Needs of ergonomic design at control units in production industries

During the last decades, an increasing use of innovative technologies in manufacturing areas was monitored. A huge amount of physical workload was replaced by the change from conventional machine tools to computer-controlled units. CNC systems spread in current production processes. Because of this, machine operators today mostly have an observational function. This caused increasing of static work (e.g., standing, sitting) and cognitive demands (e.g., process observation). Machine operators have a high responsibility, because mistakes may lead to human injuries as well as to product losses - and in consequence may lead to high monetary losses (for the company) as well. Being usable often means for a CNC machine being efficient. An intuitive usability and an ergonomic organization of CNC workplaces can be an essential basis to reduce the risk of failures in operation as well as physical complaints (e.g. pain or diseases because of bad body posture during work). In contrast to conventional machines, CNC machines are equipped both with hardware and software. An intuitive and clear-sighted operating of CNC systems is a requirement for quick learning of new systems. Within this study, a survey was carried out among trainees learning the operation of CNC machines.     

Medical malpractice,social structure,and social control

The origin and handling of doctor-patient conflict can be understood with reference to the sociological aspects of professional health care. This premise is explored by applying Black's theory of social control to the empirical evidence concerning malpractice litigation in the United States. The vertical, organizational, and relational distances between the health care provider and the patient are particularly relevant for predicting when malpractice claims will be made and how they will be resolved. These social-structural variables help explain several patterns in the American malpractice experience, including the aggregate increase in claim rates over the past four decades; the persistence of toleration as the modal response to medical injury; why poorer patients are less suit-prone than higher income patients; why surgical specialties have higher claim rates than general practice and psychiatry; why hospitals are sued disproportionately less often than individual doctors; and the relatively high frequency of prodefendant decisions when lawsuits are decided by a judge or jury.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, August 1992.     

Collective violence as social control

Collective violence is often social control: self-help by a group. It typically defines and responds to conduct as deviant. When unilateral and nongovernmental, it appears in four major forms—lynching, rioting, vigilantism, and terrorism—each distinguished by its system of liability (individual or collective) and degree of organization (higher or lower). Following Donald Black's paradigm of pure sociology, the central assumption is that collective violence varies with its location and direction in social space—the conflict structure. I offer ten propositions that predict and explain the likelihood and severity of collective violence in general and the four forms of collective violence in particular. Conflict structures with a high degree of relational distance, cultural distance, functional independence, and inequality between the adversaries are associated with collective violence in general. Each of the four forms depends on the degree of social polarization between the parties as well as the continuity of the deviant behavior to which the violence responds. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, August 1992, and the Centennial Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, University of Paris (Sorbonne), Paris, June 1993.     

Tranquillisers as social control?*

In this paper we use findings from an empirical study of the meaning of tranquilliser prescribing and use to examine the contention that these drugs are a means of social control, and to assess the explanatory value of the concept of social control when applied to the doctor-patient relationship. We first outline the historical application of the concept to the health field, specify the cultural mechanisms by which social control is said to be achieved and look at the ways in which the mechanisms are thought to operate through the prescribing of the most widely used kind of tranquilliser/hypnotic-benzodiazepines (e.g. Valium, Mogadon). We then draw on our data to see how far they substantiate the arguments which have been developed. In the final section of the paper we suggest some alternative explanations regarding the nature of doctors' power and of patient dependence. We also discuss problems involved in conceptualizing gender and class ideologies, note an inherent tendency towards an over-socialized view of the person and assess the usefulness of functionalist explanations stemming from the application of the social control concept to the doctor-patient relationship.     

Gender roles and social control

Drawing upon social control theory in criminology, this paper examines the relationship between gender roles and the inhibitors of deviance. We develop and test hypotheses that “traditional” females, defined in terms of either position in the social structure or gender‐role attitudes, perceive higher levels of three types of sanctions assocíated with crime than do males; while “nontraditional” females are similar to males in their perceptions of sanctions. Results indicate that while changing gender roles and gender‐role attitudes affect perceived threats of guilt‐feelings and social stigma, they do not appear to influence women's perceptions of legal sanctions.     

On the informational basis of social choice

The notion of informational basis in social choice can be broadened so as to cover not only the standard notions related to interpersonal utility comparisons, but also information about utilities or preferences at (ir)relevant alternatives, non-utility features of alternatives, personal responsibility, unconcerned subpopulations, and feasibility constraints. This paper proposes a unified conceptual framework for all these notions, and analyzes the kind of information retained in each case. This new framework yields a deeper understanding of the difficulties and possibilities of social choice. New welfarism theorems are also obtained.I am indebted to W. Bossert, W. Gaertner, F. Gaspart, L. Gevers, N. Gravel, S. Kolm, M. Le Breton, Ph. Mongin, P. Hammond, K. Suzumura, K. Tadenuma, A. Trannoy and J. Weymark for many conversations on topics related to this paper. I have benefited from reactions of the audience at the conference in honor of Louis Gevers, Namur 1999, and at a seminar at the LSE, and from comments by two referees and the editor, F. Maniquet. None of them is responsible for the shortcomings of the paper.     

On the limiting properties of social indicators

Characteristics of the population and economic measures that constitute traditional social indicators are compared with more recent “quality of life” measures to demonstrate that social indicators are always value statements at the policy level. The possibility of alternative perspectives is illustrated. It is suggested that an awareness of the assumptions implicit in any given indicator is as important as the data they provide.     

