Primarily employing the recent work of interactionists Eugene Myers, Leslie Irvine, Janet and Steven Alger, and Clinton Sanders, this paper advocates the reasonableness of regarding nonhuman animals as “minded,” in that mind, as Gubrium emphasizes, is a social construction that arises out of interaction. Similarly, I maintain that animals possess an admittedly rudimentary “self.” Here I focus special attention on Irvine's discussion of those “self experiences” that are independent of language and arise out of interaction. Finally, I discuss “joint action” as a key element of people's relationships with companion animals as both the animal and human attempt to assume the perspective of the other, devise related plans of action and definitions of object, and fit together their particular (ideally, shared) goals and collective actions. I stress the ways in which analytic attention to human-animal relationships may expand and enrich the understanding of issues of central sociological interest.     

Mutual Interests,Different Lenses: Current Neuroscience and Symbolic Interaction

As reflective thinkers, symbolic interactionists may well be curious about the organ with which we think. Leading neuroscientists are quite aware that a working brain depends on other brains. This article considers selected neuroscience approaches to topics traditionally addressed by symbolic interactionists including some confirmations, refinements, and challenges from current neuroscience. Confirmations support features of Mead's “objective reality of perspectives” and a relational epistemology, the inevitability of ad hoc “accounts,” self‐consciousness as behavioral control, and “self unity” as constantly re‐created illusion. Divergence between neuroscience and symbolic interaction mainly involves new evidence for the importance of unconscious cognition, emotion, and memory in shaping human behavior. The rooting of cognitive and perceptual processes in motor activity challenges the extremes of the “linguistic turn.” Refinement involves reasons for attending to the embodied salience of thoughts produced by “somatic markers” rather than mere content.     

Dancing with discrimination: managing stigma and identity

Fans are a group that are stigmatized and discredited, at least to some degree, by their “deviant” and common form of symbolic consumption. At stake in the process of stigmatization is the very identity of the individual fan, and their symbolic and emotional well‐being. This paper reports on an empirical study of one particular group of fans—Star Trek fans (or “Trekkies”)—and explores the complex identity issues articulated by them as they “manage” their problematic public identity. Drawing upon interviews conducted with 18 Trekkies, the article describes how this stigmatic identity is organized within a disciplinary matrix that operates at a micro level through two key processes: humour and self‐surveillance. In particular, we highlight their struggle with the dilemmas of exposing their private “fandom” in a public context, and the highly ambivalent manner in which they seek to escape stigmatization.     

Labeling in Interactional Practice: Applying Labeling Theory to Interactions and Interactional Analysis to Labeling

Labeling theory has long held a rather significant place in sociology generally, and in symbolic interaction more specifically. Yet, in its long history, labeling theorists have seldom considered how interactional contexts mediate the effective application of labels. Similarly, labeling theory, with its focus on deviance, has largely neglected positive instances of labeling. In this article, I consider an instance of labeling in a tutoring session and show how the local interactional context of the application of a label is accomplished such that the label “smarter than you think” is made to stick to the student. In doing so, I demonstrate how labeling theory can be productively extended to consider positive labeling as well as the interactional contexts that mediate these labeling processes. In closing, I propose that this approach could help develop labeling theory into a complex and nuanced theory of the social constitution of human behavior.     

SCIENTOLOGY “ETHICS”: DEVIANCE,IDENTITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN A CULT-LIKE SOCIAL WORLD

Qualitative research at the macrosocial level can be facilitated by examining the more fully articulated social worlds existing within advanced societies. Based on the author's field research, Scientology's structure, culture, and comparability to American capitalist society are discussed and “Ethics,” its institution of social control, is shown to involve a paradigm in which conduct flows from social identity and deviance is defined in terms of a progression of stages of identity loss through reference group confusion. A hypothetical case shows how each stage is treated through specific intervention formula designed to reverse the process. “Ethics” is shown to closely parallel symbolic interactionist theories of deviance. Its differences from symbolic interactionism are ascribed to the inherent contradiction between the individualistic and system-centered orientations permeating American capitalist society.