Developing Virtuous Children: A Theological Perspective

This paper examines various predominant moral theories and their impact on moral education. It makes a case that of these theories, virtue ethics can best handle not only the large, contemporary moral issues but also the mundane moral choices that we make day to day. It also stresses that because virtue ethics includes in its purview not only actions but also intentions, dispositions, attitudes, etc., it offers many insights into how to help children develop the capacity to make moral decisions.     

浅析编辑的职业能力与道德兼修

一个职业编辑人需要具备最基本的能力素质,包括：准确的表达能力、专业素质、知识素质、思维素质、政治素质、艺术素养等。然而,要想让社会公众认可,仅仅具备相应的能力素质是远远不够的,还必须是一个讲职业道德、有德行的人。作为编辑还应该具有高度的社会责任感,能正确处理作者、编辑、读者的关系,能树立正确的义利观等。能力素质与道德素质是相辅相成的,编辑需要能力与道德兼修。     

Otherness and empathy—implications of Lévinas ethics for social work education

This paper examines the concept of otherness in Lévinas’ ethics and raises related issues regarding the limits of empathy on philosophical grounds. This study also identifies and discusses a number of linguistic, social and cultural barriers that can establish such limits on practical grounds. This paper raises various considerations for social work educators teaching empathy. Such considerations suggest that social work educators could adopt a stance of ‘understanding and not understanding’ and a dialectical approach in using knowledge and skills. Furthermore, this study challenges the common assumption that empathy leads to compassionate action. Apart from empathy, moral commitment is necessary to engage in such action. This article discusses such moral commitment in relation to Lévinas’ notions of face and responsibility that place ethics before knowledge. Hence, the present study brings the attention of social work educators back to the importance of nourishing virtue and the moral character of students.     

Morality as a Verb: The Process of Moral Development Within the “Family Culture”

The purpose of this paper was to examine many different theories of moral development, view their similarities and differences, and expand upon the role of the family in teaching morality. There have been many stage theories developed in order to understand the process of moral development. In addition, many researchers have criticized the stage models for not adequately incorporating the role of culture in shaping a child's moral stance. We believe that the child's family (not necessarily an American Western view of the family) is crucial in directly and indirectly translating cultural values to children. We review some prominent stage theories to moral development as a point of departure for looking at the crucial role of the family culture. The family teaches morality to children by finding a balance between the forces of individuation and connection.     

The Effects of Parental Divorce on the Moral Judgment Development of Freshman and Sophomore College Students

This research investigated the effects of parental divorce on the moral judgment development of freshman and sophomore college students (N?=?377). Freshmen with divorced parents had lower scores of moral judgment development than freshmen with married parents, whereas sophomores with divorced parents had higher moral judgment development scores than sophomores with married parents. It was also found that an experience changing homes in childhood or adolescence was negatively associated with moral judgment development for freshmen but positively associated with moral judgment development for sophomores. It was concluded that the change of environment associated with a parental divorce could enhance moral judgment development growth in the early years of college.     

Relational Ethics and Moral Imagination in Contemporary Systemic Practice

This article discusses an approach to relational ethics in contemporary systemic practice. It explores the possibilities offered by traditions of moral philosophy in attending to problems from a relational ethics perspective. This includes a focus on relationships as a crucial element in the development and maintenance of a moral self and how couples and families construct an ethical platform together, both consciously and unconsciously; and also how relational ethics may inform ideas about the values‐driven problems people present in therapy. Finally, it suggests how ethical responsibility and accountability can be constructed as relational responsiveness. Despite our associations with morality as judgmental and rule driven, moral conduct and decision‐making can involve imaginative, creative and aesthetic possibilities.     

Playful Seriousness: The Virtue of Eutrapelia in Dialogue

In Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle identified three moral spheres associated with human communication: speaking with decorum, conversation, and social conduct. Each sphere has a corresponding virtue. The virtue in speaking with decorum is truthfulness, the virtue in conversation is eutrapelia (refined, playful wit), and the virtue in social conduct is friendliness. Eutrapelia is gained in part by education and in part by personal experience. One learns to habituate oneself in conversation to avoid the excessive vice of bomolochos and the deficient vice of agroikos. A communicator enacts phronesis to deliberate good communicative choices, relying on one’s awareness of ethics, tact, and ingeniousness. Eutrapelia functions in dialogue to reveal unexpected connections in language, to open new interpretations in linguistic speculation, to negotiate meaning in the play of language, and to potentially shift one’s horizon of understanding about the content under consideration. Enacting eutrapelos as both refined humor and keen insight offers a place of respite that allows one to engage in the playful seriousness that is the hermeneutic work of dialogue.     