The social control of big business

Viewed from a conflict perspective, governmental agencies are tools of power and privilege. Subservient to powerful economic interest groups, regulatory agencies are claimed to exercise little, if any, effective control over the activities of big business.

Four hypotheses derived from a conflict perspective on the social control of big business are set forth: (1) less social control is exercised over big business than small business; (2) since the onset of the consumer movement, big business has been more frequently sanctioned; (3) over time big business “captures” regulatory agencies which results in a general decrease in the percentage of social control efforts directed toward big business; and (4) when big business is sanctioned, the smaller, less powerful of those businesses are sanctioned.

In this study the pattern of sanctioning of big business by a major federal regulatory agency is examined. Specifically, data on the issuance of cease and desist orders to business enterprises by the Federal Trade Commission over a twenty‐three year span of time are analyzed. The implications of the findings for each of the four hypotheses and for conflict theory in general are discussed.     

On the manipulation of social choice correspondences

Duggan and Schwartz (Soc Choice and Welfare 17: 85–93, 2000) have proposed a generalization of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem to multivalued social choice rules. They show that only dictatorial rules are strategy-proof and satisfy citizens sovereignty and residual resoluteness. Citizens sovereignty requires that each alternative is chosen at some preference profile. Residual resoluteness compels the election to be single-valued when the preferences of the voters are “similar”. We propose an alternative proof to the Duggan and Schwartz’s Theorem. Our proof highlights the crucial role of residual resoluteness. In addition, we prove that every strategy-proof and onto social choice correspondence concentrates the social decision power in the hands of an arbitrary group of voters. Finally, we show that this result still holds in a more general framework in which voters report their preferences over sets of alternatives.     

Recent developments in school social control

In the U.S., decisions regarding social control are increasingly modeled on two dominant institutions: the criminal justice and medical/healthcare systems. Sociologists and other scholars refer to this adoption of legal and/or medical terminology and technologies as criminalization and medicalization. These models of social control are particular evident in how America defines and manages child behavior. Public schools borrow from both the criminal justice and medical systems as part of the routine educational setting. In this article, I provide the first synthesis and review of the school criminalization and medicalization literatures. In doing so, I argue that criminalized school social controls provide harsh, repressive responses to student misbehavior, while medicalized school social controls provide rehabilitative and restitutive responses. Given these fundamentally different approaches to student behavior, I argue that the disproportionate use of criminalized and medicalized social control across racial/ethnic groups and children from different socioeconomic backgrounds entrenches inequalities and functions to channel racial/ethnic minorities and poor children into the school‐to‐prison pipeline while keeping socially advantaged children in school and away from the problems associated with criminalized social control.     

Myth,allegiances, and the study of social control

That sociology subscribes to certain popular myths and has aligned itself with the welfare of some groups over others complicates research into social control. This is especially so when the research deals with stereotypes and their effects on differential legal treatment. That the discipline has historically taken sides regarding certain commonly held stereotypes and been supportive of certain groups, means that findings that challenge those stereotypes or that are viewed as detrimental to the supported groups are brought into question. Our research on a regulatory mechanism of social control—the Black Book, a list of persons excluded from licensed gaming in Nevada because of their perceived threat to the industry—is illustrative of these complications. Our findings that the Black Book is largely symbolic and is applied discriminatorily challenge not only beliefs in its efficacy but certain myths and allegiances within sociology. That a group sociologically identified with the problem was discriminated against, and that a well-protected group elicited preferential treatment at the hands of regulators who identify with them have been particularly problematic for the acceptance of the findings. We argue here that debunking myth and value neutrality are essential to scientific endeavor and should override such disciplinary tendencies toward the tolerance and protection of some groups over others. Her research has dealt with aspects of culture, organized crime, and social elites. She is currently working on a book on high society and thoroughbred racing. His publications have dealt with issues of labeling and secondary deviation, the role of stereotypes in the legal process, and the legal reaction to corporate crime.     

On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes

We present a model of coalitional property rights (CPR) regimes– regimes in which ownership of a good is attributable to coalitions of various sizes. Specifically, for each good, we define a legal structure that specifies the legal coalitions of individuals that share a communal claim to that good. Generally, each legal coalition may use exclusionary rules to allocate its holdings internally. These rules allow eligible subcoalitions to recontract by expropriating some fraction of the legal coalition's endowment. We then ask: what types of CPR regimes are socially stable in the sense of having a nonempty core? We give conditions on the legal structure and the primitives of the economy that achieve social stability in this sense. We emphasize two cases of particular interest. ( I ) Unanimity. Unanimity is required for a legal coalition to recontract against (block) the status quo. In this case, the core is nonempty under standard assumptions. Each agent's ability to veto an alternative allocation allows a partial characterization in terms of the economies that are privatized by dividing up the communal endowment among the members of each legal coalition. We show that in some economies' collective vs private ownership matters in terms of social stability. ( II ) Exclusion. Many eligible subcoalitions can expropriate the legal coalition's entire endowment. An example is the collection of simple majorities. The presence of cycles can easily lead to social instability. We show that if endowment holdings are sufficiently “specialized” and each agent's “veto power” sufficiently large, then stability can be achieved despite the presence of cycles in some goods. Received: 30 June 1993/Accepted: 28 February 1998