An unprincipled ethics?: The missing morality of the ASA code

It is argued that the present incarnation of the American Sociological Association’s “Code of Professional Ethics” supplants moral precepts of sociological practice with particularistic procedures and restrictions. This drift from moral reflection to intraprofessional control mechanisms is compared with various ethical theories applicable to social sciences, and explained in terms of perceived structural conditions within and external to the discipline. Richard G. Mitchell, Jr. is an ethnographer whose interest in ethics grew out of fieldwork experience as a participant and observer among mountain climbers (Mountain Experience, University of Chicago Press, 1983), and recently, among American survivalists and related right-wing paramilitary groups (forthcoming).     

Helpers “Here on the Front Lines”: Welfare‐to‐Work Managers' Moral Identity Work

Using data drawn from telephone interviews with Ohio Works First program managers (N = 69), we examine managers' moral identity work. This work included using militarized rhetoric to evoke moral identities as honorable workers. It also involved signifying helper/helpful moral identities by defining what it means to be helpful, legitimating their helper identity through connections to caseworkers, and affirming their identity through telling success stories. Additionally, managers implicitly othered clients they viewed as needy and politicians they considered to be out‐of‐touch. Our research contributes to the literature on welfare‐to‐work, but also more broadly to our understanding of moral identity work and implicit othering.     

Morals,Ethics and practice — in search of social justice

Abstract

This paper reports a study of sources of influence on moral and ethical decision-making in social work practice. Practitioners from ten government and five non government agencies kept journals about the main moral issues they faced over a one-month period and were then interviewed about the nature of those issues, their resolution and the influences that shaped those resolutions. Practitioners' personal moral perspectives were found to be the main sources of influence on resolutions to a wide range of dilemmas and most of those resolutions did not conform to accepted social wok ethical practice principles. Even though the results of this study are drawn from a small sample, some implications are suggested for practitioner development, professional ethics and social work education.     

Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a conceptual framework for the study and practice of social work in modern times

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to highlight the importance of Aristotle’s model of virtue ethics for today’s social workers and students, as it can help them to build an ethical character and promote ethical conduct in both their personal and professional lives. In doing so, the paper first provides an overview of virtue ethics theory and its revival over the last decades in western societies and then, discusses the basic tenets of Aristotle’s ethics theory in relation to the social work profession. In addition, the main types of Aristotelian virtues are presented including cardinal virtues (courage, justice, practical wisdom/phronesis, temperance) and the concepts of eudaimonia and golden mean in relation to their applications in social work practice are described. The paper briefly explains cardinal virtues and provides a case example of moral courage that will help social workers and students to better understand the concept of Aristotle’s golden mean. Finally, it discusses and responds to the main criticisms of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, considering alternative ways to discuss and think about this approach to social work.     

Suitability for Professional Practice: Assessing and Developing Moral Character in Social Work Education

This article considers the importance of an explicit focus upon the ‘character’ of social work applicants and students in debates regarding suitability for professional education and practice. Drawing upon the growing body of literature concerning gate-keeping decisions and the literature exploring the relevance of virtue ethics for social work, this article examines the benefits of an approach that foregrounds the assessment and development of moral character. The discussion is located within the context of the most recent reforms to social work education within England, whilst recognising the international relevance of these debates. It is argued that incorporating an approach informed by virtue ethics has the potential to bridge traditional fault-lines within selection debates that have focused upon the tensions between a widening access perspective and a focus upon academic ability. Crucially, this article examines the curriculum and pedagogic issues arising from a commitment to provide opportunities to develop moral character and virtue. The article argues that a dual focus upon selection and pedagogic issues, with an explicit focus upon character throughout, is critical to the development of wise, effective and virtuous social workers who are able to exercise sound judgment and wisdom across a range of practice contexts.     

试论新生代农民工道德同一性问题

新生代农民工和道德同一性在当下已引起各学科各专家的关注，新生代农民工的社会身份认同和道德自我认同的问题也成为社会学、伦理学的热点问题。新生代农民工的生存困境更体现在精神层面上，企业思想政治教育对于推动和加强新生代农民工的道德教育及道德同一性培育能够发挥积极的作用。目前仍需努力拓展各种途径加强新生代农民工的思想道德及价值观引导并促其向市民转变。     

How to make good choices? Ethical perspectives guiding social workers moral reasoning

Framing and distinguishing mainstream social work ethical perspectives could be useful for social work students and practitioners facing moral choices in daily practice. The article presents a summary and classification of a range of ethical theories and provides some insights into the relationship between ethical thinking and practice issues. It distinguishes between classical approaches and ‘situated’ positions. The former – which includes teleological, deontological, and rights-based approaches – refer to universal and general principles. ‘Situated’ ethics are linked to specific and unique situations of professional practice. Finally, the article suggests some useful questions derived from each approach in order to help students to reflect on complex ethical choices occurring in daily practice.     

An approach of the moral disengagement through the moral content judgment

ABSTRACT

The goal of the present study was the best understanding of the development of mechanisms of moral disengagement. Participants were 281 athletes (males, n = 133, and females, n = 148) all involved in competitive sport (teams and individuals). Their ages ranged from 13 to 23 years (M = 15.01, SD = 2.29), while their experience ranged from 1 to15 years (M = 5.42, SD = 3.13). The participants filled out two questionnaires: the Moral Disengagement in Sport Scale (MDSS) and the Moral Content Judgment in Sport Questionnaire (MCJSQ). Results revealed significant differences in gender and a negative correlation between the three mechanisms of moral disengagement (advantageous comparison, non-responsibility, and attribution of blame) with age. Findings also revealed that the mechanisms of moral disengagement relationship with elements of moral content judgment was positive with egoistic utilitarianism/consequences and negative with fairness.     

THE GLOBAL VORTEX: SOCIAL WELFARE IN A NETWORKED WORLD

This paper examines the impact of economic globalization on the organization and delivery of social welfare services. Sennett's analysis of the modern networked organization is linked to psychodynamic theory in relation to the loss of ‘containment’ resulting from the demise of the post‐war welfare bureaucracies. This changing environment has generated an anxiety‐ridden and risk‐obsessed society that features surveillance, control and the gradual diminution of civil liberties. The impact of these changes on the ethics of professional social welfare practice has been profound. It is argued that public moral debate in the context of pluralist ethics is required not only for upholding a relational based social welfare practice, but also for preserving an open and compassionate democratic society. The paper concludes with a set of questions that provides a framework whereby practitioners can assess the extent to which different practice organizations support relational practice. This typology can be a tool to enable practitioners to exercise moral agency when making career choices in today's fluid organizational world.     

Developing Anti‐oppressive Ethics in the New Curriculum

This paper describes the development of an anti‐oppressive ethics and values module appropriate for the new social work degree. It is contended that there has been insufficient attention paid to ethics teaching in social work education generally in the UK, and in particular there has been:

• ?failure to develop discrete modules on ethics and values in social work;

• ?minimal critique of conventional ethics with social work values that take oppression and diversity seriously;

• ?insufficient use of recent feminist ethical contributions relevant to social work;

• ?limited development of interprofessional ethics teaching that take service user and social work values seriously; and

• ?neglect of ethical decision‐making guides that can encompass legal, ethical and social work values.

The paper proposes a rationale for an anti‐oppressive ethics module that will enable traditional ethical theories to be placed within an anti‐oppressive social work values context, and aim to provide students with a more adequate guide for decision‐making. The module will be developed in consultation with service users and interprofessional colleagues. It will take into account the British legal and policy framework, the General Social Care Council code of practice, as well as the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education requirements, but placing them within an anti‐oppressive framework drawn from the authors' current and previous work in this area, and will have special reference to recent feminist moral philosophy. The authors have recently been re‐located into a Faculty of Health and Applied Social Studies and will be developing the new module on ethics in consultation with health lecturer colleagues specialising in ethics with the aim of developing interprofessional co‐operation and sharing of perspectives between staff and students. They write with long experience of both practising and teaching social work, and with diverse experiences of ‘race’, gender, class, and also being both service users and providers.     

Two main problems in the sociology of morality

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed.

---

A theory of prudential values and a rule utilitarian theory of morality

Ethics can be divided into a theory of prudential values and a theory of morality in a narrower sense. My paper proposes a utilitarian — a rule-utilitarian — theory of morality. But it deviates from most of the utilitarian tradition by rejecting the hedonistic and subjectivistic accounts of prudential values favored by many utilitarian writers. While economists tend to define people's utility levels in terms of their actual preferences, ethics must define them in terms of their informed preferences. To prefer A over B does not mean to have a stronger desire for A than for B. Rather, it means to regard one's access to A as being more important than one's access to B. Even though different people often have quite different preferences, their basic desires seem to be much the same. We must choose our moral rules, and our society's moral code as a whole, by their social utility. An important factor in determining their social utility are their expectation effects. Unlike the rule — utilitarian more code, the act — utilitarian moral code would be unable to give proper weight to these expectation effects. It would also unduly restrict our individual freedom. Finally, I shall argue against Kant that morality is primarily a servant of many other human values rather than itself the highest value of human life.